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A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE  
BRITISH EMPIRE



# A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

BY

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WITH SIXTY-TWO MAPS AND DIAGRAMS

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS, LTD.

10 & 11 WARWICK LANE, LONDON, E.C.4

1933

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Printed in Great Britain for the UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS, LTD.,  
by HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LTD., London and Aylesbury.

## PREFACE

THIS book is a study in political geography, *i.e.* it is an attempt to set out and examine those geographical facts which are of direct importance in their influence on the development and organization of the British Empire and its component parts. Ephemeral party politics may have little relation to these facts. But no serious long-range view of political relations can be of value unless it takes full account of them.

Perhaps the principal sources of the material have been maps of many kinds ; and to a very large extent this is a map study. I have made free use of publications of the many British governments, including the yearbooks of the dominions and the reports of many Commissions, as well as of many of the books and articles on the Empire which have appeared within the last twenty years. But the mere bulk of the matter referring to the British Empire which has been published in this and other countries within the last few years is so great that it is impossible for one person to have read all of it in detail ; and it is possible that I have missed some of importance. Three comparatively recent works which are of value as giving studies of the Empire from outside are M. A. Demangeon's *L'Empire britannique*, Dr. H. Luft's *Das Britische Weltreich*, and the relevant sections of Dr. Isaiah Bowman's *The New World*.

Two worldwide changes in international and social tendencies which have become prominent in the last few decades may be very briefly mentioned here because of their importance to the Empire.

The development of the policies which are usually

these regions are included in the figures for the areas of the Empire because they are uninhabited, and probably uninhabitable.

The planning and writing of this book has been spread over the leisure time of the past seven years ; and I owe much to the many friends with whom I have been able to talk over some of the matters with which it deals. I wish to acknowledge gratefully the invariable courtesy and help which I have received from the officers who represent the overseas dominions in London on the many occasions on which I have sought information from them. From my colleagues in the Department of Geography in University College, Dr. R. Ogilvie Buchanan and Messrs. R. E. Dickinson, G. Tatham, and A. E. Smailes, I have received much help in the collection of matter and in the preparation of diagrams, particularly of the " skew " maps, all of which were first drawn here. To Dr. Buchanan I owe special thanks for his kindness in reading through the proofs and making many suggestions for improvements. For the preparation of the index I have to thank the senior class of students in the Department.

C. B. F.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON

24th May, 1933.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

THE British Empire of today occupies more than a quarter of the land area of the globe and counts nearly a quarter of mankind in its population. Thus it is by far the largest and most populous of the sixty<sup>1</sup> distinct independent sovereign states of the world. Its lands extend by the shores of all the oceans, into every type of major geographical region, and on to every continent ; while its peoples include members of every considerable racial and religious division of mankind, at all existing levels of culture and social development. Hence it is preëminently a World State, perhaps the only state which is fully entitled to that description ; for its politico-geographical relations and problems extend into every considerable region of the world, and bring it into contact in some degree with every other independent state on the earth. No other Power has so many, so varied, and so widely distributed geographical, economic, and political contacts with the rest of the world. Its major problems are also world problems, and all world problems affect it. In respect to its magnitude, its distribution, and its internal variety, the present British Empire is the greatest experiment in human organization that the world has yet seen. Hence a study of its political geography is one of very wide range and complexity, the full treatment of which would fill many volumes and be beyond the powers of any single individual.

<sup>1</sup> Approximately. This number does not include minute statelets such as Luxembourg and Monaco. But it is difficult to be sure of many somewhat larger than these.

The whole of the expansion from the home countries in the British Isles has taken place within little more than three centuries ; since the union of the Crowns of England and Scotland in 1603 freed both countries from the burden of defending a land frontier. The earliest successful attempts at colonization in North America, the West Indies, and West Africa were made in the first half of the seventeenth century, barely three hundred years ago.

In the first half of this period of oversea expansion, down to 1772, the first British Empire was built up. Outside the home countries its most extensive territories, nine-tenths of the whole area, were in North America, where it was in nominal possession of the eastern third of the continent from Florida to Hudson Bay. Here were its true colonies. It also included many of the West Indian Islands which, in the economic conditions of the seventeenth century and from the view-point of the mercantilist theory which then dominated political economy, were regarded as most valuable possessions. Outside the Americas the British Empire before 1781 possessed a few footholds in India, including Bengal (from 1757), Madras, and Bombay. Beyond these it possessed a few small waystations, including Gibraltar (1704), and very vague claims by right of discovery to extensive territory in Australia.

The mercantilist theory which dominated the colonial policy of England and (after 1707) Great Britain during this first period of expansion led to the attempt to control all the external relations of the colonies in the interests of the trade and industry of the home country ; though it left each colony completely free to develop its local government. The theory was as fully accepted in the colonies as in the home countries and, when their obvious dependence on Great Britain for military defence was removed, it was one of the factors which led to their revolt.

These early colonies were founded during the period of the Wars of Religion in Europe. Religious antagonisms




FIG. 1 —THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1772 A.D.

The areas shaded, and the places whose names are underlined, were then parts of the Empire.


were among the strongest of the several motives which drove many of the colonists overseas. And when the expulsion of the French power from eastern North America removed their dependence on the homeland for defence the antagonism between the Puritan parties, who were dominant in some of the colonies, and the Church and State party, then dominant in Great Britain, was one of the factors which led to the war of secession. It is noteworthy that the Whig and Puritan sections in Great Britain were opposed to the Royal Government throughout that war, as one result of which this first British Empire was broken up by the secession of the Thirteen Colonies which have subsequently grown into the United States of America. Although the territory surrendered formed less than half of the overseas lands of the Empire in extent, it was so much the most important part that the secession was hailed by the enemies of Britain as the end of her expansion. And the precedent set by it dominated the policy of Great Britain towards all her subsequent colonies (not dependencies) for nearly a century after.

Yet one of the earliest and most direct results of the recognition of the independence of the United States of America was the effective founding of the colonies which have now become the two largest of the overseas dominions—Canada and Australia. Before 1781 Canada was a French colony, though it had been taken by the British in 1763. The settlements of the United Empire Loyalists, who were driven out of the newly independent United States, made Upper Canada British and increased the British population of those colonies which are now the Maritime Provinces of Canada. Since that same independence also did much to attach the French Canadians—long hostile to the “Yankees” of New England and New York—to the British flag, an attachment strengthened a generation later by the revolutionary changes in France, it is possible to date the birth of the great dominion from the secession of the Thirteen Colonies.

The first occupation and settlement in Australia was almost more directly a result of the loss of the North American colonies, which had previously absorbed, mainly in the South, a large part of the transported convicts of Britain. And while the foundation of Australia was less auspicious than that of Canada, this occupation of the land opened the way for the free colonists whose descendants are the present citizens of the Australian Commonwealth. The occupation of Australia also paved the way for the annexation and subsequent colonization of New Zealand. Thus the generation which saw the breakup of the first British Empire also saw the foundation of the second, which is still in existence.

By 1815, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the British Empire already held the nuclei of the territories which have grown into the present dominions, except New Zealand, and also a considerable foothold in India. During the next fifty years there was a slow and steady growth in almost all its territories ; but the greatest expansion took place in the second half of the century which separated the Napoleonic Wars from the next great war (1815-1914). In 1867, after many tentative experiments in organization and government, the Dominion of Canada was established. This was a decisive step in the internal development of the Empire; and it marked an important stage in the movement by which its true colonies, the lands inhabited and controlled by men of the same race and civilization as the citizens of the homelands, have become selfgoverning states within the Empire, equal in status to one another and to the home countries in the British Isles.

A very large part of the territorial expansion which transformed the factories of the East India Company into the Indian Empire was also subsequent to 1815. But it was in Africa that the widest expansion of imperial territories and responsibilities took place during the second half of the century between the great wars. Except for a slow north-



British possessions are shaded  
Names of island possessions are underlined

FIG. 2.—THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1815 A.D.

eastward spread of the Boers within what is now the Union of South Africa there was no considerable expansion of British territories in Africa until the last three decades of the nineteenth century : and almost the same can be said of the French territories in north and west Africa. The narrow footholds on the coasts of intertropical Africa, which had been in the possession of such Powers as Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain during the preceding two centuries, had not formed the bases of any important movements of penetration inland. But, in the middle of the nineteenth century, industrial and social developments in Britain and Europe, which stimulated the exploring and missionary work of such men as Livingstone and Stanley, and followed it up by economic penetration, led to the beginning of the "Scramble for Africa." This terminated in the partition of nearly the whole of intertropical Africa, except Ethiopia, into a series of dependencies of Britain and a few European Powers, with the present Belgian Congo as the territory of King Leopold of Belgium, and Liberia as a formally independent state under the ægis of the United States of America. The Powers concerned agreed among themselves at the Congress of Berlin in 1884. This preliminary delimitation of "spheres of influence" was followed by a period of more active exploration, with demarkation of boundaries and opening up of the territories concerned ; and by 1914 the British Empire included nearly a quarter of Africa. The Great War resulted in the addition to this, as mandate territories, of the larger part of the former German colonies in Africa. At the present day nearly a third of Africa is under the British flag, and the lands from the Cape of Good Hope northwards to the southern boundary of Egypt form the second largest continuous territory in the Empire.

The outstanding geographical characteristic of the British Empire is the discontinuity of its lands. From this follows its complete dependence on oversea communications.

Every other Great Power of today, like every great empire of the past, has its strength concentrated into one area; though it may also control dependencies at a great distance from that homeland. But the British Empire is spread through all the latitudes from Pole to Pole,<sup>1</sup> and beside all the oceans. It has been built up by discovery, colonization, and conquest from the home countries along the seaways; and the links between its component parts are all across the seas. The physical unity of the oceans was, and is, an essential pre-requisite for its origin and its continued existence. The seas are all one: and without that unity there could have been no such Empire. There is no precedent for the existence of so scattered an Empire; it could not have come into existence before the development of efficient trans-oceanic navigation; its greatest growth has taken place since the introduction of the steamship; and its continued existence is completely dependent on its freedom to use the seaways under all circumstances.

In its political organization also the British Empire is as different from any other Empire the world has ever known as it is in its geographical distribution. Its governments range from typical examples of modern democratic and representative systems to absolute, if benevolent, autocracies.<sup>2</sup> Its selfgoverning states have been well described as crowned republics. Many of its dependencies are autocratic monarchies. And between the two there exists almost every degree of representative government. Its governmental units vary almost as much in extent and population as in their political forms. In area they range downward from the Dominion of Canada, which, with three and three-quarter million square miles, is the second or third largest

<sup>1</sup> Actually there is a small exception in that it includes no land between 37° N. and 41° N. See p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> But while some British governors have autocratic power, all are limited by their subjection to British Law. They may be autocrats; they may not be irresponsible despots.

continuous area in the world under one government,<sup>1</sup> to miniature dominions or crown colonies of only a few square miles, as for example Jersey and Gibraltar. In population the range is from the three hundred and sixty millions of the Empire of India, who are more numerous than the population of any other state with the one exception of China, down to colonies or territories of only a few thousand inhabitants, such as British Guiana and some of the small waystations.

This unparalleled variety makes of the Empire a unique laboratory of political and social organizations, in which many varied political and social experiments have been, and are being, tried out. The essential link among all its states and peoples is their common allegiance to the Crown ; and this is almost the only formal and legal fact common to every part of the Empire. Outside this the relations of its component parts to each other vary as widely as their size and political organization, from full mutual equality and independence within an unwritten alliance to complete subordination. Within the Empire there is room and scope for a worldwide diversity ; under its flag many varieties of human culture, unnumbered languages and faiths and peoples live and develop in a peace dependent on its strength—a strength which is in turn dependent on the effective loyalty of the many peoples of the Empire.

<sup>1</sup> The Soviet Union is larger ; and so are the total nominal territories of the Chinese Republic.




FIG. 3.—THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1933 A.D.  
All the islands named are parts of the Empire.

## CHAPTER II

### THE GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF THE LANDS OF THE EMPIRE

THE first geographical question concerning anything is "Where is it?" It is probably more difficult to answer this question for the British Empire than for any other part of the world; but a full and correct answer to it is nonetheless vital to a real understanding of the Empire in both its internal and its external relations, for the mutual co-operation and development of its several parts, and for their relations to the non-British world. This chapter attempts to give at least a partial answer to the question "Where is the British Empire?"

The total area of the land on the earth is, in round numbers, nearly fifty-six million square miles. Of this six million is occupied by the ice-covered and uninhabitable lands of the Polar Regions, which are not part of the "oikumene" or "world of men." So that the lands available for the habitation of men are approximately fifty million square miles in extent. Of this total the British Empire includes rather more than thirteen million square miles, or more than one-fourth. The distribution of these British lands among the continents is as follows (*Statesman's Year Book*, 1930, pp. xvi and xvii) :

	Sq. miles.
In North America . . . . .	3,892,399
In Africa . . . . .	3,820,274
In Australia and Oceania . . . . .	3,278,917
In Asia (excluding Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine) . . . . .	2,126,263
In Europe (including British Isles) . . . . .	121,758
In Central and South America and the West Indies . . . . .	115,815
	13,355,426

This particular distribution is, however, entirely arbitrary ; and it is useful to look at the distribution of the British lands in some other ways.

First we may tabulate the larger continuous, or compact, areas which are wholly within the Empire, as follows :

	Sq. miles.	
British North America, <i>i.e.</i> Canada and Newfoundland . . . . .	3,892,399	Nin- tenths of total area
In East and South Africa, from the Sudan to the Cape . . . . .	3,274,977	
The Commonwealth of Australia, with New Guinea	3,154,373	
The Indian Empire, with Ceylon and Malaya . . . . .	1,883,418	
Nigeria, with Cameroons territory . . . . .	366,700	
The British Isles . . . . .	121,633	
New Zealand . . . . .	104,751	

No other continuous area within the Empire reaches one hundred thousand square miles ; but there are four each of which exceeds fifty thousand square miles : namely British Guiana (90,000), Gold Coast Colony and Protectorate (90,000), the northern part of Borneo (77,000), and British Somaliland (68,000). Besides these there are from twenty to thirty other areas under separate administrations, of which the smallest in area, though not the least in importance, is Gibraltar, with less than two square miles of land.

The figures just given show that more than nine-tenths of the land area of the Empire is in the four large areas in North America, South and East Africa, Australia, and southern Asia. The last three of these are on the shores of the Indian Ocean, round which lies almost two-thirds of the total area. It is easier to describe the position of the lands of the Empire in relation to the oceans than to the continents ; and we see then that nearly the whole falls into two great groups of lands, the one bordering the shores of the North Atlantic Ocean and the other encircling the Indian Ocean and extending far to the eastward among

the islands of the South Pacific Ocean. These two groups are :

	Area in sq. miles (round numbers).
<b>A. NORTH ATLANTIC LANDS :</b>	
The British Isles . . . . .	120,000
Canada and Newfoundland . . . . .	3,900,000
British West Indies and other islands and British Honduras . . . . .	20,000
British Guiana . . . . .	90,000
	<hr/>
	4,130,000
<b>B. INDIAN OCEAN LANDS :</b>	
In South and East Africa, inc. British Somaliland . .	3,300,000
In southern Asia, inc. Aden, Bahrain Islands, and North Borneo . . . . .	2,000,000
Australia and its dependencies . . . . .	3,200,000
New Zealand . . . . .	100,000
Small islands in Indian and Pacific Oceans . . . .	20,000
	<hr/>
	8,620,000

The only large areas not included in these two groups are the West African dependencies, which together occupy approximately half a million square miles of land. These lie on the shores of the South Atlantic Ocean, in which the Empire also holds the island stations of the Falkland Islands and St. Helena, with their dependencies.

Away from these three ocean areas the Empire includes only the small but very important waystations on the Mediterranean route (Gibraltar and Malta), with Cyprus and the mandated area of Palestine and Transjordan, and Hongkong in the Far East.

Thus we may say that the lands of the British Empire are included in two great groups, respectively about the North Atlantic and the Indian Oceans, and along the seaways which connect these by way of the "open-sea route," through the South Atlantic Ocean, and the "inland-sea route," through the Mediterranean Sea and Suez Canal and the Red Sea, respectively. (See map, fig. 3, p. 10.)

The North Atlantic lands of the Empire are mainly in high latitudes. The British territories in the West Indies and Central America, with British Guiana, lie within or near to the tropics ; but all the rest of the inhabited lands of this group are in the northern cool temperate zone. The British Isles lie wholly to the north of latitude  $49^{\circ}$  N., a line which passes just south of the Channel Isles and is also the southern boundary of the western provinces of Canada; and, while the populous parts of the eastern Canadian provinces are south of this line, that dominion is wholly north of  $41^{\circ}$  N. Both the United Kingdom and the provinces of Canada extend northward as far as the parallel of  $60^{\circ}$  N. ; and only Finland, Norway, and Sweden have any considerable part of their inhabited lands farther to the north than this. Thus the North Atlantic countries of the British Empire are among the most northerly of the populous lands of the world.

It is a significant and interesting fact that the inhabited lands of the Indian Ocean group are all much nearer to the equator than are those of Canada and the British Isles. Latitude  $49^{\circ}$  S. is beyond the southern extremity of the islands of the New Zealand group ; and, while the South Cape of Tasmania approaches  $44^{\circ}$  S., the southernmost point of the mainland of Australia is near latitude  $39^{\circ}$  S., seven hundred miles nearer to the equator than the most southerly of the British Isles, and South Africa does not quite reach  $35^{\circ}$  S. latitude. It is well known that lands in the middle latitudes of the southern hemisphere are somewhat cooler than those in corresponding northern latitudes ; and the South Island of New Zealand and Tasmania enjoy climates very similar to those of the British Isles and the coast and islands of British Columbia. But most of the inhabited lands of the southern dominions are in the warm temperate zone, with much warmer summers than those of England and without the cool or cold winters characteristic of our North Atlantic lands.




FIG. 4 —ANTIPODAL MAP  
(See note, App. V, p. 394)

From their southern extremities near  $40^{\circ}$  S. the Indian Ocean lands of the Empire extend northward without a break to far within the tropics, on both the eastern and western shores of that ocean. And in southern Asia these lands extend north of the tropics to nearly  $37^{\circ}$  N. latitude at the northern limits of India and  $36^{\circ}$  N. in Cyprus, latitudes which are still a few degrees to the south of the southernmost points of Canada and of the British Isles.

These distributions in latitude serve to emphasize the further very important fact that the North Atlantic States of the Empire are completely separated from their subtropical and intertropical dependencies by wide stretches of ocean. New Zealand is similarly placed in this respect. And, while the land area of temperate Australia is continuous with that of her subtropical territories, the northern part of Australia contains no considerable coloured population and there is a definite, though narrow, sea break between Australia and the populous islands of the East Indies. But in British Africa there is no break in the complete continuity of temperate and intertropical lands. The position of the Union of South Africa in this respect is thus very different from that of all the other States of the Commonwealth: and this difference of location has far-reaching influences on the composition of its population, as well as on the external relations, and so on the social, economic, and political development of all South Africa.

While the distribution of the lands of the Empire is perhaps most easily described in relation to the oceans, as in the preceding paragraphs, it is also possible and useful to describe their position in relation to the chief land mass on the earth—the Old World.

For this purpose the Old World is defined as consisting of those regions which were accessible to, and more or less in contact with, the civilized peoples of Asia and Europe before the development of trans-oceanic navigation in the Age of Discovery of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Thus it consists of Asia and Europe together with those parts of north and northeast Africa which were then accessible from Europe and southwest Asia. Its frontier towards the then unknown Africa is the Sahara Desert, but the zone of separation becomes vague in northeast Africa. The limits of the Old World are also somewhat indefinite at its southeastern corner in the East Indies. Elsewhere the Old World is very clearly marked off from the New by wide expanses of ocean, across which no regular intercourse was possible before the sixteenth century. Towards the north it was, and still is, bounded by the north polar cold deserts and icebound sea.

The Old World, as thus delimited, contains approximately twenty-four million square miles of land, which is a little less than half of the total area of the available land of the earth. But it contains some sixteen hundred millions of inhabitants, who form four-fifths of the world's total population, so that it is by far the more populous half, with at least four times as many inhabitants as the New World.

Further, and of more immediate importance in this study, nineteen-twentieths of the land area of the Old World is in one continuous land mass ; and the relatively small island groups which form part of it are widely separated from each other by their location on opposite sides of the Continent. The chief of these islands are those of the East Indies, the Japanese group, and the British Isles.

This "Old World" differs from the area which Sir Halford Mackinder<sup>1</sup> has called "The World Island," by the exclusion of Africa south of the Sahara. That great sub-continent is less definitely separated from the Old World than those of the two Americas and Australia ; both because it is nearer to the lands of ancient civilization, and because some small intercourse did percolate through the desert barrier and along the East African coast long before the Age of Discovery. Hence this area of Africa is in some ways a

<sup>1</sup> In his *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, London, 1919.

transition area between the Old and the New Worlds ; though it is here classed as a part of the New World because it became accessible to civilized men on any considerable scale only after the Age of Discovery.

In strong contrast to the one great continental land mass which forms nearly the whole of the Old World, the lands of the New World are mainly insular or peninsular in their location and are very widely separated from one another by the oceans. The chief of these lands are the four sub-continental areas of North America, Africa south of the Sahara, South America, and Australia ; but there are also very many islands both large and small.<sup>1</sup> The total area of all these lands of the New World is a little greater than that of the Old World, but the population is not more than four hundred millions ; so that the New World contains only about one-fifth of mankind on half of the available land area.

The scattered distribution of the major lands of the New World, their location to the west, southwest, and southeast of the Old World, and for the most part (except for South America) nearer to it than to one another, makes it clear that the great Continent of the Old World is by far the most important land area on the globe ; and it is likely to remain so. This fact may well justify an attempt to examine the geographical position of the British Empire in relation to it.

A correct view of the relative positions and extents of such enormous areas as those we are here considering can only be obtained from a globe ; and therefore anything that may be said about them should be checked by reference to a globe. But it is not possible to see more than half of the surface of a globe at once ; and it is not always convenient to have a globe at hand ; hence world maps are needed. To illustrate the position of the New World in reference to the Old World the accompanying diagram-map (fig. 5) is drawn on a

<sup>1</sup> The South Polar lands probably include a fifth sub-continental land mass outside the Old World. But it is uninhabitable ; and therefore it is not included in this discussion.




FIG. 5.—THE OLD WORLD AND THE NEW WORLD

(The broken line includes the Old World.) (For note on this map net see App. V)

Mollweide equal area net with the centre of the ellipse in the middle of the Old World—actually at  $45^{\circ}$  N. latitude and  $45^{\circ}$  E. longitude—near the northern part of the Caspian Sea, and with the meridian through that point as the minor axis and circumference of the ellipse. Thus we have a world map on an equal area net, with the Old World in the centre of the map and the various parts of the New World shown in relation to it.

It is at once evident that the British Empire is essentially marginal and outlying in respect to the great Continent. And in their location round the Old World its lands fall into two well-marked concentric series, an inner and an outer (see also fig. 62, p. 383).

The lands of the Inner Series are on, or just off the margin of, the Old World Continent. They include the British Isles and the Indian Empire, together with a number of smaller territories on the inland-sea route between Great Britain and India, and other territories in Malaya, Borneo, and Hongkong on the extension of that route to the Far East.

Where the inland-sea route is constricted to its central defile in the Suez Canal lies Egypt, a country whose position on this route makes it of very special interest to the Empire, which therefore holds a special position in, and in relation to, Egypt. And nearby is the "mandate" area of Palestine and Transjordan.

The sub-continent of India is part of the Old World Continent ; but it is so far cut off from the interior of the Continent by great mountain and desert barriers that it is mainly peninsular in its location, and by far the greater part of its intercourse with other lands is overseas. India has, under normal conditions, much less direct intercourse with the Continent than have the British Isles themselves; though here, to the northwest of India, is the chief military land frontier of the Empire.

Only at Gibraltar does the British Empire extend on to

the mainland of Europe, its smallest foothold on any of the continents, but in southern Asia it includes about one and three-quarter million square miles on the mainland, without reckoning mandate territories.

These lands of the Inner Series include the two most populous lands of the Empire, India and Great Britain; and while their area is somewhat less than one-sixth of the whole, their population is not less than four-fifths of the total. They form a broken fringe round the western and southern shores of Eurasia, from Norway to China. The seaway along which they are strung is one of the principal ways of communication within the Empire. It is also the coasting route of the Continent; and as such it is an important route to many other Powers as well as to the British Empire, which here as elsewhere is therefore very intimately associated with the non-British world.

The lands of the Outer Series include all the rest of the Empire, more than five-sixths of its area, and are all situated in the New World. They form an irregular series round the Old World at distances of from two to five thousand miles from it. The continuity of this series of lands is interrupted by wide stretches of ocean and large areas of non-British territory; while it is also entirely broken by the North Polar Ice Barrier. Hence it is a very fragmentary ring. Most of its more important segments are in more frequent and more direct communication with the British Isles than they are with one another.

These outer, overseas, lands of the Empire include all the selfgoverning states except those in the British Isles. Of the dependencies, India and its neighbours in southern Asia occupy somewhat less than half of the total area; and the rest are mainly in Africa, between the Sahara Desert and the northern borders of the Union of South Africa. The greater importance of India, combined with the fact that Africa is in many respects transitional between the Old and New Worlds, may justify the statement that the dependencies

are mainly in, or close to, the Old World ; while the self-governing States of the British Commonwealth are mainly in the New World.

Such a summary statement of the location of the British Empire in relation to the Old World brings out very vividly the fact that it is mainly in the New World. Its homelands in the British Isles are themselves capable of being regarded either as an outpost of the Old World of Europe towards the New World beyond the oceans, or alternatively as an outpost of that New World towards Europe. And it seems clear that the growth of the younger dominions, and their resultant increasing weight in the councils of the Empire, is steadily tending to make the Commonwealth as a whole more and more a part of the New World.

### CHAPTER III

## THE PEOPLES OF THE EMPIRE

THE total population of the British Empire numbers nearly five hundred millions ; and it thus includes about one-fourth of all mankind. The only other Power with similar total numbers is China, whose population has, within the last twenty years, been variously estimated at from three hundred and fifteen millions to four hundred and eighty-five millions. The population of the Soviet Union approaches a third of the British totals, as does also that of the United States, with its dependencies.

In all modern Empires, as distinguished from purely national states, the total population is made up of two main divisions which we may for convenience term its " citizen peoples " and its " subject peoples." Of these the former rule the state, in so far as they determine and maintain its dominant traditions, languages, laws, and forms of government ; they also organize, command, and for the most part man, its government, its armed forces, and its civil services, in which they may or may not allot some share to their subject peoples. In most European states what are here termed " subject peoples " are known as the " minority peoples." Within the democratic states of western Europe, North America, and Australia these subject peoples are in fact minorities, and usually quite small minorities, of the populations of the states concerned ; but in the oversea dependencies of the United States and of several European Powers the subject peoples are almost the whole population, as they are also in the dependencies of the British Empire.

Within the Empire the division between citizens and

subjects (in the sense in which these terms have just been used) is now almost identical with that between its White and non-White peoples ; in which respect the Empire resembles the United States and the colonial Powers of Europe. But the citizen peoples of the British Empire form barely a seventh of its total population, which is by far the smallest proportion in any of the Great Powers. So that, while it has the largest total population, it ranks only third or fourth among these Powers in the numbers of its citizen peoples, with fewer than the Soviet Union or the United States and about the same number as Germany and Japan. This relatively small proportion of citizen peoples is a serious weakness ; and it is very desirable to increase their relative numbers in the Empire. Obviously one of the best ways of doing this is to transfer from the category of subjects to that of citizens all those who are able and willing to share the responsibilities of the higher status.

The White peoples of the British Empire number in all little more than seventy millions. They form the great majority of the population of all the selfgoverning States of the British Commonwealth, with the single exception of the Union of South Africa in which they are little more than one-third, and practically all of them live in these states. Of the total nearly two-thirds are in the British Isles, where the island of Great Britain with forty-five million inhabitants contains well over half of the total White population of the Empire. The next most populous state is Canada, with about a quarter as many. And the four North Atlantic States together contain not less than five-sixths of the citizens of the Empire and, therefore, of its essential man-power. Most of the remaining sixth is at the other side of the globe in the distant southern states.

The great majority of the British citizen-peoples speak the English language as their mother-tongue. The homeland of the Empire in England is also the homeland of all




FIG. 6.—THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENGLISHRY

the English-speaking peoples. Its language and literature, and the social, legal, and political traditions enshrined therein, are now the common inheritance of all the Englishry.<sup>1</sup> But the Englishry are divided between two of the world's Great Powers. Nearly three-fifths of them are in the United States of America, where they are the great majority of its White citizens, and only about two-fifths are in the British Empire. In both the British and the American Commonwealths English is the dominant language ; it is the only language of the great majority of their citizens, and it is also known and used by almost all the educated members of those sections of their populations for whom it is not the mother-tongue. The combined weight of these two Great Powers makes English the most widely used language of the civilized world of today.

Among the British citizen-peoples there are some four or five groups whose mother-tongue is some other language than English, apart from small groups of recently-settled immigrants in many districts and towns. The most numerous of these linguistic groups is that of the French-speaking Canadians who form more than a fourth of the population of Canada and almost the whole of that of the Province of Quebec, which is their homeland. The other eight provinces of Canada are all mainly English-speaking, except for numerous immigrant groups ; and while the dominion is formally bilingual, only a small part of it is actually so. The French language is also used, on an equal status with English, in the Channel Islands.

The Afrikaans-speaking Whites in the Union of South Africa form the second in numbers of these other-language groups, with a total population of somewhat less than a million. Here there is no concentration of the Afrikaans-speaking population comparable to that of the French Canadians in Quebec Province. Of the White populations

<sup>1</sup> Englishry = English-speaking peoples. In the rest of this work I use the one word "Englishry" in place of the phrase "English-speaking peoples."

of the four provinces of the Union that of Natal is mainly English-speaking and that of the Orange Free State mainly Afrikaans ; while it is difficult to know which is the majority in the two more populous provinces of the Cape of Good Hope and the Transvaal, or in the Union as a whole. In the Union English and Afrikaans are of equal status. Both languages are known by a considerable proportion of the White population and both are used in government and public life ; but the fact that Afrikaans is limited to South Africa and is the mother-tongue of less than a million White people, while English is of worldwide value, makes the latter the more important for commercial, educational, and external affairs.

In the United Kingdom two languages other than English are still spoken. Welsh is the native language of somewhat less than half the population of Wales and Monmouth ; though only a very small minority, less than a tenth, is ignorant of English.<sup>1</sup> And in the western Highlands and Isles of Scotland there is still a small population, of ten to fifteen thousands, who habitually use Gaelic. But for all but a fiftieth of its people English is the one mother-tongue of the United Kingdom, whose population is numerically the second largest group of the Englishry.

In the Irish Free State the relative positions of the two languages of that country are somewhat obscure. The English conquests and colonization of Ireland had effectually made it English-speaking long before the end of the nineteenth century, when barely a tenth of its population still spoke dialects of the Gaelic languages which were in general use before the conquest. This minority consisted mainly of an almost illiterate peasantry living in three separate areas on the Atlantic margin of the land in Munster, Connaught, and Donegal respectively. The Irish nationalist

<sup>1</sup> At the Census of 1911, 43·5 per cent. of the population of Wales and Monmouthshire (over three years of age) was recorded as knowing Welsh, and 8·5 per cent. as knowing Welsh only.

revival, and the struggle for independence, led some of the intelligentsia of nationalist Ireland to attempt a revival of an earlier language ; and by the time when the Irish Free State became an independent dominion in 1922 the movement was sufficiently strong to compel the newly established Irish government to make some formal endeavours to change the language of that nine-tenths of its people who had known only English from their cradles. But a large share of the great literature of the English language has been written by Irishmen and much of it in Ireland ; and now that the political reasons for desiring a distinct language as a mark of distinct nationality are gone, it is doubtful whether the Irish people will in fact undergo the great labour of learning another and much more difficult language merely in order to emphasize a separate nationalism whose distinctness no one questions. The use of that language could only serve to cut them off from all the rest of the world, and not least from their neighbours in Northern Ireland. The separate nationalities of British and Americans (of U.S.A.), of Australians and Canadians, of English and Scots give ample evidence that unity of language does not necessarily imply uniformity or prevent the maintenance or development of many distinct national characteristics.

But while there is thus unity of language and tradition among the great majority (at least 95 per cent.) of the British citizen-peoples, who thus share a common social inheritance, their subject peoples are characterized by the complete absence of any comparable unity in these respects. This lack of unity is equally characteristic of the two great groups of dependent territories, in Africa and in southern Asia respectively, in each of which there is a bewildering medley of linguistic and cultural groups.

The most prominent divisions among the peoples of India are those of religion and of language ; but the divisions on these lines are very far from coinciding with one another, and there is little approach to a clear geographical separation

of the many groups concerned. Most of the world's religions are professed by some of the Indian peoples; but in India itself the main division is that between Hindus and Muhammadans, neither of whom forms a united people in anything but their opposition to one another. Here the strength of the differences and mutual hostilities appears to be much more closely akin to that which Europe knew in the periods of the Crusades, and of the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, than to anything known in the Western World of today. The outstanding feature of Hinduism is the caste system, which divides and subdivides its adherents. A rigid caste system is totally incompatible with any existing form of democratic government; and a people so divided among themselves can only attain political unity under either an autocracy or a small oligarchy of the dominant higher castes. Muhammadanism is, in principle, fundamentally democratic, and so opposed to, and intolerant of, the caste system; and the Indian Muhammadans are in some ways a stronger body than the Hindus because of their greater social unity, though they are hardly a fifth of the total population. It is well to remember that they were the ruling peoples from the period of the first Muhammadan conquest down to the British Conquest, and also that, in the present stage of social development in India, these differences of religion are the primary divisions among the peoples of India.

Within the Indian Empire, but on the northeastern fringe of India itself and in Burma, there are many peoples who differ markedly from the main mass of the population in that they speak languages of the Tibeto-Chinese group and are largely Buddhists in religion. They form perhaps one-eighth of the total population, but are more clearly separated geographically from the rest than are other groups of similar magnitude. Ceylon and Malaya are also somewhat different from India in these respects.

The linguistic divisions of India are probably more

numerous, though not more complicated and much less often a source of friction, than the religious differences. In area and population India is comparable to continental Europe west of Russia, but it has much greater linguistic complexity than the latter sub-continent. No less than ten Indian languages are each spoken by nine or more millions of people,<sup>1</sup> of which Hindustani, in its two divisions of Hindi and Urdu, claims a hundred and twenty million adherents or a third of the total population, and more than one hundred and fifty languages are recorded. Each of the greater languages has its own literature and traditions. But the importance of English as the language of the governing people, of intercourse with Western Civilization, of higher education, and of commerce, has made it the second language of the well-educated Indian and so provided India with a common language for the intercourse of her different peoples with one another and with the outer world.

Less is known of the native languages spoken in Africa south of the Sahara than of those of India. But the spoken languages of British Africa are probably as numerous as those of India ; though the population is less than one-sixth of that of the Indian Empire. No native language of Africa is of the first rank as a cultural medium, and none has any great literature. For the African peoples effective contact with civilization can only come through some one of the languages of more advanced peoples. At the present time three of these are of primary importance—the *Arabic* of the Muhammadan missionaries, traders, and ruling chiefs who are prominent in such large areas of northern and eastern Africa ; the *English* of the British governments and of English-speaking missions, traders, and settlers ; and the *French* of the corresponding bodies in French Africa and the Belgian Congo.

<sup>1</sup> These are Hindi and Urdu, which differ only dialectically and in using a different script, Bengali, Telugu, Marathi, Panjabi, Tamil, Kanarese, Oriya, Burmese, Malayalam. There are six of this magnitude in Europe, west of Russia, viz. German, French, Italian, Polish, Spanish, Romanian.

The other divisions among the peoples of the African dependencies are much less important than those of language. There is not, and has never been, except in a few limited areas such as Uganda, any form of political unity wider than the personal rule of the greatest of their chiefs; and the only widespread form of political organization has been autocracy—tempered by some deference to public opinion or by fear of revolt. Few of these peoples had, by themselves, risen above the levels of barbarism. Hence many of the problems of government and of development here are essentially different from those of India, which is a land of ancient and well-established civilization with correspondingly strong social organization and traditions.

It is essential for any person who wishes to become an effective citizen of the modern world that he, or she, must know at least one of the greater languages of Western Civilization.<sup>1</sup> Hence the peoples of the smaller languages must of necessity become bilingual if they are to enter into the civilized world as partners in its strength and its future. Most empires have insisted that among their subject peoples the second language learned for this purpose shall be the language of the governing people. Thus French is taught throughout the French Empire and English throughout that of the United States. But the several British governments have in this matter followed no consistent policy. The spread of the English language in the British dependencies has been for the most part only an incidental result of the political, economic, and social influence of the governing peoples. In some cases the local British governments have even tried to set up other second languages for large areas, as for example in the Hindustani of the old Bengal Presidency and the present proposals to use Swaheli over large areas in East Africa. To attempt to suppress any native language is foolish, and would in many cases be futile. But it is at least equally foolish to do anything which can add to

<sup>1</sup> At least until some one auxiliary language obtains wide recognition.

the linguistic complexity of a world in which differences of language are now among the chief remaining obstacles to worldwide human intercourse and the development of world unity. Until such time as the world agrees on an international language all the British governments should make English the second language in their dependencies, and so establish one common language of intercourse throughout the Empire. The possession of one language for this purpose is essential to any imperial unity, such as that foreshadowed in the setting up of "Dominion Status" within the Empire as the goal of Indian political development. It is clear that the Hindi-speaking Indian who learns English is thereby better equipped to serve India and the world than if he had spent the same amount of time and labour in learning any one other Indian language in its place. There is no alternative to English as the language of the British Empire; and it is also one of the leading languages of modern civilization.

Outside Africa and Asia the British Dependencies are small and widely scattered, and the political problems of the divisions among their peoples are of relatively less magnitude and importance. The Negro populations of the British West Indies are the descendants of slaves who were forcibly torn away from their own linguistic and social groups in Africa, and inextricably mingled by the slave trade. This origin, and the fact that their ancestors were slaves for several generations, has ensured that they have no other language than English, and little trace of any other social organization than that imposed on them by their masters; in which respects they resemble the other Negro populations of the Americas. The small populations of the Pacific Islands now include considerable numbers of immigrant peoples from Asia, as in the Indians of Fiji, and in this mingling of peoples racial and linguistic unity has disappeared from most of those groups of islands.

We may summarize this grouping of the peoples of the British Empire in tabular form as follows :

Group.	No. in millions.	Language.	Location.
British citizen-peoples	70	English (95%)	British Commonwealth
including French-Canadian	3	French	Quebec Province
Afrikaans-Dutch	1	Afrikaans	U. of S. Africa
Indian peoples	360	More than 200 languages	Southern Asia
African Negro peoples	50	More than 200 languages	Africa and West Indies

## CHAPTER IV

### THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

THE great extent of the British Empire, and the variety of its lands and peoples, make it very difficult to form any clear concept of it as a whole. As a first step towards such a concept it is useful to note that all its lands fall into two distinct groups, which are nearly coincident with the areas inhabited by its citizen peoples and its subject peoples respectively. These two groups of lands are occupied by the British Commonwealth and the British dependencies respectively.

The British Commonwealth consists of the selfgoverning States of the Empire, inhabited by the White peoples who are its effective citizens.<sup>1</sup> These states are all controlled by governments responsible to parliaments elected by their citizens. They include the larger part of the land area of the Empire, though the smaller part of its total population ; and it is useful to distinguish them clearly from the rest of

<sup>1</sup> I am aware that in limiting the term "British Commonwealth" to the selfgoverning States of the Empire, I am using it in a sense narrower than that given to it by some publicists, who have used it loosely as synonymous with the British Empire ; but my use is in harmony with that of the term "British Commonwealth of Nations," as used in the reports of the Imperial Conference of 1926. There is no need for such an alternative name for the Empire ; and it is useful to indicate the primary division between its selfgoverning and its dependent lands—even though the term "dependency" is out of fashion. Most of the states which are now members of the Commonwealth were formerly dependencies, and some present dependencies may in the future become member states ; so that the division is not unchangeable. Nevertheless, the distinction between the British Commonwealth and its dependencies is the primary politico-geographical division within the British Empire.

the Empire, which is dependent on them for its political organization and its defence.

The titles given to the selfgoverning States of the Commonwealth vary considerably. The senior State is the United Kingdom, next is the Dominion of Canada, and the youngest is the Irish Free State. There are also the Colony of Newfoundland, the Union of South Africa, and the Commonwealth of Australia. The most generally used term is "Dominion"; but that is not ordinarily applied to the United Kingdom itself, though it is generally used for any one or all of the others. If a common term is needed it should surely be "Kingdom," a name which would at once indicate both the political constitution and the equality of status of the states and stress the fact that the King is the formal link between them; for all the states are monarchical and do in fact have a constitutional King as the Head of the State; while their union is marked by the fact that they have one and the same King.

The title "Kingdom of Canada" is said to have been suggested in the discussions preceding the enactment of the British North America Act of 1867, which formulated the Constitution of Canada and gave it the title of "Dominion." Then it could be urged that "Kingdom" implied an equality of status with the Mother-Country, which was not in accord with the facts at that time; an objection which has ceased to exist. Another reason for the decision is said to have been a regard for the susceptibilities of Canada's neighbour. But that is hardly a matter of decisive weight in a question which is so completely one of internal politics as that of the name to be given to a constituent State of the British Commonwealth.

The British Commonwealth then consists, at present, of seven selfgoverning states equal to one another in political status. Four of these are in the northern hemisphere on opposite shores of the North Atlantic Ocean. Three are in the southern hemisphere, on the eastern and

western sides of the Indian Ocean ; and of these Australia and New Zealand are antipodal to the North Atlantic Ocean. The extent of the lands of the Commonwealth, and a comparison in this respect with the rest of the Empire, is shown in the following tables :

A. AREA OF THE STATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH  
(*In the Temperate Zones*)

(1) North Atlantic States	Area in sq. miles.	White popn.
In the British Isles :		
Great Britain and . . . .	89,047	46,200,000
Northern Ireland . . . .	5,237	
Irish Free State . . . .	26,592	2,973,000
The Isle of Man . . . .	221	60,284
Channel Islands . . . .	75	90,230
In North America :		
Canada (the nine provinces only)	2,188,983	10,354,000
Newfoundland . . . .	42,734	273,000
	<hr/> 2,352,889	<hr/> 59,950,514
(2) Southern Hemisphere States		
Australia (south of the tropic) .	1,825,261	6,500,000
New Zealand . . . .	104,751	1,500,000
Union of South Africa . . . .	473,089	1,830,000
	<hr/> 2,403,101	<hr/> 9,830,000
Total . . . .	4,755,990	69,780,514

NOTE.—A small part of the Union of South Africa is within the tropics—in northern Transvaal—but it may be regarded as balanced by temperate habitable land in the mandate territory of Southwest Africa.

B. AREA OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

(1) British Commonwealth :	Sq. miles.
In the Temperate Zones (Table A) . . . .	4,750,000
Subarctic lands—the Canadian territories and Labrador	1,500,000
Within the tropics in Australia . . . .	1,150,000
	<hr/> 7,400,000
(2) British Dependencies :	
Nearly all (96 per cent.) in intertropical and subtropical latitudes . . . .	5,800,000
Total . . . .	<hr/> 13,200,000

One of the first facts to be noted is that the lands of the British Commonwealth are mostly insular or peninsular in location. Of the seven states, five are situated on islands which are entirely British, one (South Africa) is peninsular; and of its two thousand miles of land boundary four-fifths mark it off from British dependencies and the rest from the Portuguese East African dependency.<sup>1</sup> Thus Canada is the only British state which has a long land boundary (over five thousand five hundred miles), of which the longer section, three thousand miles, separates it from the home territory of the United States of America. This is the only land boundary along which the British Empire is in direct contact with the home territory of any other Great Power ; it is also the only important land boundary of the British Commonwealth, and the only one which is near to the more populous areas of the State of the Commonwealth which it limits. It also lies near to the most populous sections of the United States.

The insular lands of the Commonwealth include somewhat less than half its area in the temperate zones, but about five-sixths of its citizens, a fact which emphasizes its dependence on the seaways for almost the whole of its internal and external communications. Only one other Power has effective contact with any State of the British Commonwealth except across the sea.

We may also note here that the temperate lands of the Commonwealth are almost equally divided between the northern and southern hemispheres ; but that the northern states contain about six-sevenths of its citizens, and therefore that its main strength is in the north.

The location of the dependencies is almost wholly continental, in southern Asia and in Africa; and these lands are for the most part between or near to the tropics.

<sup>1</sup> This is for the Union of South Africa. Its mandate territory of South-west Africa has a further boundary of nearly a thousand miles with Portuguese Angola, and more with the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland.

Hence in geographical situation, as well as in other respects, the British dependencies are as a whole in very strong contrast to the lands of the Commonwealth.

In estimating the extent of the land within the British Commonwealth on which the British citizen-peoples can live




FIG. 7.—RELATIVE AREAS OF CERTAIN STATES

The whole square represents the total available land area.

and establish their homes it is best to omit altogether the subarctic territories, which are never likely to carry any large permanent population, and also the lands within the tropics. This leaves a total area whose climate is suitable for White men of more than four and a half million square miles, almost equally divided between the northern and southern hemispheres, which is a little more than a third of the land of the Empire and nearly one-eleventh part of the habitable land of the whole world. This vast area includes great

stretches of very poor land, such as the barren lands of the Canadian Shield and the desert lands of central Australia and the Kalahari of South Africa ; it also contains much rough mountain land and large areas over which the rainfall is too low, or too uncertain, or both, for regular agricul-




FIG. 8. —RELATIVE POPULATIONS OF CERTAIN STATES

The whole square represents the total population of the world.

ture. But after all deductions have been made it is probably safe to reckon rather more than a quarter of it as good cultivable land, which is a somewhat smaller proportion of cultivable to uncultivable land than that for the earth as a whole.

Thus the British Commonwealth contains approximately one and a quarter million square miles of cultivable land capable of producing the ordinary crops of the temperate zones. This is a similar area of such land to that found in

the United States, and probably more than that of the Soviet Union ; while the territories of China, including Manchuria, may also contain a comparable area. But no other Power than these three includes more than one-third as great an area of such land. So that in this primary necessity the British Commonwealth ranks very high among the Great Powers. At least half of the cultivable land of the British Commonwealth lies in the northern cool temperate zone, where the length of the growing season allows of the production of only one crop per year. Hence its total agricultural productivity may be somewhat less than that of the corresponding land of the United States, which lies mostly in the warm temperate zone.

But empty lands have no actual value. They can only be made valuable by the application of human knowledge and skill and labour. Hence the strength of a nation or a state depends on its people more immediately than on its lands. The British Commonwealth occupies nearly a sixth part of all the land in the temperate zones ; but its peoples form barely a fifteenth of the total population of the temperate lands of the world. The mean density of population over the whole of the inhabited lands of the earth approaches about forty persons per square mile ; but in the temperate lands of the British it is much less than half as great—a little less than sixteen per square mile. And this relatively scanty population is very unevenly distributed within the Commonwealth. The homeland of England, with more than seven hundred people to the square mile, is one of the most densely peopled lands in the world ; and the British Isles as a whole has a mean density of population more than ten times as great as the world average. But the rest of the dominions are very thinly peopled, with a mean density of population of less than five persons per square mile. The vast dominions of Australia and Canada, with less than three inhabitants to each square mile of land, are the most thinly peopled of any considerable civilized countries. Nearly three-fifths of the

British citizen-peoples live in Great Britain ; though that island occupies less than a fiftieth part of the area of the temperate lands of their Commonwealth, and contains perhaps a fifteenth of its good cultivable land.

At present, therefore, the peoples of the Mother Countries form a very decided majority within the Commonwealth; and the United Kingdom is by far the principal single state. But the proportional rates of increase of population in the younger and larger dominions, aided by emigration from the British Isles, are generally much larger than those in the homelands ; and so the numerical predominance of the United Kingdom tends to diminish. Within three or four generations it may well be second in population to Canada. It is impossible to forecast the growth of populations for any long periods ; and it is difficult to estimate the total population which a given country can comfortably support ; but it is safe to say that the population-capacity of Canada is considerably greater than that of the British Isles, and that Australia is capable of maintaining at least as large a population as these islands.

The relative populations and densities of population of the States of the Commonwealth are set out in the following table :

State.	Area (square miles).	Population (1000's).	Density (per square mile).
United Kingdom . . .	94,284	46,200	about 440
Irish Free State . . .	26,592	2,973	110
Canada (Provinces) . .	2,188,983	10,354	5
Newfoundland . . .	42,734	273	6
Australia (temperate) . .	1,825,261	6,500	3
New Zealand . . .	104,751	1,520	14
Union of South Africa . .	473,089	{ 7,000 <sup>1</sup> 1,830 <sup>2</sup>	15 <sup>1</sup> 4 <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Including about 5,200,000 non-White peoples ; and <sup>2</sup> Whites only.

From these figures it is clear that all the overseas dominions are very thinly peopled ; most of them in fact very much

under peopled in that they do not contain nearly enough people to make the best use of their natural resources. In all of them it is probable that an increase in the numbers of their inhabitants, provided that the added population is in sympathy with, and not inferior in quality to, the existing population, would make it possible to raise the general standard of living. None of these states is yet in sight of that stage in population growth where an addition to the total numbers would mean a lowering of the general level of prosperity. And all of them are too thinly peopled to be able to hold their extensive territories against all comers without external aid, or to man their thousands of miles of frontier by sea and land. They are reserve areas for the spreading populations of Western Civilization : areas to which the British citizen-peoples who now hold them can make out a first claim. But if they remain empty lands in the face of great peoples whose numbers continue to increase and demand better conditions of living there will be no possibility of saving their present populations from being swamped by immigrants from other lands. If these dominions are to remain permanently British their populations must be increased at a rate sufficient to counterbalance the pressure of population from other lands and peoples.

From two different, though not necessarily opposed, points of view—the prosperity of the individual citizen and the strength of the state—the mean density of population may help to measure some factors which are of vital importance to any land.

Where the people are too few in relation to the natural resources of the region, and their capacity to make use of those resources—which depends also on their organization and technical skill, that is on their general level of “ culture ”—is inadequate, the region is clearly under peopled. In such a case any increase in the population, which does not lower its cultural level or lessen its unity, forms an addition to its real strength and leads to a rise in the general standard of

living. Such a rise can accompany an increase of population up to a density which we may term the optimum density. This is reached when, at the existing level of culture, the working force of the region is so proportioned to its natural resources as to obtain the maximum production per head and so to make possible the highest standard of living attainable under those conditions.<sup>1</sup> Any increase of population beyond this optimum density involves a lowering of the general standard of living, because it necessarily means that the production per head of the population is somewhat less than it was at the optimum figures.

In different form, the general standards of living of the people of any definite region may be expressed in a formula which reads :

$$S = F(P, R, C)$$

Where  $S$  = the Standard of Living,  $P$  = Population,  $R$  = Natural Resources, and  $C$  = Level of Culture.

On the three terms to the right of this equation we note briefly :

$P$ , the number of the people, is a variable dependent on the growth or diminution of population by (*a*) natural increase or decrease and by (*b*) immigration or emigration. In the past the former (*a*) was beyond the conscious control of the people concerned ; and in many lands the second factor (*b*) was also uncontrolled. Now both factors are coming increasingly under control. Practically every civilized state controls immigration into its territory by direct restrictions ; and many also control emigration from it to a greater or less degree. The control of the rate of natural increase is, however, of an entirely different order. In the form of the practice of birth restriction in many sections of society it is a factor of great and rapidly increasing importance ; but it is guided by social and economic forces

<sup>1</sup> This definition has reference only to economic conditions. The consideration of other factors would show that the matter is even more complex than is suggested here.

which are as yet normally outside the direct influence or control of the state.

R, the natural resources, is a fixed, though often an unknown, quantity. It is measured by the extent and fertility of the land, and the possibilities or disadvantages due to its situation, its mineral wealth, and its power resources.

C, culture, is here understood to mean the capacity of the people to use their resources, natural and human. It is necessarily the resultant of very many complex factors. It varies with the health and physical efficiency of the people, with their general level of education and energy, the knowledge and ability of their leaders, their technical skill and, not least, their organizing capacity and their unity of purpose. All these factors are variable, and may be modified for better or worse by the conscious or unconscious action of the people themselves, and of their governments. Hence "C" is by far the most variable of the factors stated in our formula.

The second aspect from which the density of its population is of vital importance to any state is in its bearing on the maintenance of the independence and strength of the state. And here "independence" includes control of its own cultural development as a fact of perhaps even greater importance than merely political independence, though in the modern world the two are usually closely associated.

Where, as in all the younger states of the British Commonwealth, the density of population is very low in proportion to the natural resources of the land, even though the cultural level is high, it follows that the land is not fully occupied and a large part of its natural resources remains unused. Hence there is room for the immigration of more people. If such an immigration should bring in large numbers of people of widely differing traditions and of differing types of civilization from those at present ruling in these states, the result would inevitably be a clash of two types of civilization

—perhaps also of races and standards of living. Where the existing density of population is very low it is easily conceivable that such an immigration might overwhelm the present populations and their culture, as the White immigration of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries overwhelmed and displaced the less advanced inhabitants and cultures of North America and of Australia. But where the existing density of population is high, that is, where the people in possession fill their land, especially in the sense that they form an agricultural population which actually holds and uses the cultivable land, they are probably secure against any substantial displacement. They and their descendants will remain the people of the country ; as the English survived the Norman Conquest, as the Indian peoples have survived conquests by Persian and Afghan, Mongol and Briton, as the Amerindians of the intertropical states of Spanish America have survived the Spanish conquest and still form the bulk of the population. In the latter case, where the cultural difference was great, the conquerors did to a large extent succeed in imposing their culture and language. Elsewhere, where the difference in this respect was small, it was the conquering (military) peoples who were absorbed in the greater mass of the native populations.

The ability to resist any such conquest, whether it be attempted by war or by the introduction of large numbers of immigrants of the conquering people, depends on the numbers and strength of the existing inhabitants. And in the younger and larger of the British dominions these inhabitants are too few in proportion to the area to provide a sufficiently strong defence against any possible attack of the kind. The seven million people of Australia can provide, but not equip, a maximum force of perhaps a million men of potentially high military value. But they are scattered over half a sub-continent, and would have to defend an exposed coast of some ten thousand miles in length against

an invader who might be able to concentrate attack at any point of that coast. Hence, at his own chosen point of attack the invader could overwhelm the native forces. And, therefore, Australia is at present dependent on external aid




FIG. 9.—GROWTH OF THE POPULATIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

for the maintenance of her independence. And, *mutatis mutandis*, the same is equally true of the other dominions.

It is clear that for the double purpose of raising their general standards of life by the fuller utilization of their natural resources, and of maintaining their

independence against possible enemies, the younger dominions need much larger populations than they possess at present. A sufficiently rapid increase to make them safe within the next century can only be obtained if their natural increase is fully maintained and is also supplemented by a considerable immigration. And if they are to maintain their cultural traditions and the type of civilization now ruling these immigrants must be fully assimilated. Hence they can only accept such immigrants as can be assimilated to their own people.

If the population of the temperate lands of the Commonwealth were doubled, to a total of one hundred and fifty millions, the mean density of population on these lands would still be somewhat less than the present mean density of the inhabited lands of the world. But if, in addition, such an increased population were distributed among its several states in much closer proportion to the magnitude of their relative natural resources than is the case at present, the British Commonwealth would cease to present to the overcrowded lands of the world the tempting spectacle of vast and fertile habitable lands held empty by comparatively few people ; and it would thus contribute far more to the maintenance of world peace than it can do at present.

The economic and military power of a state in the world, in peace and in war, depends on the two main factors of its available resources in men and in materials. The man-power is a function of the numbers, quality, culture, organization, and will of its peoples. Of these factors the last is not the least in importance, though it is certainly the least capable of any exact measurement ; and it is likely to depend more than the others on imponderables.

In individual and social qualities, and in the capacity for organizing and being organized, which depends very largely on the character and general level of their education, the British citizen-peoples are second to none. But in numbers they are only third among the White peoples;

since the White populations of the Soviet Union and of the United States are much more numerous than the British. Also the citizen populations of Germany and Japan are each almost as numerous as those of the British Commonwealth. Thus the British peoples have no numerical superiority corresponding to the extent of their own lands and that of the dependencies for which they are responsible.

In its material resources, its vast areas of fertile land and its mineral wealth, and in the technical skill and organized industry necessary to make use of these resources, the British Commonwealth is ahead of all other Powers, with the exception in some respects of the United States of America, which is, as a whole, further developed. The addition of its dependent lands in the Hot Belt gives to the British Empire as a whole a greater amount and variety of material resources than is within the control of any other Power ; and also greater and more widespread responsibilities and burdens. That dependencies add greatly to the liabilities of Empire is a common experience of all Empires. What, if anything, its present dependencies add to the real strength of the British Empire it is more difficult to assess. At present its strength is essentially the strength of its citizen peoples in the British Commonwealth.

## CHAPTER V

### THE DEPENDENCIES

THE British dependencies have been defined as those parts of the Empire which are not within the States of the Commonwealth, but which are dependent on those states for their government. On this definition the subarctic territories of Canada, the Labrador territory of Newfoundland, and the northern and central territories of Australia should be regarded as dependencies rather than as integral parts of those dominions. But in this book we shall follow the more usual plan, and leave the territories just named to be discussed in connection with the particular state with which they are associated. The following table indicates some facts about the chief groups of the dependencies. More details are given in the table which forms Appendix I, p. 389.

Group of Dependencies.	Approximate Area in sq. miles.	Population.
A. In southern Asia :		
The Indian Empire . . . . .	1,800,000	356,000,000
Others . . . . .	160,000	10,000,000
B. In South and East Africa . . . . .	2,850,000	22,000,000
C. In West Africa . . . . .	493,000	26,000,000
D. In the Mediterranean . . . . .	3,600	600,000
E. In the West Indies and Cen- tral America . . . . .	107,000	2,000,000
F. In the South Atlantic Ocean . . . . .	5,700	6,000
G. In the Indian Ocean . . . . .	1,000	430,000
H. In the Pacific Ocean . . . . .	200,000	1,300,000
	5,620,300	418,336,000

The distribution of these groups of lands is shown on the map which forms fig. 3 (see p. 10), a glance at which shows a few obvious, but nonetheless very important, facts in the location of the lands of the dependencies.

*First.*—They are for the most part in intertropical or subtropical latitudes. Approximately ninety-six per cent. of their total area lies in that half of the earth's surface included between latitudes  $30^{\circ}$  N. and  $30^{\circ}$  S. of the equator ; and no considerable dependencies, other than the subarctic and antarctic territories, reach latitudes as high as  $40^{\circ}$ .

*Second.*—The larger dependencies are grouped along the western and northern shores of the Indian Ocean. In eastern Africa, between the Union of South Africa and Egypt, there is a continuous series which together occupy more than two and a half million square miles of land ; and in southern Asia another series, not quite continuous, occupies two-thirds of that area. These Indian Ocean Lands include about six-sevenths of the total area of the British dependencies.

The only other large area is British West Africa ; and the four separate dependencies there together occupy less than a tenth of the total area.

The remaining dependencies are numerous, but for the most part very small. Most of them are small islands scattered in the tropical and equatorial zones of the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, nearly three-fourths of the way round the world ; and their total area is little more than one-twentieth of the whole.

Thus the greater part of the British dependencies is concentrated into a much more limited area of the earth's surface than are the lands of the Commonwealth (see fig. 10, p. 51). Also nine-tenths of the land of the dependencies is on the Continent formed by Eurasia and Africa, the "World-Island" of Mackinder. So that while the States of the Commonwealth are mainly insular and peninsular in




FIG. 10.—THE INDIAN OCEAN LANDS OF THE EMPIRE

their location, and only one of them, the Union of South Africa, is on the Continent, their dependencies are mainly continental in location. They occupy the whole of one of the four great southward-projecting peninsulas, India, large parts of two others, Indo-China and Central-and-South-Africa, and the extremities of the fourth, Arabia. It is as though the British sea-power, from its bases in the islands, had wrapped round the accessible coasts of the Continent and laid hold of its projecting peninsulas and islands—at Gibraltar and Malta, at the Cape and Aden, in India and Ceylon and Malaya—and used some of these as bases for expansion towards the interior.

It is difficult to estimate what proportion of the total area of these dependencies can fairly be regarded as good cultivable land. It includes at least three large areas of desert, in the Kalahari of southern Africa, in the Sahara of northern Africa, and in northwest India. And outside these deserts much of it has the poor and dry lateritic soils characteristic of the plateau lands of the Hot Belt. In British India two-thirds of the land is classed in the three types of agricultural land as (a) land under crops, (b) land under fallow, (c) cultivable waste, which last is often very poor land. But British India includes very little desert land, and only a small proportion of mountain and highland. So that, even after excluding the deserts from the reckoning, it is safe to say that much less than two-thirds of the remaining area of the dependencies is good land. It is probably a fair estimate that about two million square miles of the land in the British dependencies is good cultivable land.<sup>1</sup> This area is considerably greater than that of the correspondingly good land of the Commonwealth.<sup>2</sup> But in any comparison of the possible agricultural productivity of these two sections of the Empire, it is

<sup>1</sup> For the methods of reaching this estimate see my paper "The Extent of the Cultivable Land," in the *Geographical Journal*, December 1930.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 39.

necessary to take into account also the differences in their latitudes, and to remember that in most of the dependencies the growing season extends throughout the year, except in so far as it is limited by a season of drought, while only a small part of the lands of the Commonwealth can produce more than one crop per year. So that in fact the lands of the dependencies have much greater potential agricultural productivity than those of the Commonwealth.

In the forms of their political organization, and in their relations to the States of the Commonwealth, the very numerous divisions of the dependencies vary very widely. The British Empire is, and has long been, a political laboratory in which a worldwide variety of more or less experimental methods of political organization has been, and is being, tried out. For British Imperialism is not a rigid or logical system or doctrine. It does not include any insistence on logical uniformity, or even consistency, in the government of its varied dependencies. It only demands that their governments shall work with reasonable efficiency.

The Empire of India is at least five times as populous as all the other dependencies taken together. It also differs from most of them in being, except for Burma, a compact and continuous territory with a strong and distinctive civilization of its own. Its government is quite separate from that of the other dependencies, with its own Secretary of State in the Government of the United Kingdom. It is also apparently much nearer to the stage of selfgovernment than most of the African dependencies. Hence it is better to consider India separately (see Chapters XVII and XVIII).

The other dependencies may be grouped in at least two different ways on the basis of (a) their political status, or (b) their form of government.

(a) They may be divided into :

1. Direct possessions, governed by the authority of one of the States of the Commonwealth, with or without some measure of local representative or responsible government.

2. Protected states, governed by their own rulers subject to some measure of restriction by the Protecting Power, exercised through a Resident or Agent or other Political Officer.

3. Mandate areas, governed by the authority of one of the states under mandate from the League of Nations, in any one of the three classes of mandates.

Or (*b*) they may be grouped in accord with the method of government into :

1. Colonies (in the modern use of that word) with legislative assemblies or councils, *i.e.* with some degree of representative and responsible selfgovernment. The proportion between elected and nominated members in these bodies varies from one such colony to another ; and so also does their authority. But the elected members become more numerous, and the assembly more authoritative, as the colony progresses towards full selfgovernment. Some of these councils are only advisory ; some are in full control of certain departments of the government. The franchise on which their elected members are returned also differs in the various colonies.

2. Autocratically governed dependencies. Most of these are primarily military or naval stations, such as Gibraltar or Aden, with small or very mixed populations.

3. States governed by native rulers, either autocratically or with the aid of parliaments, subject to certain treaty or customary restrictions and the presence of a British Resident.

If India be considered apart, the total population of the remaining dependencies is somewhat less than that of the Commonwealth, and barely fifty per cent. greater than that of Great Britain. The most populous area is Nigeria, which, with about twenty million inhabitants, is the third most populous administrative unit in the Empire. The total population of the rest is little more than forty million people on an area of more than three million square miles. Hence in most of the dependencies the population is not

sufficiently numerous to make a full use of their natural resources. The enormous population of the Indian Empire, which contains about one-sixth of the world's inhabitants, tends to convey a very false impression of the populousness of the British Empire as a whole, and of its dependencies. It masks the fact that the Empire, without India, is as a whole thinly peopled ; since the mean density of the population over all the rest of its lands is less than a third of the mean world density. This low density is equally characteristic of the Commonwealth and of the dependencies ; though no large dependency is as thinly peopled as the two largest of the dominions.

In respect to their political, economic, and cultural developments the dependencies may be regarded as "wards" of that State of the Commonwealth which is their "guardian" and the "trustee" for their welfare. For most of them this post of guardian is filled by the United Kingdom ; but all three of the southern states are also in charge of some such wards ; and the two North American States have their subarctic dependencies. The Irish Free State is alone among the seven British States in having no such relationship to any dependent territory. For those dependencies which are held under mandate from the League of Nations by four of the states this relationship of ward and guardian is quite explicit. But it is no new principle in the Empire. It has long been fully accepted and repeatedly asserted in respect to all the dependencies.

It is inherent in this conception that the wards may be expected to grow up ; and also that their growth is to be aided and guided in an evolution which may in time render their peoples capable of selfgovernment as full and complete as that of the citizen peoples of the Commonwealth. This view has been formally expressed in the declaration that "Dominion Status" is the goal of India's political evolution ; and therefore by implication also the goal for every other British dependency. But "Dominion Status"

is a vague thing. Precise definition in such matters is probably impossible and is certainly misleading. No two countries are, or can be, identical in their geographical position or conditions.

The transition from dependency to selfgovernment has been made in most of the younger States of the Commonwealth by similar, though not identical, stages towards a similar status. But within Canada the same transition has transformed the southern part of the old North West Territories into the three Prairie Provinces as members of the federal dominion, and not into new states. They have not been formed into a new dominion. It is evident that the evolution of such dependencies as Southwest Africa and Northern Australia is to be looked for along the same lines ; and that when their development justifies it they may become provinces of South Africa and of Australia respectively.

A second trend in the possible evolution of a dependency is suggested by recent developments in Egypt and Iraq, for both of which there was a formal anticipation of the status of a fully independent state which is no longer within the British Empire ; though it will probably be in close and, it is to be hoped, friendly relations with the Empire.

There is a third type of dependency which seems to be destined to remain permanently in that status because of the poverty of its natural resources. This includes the subarctic territories of Canada, the South Polar dependencies, and the desert region of Central Australia, where there is no likelihood of the growth of populations whose numbers and density, stability and resources, would fit them for selfgovernment. It also includes many very small isolated territories whose small size in itself prohibits the growth of a population strong enough to carry the burden of statehood as a distinct unit. In this respect such territories as the Isle of Man, St. Helena, Aden, and many similar dependencies will remain dependent on larger states in

their external relations, though they may well control their own local government.

For the larger and more populous dependencies which are geographically separate from any State of the Commonwealth the possible or probable developments are much more obscure. In this group the most urgent problem is that of India, which is also probably the most difficult. The goal of "Dominion Status" implies membership of the British Commonwealth on an equal status with the present states of that body. But the citizen peoples of those states are linked together by the sharing of a common civilization and a common tradition, and more than nine-tenths of them also share a common language. How can India fit in as a member of this group? Her population outnumbers their total in the ratio of almost five to one; and many of the peoples of India have an ancient and deeply rooted civilization and traditions widely different from those of the Englishry; while India has very little of the internal unity which is characteristic of most of the existing states. For the more populous of the African dependencies the problems caused by development towards selfgovernment are perhaps less urgent, but not less important.

The difficulties which have arisen within the Empire in the transition of particular units from the status of dependency to that of selfgovernment may be said to arise from the lack of agreement as to when the "ward" has reached maturity. In the life of individuals in this country the legal relation of guardian and ward ends when the latter comes-of-age. But who can decide when a particular dependency has reached a political "coming-of-age"? In ordinary life the majority of wards regard themselves as mature some time before their guardians share that opinion. And within the Empire it is equally certain that there are, and will continue to be, wide differences of opinion among equally competent persons as to the fitness of any dependency for selfgovernment at any given time. The greater the dependency the

greater are the risks involved in a wrong decision, both for that dependency and for the rest of the Empire.

The dependencies which are held under mandate from the League of Nations are politically divided into those which were formerly parts of the Turkish Empire and those which were formerly German colonies. Of the first group the largest, Iraq, became an independent state in 1932. And Palestine is a unique land in its political relationships because of its relations to a worldwide Jewry.

The formerly German dependencies are in a very different class for two main reasons. Firstly no one of them seems likely to develop into an independent state in any foreseeable future. And secondly Germany is one of the leading states of Western Civilization and therefore should not be permanently excluded from a share in the responsibilities of that civilization to the "Backward Peoples" of the world. But it is not necessary that the admission of Germany to the mandate trusteeship of some part of the "backward" territories should take the form of restoring the divisions of those territories as they were in 1914. Those divisions were the result of the "scramble" for Africa and other unclaimed areas; and they are, both in themselves and in their development, quite irrational. The great area for which Britain and some of the West European Powers share such a guardianship is that of Africa between the Sahara and the Zambesi; and here the existing political boundaries have little claim to permanence or suitability for efficient administration. A modification of the existing allocation of this vast area of dependency among the trustee Powers which would admit Germany, and at the same time simplify rather than further complicate its divisions, is at least conceivable. And a rational geographical division of this great area of dependency into mandate regions could be so made as to ease the administrative problems of the guardian powers.

## CHAPTER VI

### SEAWAYS AND AIRWAYS

THE geographical discontinuity which is the most distinctive feature of the lands of the British Empire gives vital importance to the seaways along which those lands are strung, and by which they are held together : while the distribution of most of them into the two great groups of the North Atlantic Lands and the Indian Ocean Lands determines that the great linking seaways of the Empire are :

#### I. The North Atlantic Route

between the British Isles and British North America.

#### II. The routes between the North Atlantic States and the Indian Ocean Lands, viz. :

1. The " open-sea route " via the Cape of Good Hope.
2. The " inland-sea route " via the Suez Canal.
3. The routes across the Pacific Ocean :
  - (a) Direct from western Canada to New Zealand and Australia.
  - (b) From Canada to Hongkong and Singapore.
  - (c) Via Cape Horn.
  - (d) Via the Panama Canal.

The first route (I) is less than three thousand miles long and passes no populous lands. It has no waystations or ports-of-call, but is short enough not to need them. Under present political conditions the harbours of Iceland and Greenland to the north of it are of very little importance. The latter are very close to the direct route from Great




FIG. II.—SEAWAYS OF THE EMPIRE

Britain to Hudson Bay : but the facts that they are ice-bound for several months of the year, and that they have practically no hinderland, deprive them of any considerable economic or political value. The French fishing ports of St. Pierre and Miquelon, on small islands just to the south of Newfoundland, are near the western end of this seaway and might under some conditions affect its security. But no other foreign harbours are as near to it as are the home ports of Great Britain and Canada, which are its terminals, and those of Ireland and Newfoundland along it. This seaway is the link between the eastern and western pairs of the North Atlantic States of the Commonwealth, which are its most populous members, and it is thus the principal seaway of the Empire.

The routes of the second group of seaways (II) offer alternative ways between the North Atlantic and the Indian Oceans ; and, just because there are alternatives, no one of them has the vital character of the North Atlantic route itself. For most of the lands served by these routes the inland-sea route is shorter than the open-sea route via the Cape. The difference in distance is of course greatest for the routes between the British Isles and the lands on the north and northwest shores of the Indian Ocean. On the east coast of Africa it vanishes at Beira; and it is an unimportant proportion of the total distance for New Zealand and south-eastern Australia. Thus the inland-sea route is of much greater relative importance to the communications between Great Britain and India than it is to those between the southern and northern States of the Commonwealth.

On that part of the open-sea route which lies north of the equator, *i.e.* for a distance of more than three thousand miles from England, the Portuguese harbours at Lisbon, Madeira, and the Cape Verd Islands are, under normal conditions, the most suitable waystations for shipping ; though the alternative Spanish harbours at Vigo and in the Canary Isles are used by many British vessels. The British

stations at Gibraltar and in Gambia are less conveniently placed for this route ; but Freetown in Sierra Leone has a favourable location and a good harbour, handicapped only by climate and a traditional unhealthiness. South of the equator, and in the Indian Ocean, all the chief stations are British : they lie in series at convenient intervals for voyages to any part of East Africa or southern Asia ; but the width of the ocean between South Africa and Australia is more than four thousand miles, which is, for coal-burning ships, an inconveniently long interval. By far the chief station on this route is Cape Town, though Durban is, owing to its proximity to the Natal coalfields, a cheaper coaling station. It should be noted that the coast for a thousand miles north and east from Cape Town is British, and that a ship which wishes to pass the Cape without approaching the British ports can only do so by a very long detour.

The inland-sea route, via the Suez Canal, is not only the shortest seaway between Great Britain and India ; it is also a vital part of the coasting route of the Continent, from northwest Europe to northeast Asia. On it the British Empire has an unrivalled series of waystations from Great Britain to Hongkong at intervals which rarely exceed a thousand miles. In the two thousand miles through the Mediterranean Sea there are British harbours at Gibraltar and Malta, in the entrance and in the passage between the western and eastern basins ; and at the eastern end Britain holds Cyprus. The defile of the Suez Canal is in the territory of Egypt; and therefore the British have very considerable interests in Egypt for the double reason that the majority of the ships using the Canal are British and that the British Government is a chief shareholder in the Suez Canal Company. Britain's chief interest in Egypt is in the unimpeded use of the Canal by her ships under all circumstances.

In the Mediterranean this inland-sea route passes near the shores of the homelands of other important naval Powers;

and it crosses the routes connecting the homelands of France and Italy with their African dependencies, which are the vital seaways of the French and Italian Empires. The Mediterranean Sea is so narrow, and its shores, especially on the north, are so well provided with easily defended harbours, that the passage of ships along it can be very seriously endangered by hostile aircraft and submarines. It is very doubtful whether a purely naval force, however strong, could keep open the Mediterranean seaway against a group of its littoral powers; since the shores of the Mediterranean peninsulas and islands offer very favourable bases for aerial and submarine attacks on shipping. Hence the Suez route may be of little actual value in war; but so long as the open-sea route is available the Canal is not vital to British communications. In peace the saving of distance by using the inland-sea route is of considerable value; though it is to a considerable extent counterbalanced by the Canal dues and, for some cargoes, by the high temperatures of the Red Sea.

South of Suez the route passes through the Red Sea for twelve hundred miles to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandab and Aden, whence routes diverge over the Indian Ocean. Here the power to close the route to possible attacks from Europe directed against its Indian Ocean Lands may be of very great value in the defence of the British Empire. Hence Aden and Perim are military outposts of these sections of the Empire and part of its defence organization.

The Mediterranean route is of more vital importance to the developing airways of the Empire than to its war-time sea communications. The chief gap between British stations on the airways connecting the British Isles with the Indian Ocean Lands lies immediately to the south and southeast of Great Britain. Here, unless they make a detour by the Atlantic coast to Gibraltar, which is too small (two square miles), too rugged, too much exposed to violent local winds, and in other ways unsuitable for an airport, the first British

station is in Malta—some twelve hundred miles away by the most direct route. The direct routes from England to Malta must cross the territory of one or more European states. The most direct way is over France ; and any way which avoids France must cross either the Alps or the mountains of northern Spain. Actually the shortest, great circle, route from Great Britain to India lies across Germany, Poland, and south Russia, but under present political conditions this is not open for any purpose.

East of Malta the present airways converge in Egypt, where is the most important junction of existing imperial air routes. Here, however, there is a wider area of choice for the actual sites of the airports ; and while the area of which the Suez Canal is the axis is likely to become of increasing importance in this respect it is not yet certain where will be the principal airport of these routes. The need of fresh water, and the importance of the Nile route southwards make Lower Egypt a most favourable location. From this area the airways lead southward by the Nile to East and South Africa, eastward across Transjordan and Iraq towards India and Australia, and, probably in the near future, also southeastward along the Red Sea to Aden and thence both southward and eastward along the coasts. In the development of such routes by seaplanes it is possible that many island stations, such as Sokotra and others in the Indian Ocean, may acquire a greater importance than they have hitherto possessed, particularly if these flying boats prove capable of maintaining regular services over great distances.

The trans-Pacific routes are on the whole of quite secondary importance for many reasons. The first of these is the obvious fact that the chief habitable regions of the temperate zone, and, therefore, the most important world regions, are on the shores of the North Atlantic. A second, perhaps of more direct importance, is the vast size of the Pacific, which extends for 180° of longitude from Ecuador

to Singapore half way round the world. This is the water hemisphere ; and the land hemisphere, whose centre is near the south of England, must always be of greater importance and value to Man. For communications between Great Britain and Australia the Panama-Pacific route has no marked advantage in distance over the Suez or Cape routes.<sup>1</sup>

In fact the gap formed by the relatively islandless eastern third of the Pacific Ocean is the chief break in world routes south of the northern tropic. This gap is as wide as the whole Atlantic Ocean, and the routes across it are, and are likely to remain, of much less importance than those across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. While this is true of these routes as a whole, it is even more so of the British routes. For the British nations the trans-Pacific routes are a back way, which may have considerable value and importance but can never compete with the main routes.

A third fact which lessens the importance of the trans-Pacific routes to the British Empire is that their principal waystations, at Panama and Honolulu, are not British. The widest gap in the network of British waystations along the seaways is that of the eastern Pacific ; thus while British Columbia forms the western outpost of the Empire

<sup>1</sup> A statement of some few distances by usual routes may make this clear.

England to southeast Australia :		Miles (approximately)
via Suez Canal . . . . .		11,000
Cape of Good Hope . . . . .		12,000
Panama . . . . .		12,000
Cape Horn . . . . .		13,000
Canada . . . . .		14,000
Across Pacific Ocean :		
Vancouver, B.C., to Hongkong . . . . .		6,800
Vancouver, B.C., to Sydney, N.S.W. . . . .		8,000
Wellington, N.Z., to Falkland Isles . . . . .		5,000
Falkland Isles to England . . . . .		7,000
Compare North Atlantic distances :		
Liverpool to St. John's, Newfoundland . . . . .		1,900
Liverpool to Quebec . . . . .		2,600
Liverpool to Churchill, Man. . . . .		3,000

the islands of the South Pacific Ocean mark its easternmost edge. And the continuous series of British waystations extend from Canada and the West Indies eastwards via the British Isles, the Mediterranean, and the Cape, to the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific.

In the airways of the Empire the two ocean gaps of the Atlantic and the eastern Pacific form, at present, complete breaks ; so that the Empire is in this respect divided into two sections. In its eastern section, air routes, in actual operation or in preparation, connect Great Britain with South Africa and with Australia, linking up with the various Indian Ocean Lands between these terminal areas ; and it is possible that the longer route may be extended to New Zealand. In the western section, Canada has a considerable development of airways ; and these can be linked up with the West Indies, either by way of Bermuda or over the territory of the United States ; though the present airways to and among the British West Indies are mainly served by American lines. But until the North Atlantic can be spanned by regular air services the airways of the Empire lack a vital link, and Great Britain will remain a terminus on these routes instead of a focus. The exploration of the possibilities of maintaining a regular air service between Great Britain and Canada, either direct or via Iceland and Greenland, or via the Azores, is therefore a matter of great importance ; and the successful establishment of such a service would be of great value to the inter-imperial communications. But it still remains true that there is little likelihood that the exploitation of the airways can be made of great value in inter-imperial communications, as distinct from local communications within one territory or group of territories, before the development of aircraft capable of long continuous flights. The British Empire needs air vessels capable of making regular non-stop voyages of at least three thousand to five thousand miles between ports. Until such




FIG. 12.—AIRWAYS OF THE EMPIRE

vessels are developed the dependence of the airways on landing stations at intervals of only a few hundred miles means that on vital sections of inter-imperial routes British air communications are dependent on the good-will of foreigners. No state in the world has so great an interest in the development of reliable long-range air vessels as the British Empire, for no other Power has its territories separated by such vast distances.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE BRITISH ISLES—INTERNAL

THE most obvious natural division affecting the internal political geography of these islands is the separation of the two large islands which dominate the group, Great Britain and Ireland. . In fact, however, the present political, linguistic, and economic divisions do not coincide with that obvious physical division. Politically the islands are divided between two of the States of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Irish Free State, and three smaller units, which are perhaps to be regarded as miniature dominions, in the Isle of Man and the two divisions of the Channel Islands, one Jersey, the other Guernsey with the smaller islands. Nationally there is a grouping into English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish ; but of the last the majority in Northern Ireland very definitely groups itself with the three peoples in the larger island as a part of the British people. In language the overwhelming majority is English-speaking. A large proportion of the ninety thousand people in the Channel Islands are bilingual, speaking both French and English; nearly a million in Wales are also bilingual, with English as their second language. In the thinly peopled western Highlands and Isles of Scotland there is a small Gaelic-speaking population, which may number twenty thousand; and there is no certain knowledge of the numbers of the small minority in the Irish Free State who have a really effective knowledge of the Erse language.

But the most important divisions within the British Isles from our point of view depend more on the distribution of




FIG. 13.—THE BRITISH ISLES: POLITICAL DIVISIONS

NOTE.—The United Kingdom includes Great Britain (*i.e.* England, Scotland, and Wales) and Northern Ireland.

the population than on ancient boundaries. And by far the chief of its sub-regions is the English Lowland. This is the lowland area in the southeastern part of Great Britain,




FIG. 14.—LINGUISTIC DIVISIONS IN WALES AND MONMOUTH-SHIRE

no part of which rises to more than a thousand feet above sea-level. It extends inland from the east coast of England westward to the edge of the highlands of Wales and the southwestern peninsula, and northward from the south

coast to where the highlands of the North York Moors and the Lake District combine with the central and widest part of the Pennine Highland to form an incomplete barrier of high ground across the island, nearly half way between its northern and southern ends. The central and southern Pennines thrust a tongue of highland southwards for a hundred miles towards the centre of this Lowland. This combines with the great estuaries of the Humber and the Mersey to mark off its northeastern and northwestern sections in Yorkshire and Lancashire, but does not break its effective unity.

This English Lowland occupies more than a third of the area of Great Britain ; and in extent and fertility it is much greater than the total of all the remaining small and scattered lowlands of the island. It is also the most favoured division in climate, having neither the excessive rainfall of the west nor the too cool and cloudy summers of the north. Its inhabitants, including those of the industrial areas which lie among the foothills of the southern Pennines, number nearly thirty-five million people, more than three-quarters of the total for Great Britain. It has been the principal region of Britain throughout historic time, and there is little reason to think that its relative populousness was less in the past than it is today. It is the England of history and of tradition, the homeland, the area of development of the language, the institutions and the traditions of the Englishry.

Geographically and historically the chief routes of the English Lowland are focussed on its metropolitan district of London, in the middle of its southeastern quadrant, to such an extent that London has had no rival since England became one country a thousand years ago. And this position of the capital in the southeastern corner of the country, and thus nearer to the Continent than any other of its principal cities, has been a fact of considerable and permanent importance in the internal and external development of England and of the United Kingdom. The Narrow Seas which sever this




FIG. 15.—THE BRITISH ISLES: RELIEF

English Lowland from the nearby lands of the Continent are narrower than the spaces which separate it from the populous areas of Scotland and Ireland ; and down to the later Middle Ages<sup>1</sup> France and the " Low Countries " were of more direct interest to England than were these poorer, more distant, and less accessible countries to the north and west.<sup>2</sup>

In its northern half, all round the southern Pennines but particularly on their eastern flanks, this Lowland contains the principal coalfields of Great Britain, with much more than half of both its normal present output and its reserves. It also contains, in the jurassic " Edge " which traverses it diagonally from northeast to southwest, nearly the whole of the available iron ore resources of the island. Thus its relative importance in the life and economy of the United Kingdom is more likely to increase than to diminish ; and in fact a movement of population from north and west towards it is in progress. In the intercensal period 1921-31 the whole of the two million increase in the population of Great Britain was in the English Lowland ; and both Wales and Scotland experienced a decrease in population.

The only other important lowland in Great Britain is the Scottish Lowland, which stretches across the island from east to west between the Central and the Scottish Highlands, with an extension northwards along the eastern coast. It is separated from the English Lowland by the Central Highlands of Great Britain and a distance of over a hundred miles. It was fortunate for the unity of Great Britain that the most fertile parts of this lowland were effectively settled by the Angles in the same period as that of their settlements farther south, so that the folk of both English and Scottish Lowlands inherited the same language and social traditions. And when, after the union of England and Scotland in 1707,

<sup>1</sup> Say till the middle of the sixteenth century.

<sup>2</sup> The straight-line distances from London to their chief cities are in round numbers, respectively, to Antwerp 200 miles, to Paris 220 miles, to Dublin 300 miles, and to Edinburgh 320 miles.

the Industrial Revolution came, both lowlands, and North England between them, found themselves in possession of local deposits of coal and iron ores and so shared fully in the changes and growth of that period, as South Wales did also for the same reasons. This common evolution made of Great Britain one economic unit, and thereby greatly strengthened the bonds of union between the three countries ; while it has caused so much internal migration that the historic and administrative boundaries between England, Scotland, and Wales have now very little relation to any boundaries between English, Scottish, and Welsh populations.

As a political division England includes two other areas besides the English Lowland, namely the southwestern peninsula, which stretches a hundred miles out towards the Atlantic, and the " Border " country of North England, which is the southern half of the area of tangled highlands and small lowlands in the middle of Great Britain between the English and Scottish Lowlands. Neither is of much importance for this study ; but it should be noted that North England contains, on its eastern margin, one of the three important industrial regions of Great Britain which are not on the English Lowland ; and it has more inhabitants than Wales, though only a few more than half as many as Scotland. This Northeast Coast industrial area possesses almost unrivalled natural facilities for the development of the iron and steel industry ; and it is therefore of considerable economic and strategic importance.

On the western edge is Wales, a small country whose total area is a fourth of that of the English Lowland, with a population less than one-sixteenth as great. Most of the country is occupied by the barren and thinly-peopled Welsh Highland, which fills its area from east to west and almost from north to south, leaving only small projections of lowland to southeast, southwest, and northwest, and fringing strips along the north and south coasts. The chief of these




FIG. 16.—BRITISH ISLES: DENSITY OF POPULATION




FIG. 17.—BRITISH CONURBATIONS IN 1931 A.D.

NOTE.—The urban areas shown here (in Great Britain) together include 60 per cent. of the total population.

small lowlands are extensions from the English Lowland. More than three-fourths of the population of Wales is concentrated into the southeastern corner of the country, on the South Wales coalfield and the coastal lowland of Glamorgan (the Vale of Gwent); while most of the remaining fourth is on the narrow lowland edge to north-east and north. The northwestern lowland of Anglesey and the neighbouring coast is the only populous part of Wales which is distinctly separated from England; and that area, together with the westward sloping valleys of the Highland, forms "Welsh Wales" (see fig. 14, p. 71), with a population of about a quarter of a million. The chief valleys of Wales open out towards England; and this fact, together with the absence of any considerable area of fertile land within Wales, prevented any development of national unity till recent years. Wales has no natural capital or focus for its organization; and not until the nineteenth century was there any real approach to a Welsh nationalism over most of the country. The economic relations of its separate northern and southern populous areas are more direct and closer with the neighbouring parts of England than with each other. And the Welsh colonies in the great cities of England are perhaps the chief upholders of Welsh nationalism, which is a cultural rather than a political movement.

Scotland occupies the northern third of Great Britain and includes approximately one-ninth of its population. Most of its area is occupied by highlands which rise well above the upper limits of agriculture. The Scottish Highlands in the centre and northwest fill up half the country; and in the south it includes the northern part of the Central Highlands of Great Britain. Between these the Scottish Lowland occupies less than a sixth of the land, but contains all its large towns, except Aberdeen, and nine-tenths of its population. It is noteworthy that the structure lines and relief features of Scotland, including the Cheviot Hills on

its southern border, trend from northeast to southwest across the island from sea to sea. Hence the highland barriers cut up the country to a much greater extent than is the case in South Britain, where the relatively less extensive highlands do not form any continuous barrier across the island. The political and social unification of Scotland was therefore a much more difficult process than that of England ; and it was not fully accomplished till after the Union. Even now it takes longer to reach the remote parts of Scotland from Edinburgh or Glasgow than it does to reach corresponding parts of England from London.

There is no distinct Scottish language ; and the chief dialect-frontier between northern and southern forms of spoken English lies near the northern edge of the English Lowland, some sixty miles south of the Anglo-Scottish boundary, which is in no sense a linguistic or racial or social divide. From the population of the small and scattered lowlands and dales and glens of the northern half of Great Britain there has been for more than two centuries a steady outward migration, mainly to the richer lowland in the south of the island, but also to all other parts of the English-speaking world. These emigrants and their descendants are not the least successful or prominent members of the communities they have helped to build up ; a large proportion of them cherish the personal and sentimental ties which link them to their mother-country ; and the extent and strength of these associations is today one of the most important factors in the unity of the British Commonwealth, and in its relations to the other division of the Englishry in the United States of America.

Ireland lies west of Great Britain. It is thereby shut off from nearly all direct communication with the Continent ; and it has been in the lee of the larger island since the beginnings of the Iron Age. It has a little more than one-third of the area and a little less than one-tenth of the population of Great Britain.

At five separate places promontories of the larger island stretch out towards its smaller and more compact neighbour. From Scotland the projections which enclose the Firth of Clyde on the north and south respectively reach to within fourteen and twenty miles of the coast of Antrim. Farther south the distance between Holyhead and Howth Head is sixty miles ; and the two westward projections of the mainland of Wales are only fifty miles from Wicklow Head and Carnsore Point respectively. These distances are less than the corresponding shortest distances across the Narrow Seas between England and the Continent ; but the routes between the two islands illustrate the fact that the shortest distance is not always the determining factor in the choice of a sea route. The fourteen-mile passage from the northeast corner of Ireland to Kintyre has never been of any great importance, because its landward sides are poor highland areas which have no good communication with the lowlands beyond them. The next shortest passage has been tried, but is not now used because its shores are too much exposed to storms ; here the effective route is from Stranraer to Larne, a distance of about forty miles. This is the shortest regular crossing between the islands, and it is interesting to note that it is almost twice as long as that from Dover to Calais. But by far the most used of the shorter crossings is that between Holyhead and Dun Laoghaire (Kingstown), somewhat over sixty miles long, because it forms part of the most direct route between the most important lowland regions of the two islands, which are focussed on London and Dublin respectively. And even this central short route is less important for heavy traffic than those routes which connect Glasgow and the Lancashire ports of Liverpool and Heysham directly with Dublin and Belfast ; the latter also rival it for passenger traffic, though they are more than twice as long, because these longer routes make a direct link between more important areas. Most of the traffic is to and from the northwestern shore of




FIG. 18.—THE INLAND SEAS OF BRITAIN

the English Lowland. These longer routes are somewhat shorter than the corresponding routes between England and the Continent, London to Antwerp or Amsterdam, and Southampton to Havre, so that Ireland is actually a little nearer to Great Britain than Great Britain is to Europe.

The real zone of separation between England and Ireland is the combined width of the Welsh Highland and the St. George's Channel. Had St. George's Channel been as narrow and as accessible from England as the Strait of Dover it is probable that all the historic movements from the Continent to England would have extended to Ireland, and the two islands would thus have undergone a parallel evolution. As it was the Roman and Angle conquests never reached the smaller island, which was not directly influenced by the Roman Empire, or affected by the Angle settlements which changed the language and social organization of the lowlands of Great Britain. Ireland remained tribal in its social organization till the end of the Middle Ages. As it was not reached by the Romans, so it was less affected than Great Britain by nearly all subsequent waves from Europe, including that of the Reformation. This difference in its evolution was emphasized during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution by the contrast in the mineral resources of the two islands, for Ireland has no important deposits of coal or iron, and by the mercantile policy ruling at the time.

Within Ireland there are few internal barriers to mark off separate regions. Its many highlands are small and scattered, and they nowhere form a continuous barrier of any serious length. The poorer soils and excessive rains of the west and northwest have confined the chief centres of population to the central and eastern parts of the island, a distribution which is in general somewhat like that in Great Britain, so that in both islands the chief centres of population are rather towards the east and southeast. The east coast lowland of Ireland is broken by the coastal high-

lands of the Wicklow Mountains and the Mourne Mountains into three main segments which are focussed on the ports of Belfast, Dublin, and Waterford with Wexford, respectively. Of these Dublin has the advantages of being the most central, the Irish terminus of the best route from the English Lowland, and the best focus of internal routes for Ireland. Hence it is the natural metropolis.

But while the physical features of Ireland favour its unity, historical causes have divided its population into two nations. Racially the overwhelming majority of the Irish people are indistinguishable from those of Great Britain, and have been formed by a similar mixture of Mediterranean (or Neolithic) and Nordic types ; and the development of this racial identity has been aided by many cross currents of migration between the two islands within historic time. Within the same time Ireland has not been united politically except as the result of conquest. The country was twice conquered from England. The first conquest took place in the later Middle Ages, from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, and resulted in the establishment of Anglo-Norman (later Anglo-Irish) nobles and their retainers as rulers of extensive feudal domains and vassals to the Kings of England. The conquest was essentially similar to the earlier stages of those of Wales and some other countries. This first period of partial union with England came to an end during the Wars of the Roses in the second half of the fifteenth century ; when, owing to the paralysis of royal authority, the Anglo-Irish nobility became practically independent and merged with the Irish people ; while the country sank back into a medley of conflicting tribal territories.

The second conquest extended from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century ; it was begun under the Tudors and completed under the Cromwellian Protectorate, but partially reversed during the Restoration Period. It was part of a conscious effort

to bring the whole of the British Isles under one rule, which followed the end of the continental ambitions of England after the loss of Calais in 1558 A.D. It is one of the greatest historical misfortunes of the peoples of the British Isles that this conquest was made immediately after the peoples of Great Britain had broken away from the Church of Rome, and before that movement spread to Ireland. Hence the wars of conquest became also wars of religion ; as wars of religion they have left a long-enduring legacy of hatred and oppression which has embittered all the subsequent relations between the peoples of the two islands ; and the division between Roman Catholic and Protestant is still a primary political division of the Irish peoples. All through the second conquest there was a planting of settlers on land taken from the defeated people. Over southern and central Ireland these settlers were mostly English and they formed only a minority of the total population. But in Northern Ireland a large proportion of them came from Scotland, and here the Protestants form a majority. Also they are much nearer to their homeland and have maintained a more intimate intercourse with it than have the settlers in the rest of Ireland ; and so they have resisted assimilation to a greater extent. Hence we get the distinction which, since 1922, is reflected in the political division of Ireland between the Irish Free State, of whose population more than seven-eighths are Roman Catholics, and Northern Ireland, in which Protestants form nearly two-thirds. The differences between the Irish Free State and the United Kingdom (which still includes Northern Ireland) have also been aided by the differing development of the two islands since the Industrial Revolution, in which the lack of useful coal and iron deposits in Ireland prevented that country from sharing in the industrial growth of England, Scotland, and Wales. While the fact that Belfast became in part an industrial outlier of Great Britain, drawing its coal and iron from, and selling its ships mainly to, the larger island, helped to

strengthen the links which bind Northern Ireland to Scotland and England, and made Belfast a rival of Dublin as a metropolis. And if the attempts of the Free State authorities to revive the Erse language have any real success, it will be at the cost of erecting a formidable linguistic barrier between the two nations in Ireland.

Against all these separating influences there are still many factors making for union among the peoples of the British Isles. So many Irish have migrated to Great Britain that there are now probably almost as many there as in the Free State itself; London, Glasgow, Liverpool, and Tyneside in particular are among the larger Irish cities, and each of them contains more Irish than any city of the Free State except Dublin. Many of the descendants of English immigrants to Ireland still have close connections with England. Geographical contiguity, linguistic unity, and long political association have forged innumerable links between the peoples which will count for more and more in their relations with one another as the passage of time, and the problems of a self-governing state, allow the memories of ancient hatreds to fade away. Both in past centuries and at the present time, English literature has been greatly enriched by Irish writers; and the transference of Irish genius and talent to a different language would be an immeasurable loss to all those who read and speak English, and a wasteful restriction of the range of appeal and influence of the Irish themselves.

The industrial revolution which has remade the world in the last two centuries began in Great Britain. In addition to the island's advantages of geographical position and insularity it made available those of its readily accessible coalfields; and owing to her early start in industrialization, and the devastation of Europe in the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain became early in the nineteenth century the chief, and for a few decades almost the only, industrial manufacturing country. One of the chief bases of this

industrial development was the use of coal as fuel in steam engines to generate mechanical power. It drew to the coalfields the new industries which it created ; and the densely peopled industrial areas thus developed on and close to the coalfields are still the chief workshops of the heavy industries of Great Britain.

The coal occurs chiefly in a series of basins which lie on the flanks of the Central Highlands, at the northern end in Scotland, to the east in Northumberland and Durham and in Yorkshire, to the west in Cumberland and in Lancashire, and to the south in the Midland coalfields. A second series of coal basins extends across the south of the British Isles from Tipperary to Kent ; but the only considerable field in this series is that of South Wales and Monmouthshire. There is no coal in the ancient highlands of the oceanic margin. Thus all the important coalfields are in the central sections of Great Britain between the " Highland Line " in Scotland and an approximately parallel line, along the valleys of the rivers Avon and Welland, which almost bisects the English Lowland in crossing it from the Wash southwestwards towards the estuary of the Severn. These central regions of Great Britain together form one of the three greatest industrial regions of the world, and the technical base of British industrial and military power ; and it should be noted as an important fact of our political geography that the metropolitan region lies between this Industrial Britain and the Continent. The only coalfields outside these central sections are the small ones in Somerset, and the recently opened, but as yet unimportant, Kentish field, which together mine only an insignificant proportion of the total coal produced.

Owing to the narrowness of the island of Great Britain, whose average width from east to west is somewhat less than a hundred and fifty miles, and in which no part is as much as eighty miles from tidewater, all the coalfields and industrial districts are near the sea, and land carriage of heavy and

bulky raw materials is reduced almost to its minimum. The first coalfields to be developed were those actually on the




FIG. 19.—INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN

coast ; and these are still the ones which export the largest proportions of their coal. The importance of this coal export in British trade arises from the fact that coal forms the chief bulky outward cargo and so is one of the chief

means of paying freights on the outward voyages of the ships which bring in food and raw materials. Part of the vast mercantile marine of nineteenth-century Great Britain was built up on the export of coal.

The fundamental manufacturing industries were also built up on coal, and located on or near to the coalfields. The production of iron and steel, the most vital industry of our industrial civilization, both in peace and in war, was formerly carried on on nearly all the coalfields of Great Britain ; but its present chief centres are round Teesmouth, in the Scottish Lowland, and on the Yorkshire and South Wales coalfields, with a promise of an important centre in the east Midlands. The great textile industries of cottons and woollens are markedly concentrated in Lancashire and in West Yorkshire, while the heavy chemicals are mainly in their older centre of South Lancashire and the newer one by Teesmouth, side by side with the iron industry. The very miscellaneous industries grouped under the name of engineering are very widespread ; but they all depend on the iron and steel industry for their principal raw materials ; and the heavy engineering work, in shipbuilding and constructional steelwork, is closely associated with that industry and located on the Clyde, on the Northeast Coast of England, and in South Yorkshire.

These heavy industries, of coal, iron and steel, textiles, chemicals, and engineering, are thus all in the group of areas in Mid-Britain which forms Industrial Britain and is the technical base of her industry, and her munition base in war. This is at its nearest only some two hundred miles distant from the nearest point of the Continent at Calais. Many of the lighter industries, including those concerned with automobiles, the lighter textiles, electrical fittings, and so on, occur farther to the southeast and are strongly influenced by the attraction of London, which is both the largest market and the best distributing centre for their products, and the financial centre whence their organization is controlled.

The metropolitan region focussed on London lies midway between the southeastern edge of Industrial Britain and the nearest part of the coast of the Continent, and this situation of London itself is also a fact of great importance in the political geography of Great Britain. The metropolitan conurbation of Greater London includes some ten million people, or more than a fifth of the total population of the island ; and it is by far the largest single urban group, even though there is almost as large a population within a thirty-five miles radius from Manchester City Hall as within the same distance from Charing Cross. London is primarily a seaport and a commercial and financial city, and those of its industries which are not directly dependent on its local market are of secondary importance. But it is the centre of government and economic organization, the chief node of the railway and road systems, and the largest importing port and distributing centre ; while the magnitude of its population makes it also the largest local market for many classes of goods. The centre of London is hardly more than sixty miles from Dover ; and some of its suburbs are within long-cannon-range of the nearest Continental shore. This nearness to the southern and eastern coasts of England and to the Continent makes London peculiarly exposed to air attack ; so that it is now probably more vulnerable than the capital of any other Great Power. This vulnerability of its capital is quite a new fact in the political and military geography of Britain, which has for several centuries regarded the Narrow Seas as a barrier impassable by her enemies.

The most important of all the problems of the political and economic geography of Great Britain arises from her dependence on overseas lands for the supply of a large part of her foodstuffs and some essential raw materials of her industries. We may regard the British Isles as one region for this purpose ; since not until they were completely defeated could any enemy prevent traffic across their Inland

Seas. These islands contain fifty million people on an area of about a hundred and twenty thousand square miles, of which not much more than half is good cultivable land. Little of it is desert, except the peat bogs of its western margins and the highest parts of its highlands ; but a large proportion suffers from the drawbacks of excessive rainfall, insufficient summer heat, or poor soils, and is therefore poor land. And the whole region is so far from the equator that it has but a short growing season. Even under present conditions it is probable that by skilful and thorough cultivation of all its good land, and a full utilization of the poorer land and the fisheries, the country might be able to produce nearly half of the food needed to support its present population on their present standards of living. The rest of the food must be imported ; and since the chief means of paying for this food is by the export of British manufactured goods and services the import of raw materials for the great manufacturing industries is also essential to the maintenance of the present population. Any serious check to these imports of food and other materials, whether through blockade, or embargo, or destruction of merchant shipping, or political, financial, or commercial upheavals, would be disastrous ; and a stoppage for even a short time would cause famine. The maintenance of a steady flow of the essential imports is, under present conditions, necessary to the very existence of the people.

The fact that the great majority of the population is concentrated in the southeastern part of the islands, together with its dependence on oversea supplies, determines the most important areas of the neighbouring seas. They are, first the Narrow Seas to the southeast, from beyond which has come every serious invasion or threat to the security of these countries in the past, and across which are the only probable dangers of the same type in the future. And, secondly, those areas of the sea which we call the "Western Approaches," the seas between the south coast of Ireland

and the north coast of Brittany, over which must come the greater part of the imports, especially of the cereals and raw materials which are obtained mainly from the New World. The safety of traffic through the Western Approaches is essential to the existence of the people of Great Britain ; while the moat of the Narrow Seas is their zone of defence against foreign aggression.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE BRITISH ISLES—EXTERNAL

BEFORE the Age of Discovery, Great Britain was an island off the edge of the Continent, backed by the impassable ocean. It lay on the outer northwestern margin of the world of men and of civilization ; and its peoples were therefore of relatively little importance in the development of civilization. At that time England was at best only a minor European state ; and not until more than a century after the discovery of the Americas did Great Britain rise to the rank of one of the Great Powers.

The discovery of the New World revolutionized the geographical position of Great Britain. And now that major exploration is practically complete she finds herself almost at the centre of the land hemisphere of the globe. From being an outlier of ancient and medieval civilization she is moved to a central position in the modern world. This centrality in the Land Hemisphere does not produce its full effects in giving to Great Britain a central location on the great routes of the world because to the north lies the polar ice. The ice barrier completely prohibits navigation across the North Polar Sea, which would otherwise form the direct highway from Great Britain to the Pacific Ocean and its bordering lands. But in spite of this barrier, and of the high northern latitudes of the British Isles, the fact that the centre of the Land Hemisphere lies near the south of England is one that helps to make this country a major node of important world routes, both seaways and landways, and in the near future also airways.

The most obvious and most important primary fact in the

external political geography of these islands is their nearness to continental Europe, from which they are separated only by the Narrow Seas.

Europe as a cultural region of continuous habitation extends from the sub-arctic tundra southwards to the Sahara and Arabian deserts, and from the Atlantic Ocean eastwards to the break in the oikumene formed by the Ural Highlands and the Caspian and Persian deserts. Within these limits it covers a total area of some four million square




FIG. 20.—THE CENTRAL POSITION OF THE BRITISH ISLES  
The area within the circle is the Land Hemisphere.

miles, or nearly a twelfth of the available land of the world, and includes nearly a fourth of all mankind. It is thus one of the three most important regions of the world ; perhaps the most important region of development of civilization, since it is the home and focus of that " Western Civilization " which is now dominating the whole world. And within its natural frontiers of ocean and desert Europe has a larger continuous area of good, habitable land than has any other region in the temperate zones. Hence it is likely to remain the most important major human region of the world. (Cf. fig. 61, p. 369.)




FIG. 21.—WORLD MAP CENTRED ON LONDON

Physically the British Isles are a part of the European sub-continent. They lie on the continental shelf of north-west Europe, and are marked off from the rest of Europe only by the shallow seas which have been formed by the flooding of a part of the Great Lowland since the last Ice Age. They lie just off the northwestern edge of the Continent, with their fertile lowlands near to it and their more barren highlands along the oceanic margins of the islands ; so that in all four countries the chief towns are towards the east. London, Edinburgh, Dublin, and Cardiff are each nearer to Europe than any other large town in their respective countries.

In Europe north of the Alps the distribution of highlands and lowlands and natural routes tends to focus its life in the valleys of the great rivers which flow to the Narrow Seas and the Baltic, from the Seine to the Elbe and the Vistula. And for two or three centuries past the countries round these Narrow Seas have been the leaders of Western Civilization and its expansion, and in the colonization and exploitation of the New World. Here, in France, Germany, the Low Countries, and England, is the primary focal region of the modern world, and the homelands of its dominant peoples. Of their three great capitals, London, Paris, and Berlin, it is significant that only that of the British is a seaport and so actually on the great seaways which come to a focus here. Any study of the geography and the political relations of England must take account of the great fact that she is a part of this vital region, separated from its larger continental sections only by the Narrow Seas.

At the Strait of Dover, off the southeastern corner of England, our island is separated from the Continent by a distance of only twenty-one miles. For three hundred miles westward along the English Channel this distance gradually increases until from Cornwall to Brittany it is over a hundred miles. Northward from Dover the sea separating us from the Continent widens steadily to a hundred

miles between East Anglia and North Holland, and beyond that very sharply to more than four hundred miles between Scotland and Jutland. But farther north the westward projection of Norway combines with the easterly trend of



FIG. 22.—THE NARROW SEAS AND THEIR COASTLANDS

northern Scotland to reduce the northern opening of the North Sea to a width of barely two hundred miles between Shetland and west Norway.

Just to the south of the Narrow Seas the western end of the Mid-World Mountain Belt comes to the Atlantic coast in northern Spain, and approaches it in the Alps and the

western outliers of highland in central France. To the northwest these Narrow Seas penetrate the breaks between the highlands of Norway, Scotland, and northwest Ireland, which belong to one and the same geological structural series. To the north of the Mid-World Mountains, from the Alps and Karpathians to the Caucasus and the Hindu Kush, lies the Great Lowland of Eurasia, which extends for some four thousand miles eastward from the shores of the Narrow Seas to the foot of the East Siberian and Altai Highlands. This is the greatest continuous expanse of lowland on the globe. To the south and east it is bordered by great mountains and wide, often desert, plateaus and to the north by the icebound margins of the North Polar Sea ; only to the west does it come into direct contact with seas open to navigation. Here is the "Ocean Gate" of Europe, between Brittany and Norway. And here the British Isles lie between it and the open ocean, stretching across it for seven hundred miles like a vast breakwater ; so that all the ocean traffic of the populous west of the Great Lowland must pass by the shores of Great Britain ; and the Strait of Dover is the busiest channel of all the high seas.

It is a fact of common observation that the possession of direct access to the sea is of great value to any country in its economic and political relations as well as in its cultural developments. Across a land frontier a state comes into direct contact with only one neighbour ; but at the shore of a navigable sea it becomes a neighbour to all the peoples who go down to the sea in ships. The sea is the common highway open to all who have access to its shores. Unlike the highways of the land it requires no costly construction or maintenance of roads to make it available for traffic. And, chiefly for that reason, and because of the low frictional resistance of water, the cost of carriage by sea for any considerable distance is everywhere very much less than the cost of land carriage for corresponding distances. It is by far the cheapest of all transport routes. The value of this

open highway is well shown by the efforts made by all civilized land-bound states to obtain access to it. The bulk of the long-distance traffic of the world is sea-borne, even between countries situated on the same land mass or between distant parts of the same country if both parts have good access to the sea. Only comparatively light and costly goods can bear the great expense of long land jour-




FIG. 23.—THE OCEAN GATE OF EUROPE

neys, or the still greater expense of air transport. Thus the great trade routes of the world are on the seaways ; and the Ocean Gate of Europe, which is a nodal region for such routes, is also the chief commercial focus of the world.

The value of Great Britain's position in this Ocean Gate is considerably increased by her possession of a large number of good natural harbours and by the form of the shores of the Narrow Seas. In the Channel all the natural conditions combine to place the great route of shipping close to the English shore. This northern shore is formed by a series

of half a dozen sweeping reëntrant curves, of no great depth, separated by prominent cusped headlands which are mostly composed of relatively high land. On the south shore the peninsula of Cotentin breaks the French coast into only two reëntrants, each of which is very much larger than the English bays. The tidal wave entering from the southwest sweeps round the northern curves and is reflected thence to the southern side, which is on the whole more cumbered with silt. No large river enters the Channel from England ; but the drowned estuaries of many small valleys give the English coast a large number of good harbours in the western two-thirds of its length, from Falmouth and Plymouth to Southampton and Portsmouth ; and these harbours, partly because of the small size of the streams which flow into them, are less liable to become silted up than the estuaries on the French side. To balance these the south shore has only Le Havre and the artificial harbour of Cherbourg. But the relation to navigation is the most important difference between the two shores of the Channel. When near land it is customary for a ship to use point-to-point sailing, checking her position by sighting suitable landmarks by day or lights by night. At the ocean entrance to the Channel rise the alternative landmarks of the Lizard Head and Cape Ushant, and on almost all the counts which make a good landmark the Lizard is far superior to Ushant. It is much higher, and the shoals which extend out from it are much less extensive than the reefs which make the approach within sight of Ushant dangerous. But above all once the navigator has sighted the Lizard he can continue directly along the Channel within sight of the English shore, keeping all the way in a safe depth and yet so near to land as to be able to see at least two headlands or lights from every point on his course till he is past the Strait of Dover. While from Ushant he must either cross to the English side or pass the more dangerous bay between Brittany and Cotentin, which contains the rocky islets and reefs of the

Channel Isles and is swept by strong tidal currents. East of Cotentin also the direct course to Dover Strait lies nearer to the English shore and out of sight of the French coast. The whole form of the Channel causes the lane of ocean traffic to hug the south coast of England within sight of her headlands and lighthouses. It is no mere figure of speech which says that here :

“ . . . The coastwise lights of England  
Watch the ships of England home.”

And not the ships of England only.

North of the Strait of Dover there is a contrast between London River, the tidal estuary of the Thames, and the combined delta of the Rhine and Scheldt which makes London a more accessible port than Antwerp or Amsterdam and not less so than Rotterdam. But here, with modern developments of engineering, the artificial dredging and equipment of a great port is able to counterbalance natural advantages of this order ; and London's chief advantage over the Rhine ports lies in its unity as against their diversity, and in the political distributions which place customs barriers at a short distance behind the Rhine ports, between them and their natural hinderland. While to complete the tale of the natural advantages of Great Britain in this ocean gateway we note that at the northern end of the island it is extended by the Orkneys and Shetlands to latitudes well beyond those of the populous shores of the Continent. Here the chief route to the ocean lies through the Pentland Firth, bordered by the harbour of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys and by many less known harbours. This northern way to the open ocean is, for all ports of the European shores between Norway and France, longer than that by Dover Strait ; and it lies in one of the stormiest areas of the world. Hence it is comparatively little used by European shipping.

In the southeast of Europe there is a waterway from the Great Lowland through the mountain systems in the

straits which lead from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, whence there is connection with the oceans by the defiles of the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. But this is a minor route in comparison with the direct westward way past the shores of Great Britain ; and it lies too far to the east to serve the more populous and industrialized parts of Europe. The chief land routes of the Great Lowland meet the ocean routes between Norway and Brittany; and here, chiefly round the southern half of the North Sea, is the chief node of world routes. Here also is the centre of the land hemisphere of the world, which contains about nine-tenths of the total area of habitable land, so that this nodal region is also in a high degree a central region of the inhabited world. Thus the position of Great Britain here is one of great strategical value in culture, in commerce, and in war ; and, while her position as the chief naval Power in the Narrow Seas is essential to her own life and security so long as war on the seas is probable, it is nonetheless capable of being regarded as a menace to the European Powers. It could not be maintained against a really united Europe, whose land base is so much greater than that formed by the British Isles.

Before the Age of Discovery this location of the British Isles off the northwest corner of the Continent, backed by the impassable ocean, made them physically and culturally merely an outlier of Europe, from which they derived their population and the bases of their culture, and through which lay their only possible contact with other inhabited lands. During all our history before the sixteenth century the whole of our overseas relations were with Europe, or through Europe with the dimly-known lands beyond it in the "East." Even a short hundred and fifty years ago there was no possibility of doubt that Britain was primarily and essentially a European state, an outlier and outpost of Europe in the ocean. Have the developments of the last three centuries altered that position ? Little more than a

century ago a British foreign minister could speak of "calling in the New World to redress the balance of the Old," in his protest against the policies of the Holy Alliance. Today may it be said that for Great Britain the New World outweighs the Old ?

A little more than a century after the voyages of Columbus the first English colonies were founded in North America<sup>1</sup>; and from that time the relations of the British Isles with the New World have been continuously expanding and becoming closer until they are now in some respects more important than her relations with Europe. In the seventeenth century England, and after 1707 Great Britain, steadily became the leader among the colonizing Powers, a position which was greatly facilitated by the relative freedom from the continental entanglements and dangers of her rivals which she owed to her insular position and the loss of the last of her medieval possessions on the mainland in the sixteenth century. By the end of the eighteenth century the rivalry between the colonizing Powers had ended in the establishment of the decisive naval supremacy of Britain, a supremacy which was unchallenged from 1805 to 1898. During these same centuries the Industrial Revolution transformed a large part of both the internal and external economic and geographical conditions of Britain, the country in which it originated and in which its effects have been most fully felt. The population of Great Britain has increased more than fourfold within the island, while it has also sent out emigrants whose total numbers are greater than those of the population of the homeland at the beginning of this period of expansion; and the trans-oceanic intercourse and trade has steadily grown, both absolutely and relatively to the total external exchanges, until now it far exceeds that maintained across the Narrow Seas. In the sixteenth century Britain began the modern age as an outlying fragment of Europe. By the eighteenth

<sup>1</sup> Newfoundland 1583 & 1623, Virginia 1607, Bermuda 1612, New England 1620.

century she had become the chief outpost of Europe towards the New World beyond the oceans. The growth of her connections with that New World has placed her between it and Europe ; and the pull on her of all the links which now attach her to the younger lands is so great that it is arguable that in this twentieth century she is more closely bound to her daughter lands beyond the oceans than to the old Europe of which she was once a part.

The most important century of British history is that which has just passed. During it the steamship and the railway and the telegraph and telephone have revolutionized the means of communication. During it the population of Great Britain has multiplied threefold at home, from 14,091,757 in 1821 to 42,769,196 in 1921, and her wealth has increased twentyfold ; while she has sent out to the New World a flood of emigrants more numerous than her total population of 1801, and they have multiplied in the new countries in which they settled at least as rapidly as the home population. During that century the present British Empire has been mainly built up, though its foundations had already been laid by earlier generations ; and all the younger States of the Commonwealth came into separate existence as independent states within that period. These developments may fairly be set against the effects of the preceding ten or twenty centuries during which Britain was an outlier of Europe ; and they explain her present-day position between Europe and the New World.

More than two-thirds of the total area of the New World is occupied by the two Americas and Australia and New Zealand, regions which are sometimes regarded as forming the whole of the New World in a narrower sense of that term. These three sub-continental regions contain together nearly two-fifths of the available land area of the world. Nearly all of it falls into two great human or cultural regions, deriving their culture from Latin Europe and from England respectively. Of these, Latin America, which includes

Mexico and almost the whole of Central and South America, is dominated by the languages and culture introduced from Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and reinforced by later immigrations from and cultural connections with those lands and the other great countries of Latin Europe, France, and Italy ; so that the " Latin " countries of South and Central America and of southwestern Europe form a distinct group within the modern world, bound together by a common culture which is a part of our civilization rather than by political or commercial ties.

North of the republic and Gulf of Mexico lies an area approximately equal to that of Latin America. This, with the exception of the one Province of Quebec, may well be termed " English<sup>1</sup> America " since it is related to England in ways similar to those which link Latin America to Latin Europe. Over all English America the English language and its traditions, the English Common Law, and Protestant forms of Christianity, form the bases on which the social and cultural life of its communities has been built up ; just as the life of Latin America is largely based on the Spanish and Portuguese languages, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Roman Law. English America is far greater than Latin America in population and in wealth ; it contains a much smaller proportion of the aboriginal Amerindian peoples, and of the descendants of the imported Negroes ; and it has reached a more advanced stage of economic and political development. Like Latin America it has close cultural relations with a distinctive group of European nations, in this case those of northwestern Europe ; but it has greater linguistic unity, and it is divided politically between only two major units—British North America and the United States of America.

<sup>1</sup> Note that English is not used here as a political adjective. It refers to a people and the language, law, and traditions which they have built up. Politically the people of England are British, citizens of the British Commonwealth.

The peoples and states of Australia and New Zealand are more completely British in their origin and their cultural relations than are those of English America. And in North America and Australia and New Zealand together the lands of the Englishry occupy nearly half the total area and population of the New World, in the widest sense of that term.

Hence the links which bind the peoples of the British Isles to the New World, and turn their attention and interests away from Europe, are many and strong. All the rest of the British Commonwealth is in the New World ; and there also dwell the greater part of the English-speaking peoples ; so that in her political relationships, and to a large and increasing extent in her cultural affiliations, Britain herself is almost a part of the New World. For the "good European " the New World begins at the Strait of Dover ; across which he finds a people whose chief interests and sympathies are no longer focussed on Europe.

Keeping in mind the importance of the New World in the overseas relations of the British Isles it is convenient to discuss these relations in reference to three great divisions.

These are :

1. The rest of the British Empire.
2. Europe, including for statistical statements all the territories of the Soviet Union.
3. The rest of the world, in which the chief unit is the United States of America.

Of the chief components of the external relations of Great Britain the value of its trade is the most easily measurable and one of the most important ; and so it may be briefly considered here. The total external trade of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in 1930 was returned at a value of more than seventeen hundred million pounds sterling in round

numbers. As divided among the three great divisions here considered this is :

	Millions of £
With rest of British Empire . . . . .	573
With rest of Europe. . . . .	650
With rest of world (including U.S.A. 194) . . . . .	481

so that there is an approach to equality of the three great divisions.

It should be noted that trade with the Irish Free State accounted for 87 of the 573 with the rest of the Empire ; and that nearly nine-tenths of the external trade of the Irish Free State was with the United Kingdom (87 out of 102), and of the remaining fifteen million pounds, about two-thirds was with the New World. Before 1922 all Ireland was in the United Kingdom for customs purposes, a fact which should be allowed for in comparisons before and after that date.

It is very obvious from the above figures that less than a third of the external trade of the British Isles is now carried on with the nearby countries of the Continent. In trade relations Britain has evidently already turned away from Europe to a considerable extent. And our imports from Europe consist largely of manufactured articles, which could be made in Great Britain, and of luxuries, while those from the New World include a large share of our food and raw materials.

In so far as postal intercourse is on purely business matters it is likely to be proportional to the volume of trade. Apart from this it is self-evident that the volume of intercourse between peoples who use the same language is likely to be much greater than that between other peoples, particularly in regard to books and magazines. Many English writers in Great Britain have found that the sales of their books are greater in the United States than in Great Britain, essentially because that country has more than double the population, and proportionally as large in the

overseas dominions, *i.e.* the book market depends mainly on the numbers of the people who use the language.

There is hardly a family in the British Isles, especially among the middle and artisan classes, which does not keep up a more or less regular correspondence with relatives and friends overseas in the other dominions or in the United States. This intercourse of private persons on personal and family affairs is one of the strongest links in the connection between the peoples of the British Isles and those of the other lands of the Englishry. It has led to cheaper postage to and from those lands, which in turn tends to encourage and help its extension. And it has no parallel in our relations with the rest of the world.

Is it possible to measure this connection? A summary of postal figures for the world is published in the annual reports of the International Postal Union from its office at Bern, usually some years after that to which the figures refer. From this report I quote some figures referring to 1925.<sup>1</sup> In that year the British Post Office sent out from the United Kingdom 328 million postal packets (letters, postcards, and newspapers).

Of these a little over a fourth went to Europe,  
over a third went to the other States of the  
Commonwealth,  
over a sixth went to the British dependencies.

Together well over half was within the Empire.

Outside the Empire the greatest volume went to the United States, which received about a ninth of the total, *i.e.* fifty per cent. more than Canada, but less than a third of the amount going to all the dominions together.

Among non-English-speaking countries the largest volume went to France; but France received less than any one of the Irish Free State, Canada, Australia and New

<sup>1</sup> The returns are sent in triennially, and those for the three years 1926–28 are the latest available. A study of these shows no important change in the proportions.

Zealand, or the United States, and very slightly more than India. Yet it is probable that a very high proportion of the British people abroad on holiday were in France.

If we assume that the business correspondence is proportional to the value of the trade, and allot the excess to personal communications and exchange of books and magazines, etc., we can estimate that of all the postal communications sent to the other States of the Commonwealth, two-thirds are of this personal relation character, of those to the United States nearly a third are personal, to the dependencies perhaps a fifth, while to foreign countries the proportion of personal correspondence is very small.

One of the most important factors in the external intercourse of a country is the extent to which its people actually visit other lands, and to which it is visited by others, as well as the extent to which it is a country of emigration or immigration.

During the last two centuries the British Isles have sent out large numbers of emigrants to the New World. Records of the numbers of these emigrants have been kept only since 1815. From that year to 1852 the total was no less than 3,463,592. After 1852 the flood of emigration to North America set in in earnest; and also our records from 1853 onwards distinguish between British emigrants and aliens passing through this country. From 1853 to 1931 inclusive the total number of emigrants of British origin going to lands outside Europe was 15,876,000, a number which is almost the same as that of the total population of the British Isles in 1801.

In 1930 nearly two million passengers left this country for places abroad; most of them only as visitors to oversea lands, for the flood of emigration has fallen to a mere trickle within the last twenty years, and in that year the net outward balance of trans-oceanic passengers was less than fifty thousand. The numbers for 1930 were :

Passengers to non-European ports . . . .	327,992
Passengers from non-European ports . . . .	290,369
	<hr/>
Balance outward . . . .	37,623
Passengers to European (incl. all Mediterranean) ports .	1,504,857
Passengers from European (incl. all Mediterranean) ports	1,549,991
	<hr/>
Balance inward . . . .	45,134

Evidently most of those who go abroad for a short holiday, and the vast majority of our oversea tourists, go to some part of Europe, a natural result of the relative distances to Europe and to other lands ; though it is probable that the majority of those who go abroad for more than a brief holiday go to lands outside Europe. But the comparative intensity of intercourse which results from travel is not to be measured by the mere numbers of the travellers. It is very much influenced by the proportion the travellers bear to the total population of the lands concerned ; and therefore it is of interest to note that the travellers between the British Isles and North America are twice as numerous in proportion to the joint population of those lands as are the travellers between Britain and Europe.

The amount of actual intercourse which results depends even more on the extent to which the traveller comes into real contact with the minds of the people amongst whom he sojourns : and a really effective contact is only possible when the traveller can speak the language of the country. Few British people are really masters of even one European language ; and still fewer are at home in more than one. But the peoples of Europe speak many different languages—at least seven of these languages are spoken by over ten million people each and six others by more than five million each—and no one language will enable the traveller to talk with more than a small proportion of the inhabitants of Europe. That continent is cut into many sections by a number of effective linguistic barriers.

In this important respect the position of the English-speaking traveller in the New World offers a most striking contrast to his position in Europe. More than a third of the peoples of the New World speak English as their mother-tongue, or, excluding the Negroes of Africa, nearly two-thirds of the civilized populations of the New World are English-speaking—an approach to linguistic unity which is a remarkable contrast to the linguistic diversity of Europe and other parts of the Old World.

Even outside the British and American Commonwealths, the English language is the most useful means of intercourse for the traveller throughout all the British and American dependencies, and in the Far East. And it is probably more useful than any other foreign language in most of Latin America. Just as the effectiveness of Great Britain's intercourse with Europe is enormously reduced by the barrier of difference of languages, so the community of speech enables her peoples to enjoy a far more real intercourse with the rest of the Englishry beyond the oceans, in spite of the much greater distances which separate them. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the difference in the quality and extent of the actual intercourse between peoples which results from these different linguistic relations. The chief obstacles to human intercourse now remaining on the earth are the linguistic barriers which hinder mutual comprehension. Between the peoples of the British Isles and the most important peoples of the New World there is no such barrier ; but many linguistic barriers separate them from the peoples of Europe.

So far we have dealt almost more with the intercourse of the peoples of the British Isles with those of the New World and of Europe than with the location of the islands. But for many centuries, and not least in this twentieth century, Great Britain has been continuously in close contact with Europe and with European peoples and states. No one who influences the attitude and outlook of the peoples of

these islands can ever afford to forget their nearness to Europe. If Great Britain is not actually in Europe she is at least well within its shadow. The present population of Europe is nearly ten times that of the British Isles ; and its areas and resources are proportionately much greater than this figure indicates. The nearness of this overwhelming mass is a fundamental fact in the location of Great Britain. From London to Paris or Berlin is less than a day's journey. But the journey to Montreal or New York takes five to nine days, to Capetown fifteen to twenty days, and to Sydney or Melbourne from thirty to fifty days. Great Britain is inevitably closely interested in European affairs ; and if she stood alone she would find Europe of far greater importance to her than all the rest of the world.

The nineteenth century was the century of Great Britain. In no previous century of the modern world was the economic and political leadership of one state so decisive. And there is no present probability that any one country will ever be able to repeat that unquestioned leadership. Note that from 1815 to 1898 the supremacy of the British navy was never challenged. In 1815 Great Britain was supreme on the high seas of the world and was also the only one of the Great Powers whose home territory had not suffered invasion during the Napoleonic Wars. Europe was exhausted, and the United States still in its infancy. Great Britain alone at that time possessed readily accessible deposits of good coal. Here the Industrial Age began ; and it concentrated in this country its first great accumulations of population, of wealth, and of economic and political power, to such an extent that during the first half of the Industrial Age, Great Britain had no serious rival.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the British Empire outside the home countries consisted almost wholly of a few footholds on the edges of vast empty territories. Canada was British, but was still very weak and threatened by the annexationist policy of some parties in her growing

though very youthful neighbour—a policy decisively defeated in 1812. In Australia and South Africa the Empire had only a foothold, and little more than that in India ; while New Zealand was still unexplored and unsettled.

The feebleness, slowness, and uncertainty of long oversea communications at that time, made the communications between all these territories and the homeland small and slow ; while the general belief, based mainly on the experience with the Thirteen Colonies and on that of Spain and Portugal in Latin America, was that all these colonies would naturally and inevitably separate from the homeland when they grew up. Hence these oversea lands counted for little in the life of Great Britain, certainly for far less than did the more accessible and populous countries of Europe.

Also, on the smaller scale of human political and economic organization before the Age of Steamships and Railways, Great Britain was a relatively large country. The huge area of such an Empire as that of Russia was so fully counter-balanced by the difficulties and slowness of transport over its vast distances that it counted for less than did France or Great Britain. The infant United States suffered from the same handicap. Until the coming of railways the handicap of mere distance prevented the effective consolidation of any lands of sub-continental magnitude. It may be argued that the breakup of the First British Empire in the latter part of the eighteenth century was due largely to the fact that the Atlantic was then at least six-weeks wide, and that therefore no close or frequent intercourse between the peoples or the governments was possible. Such distances made continuous effective co-operation between peoples of distant lands quite impossible ; and the strongest states of the period, the Great Powers of Europe, were all based on territories of moderate extent, from the hundred thousand square miles of Prussia or Britain to nearly double that area for Austria and France. Further it is noteworthy that no state whose territory extended to much more than three hundred

miles away from its metropolitan district escaped some movements of secession in such distant areas during the century which preceded the first railway.

The invention and development of the steamship gave a more reliable and rapid means of ocean transport ; and it enabled Great Britain to build up her overseas connections and strengthen her influence on all the shores of the oceans. There is some truth in the assertions that the British Empire of today is a product of the steamship ; and that it is British because Great Britain was the maritime state which took the lead in the development and exploitation of the steamship. In the same way the railway made it possible to link together effectively the widely separated areas of one continuous land mass in the temperate zones ; and the United States is as much a product of the railway as the British Empire is of the steamship.

These mechanical inventions, supplemented by the telegraph and later improvements in communications, changed the whole scale of economic and political geography. They provided some of the material pre-requisites for the growth and organization of far vaster Powers than the Great Powers of Eighteenth-century Europe. But only three important states in the world were in a position to make any full use of them during the nineteenth century. The British peoples, primarily by means of the steamship, but in the larger dominions and dependencies also by the railway, built up a vast Empire along the seaways ; while the United States and Russia each built up a land Empire of sub-continental magnitude by means of the railway. China has similar, but as yet almost unused, possibilities of development ; and Argentina is doing the same on a somewhat smaller scale. All the other states of the eighteenth century have been left far behind by this growth of the modern giant World Powers.

Thus during the nineteenth century Great Britain built up an Empire by which she has been, and is being, steadily

pulled out of the orbit of Europe into that of the New World. The homelands in the British Isles lie between Europe and that New World, which is mainly a growth of the last century ; but all the rest of the British Empire is across the oceans, all the other States of the Commonwealth are in the New World, and the centre of gravity of the Englishry is now in North America, somewhere between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic seaboard.

At the same time the scale of political geography has been changed. The United Kingdom, with less than a hundred thousand square miles of land and some forty-seven million inhabitants, cannot hope to remain a Great Power on its own resources throughout the twentieth century ; though the British Commonwealth, in which it is the senior state, has sufficient resources to enable it to maintain that standing if it can develop sufficient unity.

The British Isles are rooted in the continental mass of the Old World. Their physical foundations are part of that Continent ; and a very slight change in the relative level of land and water could again, as in prehistoric time, destroy their physical insularity and unite them to the mainland.

In strong contrast to this permanent physical basis the connections with the Englishry across the ocean depend wholly on human, man-made, factors. They rest on rapid and efficient trans-oceanic communications, by sea or by air, on associations of language, of tradition, of social and legal organization, of sentiment, and of interests, which are but a recent growth in the civilized world—barely three hundred years old at most—and on membership of that entirely unprecedented political unit, the British Commonwealth.

The civilization and political development of Europe, shaken and stimulated by the Great War of 1914-18, has reached a stage in which a " United States of Europe " is becoming a possibility which serious statesmen may consider seriously. If that ideal could capture the imaginations and loyalties of the peoples of Europe it might be trans-

formed into a reality within our generation. But it seems more probable that the age-long divisions and the mutual jealousies and antagonisms of the nations of Europe will delay it much longer, or perhaps defeat it altogether. Yet the very possibility of such developments in Europe raises vital questions as to the future position of the British Isles. Are they to be reabsorbed in Europe? Or will their peoples turn rather towards the New World and strive to link their fate with that of the younger peoples who speak their language and share their traditions? And if the peoples of Britain prefer to look west rather than east how far will the Englishry in the New World meet them and welcome them.

Separation from the rest of the Englishry would throw Great Britain back on to Europe, from which both England and Scotland turned away at the close of the Middle Ages after the Discovery of the New World, the loss of Calais, and the union of their Crowns. Since then the United Kingdom has held aloof from Europe except when her overseas interests were threatened by some European Power, or when an attempt of some one state to secure hegemony in western Europe seemed a threat to the independence of Great Britain. Yet the past attempts of the United Kingdom to hold aloof from the greater European conflicts, to maintain a "splendid isolation," have often failed because of the narrowness of the "Narrow Seas." Only a British Commonwealth whose chief centres of population and power are out of reach of Europe can hope to keep out of the entanglements of European affairs; and then only if its economic and political policies are guided by a determination to hold aloof.

If the question is postponed, by delays in the organization of Europe, for a couple of generations, it may be that the British peoples will already have shifted the centre of gravity of their Commonwealth to Canada. Or it may be that the League of Nations will so develop as to determine

a worldwide organization of states in place of a merely European grouping. But in any case, it is safe to assert that for the coming generation the peoples of the British Isles will be increasingly called on to decide whether their outlook is to be eastward or westward, towards a European grouping apart from their overseas kindred, or towards closer links with the other English-speaking nations. And a very important factor in their decision will inevitably be the attitude towards them and their problems adopted by the peoples and governments of those kindred nations, particularly those of the nearest and strongest of the Englishry in North America.

## CHAPTER IX

### CANADA—INTERNAL

THE Dominion of Canada occupies the northern half of North America. Its southernmost point is near latitude  $42^{\circ}$  N., whence its territory extends northward for more than three thousand miles towards the North Pole. Its length from the Atlantic to the Pacific between latitudes  $50^{\circ}$  and  $55^{\circ}$  N. is about the same distance. But of this enormous area only the southern portions are of much direct value. All the nine provinces lie wholly south of latitude  $60^{\circ}$  N., that of the Shetland Isles ; almost the whole of the population is south of latitude  $55^{\circ}$  N., that of Newcastle-on-Tyne ; and all the populous areas of eastern Canada are well to the south of latitude  $50^{\circ}$  N., which passes through Lizard Head. Thus the peoples of Canada east of the Great Lakes dwell in the latitudes of France, and those west of the Lakes are in the latitudes of England and the English Channel (cf. fig. 25, p. 125).

Physically Canada falls into a small number of major physiographic regions which are of very unequal extent and importance. Of these by far the largest and most distinctive is that of the Canadian Shield ; this extends from the Arctic Ocean to the Great Lakes and occupies approximately half of the total area of the dominion (see fig. 24, p. 119).

The central area of the Shield is the depression of Hudson Bay, flooded by a shallow inland sea towards which most of its surface slopes gently. Its eastward limit is the steep coast of Labrador, where its fractured edge rises in places to more than three thousand feet above sea-level, the highest

altitudes of any part of the Shield. To the southeast it is bounded by the Gulf of St. Lawrence below Quebec, though part of Newfoundland may be regarded as an outlier. Southwest from Quebec the edge of the Shield trends towards Ottawa along the northern edge of the St. Lawrence Lowlands, and from the St. Lawrence near the eastern end of Lake Ontario towards Georgian Bay. The western edge is marked by a series of lakes from Winnipeg through Athabasca and Great Slave to Great Bear Lake. In two places, the Adirondack Highland east of Lake Ontario which is almost connected with the main mass by the hills of the Frontenac district, and to south and west of Lake Superior, the Shield extends beyond the southern boundary of the dominion. And its western and southern edges towards the rest of the continent are marked by series of shallow depressions occupied by lakes, in which it resembles its structural analogue in Europe, the Baltic Shield.

This Canadian Shield is one of the most ancient land areas on the earth. It is almost wholly composed of archæan (or pre-cambrian) rocks, except on the southwest shores of Hudson Bay where these are overlain by a wide band of paleozoic strata bordering the Bay ; and it contains great mineral wealth in metalliferous deposits. It was an area of outflow of ice during the last Ice Age ; hence much of its central areas is almost bare of soil, except in the valley bottoms. Towards the edges there are some deposits of soils which may give cultivable areas, such as the Clay Belt of northern Ontario and Quebec ; but as a whole the Shield is infertile. Its southern portions are covered by extensive coniferous forests, moderately dense along the valleys but thinning out to a scattering of stunted trees on the inter-stream areas ; while the irregular topography due to recent glaciation gives it innumerable lakes and swamps, rapids and waterfalls. Thus the natural wealth of the Shield is mainly to be grouped under the three heads of minerals, forests, and water-power. The climate is for the most part




FIG. 24.—BRITISH NORTH AMERICA: PHYSIOGRAPHIC REGIONS.

unfavourable to agriculture, except towards the southern margins.

To the southeast of the Shield is a narrow strip of relatively low land in two sections which occupy the Lake Peninsula of southern Ontario, between Lakes Huron, Erie, and Ontario, and the St. Lawrence Lowland from Ottawa and Prescott eastward to the Gulf. These regions are lowlands developed on paleozoic rocks, of which the oldest (Cambrian) are exposed in eastern Quebec and thence westward the outcrops change through Ordovician and Silurian to Devonian in southwest Ontario. These lowlands have considerable areas of fertile soils, including the lacustrine terraces, which are in part the result of the glacial period; they are respectively the populous regions of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and up to the present the most populous regions of Canada. Here both soils and climate tend to improve towards the southwest; and the Lake Peninsula is the most favoured region of eastern Canada in these respects. The position at the edge of the Shield, which falls steeply from the Laurentian Heights to these lowlands, gives them an abundance of water-power, and this has aided in the development here of the chief industrial region of the dominion.

Farther to the east the three Maritime Provinces, together with the Gaspé Peninsula of Quebec Province, occupy a third region for which the ancient name of Acadia may be used. This Acadia is the northern end of the Appalachian Zone. It is composed mainly of paleozoic rocks, somewhat younger than those of the St. Lawrence Lowlands. Much of it is a rugged highland country similar to that of the central and northern highlands of Great Britain, with strongly marked structural grain in a northeast to southwest direction. The valleys generally contain good soils while the highlands are relatively barren; and the most fertile lands are in the central depression, on both shores of the Bay of Fundy and from there northwards to

Prince Edward Island. There are also important coal deposits on both flanks of this central valley, with the advantage of nearness to navigable waterways.

Away to the west, beyond the line marked by the western series of great lakes, the regions of the Prairies and the Mackenzie Valley lie between the Shield and the eastern edge of the Rocky Mountains. The southern or Prairie region, which extends from the boundary on latitude  $49^{\circ}$  N. northwestwards to include the districts about the Peace River, is mostly underlain by rocks of mesozoic age, with some tertiary sediments in southern Alberta and Saskatchewan. This Prairie region contains a high proportion of good soils ; and it is by far the most extensive of the fertile regions of Canada, with four or five times as large an area as that of the fertile eastern lowlands. There is some natural wealth in minerals, particularly in extensive deposits of lignite, and in water-power, though the Prairies are less favoured than eastern Canada in these respects ; but for the present, and as far into the future as can be seen, the wealth and importance of the Prairie region lies in its fertile soils and its agricultural development. The southwest of the Prairie region, in the south of Alberta and the southwest corner of Saskatchewan, has a very low rainfall and is a semi-arid pastoral region in which agriculture is dependent on irrigation ; while the Mackenzie Valley to the north is in subarctic latitudes, and so has little present-day importance.

The last of these major regions of Canada is that of the Cordillera formed by the mountains and valleys which fill nearly all British Columbia, excepting only the Peace River District, and most of Yukon Territory. This is a region of rugged mountain and valley with scattered and relatively small fertile areas in the valleys and at the mouths of the rivers. It has been estimated that not more than a tenth of its area is cultivable. It has great resources of forest wealth, minerals, and water-power ; but only its south-

western valleys near the coasts are as yet occupied on any considerable scale. The inland communications are more difficult here than in any other region of temperate Canada.

Of these five regions only the first, the Shield, is almost wholly Canadian ; each of the other four is a northward extension of one of the major physiographic regions of the United States, and is thus closely linked with the corresponding region to the south of the boundary. The international boundary between Canada and the United States cuts directly across both the structural grain and the relief pattern of North America. For most of its length it is a purely artificial line ; elsewhere it is drawn along the principal natural way of communications, in the Great Lakes which form a link rather than a barrier between the two countries.

The present distribution of population in Canada has been determined mainly by the two considerations of fertility of the soil, including climatic conditions favourable to agriculture, and accessibility to the incoming settlers, most of whom came from the British Isles and Europe. Thus the Maritime Provinces and the St. Lawrence Lowland were the first areas to receive immigrants in considerable numbers. Next came the Lake Peninsula, peopled in the first instance by the United Empire Loyalists from the colonies to the south when the latter seceded from the Empire. For nearly a century after this settlement the Lake Peninsula, accessible by the St. Lawrence route and the most attractive region of eastern Canada, received the larger share of the small flow of emigrants from the British Isles to Canada, a flow which passed by the less attractive Maritime Provinces, and left little deposit in Quebec because that home of the French Canadians was a foreign land to most of the immigrants. It is partly owing to this century's start that southern Ontario is today by far the most populous region of Canada, with more than a fourth of the total population on less than a fortieth of the total area of the dominion. This relatively

high density of population has combined with a favourable situation in other respects to allow the development of many industries ; and nearly half the manufacturing industry of Canada is in southern Ontario.

The Far West along the Pacific Coast, in Vancouver Island and on the mainland of British Columbia, received its first settlers by the long ocean route round Cape Horn ; and the length and difficulty of the journey kept their numbers small. The completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway gave them effective connection with eastern Canada ; and this has aided the growth of Vancouver City to a great seaport, and a city of a quarter of a million inhabitants. But British Columbia is still the "Far West"; and the growth of its population has been slower than that of eastern Canada and of the Prairie Provinces.

After the building of railways into the Prairies in the eighties of the last century made the vast empty fertile lands of that region accessible, it became the chief area of attraction for the incoming settlers ; and its population increased very rapidly. By 1931 the three Prairie Provinces together contained nearly two and a half million people, not much less than a quarter of the whole population of the dominion.

Thus the great majority of the population of Canada is concentrated in five relatively populous areas in four of the major physiographic regions described (see map, fig. 26, p. 127). These populous areas together cover less than a tenth of the total area of the dominion. The valleys and coastal towns of the Maritime Provinces contain nearly a million inhabitants. Next to the westward, and separated from them by the highlands of New Brunswick and eastern Quebec, is the populous area of the St. Lawrence Lowlands in Quebec Province and the eastern corner of Ontario. Here there are nearly three million people, more than a third of whom are concentrated in and about the metropolitan city of Montreal. Then in the Lake Peninsula and along the northern shore of Lake Ontario is the still more populous

area of southern Ontario, which contains nearly a third of the total population of the dominion, partially separated from the area of similarly dense population round Ottawa and Montreal by the more rugged and thinly peopled extension of the Shield east of Kingston in the district of Frontenac.

The vast extent of the Canadian Shield is almost uninhabited, though there are scattered settlements in its mining districts and along the railway routes which cross its southwestern sections from the St. Lawrence to the Prairies. There is also a small, though increasing, population on the Clay Belt. But in spite of these settlements the Shield is mainly prominent on a population map as an empty area. To the north of Lakes Huron and Superior, it interposes a wilderness, some six hundred miles wide, between the relatively populous areas near Georgian Bay and the corresponding area in southern Manitoba at the eastern end of the Prairies.

The three prairie cities of Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Calgary mark the corners of a triangular area which forms a fourth comparatively well-peopled region. This is already, despite the recent date of its opening up, the third most populous region of Canada. Here the three Prairie Provinces contain about a third as many people as the eastern fertile lands of the Lake Peninsula and the St. Lawrence Lowlands, nearly a quarter of the total population of Canada.

And lastly the small coastal lowlands and inhabited valleys of the Pacific Coast have a total population of barely three-quarters of a million. These are mostly in the extreme southwest of British Columbia and in Vancouver Island, in an area separated from the Prairies to the east by the Cordilleran ranges which are here about three hundred miles in width.

These five naturally habitable regions of Canada are the five "sections" into which the dominion is often divided by public opinion: *i.e.* the Maritime Provinces, Quebec or Lower Canada, Ontario or Upper Canada, the Prairie Pro-

vinces, and British Columbia or the Pacific Coast. Until recently the last two were usually regarded as one "section," the West; but they will inevitably develop as two: though they may still form the "West" by contrast with eastern Canada. The constitution of the dominion implicitly recognizes four sections by giving equal representation in




FIG. 25.—BRITISH NORTH AMERICA: POLITICAL DIVISIONS

(For key to shading see fig. 3, p. 10)

The British Isles are shown in outline, in correct latitude and on the same scale.


the Senate, twenty-four senators each, to (1) the Maritime Provinces, (2) Quebec, (3) Ontario, and (4) the West.

It is to be noted that all these five populous areas, which together contain practically the whole population, lie close to the southern border of the dominion. The more populous areas of the Maritime Provinces are partly cut off from those of New England to the south by the thinly peopled districts of western New Brunswick and of Maine. But those of Quebec and Ontario lie along the boundary

and are continuous with similarly populous areas to the south and southwest in the United States. West of the Great Lakes the inhabited areas of the Prairies are continuous across the international boundary ; though the most densely peopled belt lies some distance north of that line, and the southern occupied parts of Saskatchewan and Alberta are more densely peopled than the state of Montana to the south of them. Most of the population of the Pacific Coast is closely grouped in the extreme southwest corner of British Columbia, close to the boundary.

This grouping of the population along the southern edge of the dominion is strikingly reflected in the location of its chief cities. The seven largest cities, all of which have more than a hundred thousand inhabitants, are all within a hundred miles of the southern boundary. There are six other cities with more than fifty thousand inhabitants in each ; but four of these are more than a hundred miles from the boundary, though only one, Edmonton, lies more than three hundred miles north of the boundary, in the northwest end of the belt of maximum density of population on the Prairies which extends from Winnipeg to Edmonton. The establishment of an effective route to the outer world via Hudson Bay, which was opened to commercial traffic in the summer of 1931, will also tend to give the Prairies another outlook away from the southern frontier.

The fact that almost the whole population of Canada is thus disposed along the southern edge of her territory, and more than four-fifths of it within two hundred miles of the boundary, is of decisive importance in the political geography of the dominion. It follows that the main internal communications are near, and generally parallel to, the boundary ; and that a majority of the great cities of Canada are nearer to cities of corresponding magnitude in the United States than they are one to another. Such a distribution tends to develop direct connections across the boundary, which is not in any sense a physical barrier for any con-



[By permission of the High Commissioner.

FIG. 26.—CANADA: DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION  
 (Based on the map in the census of 1931.)

siderable part of its length, rather than along the areas of inhabited country near it which are the effective Canada. This tendency is opposed by the east-west trend of the historic development and settlement of Canada, by the national unity and policy of her citizens and of the Federal Government, and by the tariff walls which erect a real economic barrier along the international boundary line. The border location of her population also deprives Canada of the power of any effective resistance to military aggression from the United States, so long as the disproportion of population gives the latter a ten to one superiority in available numbers ; for the vital points in the internal communications of the dominion are all in the border zone, and at any one of them her forces could be far outnumbered. This strategic disadvantage is the justification for the view that Canada has been, and is, a permanent hostage to the United States for the good behaviour of the British Empire.

It was the closeness of these relations to the United States which led so often in the early decades of the nineteenth century to the expression of the view that it was the "manifest destiny" of Canada to be incorporated in the United States. Less has been heard of this prophecy since the establishment of the dominion in 1867. The growth of a strong sentiment of Canadian unity and independence became evident towards the close of that century. And the rapid growth of the population and wealth of the dominion during the present century has pushed that "manifest destiny" into the background. The population has almost doubled since 1901,<sup>1</sup> and the self-confidence which results from such a rapid expansion looks forward to the time when Canada will no longer be overwhelmed by the mere weight of her neighbour.

The population of Canada, like that of the other temperate lands of the New World, is mainly descended from the

<sup>1</sup> In 1901, 5,371,315 ; in 1931, 10,374,196.

emigrants who have left the British Isles and Europe since the beginning of the modern age of trans-oceanic colonization. Here there have been three main currents of immigration.

In the early colonial period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Canada received the two groups of immigrants who laid the foundations of her modern growth. There were first the French settlers, estimated at less than five thousand eight hundred in 1680, after which immigration from France almost ceased, who made their homes in the St. Lawrence Lowlands. There they prospered, and their descendants have increased until they now number nearly three millions in that region, with another half million in other parts of Canada and about a million in the United States. Such an increase, more than six hundred-fold in two and a half centuries, is almost unparalleled. It is an indication of the possibilities of human growth where space and resources are abundant.

The second group of immigrants of the colonial period came from the British Isles in several stages. Before 1780 they settled mainly in the Maritime Provinces. After that they were strongly reinforced there by the United Empire Loyalists, many of whom also established themselves in the Lake Peninsula. Some few immigrants from the British Isles were settled in the southern parts of what is now Quebec Province, in areas still marked by placenames of English and Scottish origin though now part of French Canada. By the beginning of the dominion period the English-speaking Canadians were more numerous than those of French origin, in the proportion of ten to nine in the Canada of 1861. Since then the inclusion of other provinces, and the fact that the majority of the immigrants have come from the British Isles, have reduced the proportion of French Canadians to somewhat less than a third of the total population.

The problem of grouping two peoples into one state is

perhaps more difficult in Canada than in Great Britain because of the differences in language and religion, which have no parallel between English and Scots. Canada's solution is through federation, after the failure of an attempt to combine the two peoples in a unitary state. And while federation has not avoided all occasions of friction, for both are growing peoples, it has succeeded in uniting two nations into one state and demonstrating once again that wide differences in tradition, in language, and in social organization are not necessarily incompatible with political union. The partial segregation of French- and English-speaking Canadians into different provinces favoured the federal solution, as did also the huge areas involved. And, though only one of the nine provinces is French, the Dominion Government is bilingual and strictly neutral in its relations to the two languages.<sup>1</sup>

Since the dominion was established there has been a fresh immigration, stimulated by the opening-up of the Prairies which followed hard on railway construction. This has come mainly from the British Isles and northwest Europe; but since 1900 it has included an increasing proportion of settlers coming from the United States and from eastern and southeastern Europe, most of whom have settled in the Prairie Provinces.

The distribution of population by birthplace recorded in the census of 1921 shows more than three-fourths as Canadian born.<sup>2</sup> Of the rest the majority were born in the British Isles; and the United States contributed nearly half of the immigrants who came from outside the British Empire. The problem of assimilating large masses of foreign-speaking immigrants had not yet arisen; though

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note that the same problem of uniting two nations, each with its own language, into one state is being met in the Union of South Africa, under very different geographical conditions, by what is essentially a unitary state.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote on next page.

there are many small groups of such settlers in parts of the Prairies and in some of the larger cities, and it may become a serious problem in the near future.

The White population of Canada, as shown in the tables below<sup>1</sup> is more than fifty per cent. of British origin and nearly thirty per cent. of French origin. The remainder is made up mainly of persons of mixed descent and of those whose ancestors came from northwestern Europe. The numbers of the settlers from eastern and southern Europe are not yet large, though they show a marked tendency to increase. Thanks to her cold winters Canada does not attract any considerable numbers of coloured people, or of the southern Europeans, and hence has much less of the complications due to antagonism and intermixture between widely different races than her southern neighbour.

The greater part of the original French settlers were drawn from northwestern France, mainly from the provinces

<sup>1</sup> COMPOSITION OF THE (WHITE) POPULATION OF CANADA RECORDED  
AT THE CENSUS OF 1921

I. By birthplace	Numbers	Percentage
Born in Canada	6.8 millions	77½
Born in British Isles	1.1 „	12½
Born in U.S.A.	0.4 „	4½
Born in other countries	0.49 „	5½
	<hr/> 8.8	
II. By origin	Numbers	percentage
French	2.5 millions.	28½
English	2.5 „	From British Isles 4.8 . 55
Scottish	1.2 „	
Irish	1.1 „	
German	0.3 „	From N.W. Europe 0.5 5½
Dutch	0.1 „	
Norwegian and Swedish	0.1 „	
	<hr/> 7.8*	

No other as high as 0.1

\* Leaving one million for the smaller groups and the peoples of undetermined or mixed origin.

of Normandy and Brittany, areas whose inhabitants are racially near akin to those on the other side of the English Channel. Hence the difference of language is not associated with any corresponding difference of race ; and almost the whole population of Canada is descended from peoples of the "Nordic Region" of northwestern Europe, the chief exceptions being some recent immigrants from eastern Europe.

The growth of the population of Canada during the nineteenth century was much slower than that of the United States—mainly because the latter country, lying more to the south, was far more attractive to the great majority of the flood of emigrants from Europe. So great was its attraction that Canada itself lost many of its citizens by emigration to the south.

In the early years of the twentieth century, however, a decided change appeared. The effective opening-up of the Prairie Provinces coincided with the end of the "free farm" period on a large scale in the United States. And the latter country, for many reasons, but chiefly because it is getting fairly well filled, has become both less attractive and less hospitable to the immigrants. This change has been accelerated since the close of the Great War ; and by 1930 the United States was practically closed to any large-scale immigration from Europe. Both sets of factors have tended to divert a larger proportion of the flow towards Canada. Also in this period the governments in the chief States of the British Commonwealth took steps to direct the flow of migrations within the Commonwealth, with some amount of success. The accumulated effect of these factors is seen in the fact that the total population of Canada was practically doubled in the first thirty years of this century. This is the greatest proportional increase recorded in any country during these decades ; and it is the more remarkable in that the period includes the years of the Great War, during which immigration almost ceased and Canada sent

overseas nearly half a million men, not all of whom returned.

The growth in all directions which has accompanied this rapid increase in numbers has produced a spirit of exulting hopefulness which declares that the twentieth century is Canada's. The rate of increase is closely comparable to that of the United States in the corresponding decades of the nineteenth century. If such a rate of growth could be maintained during the rest of the century then by 2000 A.D. Canada would have fifty million citizens.

But the least safe method of forecasting in regard to the growth of peoples is the rule-of-three system. The total numbers of Canada's future population will be the result of at least four principal factors, no one of which can at present be quite accurately known. These are :

- (1) The population-capacity of Canada.
- (2) The natural rate of increase in Canada, which depends on the ratios between birth-rate and death-rate and on the average length of life.
- (3) The increase due to immigration, which depends on conditions and rates of increase in the countries of emigration, and also to a considerable extent on their national policies, as well as on Canada.
- (4) The loss due to emigration, which also depends on many variable conditions both within and without Canada.

The chief factor determining the population-capacity here, as elsewhere, is the food-producing capacity of the land. Except for scattered, and essentially temporary, mining populations a dense population can only be maintained in climates favourable to agriculture, or where industrial development can reach a high stage in a region to which adequate food supplies can economically be taken.

The amount of cultivable land in Canada has been variously estimated. A recent low estimate puts it at about three

hundred million acres, which is thirteen per cent. of the total area. After making allowance for the vast subarctic territories and the infertile lands of the Canadian Shield this figure seems reasonable by comparison with the better known lands of Europe in the same latitudes.

Such lands in western Europe and in England do at the present day support populations of about three hundred persons per thousand acres, in counties and departments where there is no great industrial or commercial city. If we accept the view that the British Isles are capable of producing food for half their present population, then such cultivable lands in these latitudes are capable of supporting approximately four hundred persons per thousand acres. On the lower of these figures, *i.e.* three hundred persons per thousand acres of cultivable land, it may be calculated that, on the standards of living now ruling in Great Britain and western Europe, Canada can support a total population of ninety millions. This estimate makes no allowance for improvements in implements, in methods, and in plants, which are likely to increase agricultural productivity and extend the limits of the cultivable area within the next century. If we may speak in round numbers, we may provisionally estimate the population capacity of Canada at a hundred millions. Further, we may note that at the rate of growth of the last thirty years this total would be reached in a hundred years from today.

Within the twentieth century Canada has developed modern industry on a considerable scale, with a resulting increase in urban populations. By 1926 the population was almost equally divided between urban and rural areas, the latter including some of the smaller mining villages and camps ; and the total number of the workers engaged in manufacturing industry, mining, and commerce exceeded the numbers of those engaged in agriculture. The metropolitan district of Montreal has a population of more than a million, and the corresponding area about Toronto

more than three-quarters as many ; while two other cities, Vancouver and Winnipeg, have each more than two hundred thousand inhabitants.

Although Canada is still largely agricultural, and the products of agriculture furnish the bulk of her exports, yet in 1930 the gross value of her manufactured products reached four thousand million dollars as against a total of less than thirteen hundred million dollars for agricultural products. The industrial development is mainly concentrated in the cities of the Lake Peninsula and the western end of the St. Lawrence Lowlands—from Montreal to Windsor. The chief form of mechanical power is electricity generated from water-power, a natural resource with which Canada, and in particular eastern Canada near the edge of the Shield, is abundantly endowed. The raw materials are chiefly the products of the agriculture, forests, and mines of Canada herself ; since there is as yet comparatively little import of bulky raw materials, though some wool and rubber are imported. The products of Canadian factories, other than those engaged on agricultural produce and wood products (including paper), are mainly for home consumption, and hardly a tenth of the total manufactured products is exported.

## CHAPTER X

### CANADA—EXTERNAL

THE first fact governing the external relations of Canada, as of any other country, is its position on the globe in relation to other lands. A study of a world map drawn round Ottawa as its centre reveals some of the chief facts in that location. First it is evident that Canada has only one near neighbour, the United States of America. Except for her contact with the Labrador territory of Newfoundland, all Canada's long land boundaries, to a total length of well over five thousand miles, march with those of the American Commonwealth and its largest dependency, Alaska.<sup>1</sup> Probably no other country in the world, certainly no country of comparable importance, has its external relations influenced so largely by a single neighbour.

An interesting historical analogy is the relation of Scotland to England before the union of those two countries. And in some respects the position and attitude of Canada and many Canadians in respect to the United States and its citizens finds parallels in those of Scotland towards England; but without the traditions of long-continued medieval border warfare. The difference of scale is counterbalanced in many ways by the improvement of communications; but there is no physical separation between Canada and the United States comparable to that formed by the Central Highlands of Great Britain between the populous Lowlands of Scotland and England. The analogy may be carried further by noting that many of the inhabitants of the

<sup>1</sup> The southern boundary is 3,987 miles long from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and the northwestern boundary with Alaska 1,540 miles.

northern tier of states in the Union are more nearly akin to the English Canadians in their outlook and modes of life than they are to their "southern" compatriots; just as in Great Britain the divide between northern and southern forms of spoken English and many customs leaves the people of at least the four northern counties of England more akin to the Lowland Scots than they are to the south-country English.

Next to the United States the nearest neighbours of Canada are the British Isles. It is true that in actual distance Mexico is nearer, and the West Indies are at almost the same distance as Ireland and Great Britain, while Greenland is even nearer in direct distance; but none of these is so near by the effective routes. Thus the British Isles inevitably form Canada's chief counterpoise against the economic, social, and political pressure and attraction resulting from the nearness and overwhelming mass of the United States; and the desire to develop and strengthen Canadian individuality tends to strengthen the links with Great Britain.

The hemisphere of which Ottawa is the centre (see map) includes all North America and Europe, nearly all South America north of latitude  $40^{\circ}$  S., *i.e.* all the inhabited lands of that continent, the northwestern half of Africa, and the northern third of Asia, *i.e.* Siberia. But the ice of the North Polar region blocks communications to the north; and, while the most direct routes to other northern lands skirt that barrier as closely as possible, Canada's effective external communications are, like those of Great Britain, east and west along latitudinal zones and to the southward across those zones. The part of the earth which is farthest away from Canada, its antipodes, lies to the south of the Indian Ocean, southwest of Australia and extending towards the South Pole (see fig. 4, p. 15). Thus this second State of the British Commonwealth is at almost the maximum possible distance from the ocean




FIG. 27.—WORLD MAP CENTRED ON OTTAWA

area round which lie the greater part of the British dependencies.

For many reasons the eastward outlets of Canada are, and are likely to remain, much more important than those to the Pacific Ocean. More than half the area of the dominion is drained to the Atlantic Ocean and its marginal seas, and barely a tenth to the Pacific Ocean. And more than nine-tenths of the population lives on the Atlantic slopes ; while the traffic divide between the coasts is pushed far to the west, into Alberta, by the waterway of the Great Lakes. The chief overseas relations are to the eastward, where lie the populous lands of the British Isles and Europe. The eastward trend of the American continental ridge as the land stretches southward places the Panama Canal almost on the longitude of Toronto, and thus brings the west coast of South America nearer to Montreal than it is to Vancouver. The distance from Halifax to Panama is only three-fourths of that from Panama to Vancouver. The greater width of the Pacific Ocean in comparison with the Atlantic places the eastern ports of Canada much nearer to important areas of intertropical lands than are the western ports; while on a world view the half of the total land surface (excluding Antarctica) which is drained to the Atlantic-Arctic Ocean is of much greater importance than the quarter which drains towards the Pacific.

In the United States of America even more markedly than in Canada the more populous and important areas are on the Atlantic slope, east of the continental divide. Hence all the external oversea relations of the dominion tend to emphasize the greater value of her eastward outlets. Even for communications with the " East " it is to be noted that the shortest route to India is that via the Mediterranean Sea; while Capetown is nearer to Halifax, N.S., than Sydney, N.S.W., is to Vancouver by some two thousand miles. Only the Far East, east of Singapore, and Australia, with New Zealand and the smaller islands of the Pacific, are more

readily reached from the western ports of Canada than from her eastern ports. This distribution of lands is a permanent fact in world geography ; and hence the eastern outlets are likely to remain the more important.

In this relation the fact that the estuary and Gulf of the St. Lawrence are normally closed by ice for at least four months in every winter, December to March, very much reduces the value of their ports. During this part of the year the ocean ports of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are still open to navigation ; but they are much farther away from the populous areas, and the direct railway route from Montreal to St. John and Halifax passes across the state of Maine. Hence for her winter routes to the eastward Canada is very largely dependent on her neighbour ; and a large part of the winter traffic passes through the United States ports of New York, Portland, and Boston. In nearly all respects other than those of winter climate and tariff boundaries, Montreal is better placed than New York to serve as the ocean port for all the regions served by the Great Lakes waterway. But the climatic handicap which closes the St. Lawrence to navigation for a third of every year has given a decisive advantage to the more southerly port. The Hudson Bay ports are even more badly handicapped by ice ; since Hudson Strait is usually open to navigation for less than four months in the year, mid-July to October. But the western ports in British Columbia, though farther north than those of the St. Lawrence, are never frozen up.

Of the total external trade of the dominion a little more than half is with the United States, a somewhat lower proportion than might be expected in view of the many factors favouring trade intercourse with that country. In respect to nearness, similarity of language, customs, weights and measures, and in the possession of a very highly developed manufacturing industry, the United States has overwhelming advantages in the Canadian markets, advantages which are

greatly enhanced by the fact that more than half the capital invested in Canada by other countries belongs to citizens of the States, and that the value of Canadian investments in the United States is nearly a quarter as large as that of the States in Canada : and so much more per head of the population. The chief hindrances to a great increase in the volume and value of the trade between the two countries are the tariff obstacles placed in the way of the sale of Canada's chief products beyond her southern border.

The United Kingdom is the second largest single market for Canadian exports, taking in 1930-31 more than a fourth of the total, two-thirds as much as the United States ; but Great Britain supplies only a sixth of the imports. The rest of the Empire does with Canada a trade to a little less than a fourth of the value of that done by the United Kingdom. Six-sevenths of the external trade is done with other parts of the British Empire, and with the United States. The remaining seventh is very widely spread, as indicated in the summary below,<sup>1</sup> the largest trade being done with Germany, Japan, and France.

<sup>1</sup> SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL TRADE OF CANADA FOR THE YEAR  
1930-31

(VALUES IN MILLIONS OF CANADIAN DOLLARS)

	<i>Canadian Exports to</i>	<i>Canadian Imports from</i>	<i>Total</i>
United States . . .	364	584	948
United Kingdom . . .	221	150	371
Rest of British Empire . .	66	39	105
In order—British West Indies, India, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Australia, others.			
Europe . . . . .	89	69	158
In order—Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Holland, others.			
Far East . . . . .	31	15	46
Japan 28, China 14.			
Latin America . . . . .	18	22	40
Chiefly Argentina, Cuba, Colombia, Peru, and Brazil.			
<i>Totals, all countries . . .</i>	<i>817</i>	<i>907</i>	<i>1724</i>

The difference in value between total exports and imports in any one year is to be accounted for by several items not appearing in the lists. Since both are valued at the port, for seaborne goods in most cases imports include and exports exclude the cost of freight. Also trading accounts are not closed for each financial year of the Customs record. But probably the chief explanation of the excess of exports to several countries is to be found in the payments of interest on non-Canadian capital invested in Canada. The difference would probably be much greater but for the fact that these investments are still increasing, and the invested capital is to a large extent represented in the value of goods, especially of manufactured goods, imported. The fact that the chief investments of this kind in Canada since the War come from the United States of America goes far to explain the predominance of that country in Canadian imports ; for the United States firm which builds and equips a branch, or subsidiary, factory in Canada usually sends in a large part of the equipment and material from its established works.

This close relation to the United States is also fostered by the importance of the waterway formed by the Great Lakes and the rivers which connect them, which is shared between the two countries. This great waterway stretches a thousand miles inland from the Atlantic into the most densely peopled zone ; and it has attracted a large proportion of the population, cities, and industries of North America to its shores. It is the chief single route of internal bulk traffic in that continent. The control of the Lakes is shared between the two countries, by one province in the Dominion and eight states in the Union, and by the International (Canada and United States) "Joint Commission for Boundary Waters."

The Great Lakes are the cause and scene of a constant intermingling in commerce, in pleasure, and in social intercourse. They form a "frontier of contact" which serves

to increase manyfold the closeness of the inter-relations that spring from neighbourhood. The control and development of the waterways of the Lakes and of the St. Lawrence is an important part of the joint work of the two countries. The canalization of the river between Lake Ontario and Montreal, to make a way for ocean-going ships to reach the Lakes, has long been under discussion. The treaty providing for the carrying out of this work is not yet (April 1933) ratified ; but it awaits only that final act on both sides.

Another result of the closeness of the two countries is the reaction on one of many of the " internal " policies of the other. A striking example of this is the fact that Canada was put to very great trouble and not a little expense (estimated at fifteen million dollars in 1930) by the great increase in the activity of smugglers due to the attempts of the United States government to enforce the prohibition of the manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquors in that country.

Unlike several of the other States of the British Commonwealth, Canada has no external political dependencies. Her only dependent territories are those which occupy the areas immediately to the north of her provinces, beyond 60° N. latitude, in Yukon, Mackenzie, Keewatin, and Franklin. These cover a total area of more than a million square miles ; but they are all in arctic and subarctic latitudes, and therefore they are, and are likely to remain, very thinly peopled and of small economic and political value. It is probable that they contain large deposits of useful minerals and some areas available for a thin pastoral development depending on reindeer, and perhaps the musk ox. But until the much more attractive lands to the south are more fully settled there is no likelihood of any large development of these northern territories apart from specialized, and temporary, mining towns ; of which Dawson City in the Yukon is a classic example.

To the southward Canada has in the present century developed increasingly close relations with the British West

Indies. The driving force in this development is that which has led all the civilized and industrial nations of the temperate zones to seek trade relations with lands in the Hot Belt, *i.e.* the need for many commodities which can only be produced in tropical and intertropical regions. The direction in which Canada turned resulted naturally from the geographical position of the islands, which are less than two thousand miles away from the chief seaports of her Maritime Provinces, and the political relationship due to the fact that both are within the British Empire. It has led to the development of a substantial trade relationship (29 million dollars in 1930-31), of some social relationships with the Whites of the British West Indies, and to a considerable growth of the Canadian merchant marine in the form of liners plying between Canada and the West Indies. This is a connection which seems likely to become closer as Canada's demand for "tropical" products increases with increase of population and industrialization, and as her capacity to pay for them increases in the same way.

Within the last few years Canada has undertaken the direct management of some part of her foreign relations which, like those of the rest of the British Empire, were formerly dealt with through the Diplomatic Service maintained by the United Kingdom. The King now has Canadian ministers, as well as ambassadors from the United Kingdom, accredited to the governments of the United States, France, and Japan. This distribution is an indication of the importance of Canada's relations outside the Empire. The closeness of those with her neighbour needs no further discussion. With France the relationship is both economic and cultural. French Canada looks to France as the homeland of its language and of some part of its culture. This relationship was broken for nearly a century by the French Revolution. And the fact that French Canada was built up on the customs and laws of pre-Revolution France, and is still strongly Roman Catholic, somewhat lessens its

sympathy with many aspects of modern France. Nonetheless France is the second Mother-Country of Canada. With Japan the relations are almost wholly commercial ; and the establishment of a Canadian Legation in Tokyo is a witness to the importance of Canada's trade with the Far East, and to her desire to extend that trade.

## CHAPTER XI

### NEWFOUNDLAND

THE Colony of Newfoundland is at once the nearest to the Homelands, the oldest, and the least populous of the overseas dominions. It is an island, four-fifths as large as England, lying off the easternmost part of North America; and it is separated from the western parts of the British Isles by less than two thousand miles of open ocean. But the streams of migration have passed it by; and after three centuries of settlement its population still numbers only a little more than a quarter of a million.

The reasons for this slow development are mainly climatic. The island lies in middle latitudes, between  $46^{\circ}$  and  $52^{\circ}$  north of the equator, almost wholly south of the latitude of London. But it is off the eastern margin of a continental land mass which extends into very high latitudes; and its shores are washed by cold currents from the North Polar Seas which bring down vast quantities of ice, and keep the summer temperatures low along the coasts. Its climate is one of cold winters and cool summers, with heavy precipitation, and on the east and southeast coasts a high proportion of fog and cloud.

Most of the island is of archæan rock, like that of the Canadian Shield of which it is an outlier, and the chief areas of less infertile soils are in the extreme southeast. Hence it has a low proportion of good land, as well as a climate whose cool summers are very unfavourable to agriculture. The earliest development was the use of the east and south coasts as bases for fishing vessels exploiting the Grand Banks; and the chief centre of population is still in the extreme southeast peninsula of Avalon.

Fishing, with the curing and preparation of fish products, was until recently the chief occupation and provided the chief exports ; but within the last five years the products of the exploitation of the forests have provided a larger part of the exports. In 1929-30 out of total exports valued at thirty-six millions of dollars, the fishing products were valued at thirteen millions, the pulp and paper at sixteen millions, and the iron ores at seven millions, figures which




FIG. 28.—NEWFOUNDLAND AND THE GULF OF ST. LAWRENCE

indicate the chief occupations, and something of their relative importance, except for the raising of vegetable and animal produce for local consumption. One of the chief imports was flour, since the island does not grow wheat and has small agricultural resources ; though the value of the manufactured goods imported is somewhat greater than that of the foodstuffs.

The exported fish is still sold largely to the Roman Catholic countries of southwestern Europe and Brazil ; and the trade is still influenced by commercial relations arising

out of the seventeenth and eighteenth century connections between Great Britain and Portugal. Spain, Brazil, Portugal, and Italy together take three-fourths of the exported cod ; though there is no important return trade directly from those countries. Apart from this export the external trade of Newfoundland is almost limited to the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom in the proportions, in 1929-30, of eight to six to five.

The geographical situation of Newfoundland in the North Atlantic Ocean, with its southeastern, and most favoured, section close to the Great Circle route from the English Channel to the eastern coasts of North America and the West Indies, together with its possession of many inlets capable of forming good harbours, seems to mark it out as a convenient site for a port-of-call for the vast trade between Europe and North America. In fact it has not developed such a port, for several reasons. The frequency of fog off its coast, and the presence of icebergs at some seasons, lead to its being avoided by ships as far as possible ; and its local resources do not offer sufficient attractions to counteract this repulsion. Also, the transatlantic routes, of only some three thousand miles, are not so long as to render intermediate ports-of-call necessary. Hence the traffic passes by. And Newfoundland, though close to one of the most important lanes of ocean traffic, is nevertheless comparatively isolated and is served mainly by local connections from the nearer ports of the mainland. It served as a starting base for the first airplane flight across the Atlantic, and it has very important stations for both cable- and radio-telegraphy, yet it has not become a regular base for any mode of transport. In most of the factors which lead to growth and development, the climatic disadvantages and the ruggedness and infertility of the land have made Newfoundland "the land that was passed by." Its population and wealth have increased very slowly; and these conditions are so far permanent that no great change in the rate of growth is to be expected.

The increasing complexity of modern political and economic organization, and the resulting advantages of the larger countries, emphasize the handicaps to its development which are inherent in the smallness of Newfoundland's resources and population. Since the settlement of the long-drawn-out dispute with Canada over the landward boundary of her Labrador dependency in favour of Newfoundland's claim, there has been a revival of the suggestion that the Colony should enter the Dominion of Canada. Sixty years ago she might have entered as an original member. Now she could only be the tenth province, and one of the least in population and resources. But such a union could probably ease many of her economic and political difficulties.

## CHAPTER XII

### AUSTRALIA—INTERNAL

THE Commonwealth of Australia has for its home territory the sub-continental island of Australia, and the islets off its coasts, together with Tasmania. The main island is divided among the five states of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and Western Australia, with the two large territories of Central and Northern Australia and the small Federal Territory. Tasmania, with some small islands near it, forms the sixth state.

The total area is a little less than three million square miles, approximately five-sixths of that of the Dominion of Canada, equal to that of the continental United States of America, twenty-five times that of the British Isles, and sixty times that of England : so that in mere extent of land Australia ranks with the larger states of the world.<sup>1</sup>

Australia lies between latitudes  $10^{\circ}$  and  $40^{\circ}$  south of the equator, with Tasmania extending farther south almost to latitude  $44^{\circ}$  S. Thus Tasmania is at the same distance from the equator as the southern half of the Lake Peninsula of Canada, and all the rest of Australia is in lower latitudes than any part of the North Atlantic States of the British Commonwealth (see fig. 4, p. 15). The Australian region is antipodal to the wide central area of the North Atlantic Ocean and is, therefore, at the maximum possible distance from the regions on the shores of that ocean which are the homelands and chief centres of the White Race and

<sup>1</sup> Land area of Dominion of Canada, 3,542,049 square miles ; Commonwealth of Australia, 2,974,581 square miles ; Continental United States of America, 2,973,776 square miles.

of Western Civilization. This remoteness from the areas from which its population and civilization are derived is a principal fact in Australian geography, and therefore in all the conditions of human life there. Its effects are strengthened by the isolation of the land in other respects. The important part of Australia is the southeastern section, in which live nine-tenths of the population on less than a sixth of the area. This is separated by twelve hundred miles of ocean from the nearest considerable land, New Zealand, which itself has only a fifth of the extent and a quarter of the population of that section, and is thus much smaller and less populous than Australia ; though its people are identical in race and language and it is also a member of the British Commonwealth. The isolation of these two States of the Commonwealth from all other countries, and their similarity in stage of development, produce many resemblances between them in spite of the width of the sea which separates them from each other and the differences between their lands in climate and in structure.

The nearest important area of non-British land is that of the Dutch East Indies to the northwest, separated from the nearer northern shores of Australia by from two to five hundred miles of tropical seas, separated still more by the great contrast in structure and natural resources between these mountainous islands, whose fertile valleys and plains are the "Gardens of the Sun," and the low, uniform, and generally barren plateau of northern Australia, and still further separated by the wide differences in civilization and race between their peoples. From the relatively populous areas of southeastern Australia the direct distance to the East Indies is more than two thousand miles (cf. fig. 33, p. 169).

Beyond the East Indies to the north lie the populous lands of the "Far East," separated from southeastern Australia by an ocean voyage of more than four thousand miles ; and to the northwest India is equally remote. Java is the only

populous land within a thousand miles of any part of Australia. At its nearest the mainland of Asia in Malaya and Cochin China approaches within two thousand miles of the northwestern coast of Australia ; and the intervening sea is occupied by the East Indian Archipelago. India and China are both separated from the nearest points of north-western and northern Australia by more than three thousand miles of ocean, and from the great cities in the southeast by an additional fifteen hundred miles. South Africa lies five thousand miles west from southern Australia and, away to the northeast across the Pacific Ocean, the west coast of the Americas is seven thousand miles distant from Sydney. To the south the icebound lands round the South Pole bar all direct travel. These distances indicate, and in some degree measure, the geographical isolation of Australia ; they should be compared with the twenty-five hundred miles between Great Britain and eastern Canada and the three thousand miles from Great Britain to the eastern ports of the United States of America, which measure the width of the North Atlantic Ocean ; and with the six thousand miles between England and the Cape of Good Hope. Australia is more isolated than any other large land mass except the South Polar sub-continent ; and its people are more remote from any other populations of comparable numbers than are those of any other country on the earth.

The general structure and relief of Australia is comparatively simple. There are only three major physiographic regions :

(1) The low plateau which occupies the western half of the island is mainly composed of archæan and ancient paleozoic rocks, long ago peneplaned, and its surface is now at a general level of from a thousand to sixteen hundred feet above the sea. It is a region of low relief, consisting of great plains with shallow valleys and low hills, and for most of its extent without any perennial streams.

(2) The eastern margin of the land is occupied by the

Eastern Highlands in a belt extending all the way from Cape York to the south of Tasmania, with a width of from a hundred to two hundred and fifty miles. This is an area of tangled longitudinal ridges and valleys, block highlands, and rift and basin depressions, bordered on the east by a very narrow and fragmentary coastal plain. In the extreme south of New South Wales it includes the highest point in




FIG. 29.—AUSTRALIA: PHYSIOGRAPHIC REGIONS

Australia—Mt. Kosciusko, 7,318 feet ; but very little of it is more than three thousand feet above sea-level. It is on the whole lower in the north ; and within the tropics only a few detached areas rise above two thousand feet to form small highlands or plateaus.

(3) Between these Eastern Highlands and the plateau in the western half of Australia lie the Central Lowlands, extending right across from the south coast to the Gulf of

Carpentaria in the north. In the south they are partly divided by the South Australian Highlands of cambrian rocks which separate the Lake Eyre Basin from the lowland of the Murray-Darling Rivers. Where this great lowland comes to the coast it has undergone slight depression, giving rise to the only considerable sea inlets which break the general smoothness of Australia's outline.

In spite of the great extent of plateaus, the general elevation of Australia is low. Barely a twentieth of its surface is more than three thousand feet above sea-level, and it has no considerable area of high plateaus or mountains. No summit reaches the snowline, and therefore no Australian rivers are fed from permanent snowfields. The chief areas of highland are in the southeast, in the midst of what is climatically the most favoured part of the land, where their infertile soils and rugged relief reduce the area available for agriculture, and they form a considerable area at altitudes too great for cultivation. Such areas of highland in northern Australia would there have been at elevations more favourable to settlement and might well have been of much greater value to the people.

The maximum length of Australia, some twenty-four hundred miles from east to west, is near the southern tropic, and nearly two-fifths of its area lies within the tropics. Thus the greatest extent in longitude lies within the climatic zone of the tropical deserts ; and, as a direct result of this position, a large proportion of central and western Australia is desert or semi-desert land, a condition which is accentuated by the lack of any high mountains. This arid region extends to the coast in the northwest, and also at the head of the Great Australian Bight in the south, and reduces the well-watered regions to a crescentic band round the north, east, and southeast coasts and an isolated corner in the extreme southwest. These are separated from the arid interior by a wide frontier zone of low and very variable rainfall, which may fairly be classed as semi-arid ; and the arid and

semi-arid regions together cover more than half of the total area of Australia.

In South Australia wheat is grown inland as far as the twelve-inch isohyet and, by dry-farming methods, it is possible to obtain some crops with even less rainfall, down to eight inches where the rain comes at the right season for the crop ; though such agriculture is inevitably precarious.




FIG. 30.—AUSTRALIA : RAINFALL DISTRIBUTION

Towards the north, however, the amount of rain necessary for cultivation becomes greater with the increased evaporation of lower latitudes, and agriculture in south Queensland hardly extends beyond the twenty-inch isohyet. Through most of New South Wales, fifteen inches of average annual rainfall appears to be the minimum for permanent agricultural settlement. North of the tropic there is little agriculture for quite other reasons.

With so large an area of arid and semi-arid land, Australia

has relatively a small area of good cultivable land. The chief areas suitable for the growth of wheat, and of some other crops of the temperate zones, have been indicated on maps published by the Australian Immigration Department, and in some studies of Australian geography. There are two such areas ; the larger is a crescentic belt in the southeast, with the ends of the crescent in the Eyre




FIG. 31.—AUSTRALIA: CULTIVABLE LAND

Peninsula and in southeastern Queensland near latitude  $26^{\circ}$  S. and a maximum breadth of about three hundred miles from the coast towards the interior : the second is a much smaller area in the southwest corner of Western Australia. The whole of these two regions may be regarded as climatically suitable for the cultivation of the chief crops of the warm temperate zones. These areas together occupy little more than a tenth of Australia ; and the main one includes a large proportion of the higher and

more rugged parts of the Eastern Highlands, so that probably not more than half of it is actually cultivable. Hence it is probable that little more than an eighth of the area of extratropical Australia is good cultivable land. This is an area of approximately two hundred thousand square miles, or almost a hundred and twenty million acres, nearly four times the total area of England, at least six times as large as the cultivable area of that country, and thrice as large as the cultivable area of the British Isles. It is equal to about two-fifths of the cultivable area of Canada and perhaps a sixth of that of the United States.

North of the tropic the annual rainfall exceeds ten inches over nearly the whole of the area ; and hence little of it is absolute desert. But in tropical latitudes the amount of precipitation needed for cultivation is greater than that in temperate regions ; and here the limit of cultivation is probably within the twenty-inch isohyet. Over most of northern Australia, where in parts of the York Peninsula, Arnhem land, and Kimberley the total annual rainfall exceeds thirty inches, the greater part of the precipitation is concentrated into a short rainy season and there are some months of regular seasonal drought. Only in the northeast, on the highlands and coastal lowlands of Queensland, is there an area of ample rainfall without a long season of drought. This seasonal distribution of the rain very much reduces the possibilities of any agriculture in northern Australia ; and the absence of any highlands of sufficient elevation and extent to supply large perennial rivers rules out the possibility of irrigation on any considerable scale. In addition to these disadvantages it should be noted that all tropical Australia west of Queensland is part of the plateau of ancient rock. It contains few areas of good soils, and very few and small alluvial valley bottoms. There are no areas comparable to the great alluvial valleys and deltas which are the homes of the dense agricultural populations of southeastern Asia, or to the volcanic soils of some of the populous areas

of Java. This part of tropical Australia, which occupies at least three-fourths of its area, is one of the poorest of all the intertropical lands in respect of its agricultural possibilities. At the present time its total settled population is less than ten thousand, apart from some few mining "camps," in spite of many attempts to encourage development during the past thirty years.

In the northeastern corner of the sub-continent there is a region of ample rain and high temperatures which has possibilities of developing a rich tropical agriculture. This occupies most of the belt of the Eastern Highlands in Queensland, and also the narrow coastal plain and the valleys extending inland from it, which are far more extensive here than in the region south of the tropic. This northeastern region extends northward from latitude 26° S. and inland from the east coast for at least two hundred miles, and has an area of not less than one hundred and fifty thousand square miles or approximately a twentieth part of the whole of Australia. None of its highlands rises above the limits of cultivation ; and its abundant rainfall gives it a far better water-supply than that of any other part of the Australian mainland, and with it the possibility of cultivation by irrigation if that becomes desirable.

I know of no data which would enable one to make any useful estimate of the population-capacity of a tropical region such as this in terms of the standards of living of a White population of Western Civilization. The possible agricultural productivity is certainly greater than that of similar areas of equal soil fertility in temperate regions. But in any case the settlement of tropical Australia can only proceed very slowly so long as there are abundant areas of fertile land available in the, to White men, much more attractive regions of the warm temperate zone. And therefore in estimating the probable growth of population in Australia for some few generations to come, the tropical regions may be almost neglected. They will not be largely

settled by White peoples until the pressure of population in temperate Australia becomes very much greater than it seems likely to be in the near future.

Thus estimates of the population capacity of Australia for the twentieth century may be based on the resources of temperate Australia. Here the possession of more than a hundred million acres of good cultivable land in a warm temperate climate, bordered by at least twice as great an extent of poorer land capable of pastoral development, together with adequate sources of power (coal) and mineral wealth for a proportionate industrial development, gives a capacity to provide for not less than fifty million people on the standards of living now existing in the States of the British Commonwealth.

The estimated population of Australia on June 30, 1931, was just over six and a half millions. It has doubled in the forty years since 1890, and is four times as numerous as in 1870. Yet in proportion to the total area it is smaller than that of any other civilized country. With a mean density of population of barely 2.16 persons per square mile Australia is the most thinly peopled country in the civilized world. This position is due mainly to two outstanding facts: first the large proportion of desert and other very poor land in Australia, and second its remoteness from the homelands where the great floods of emigration of the last century originated. Australia was both more difficult of access and less attractive to the British and European emigrants of the nineteenth century than the then open lands of North America. Not until late in the eighteenth century did explorers visit its more favoured southeastern and eastern coastlands; and its oldest settlement is not yet a hundred and fifty years old.

The mean rate of increase of the population of Australia during the past generation is one of the highest on record, at 1.83 per cent. per annum down to 1921, with a check later due to the worldwide economic depression. The rapid

increase was largely due to immigration, but the rate of increase due to excess of births over deaths averaged 1.36 per cent. per annum from 1919-28. The latter, the rate of natural increase, is higher than the average in those countries for which census statistics are available (1.159 per cent. per annum) ; but it is not among the highest rates recorded.<sup>1</sup>

From the beginnings of colonization the greater part of the White population has been settled in southeastern Australia. The first permanent settlement, at Sydney, numbered less than four thousand people in 1800 A.D. ; where today there is a metropolitan city with one and a quarter million inhabitants. And at the present day the overwhelming majority of the population and all the large cities, with the one exception of Perth the capital of Western Australia, are in the southeast.

A line drawn on the map behind the settled areas of Western Australia, from Sharks Bay to the Bight, and thence north of the inhabited parts of South Australia, across the northwestern corner of New South Wales and along the western fringe of settlement in Queensland to the Gulf of Carpentaria, marks off the almost uninhabited regions of the centre and north of Australia (see map, fig. 32). These occupy about half the total area and had in 1921 a settled population of only ten thousand people ; with an unknown number of "wild" aborigines, estimated at a possible fifty thousand. Probably no other land area of similar extent, outside the Polar Regions, has so few inhabitants. The southwestern corner in Western Australia had a population of over three hundred thousand, of whom nearly two-thirds are concentrated in the city of Perth and its suburbs. The total White population of tropical Australia, almost wholly in the northeastern region, was approximately seventy thousand ; so that more than twelve-thirteenths of

<sup>1</sup> A comparison of the rates of increase in the chief lands of the Englishry is given in the tables in Appendix IV, p. 392.

the total population of six and a half millions live in the southeastern section of the island.

In a country with so low a density of population, and in which the chief products are those of pastoral and agricultural occupations—wool and wheat—it is surprising to find that the rural population is little more than a third of the total. And the six metropolitan districts contain nearly half the total population.<sup>1</sup>

The next distinctive feature in the distribution of population in Australia, closely associated with its concentration in the state capitals, is its concentration by the coast. All six of these capitals are by the sea. So is the second largest town in every one of the states ; and many of the smaller towns are also coastal. Considerably more than three-fourths of the total population resides within fifty miles of the sea, scattered along the coast from Cairns in Queensland to Spencer Gulf in South Australia, with outliers along the

#### <sup>1</sup> RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION IN AUSTRALIA

CENSUS OF 1921

Rural	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	37·35%
Urban	{ Six metropolitan cities . . . 43·01% }							62·1%
	{ Provincial towns . . . 19·09% }							
Migratory population	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0·55%


#### POPULATIONS OF THE SIX METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS

ESTIMATED ON DECEMBER 31, 1930

<i>State</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Percentage of Population of State</i>
New South Wales.	Sydney	1,250,000	50
Victoria . . .	Melbourne	1,030,000	56
Queensland . . .	Brisbane	310,000	32
South Australia . . .	Adelaide	325,000	56
West Australia . . .	Perth	205,000	49
Tasmania . . .	Hobart	58,000	26
All Australia . . .	Six capitals	3,178,000	49

Note that the proportion of metropolitan population had risen by 6 per cent. from 1921 to 1930.

southwestern coast of Western Australia from Albany to Geraldton. From this fringe of coastal towns the rural population spreads inland, largely agricultural in the narrow coastal plains and the better parts of the interior plains, but giving way to a very thinly-spread pastoral population at from fifty to a hundred miles inland. And except round some



[By courtesy of the High Commissioner.]

FIG. 32.—AUSTRALIA: DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION, 1921

The broken line has been added to mark off the area in central and northern Australia which is practically uninhabited (cf. p. 160).

mining towns there are no important centres of population as far inland as a hundred miles from the coast. The vast interior, the "Dead Heart" of Australia, is empty; this sub-continental island is held by a mere fringe of population thinly scattered along half its coast.

Such a distribution of the people is not paralleled in any other large country. It results partly from the fact that so much of the interior is barren, partly from the youth of the

country, and partly from its insularity. All the immigrants necessarily came in at the coast ; near the coast they found the most favourable areas, and as yet the numbers of the population have not been so great as to produce sufficiently serious pressure of population in the coastal districts to cause migration towards the interior.

As a result of this coastal location of nearly all the centres of population the chief " internal " means of communications, especially for bulk traffic, are the coasting steamers. The railways of Australia began as independent systems ; and, except in Queensland, they have developed into radial systems reaching inland from the capital of each state and bringing the whole of the state into the hinterland of that city and port. In Victoria and New South Wales this radial development was favoured by the paucity of easy routes to the interior. Farther north the Eastern Highlands are generally lower ; and in Queensland there are several easy ways through them. This fact, combined with the position of Brisbane right in the southeastern corner prevented a similar radial development in that colony, and here a number of disconnected lines were built inland from various seaports. Most of the earlier lines were built on three different gauges (5 ft. 3 in., 4 ft. 8½ in., and 3 ft. 6 in.) and the subsequent endeavours, made mainly for political reasons, to link them into a single system are thereby still further handicapped. The adoption of one of the gauges as standard and the reduction of all lines to that gauge have been proposed. Obviously the least expensive would be the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge, which is now that of half the total mileage (13,335 out of 26,739 miles in 1928) ; but the official policy is to convert to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge.

The population of Australia is remarkably uniform in its origins, customs, and traditions. Only 1·99 per cent. of the population, including the aborigines, is non-White. At the census of 1921 the distribution of the Whites by country of birth showed that 97·87 per cent. were born

within the British Commonwealth ; and of the 0·94 per cent. of foreign-born Whites 0·79 came from Germany, Scandinavia, and the United States of America. The standard of literacy is high ; over 98 per cent. of all adults are literate in English, and less than a thousand are recorded as literate only in some other language. With the possible exception of New Zealand, Australia is probably the most fully unilingual country in the world.

This uniformity in the language and customs, and in the forms of social and political organization associated with the English tradition, has given rise to the policy of *White Australia*. This may be defined as the policy which asserts that the Australians are, and intend to remain, a people of one race, one language, and one social type, and that no immigrants who cannot be fully assimilated shall be admitted. It arose, in part, from the fear of Asiatic immigration which, on any large scale, would form a threat to the maintenance of the Australian social organization and standards of living. It led to the repatriation of the coloured labourers (Kanakas) who had been imported, before federation, to work on many Queensland plantations ; and it is the chief stimulus towards the efforts made to develop agriculture in tropical Australia by White labour. It is not now a debatable policy in Australia, but a settled conviction of the overwhelming majority of the people, and a dominating factor in all the policies of their governments. It determines the immigration policy.

In general, immigration from other British States is encouraged, and in some cases directly assisted, subject to normal limitations in respect to health and capacity. Immigration of other Whites is permitted under similar conditions ; but within the country the foreign White finds it necessary to obtain a working knowledge of the English language. The immigration of coloured people of any race is very strongly discouraged. And under these conditions the numbers of coloured persons admitted in the years 1924-28

inclusive exceeded the departures by less than two thousand, most of whom are temporary residents.

The internal political division of the sub-continent of Australia into five states and three territories is almost wholly accidental and arbitrary. The oldest colony is New South Wales, which became a British possession in 1788 by right of discovery and colonization. Its limits were then undefined. The other colonies, including New Zealand, came into existence by the establishment of similar settlements at considerable distances from Sydney, round the sites of the cities which are now their capitals. And the subsequent grant of separate governments for the sake of administrative efficiency was rendered necessary by the great distances between these settlements.

Thus each of the colonies, now the "Original States" of the Commonwealth of Australia, began as a coastal settlement or a small group of such settlements. Each of them made attempts to expand towards the interior. In the fertile southeastern section the acceptance of the Murray River as the boundary between the areas reached from Sydney and Melbourne respectively was a natural development, in line with the types of boundary adopted in other "new" countries. The capitals, and the nuclei, of four of the five mainland states are in the fertile crescent of the southeast. But except along the Murray no "natural" boundary is available; and the result was the adoption of artificial lines of reference, usually meridians or parallels of latitude, as the intercolonial boundaries. In fact the real frontier of all the states is the arid and uninhabited interior which forms their common background; and the precise position of a boundary line in that region is of little practical importance except where it lies in, or near to, a mining district. In the southeast the River Murray is now of importance mainly as a source of water for irrigation; and the differences arising from the many claims on its water have been met by agreement among the four governments

concerned. Since the federation of the colonies in 1901 the importance of these interstate boundaries has been greatly diminished ; and the tendency towards increasing the authority of the Federal government at the expense of the State governments makes for still further reduction.

The Federal government has acquired the small Federal Territory, of Canberra and Jervis Bay, from New South Wales to accommodate the seat of government and a naval training depot. It has also relieved South Australia of the burden of administering the large area now organized in the territories of Central and Northern Australia, which were formerly the "Northern Territory" of that state. But it has not taken over from any of the other states their sections of the arid and undeveloped parts of the sub-continent. And the six-and-a-half million people of Australia still maintain seven distinct parliaments, with a total of more than six hundred members, and seven distinct governments.

In the southeast, where the nuclear areas of the four mainland states are all in the one large area of continuous habitable land, the federation seems to be well established. But in the southwest there is a strong movement aiming at the withdrawal of the State of Western Australia. This is a natural result of the remoteness of the populous area of that state from that of the southeast (cf. map, fig. 32, p. 162). It is farther away from the chief centres of population in Australia than is New Zealand. The inhabited lands of southwestern and southeastern Australia are separated from each other by a thousand miles of empty territory ; and this isolation of Western Australia gives real grounds for a desire to withdraw from the federation. The island state of Tasmania is also somewhat detached from the relatively populous section of Australia. Both these detached states are almost wholly agricultural ; and the federal policy of high protection for incipient manufacturing industries has caused some of their citizens to feel that their

interests are being sacrificed for the benefit of some sections of the urban populations in the southeast.

In New South Wales there has been, in recent years, a movement for a division of that state into three or four new states. This movement seems to take its rise in some resentment felt by other citizens against the domination of the whole state by the metropolitan district of Sydney ; but the lack of any strong natural divisions or rival foci within the state is a great obstacle to its success. The capital contains half of the total population of the state ; and the concentration of its voters in one urban area, added to their numbers, has on occasion enabled them to dominate the state. This problem of internal government in New South Wales is a particular instance of the worldwide conflict of interests and sympathies between urban and rural electorates, and between " metropolitan " and " provincial " cities and districts. It is very obvious here because of the almost equal balance of forces, under a democratic system of government, which results from the present distribution of population in the state, and the absence of external pressure making for internal unity, which results from its sheltered position within the British Commonwealth. The great relative expansion of a small number of very large cities, chiefly at the expense of smaller towns and rural areas, is a characteristic feature of present-day movements of population in many countries ; and the changes resulting from this movement are likely to impose severe strains on the cohesion and organization of many states. It is possible that in Australia a solution of some part of the difficulties is to be found in the increase of the powers of the Federal government at the expense of those of the state governments ; for no one city is so populous as to be able to dominate all Australia.

## CHAPTER XIII

### AUSTRALIA—EXTERNAL

THE geographical facts which dominate the external relations of Australia are those which influence its external trade, its problems of defence, and the other overseas relations of its people. Among the primary facts are its insularity and its relative isolation. The home territory of Australia is entirely insular : it has no land frontier. Only in respect of its dependencies in New Guinea does the Federal Government of Australia come into contact with the problems of an external land boundary, and there only to a very slight extent, since this boundary is a line drawn across an island which is not the home territory of either of the states concerned, is very thinly peopled, and as yet is almost undeveloped. These facts rule out from Australia's external relations nearly all the serious complications which can, and do, arise on land frontiers. All external relations are overseas ; and in all of them the great distances which sever Australia from other populous lands form a very important factor.

The character of the overseas trade is determined mainly by the stage of economic development. Australia is a young country, with a population which is far too small to exploit its natural resources to the full. Hence the most fully developed activities are those concerned with primary production, and primary products are the staple exports. Thus of the total value (£139 million) of the exports of Australian produce in 1927-28 more than 95 per cent. (£132 million) was made up of the products of pastoral, agricultural, and mining occupations, the first named




FIG. 33.—WORLD MAP CENTRED ON CANBERRA

(Actual centre is  $30^{\circ}$  S. lat. and  $150^{\circ}$  E. long.)

NOTE.—The circle marks out the hemisphere of which Canberra is the centre. The map illustrates the isolation of Australia and New Zealand.



The character and volume of this overseas trade is such that any sudden interruption in its smooth flow would be disastrous to the whole economic and social life of Australia to almost as great an extent as a similar interruption could be to the life of the peoples of the United Kingdom. Under present conditions, and at its present stage of development, Australia is completely dependent on the maintenance of its overseas communications. That is, freedom to use the ocean routes is essential to the civilized life of the Australian people. This vital necessity they share with the peoples of all the other insular States of the British Commonwealth.

The White Australia policy is a principal fact in the foreign relations of Australia. It is one of the few important declared political policies in the world which may, under easily conceivable conditions, be challenged by other states and so become a possible cause of conflict. In this respect it resembles such policies as the Monroe Doctrine, which similarly declares a large region to be outside the range of some easily conceivable political ambitions, the policy of the "Open Door" in dependencies of states other than those who make the claim for the "Open Door," and some immigration and tariff policies.

The policy of excluding Coloured settlers from Australia can be justified on the grounds that, under present conditions and any conceivable in the near future, a large-scale immigration of such settlers would lower the standards of living and of civilization in the country, and would introduce all the racial, social, and economic difficulties associated with the mingling of White and Coloured peoples in countries such as South Africa and the southern United States. The latter danger is in itself ample justification for Australia's policy.

There is also the fact that at present, owing to age-long isolation from other equatorial and tropical regions, northern Australia is free from many of the more dangerous parasitic diseases characteristic of those regions ; even though it

has many of the mosquitoes and other carriers of such diseases. Strict quarantine measures have so far prevented the introduction of yellow fever. Malaria, hookworm, and some other diseases of this group have occurred, but only on a small scale. In a small population at a high standard of civilization and a low density of settlement, it is practicable to prevent the spread of such diseases, and perhaps to exterminate them, by a strict public administration and personal observance of health regulations. Among a large population of Coloured land workers of lower cultural grade, such as could be introduced on an economic scale, no such adequate control of these diseases would be possible; and they would almost certainly become endemic and spread to the White population.

The permanent maintenance of a White Australia depends on the effective occupation of all the fertile areas of the island by White people. Thus it depends on the success of the attempts now being made to acclimatize Whites as land workers in tropical Australia. Many volumes have been written, and many conflicting assertions made, about this particular problem of acclimatization. But so far the attempts have been made for little more than a generation, and on a comparatively small scale, with a selected population which is mainly composed of young male adults and has therefore a low proportion of old people and of women and children; so that the evidence is as yet far from conclusive. A first stage may well be the establishment of a population part of which is migratory between tropical and temperate Australia. Modern transport, by railway and coastal shipping services, makes such seasonal migration of workers between southeastern and northeastern Australia quite practicable; and the advantages in the maintenance of the health and efficiency of the workers might well counterbalance its cost. Here in tropical Australia the attempt to settle a White population in a tropical region is being made under more favourable geographical and social

conditions than are possible in almost any other land ; and success in the control and extermination of tropical diseases here would benefit the whole world.

On the other hand the exclusion policy does undoubtedly slow down the rate of the possible economic development of tropical agriculture in northern Australia ; it is more costly in money, if less costly in human life, than the alternative of a rapid exploitation by imported coolie labour ; and for those who measure human progress by immediate cash returns these are very strong arguments against it. The equatorial and tropical regions of the world are, however, so far from being fully exploited at present that the time when the pressure on their resources will be so great as to justify interference with Australia's experiment is as yet very distant. Even in the East Indies, just to the north, only the island of Java and a few of its smaller neighbours are fully occupied ; the larger islands are practically empty, and any one of Sumatra, Borneo, and New Guinea probably contains a greater area of land suitable for intensive tropical agriculture than does the whole of Australia.

In fact, apart from the forced immigration (" blackbirding ") of indentured Coloured labourers, all of whom have since been repatriated, from some islands of the Pacific for work on Queensland plantations in the nineteenth century, the Coloured immigrants who have entered Australia came for the most part to southeastern Australia. Those who were free to settle where they chose were influenced by motives similar to those which determined White immigration ; and, like the Whites, they sought the regions which are climatically most favoured, or the mining areas where wealth might be obtained more rapidly. If Coloured immigration were to be freely allowed once more it is safe to say that the majority of such immigrants would come to southeastern Australia, and not to the northern regions within the tropics. And even if such immigrants were admitted only to tropical Australia it would be

quite impossible to prevent them from spreading southward.

The dependencies of Australia fall into three groups :

- I. Within Australia are the territories of Northern and Central Australia and the Federal Territory ;
- II. Outside Australia are Papua and Norfolk Island, and the recently proclaimed (March 1933) Australian sector of the South Polar lands.
- III. Also outside Australia are the territories held on mandate from the League of Nations. These are the territory of New Guinea with the Bismark Archipelago, administered directly by Australia, and the island of Nauru, administered in conjunction with the United Kingdom and New Zealand. (See figs. 57, p. 355, and 59, p. 361.)

All the dependencies, except the Antarctic sector and Norfolk Island, and the southern edge of Central Australia, are within the tropics; and all except Antarctica lie to north and northeast of Australia. Those to the north include the eastern half of New Guinea and the western half of the Solomon Islands. These territories lie between longitudes  $141^{\circ}$  and  $156^{\circ}$  E., and between the equator and  $12^{\circ}$  S. lat. Within these limits the land area is approximately one hundred and ninety thousand square miles, of which one hundred and fifty thousand is in the island of New Guinea, and the population is less than three-fourths of a million,<sup>1</sup> of whom more than half are in the smaller islands. The southern territory of Papua and the northern mandate territory are under separate administrations. Most of the area is mountainous, very thinly peopled, and almost undeveloped. Very little of it is under cultivation, and on that part the chief plant is the coco-nut palm. The aborigines live mainly by a primitive agriculture, which is gradually being improved by the example and

<sup>1</sup> Partly estimate and partly census, of 1931.

teaching of the government's officers and of the few planters and missionaries. The control of these territories brings the Australian government and parliament into direct contact with some of the problems arising from the relations of advanced civilized states to backward peoples, including the aborigines of Australia itself.

The problems of the defence of Australia are mainly naval problems. For an insular country, in particular one with its population so much on its coasts and so far isolated from any probable enemy, the first line of defence must be on the ocean; and therefore here, as for the rest of the British Commonwealth, the Royal Navy is the first and chief line of defence. Australia is keenly interested in the establishment of a first-class naval base at Singapore, and maintains one of this class at Sydney, as well as a small fleet-unit based on Australian harbours; but the smallness of the population makes it impossible for the country to provide from its own resources adequate provision for defence against any considerable naval Power.

Only the three "oceanic" naval Powers, the British Empire, the United States of America, and Japan, have important bases in the World Ocean in which Australia and New Zealand lie. Those of Japan are wholly in the islands of the Japanese Archipelago in the northwest of the Pacific Ocean, more than four thousand miles from southeastern Australia and from New Zealand, but with advanced posts only a few degrees north of the equator. Those of the United States are in the series, stretching across the North Pacific from the western coast of its home territory to the Philippine Islands, which includes Pearl Harbour in the Hawaiian Islands, Dutch Harbour in the Aleutian Islands, and Guam, and at Pago Pago in the Samoa Islands in the South Pacific. The British Empire has naval stations on the western coast of Canada, in Australia and New Zealand, at Singapore and Hongkong, and in some islands of the South Pacific, as well as in the Indian Ocean. But of these

only the principal ports of Australia have good accommodation for large capital ships.

This distribution shows that the central position in the Pacific Ocean is held by the United States, whose naval bases stretch between the British islands in the south of that



FIG. 34.—THE PACIFIC OCEAN: POLITICAL DIVISIONS  
(And cf. fig. 59, the South Pacific Ocean, p. 361.)

ocean and the Japanese islands in the northwest. So that here, as in North America, the United States is the principal neighbour of the British Empire.

Actually the nearest foreign territories to southeastern Australia and New Zealand are those of the French Empire in the New Caledonia and Loyalty Islands, and the Franco-British condominium of the New Hebrides (see fig. 59, p. 361). The use of New Caledonia as a convict station

has at times been a cause of popular irritation in Australia; and the arrangements for joint control in the New Hebrides give little satisfaction to either of the governing Powers and hinder the development of that country, while providing many possible sources of friction. But France is a European continental Power; and she could not be a dangerous neighbour to the British in the Pacific Ocean unless the British Navy were first destroyed in the European seas. The last great war fully demonstrated that the naval defence of Australia against a European enemy must be decided in the seas of Europe.

The coastal location of all the chief cities and of two-thirds of the population makes Australia very much exposed to raids or to invasion in case of war, if the enemy has sufficient naval power; and the great extent of the country together with the weakness of its internal (land) communications would hinder concentration of its land forces to oppose any such attack. If together with these facts we consider the dependence on, and the character of, the overseas trade it may be said that probably no other country in the world—not even excepting Great Britain—is so completely dependent on sea power for its protection against any possible or probable external enemy as is Australia.

## CHAPTER XIV

### NEW ZEALAND

THE island group of New Zealand is the most remote of the larger islands of the world, separated from the nearest larger land mass, Australia, by more than a thousand miles of open sea and from any other comparable land area by at least four times that distance (see map, fig. 33, p. 169). The main islands lie between  $34^{\circ}$  and  $48^{\circ}$  south latitude and between  $166^{\circ}$  and  $179^{\circ}$  east longitude, and are thus nearly antipodal to the British Isles, but nearer to the equator by their whole length ; since these latitudes correspond to those from the southern edge of the English Channel to the northern edge of the Sahara Desert (see fig. 4, p. 15). There are two large islands, the North Island and the South Island, of which the North Island is a little smaller and the South Island a little larger in area than England. The total area is a little more than a hundred thousand square miles, about five-sixths of that of the British Isles, and the length along the curve of the group is about a thousand miles.

The shortest seaway between the British Isles and New Zealand, the nearest approach to a Great Circle route, lies across the North Polar seas and through Bering Strait. It is, of course, closed to navigation by the Polar ice. Thus the available routes must pass south of either Asia or North America, westward or eastward from New Zealand. And although New Zealand lies to the western side of the antimeridian of Greenwich ( $180^{\circ}$  longitude) the sea routes from New Zealand westward to the British Isles are somewhat longer than the more direct way via Panama because of the departures from a direct route caused by the passage

round Africa, either through the Red Sea and via Gibraltar or by way of the Cape of Good Hope. The routes via Panama and the Horn are both handicapped by the great distances between ports-of-call on them ; while the westward routes are influenced very strongly by the fact that they pass either, or both, Australia and South Africa, and the existence of numerous ports-of-call. The result is that of the vessels cleared from New Zealand ports (in 1927) a little more than three-fourths departed westwards and less than one-fourth eastward and northeastward across the Pacific Ocean.

New Zealand is structurally a part of the circum-Pacific belt of young folded mountains, with some small areas of coastal lowlands, and, in the northwest, attached volcanic areas. The principal ridge extends from southwest to northeast through the whole length of the South Island and the main block of the North Island. The western projection of the North Island is formed by the volcanic cone of Mt. Egmont and the basaltic areas between it and the main ridge ; while to the northwest is the long low projection of the Auckland Peninsula, with a length of three hundred miles and an average width of barely a tenth of its length. The maximum width of the islands is about one hundred and sixty miles ; and no point in New Zealand is more than eighty miles from the sea, which is similar to the corresponding distance in Great Britain.

The latitudes of New Zealand place the whole of the islands in the zone of westerly winds of the southern hemisphere ; and since there is very little land in these latitudes the climates of the islands are mainly dominated by maritime conditions. Only to the east of the mountains in the South Island is there a considerable area with less than thirty inches of rain in the year, including a small area with less than twenty inches. Over most of the land the rainfall ranges from thirty inches to sixty inches per year, and all the western slope of the South Island has more than

seventy-five inches per annum. The Auckland Peninsula is so far north that it is in "Mediterranean" latitudes, at the equatorward edge of the belt of westerly winds in summer ; so that it has a distinct minimum of rain in its summer months. But there is no marked dry season in any part of New Zealand. The climates in general closely resemble those of Great Britain, though they are slightly warmer because of the much lower latitudes. The west coasts, particularly to the south of Mt. Egmont, are fully exposed to the strong westerly winds in a zone where calms are rare ; and a marked local feature is the concentration of these winds through the gaps in the mountain ridge, especially in the straits between the islands. The capital is "windy Wellington."

The chief natural resource of New Zealand is its fertile lowlands. The islands contain no desert, except that part of its mountains which is too high for any useful plant growth ; but considerable areas are too rugged for cultivation under present conditions, and the occupied farm land is almost wholly limited to the fertile lowlands. Owing to the absence of both a cold winter and any marked dry season the chief crops are the cultivated grasses, which grow all the year round, with green fodder crops and root crops. New Zealand farming is mainly pastoral. The principal cereal-growing district is on the east side of the South Island ; but the country grows only sufficient wheat and other cereals for its own needs, with a small margin of import or export after bad or good harvests. The most fully occupied and developed pastoral areas are on the lowland of the North Island, at the base of the Auckland Peninsula and from there southward to Cook Strait. These areas are mainly occupied by dairy farming ; their mild winters allow cattle to live in the open all the year round, and so there is no need to provide winter shelter. The second considerable developed areas are on the lowlands along the east side of the South Island, of which the chief is known as the Canterbury Plains. Here,

with less rain and lower temperatures than in the North Island, pastoral farming is more largely concerned with sheep than with cattle, and the chief products are mutton and wool.

The mineral resources of New Zealand are not great, though they have been of great importance in the early development of the country, especially in the "Gold Rush" of the 'sixties of the nineteenth century which contributed so largely to the increase in the numbers of the population. Good coal is mined on the west side of the South Island; but the output is even now hardly sufficient for the country's needs, and the known reserves are small and are estimated to be sufficient for barely a hundred years at the present rate of use. There are large deposits of iron ores; and many other useful ores are known to occur in small quantities; but there is no present prospect of the development of any large industry based on metals.

After its fertile lands the greatest natural resource of New Zealand is its water-power. The altitude of its rain-soaked mountains, many of which rise well above the snowline and give rise to glacier-fed rivers, the abundance of natural lake-reservoirs, and the absence of any marked dry or cold seasons, combine to provide abundant and constant water-power. Hydro-electric works have been established on a systematic plan; and by 1928 New Zealand produced over 133 units per head of its population and ranked third among the countries of the world in this respect, preceded only by Norway and Canada. Electric power is used throughout the country and performs the greater part of the mechanical work in a large proportion of the farms and factories, as well as in a small part of the railway transport. The present developed generating power is about 150,000 h.p., generating 500 million units (kilowatt-hours). The undeveloped power is practically unlimited in relation to any foreseeable needs or demand.

The total population of New Zealand in 1931 was estimated at about one and a half millions, of whom nearly

seventy thousand were Maoris or of mixed Maori and White origin. Of the total nearly two-thirds live in the North Island and a little more than one-third in the South Island ; so that the North Island is on the average twice as densely peopled as the South Island. The mean density of population in New Zealand is nearly fifteen persons per square mile—about twenty in the North Island and nine in the South Island—figures which should be compared with Australia's density of two, the world average of forty and England's seven hundred. Thus New Zealand is still a thinly-peopled country even by comparison with the world average ; but in the more populous parts of the North Island the density is over fifty per square mile, and these districts may claim to have passed well beyond the conditions of frontier settlement and to be fairly comparable with many similar districts in long-settled countries.

The population-capacity of New Zealand can only be estimated in relation to the extent of its cultivable land. After making allowance for the areas occupied by lakes, high mountains, forests, roads, and rivers, the remainder, which is termed the " usable " area, is estimated to cover 84,500 square miles.<sup>1</sup> This " usable " area is fairly comparable to, though not quite identical with, the " productive " area of European countries recorded in the *International Year Book of Agriculture*. Hence by analogy with West European countries of similar climate we may assume that half of it is good cultivable land. On this estimate the cultivable land of New Zealand is of practically the same extent as that of the British Isles ; and its food-producing capacity is probably also of the same order of magnitude. Hence the population-capacity on present levels may be put at about twenty million people.

As a country of settlement New Zealand is much younger than Canada or South Africa, and no older than Australia. The first British resident settled in 1833 and British

<sup>1</sup> *New Zealand Yearbook*, 1929, p. 105.

sovereignty over the group of islands was proclaimed in 1840. Thus the country is not yet a hundred years old. Yet its present density of population is much greater than that of either Canada or Australia, whether we compare total areas or only the occupied areas, and also greater than that of the White population in South Africa ; although it is the most remote from the homelands of all the British dominions. This relatively greater attractiveness for emigrants from Great Britain may be in part due to the fact that emigration to New Zealand has been, on the whole, much better organized than that to the other dominions—especially in the first half century of New Zealand's colonization. But it is also due in some degree to the fact that the climate of New Zealand resembles that of Great Britain so nearly that all the ordinary agricultural crops and domestic animals of Great Britain can thrive there. The settler could use in New Zealand the experience and knowledge of the old countries more directly than he could in lands where these conditions differed more widely. Yet he found there in practically all cases, both the Scots about Dunedin and the English in Canterbury and farther north, conditions definitely better than those of the homeland, a somewhat longer and warmer summer and a shorter and milder winter, giving the farmer normal conditions which are like those experienced in the British Isles in good years. The length and cost of the voyage was itself a selective factor among the immigrants ; and once there, the settler in New Zealand found in the isolation of the country by great distances a factor which hindered the easy flight of the less successful ; so that New Zealand has lost comparatively few of its people by emigration. In this respect it is a strong contrast to Canada, which has lost a considerable proportion of its people to its near neighbour.

Within New Zealand the concentration of population in urban areas which is marked over all the regions of Western Civilization has already gone so far that by 1926 the urban

population was more than half of the total (51.6 per cent.). There were, however, only four "urban areas"<sup>1</sup> containing more than fifty thousand people; and the largest of these, Auckland, had little more than two hundred thousand. Thus there is not yet any such gigantic city growth, either absolutely or in proportion to the total population, as that which is characteristic of some of the Australian states. The four most populous urban areas together contain just a quarter of the total population (census of 1926).

In its economic development New Zealand is still a land of primary production. There is little manufacturing industry, partly because of the youth of the country and its small population, which gives only a small home market, partly because the smallness of the population and so of the labour-supply, together with the great distance from probable, and open, markets, forms a practically insuperable barrier to the development of large-scale mass production, as does also the lack of any very large local supplies of raw material. The possibility of producing large quantities of cheap electric power from its water-power may aid industrial development; but it is likely to be a long time before other local advantages will be sufficient to enable New Zealand to sell manufactured goods in distant markets.

The overseas trade of New Zealand is very large in proportion to the population, both in volume and in value.<sup>2</sup> In 1927 the total value of the external trade was £64 per head, the highest *per capita* value of any country, though lower (in value) than the maximum of £87 per head, reached in 1920. Such high values usually indicate either a very active commercial intercourse, or an unevenly balanced stage of economic development, or both. New Zealand has both.

<sup>1</sup> "Urban area" in the New Zealand census records appears to be equivalent to what, in the case of some large cities elsewhere, has been called "metropolitan district."

<sup>2</sup> See table, App. IV, p. 393.

In 1927 the products of her pastoral industries formed no less than 93 per cent. by value of her total exports. The chief items are wool, meat, dairy produce, hides, and skins. Of the exports 88 per cent. was sent to other parts of the British Empire, the United Kingdom alone taking 76 per cent., and 5·5 per cent. to the United States, leaving a little more than 6 per cent. to all other countries.

The imports showed a complementary character, 94 per cent. by value consisting of manufactured goods, with foods, drink, and tobacco, and only 2·5 per cent. of raw materials. Of these imports 69 per cent. was drawn from the rest of the British Empire, including 48 per cent. from the United Kingdom, and 18 per cent. from the United States.

The character and magnitude of this external trade show that New Zealand, to an even higher degree than Australia, is dependent on it for the maintenance of the civilization and standards of living of her people. Like Australia also her towns and population are mainly coastal in location ; though here there is no vast empty interior. Hence New Zealand shares to the full in that dependence on sea power for security which is the most marked feature in the strategic considerations of all the insular States of the British Commonwealth.

The resemblance to Australia is also marked in the immigration policy which has been developed under similar conditions, and in the composition of New Zealand's population which is overwhelmingly of British origin. This composition is maintained in the present immigration, since in 1927, a normal year in this respect, ninety-five per cent. of the immigrants were from other British States and one per cent. from the United States of America.

The Maori population, descended from the people who inhabited parts of New Zealand at the time of the discovery of the country, now numbers over sixty thousand, approximately a twenty-fifth of the total population. Their number at the time of the discovery and settlement is unknown ; but it is usually believed to have been greater than this. At the

first recorded census, which was probably incomplete, there were fifty-six thousand Maoris. Their numbers declined to a minimum of forty thousand in 1896, and have since then increased to the present total of sixty-eight thousand, which includes over seven thousand people of mixed White and Maori descent.

The great majority (sixty-two thousand) live in the North Island; and more than two-thirds of the whole in the northern part of that island, in the provincial district of Auckland. Although the first contact between Europeans (the Dutch expedition led by Tasman) and Maoris occurred near the north end of the South Island, the Maori population does not appear to have extended at any time into the cool temperate areas of the south in any considerable numbers; though there are some very small Maori settlements in the south of the South Island.

The Maoris are of Polynesian race and linguistic affinities, akin to the peoples of the scattered islands of the South Pacific to the east and northeast of New Zealand. They live either in tribes on reserves, under the Native Lands Acts, or among the White population on the same terms as the latter. The New Zealand parliament contains four Maori members elected for Maori constituencies. The school system is extended to them; and they are free to take up the duties of citizenship. It seems probable that they will ultimately be absorbed into the main mass of the population and cease to exist as a separate people.

The Dominion of New Zealand is responsible for several dependencies outside the islands of the New Zealand group which form its home territory (see maps, pp. 355 and 361). These dependent lands fall into three distinct groups:

To the east and south there are several small and widely scattered islands, and the portion of Antarctica included in the Ross Dependency. Here the government maintains depots of provisions on several of the islands for the relief of castaways, and attempts to regulate whale fishing in

territorial waters. There are no permanent inhabitants in this group of dependencies, and their political and strategic importance is very small under present conditions.

To the northeast, at a distance of some fifteen hundred miles from the nearest points of New Zealand, lie the Cook Islands, a widespread group between the southern tropic and latitude 9° S. All are small islets. The total population (estimate of 1928, census of 1926) numbers less than fifteen thousand, almost all of whom are Polynesians.

More nearly north-northeast from New Zealand, and at a similar distance, are the islands of western Samoa held on mandate from the League of Nations. These have a total area of well over a thousand square miles and a population (in 1930) of forty-five thousand, of whom nineteen-twentieths are native Samoans and the remainder includes Whites, Chinese, and persons of mixed descent.

The government of the Cook and Samoa islands, and the presence of the Maoris, who are akin to the native inhabitants of those islands, has brought the New Zealand government and people into direct contact, on a small scale, with many of the problems arising from the contact with peoples at lower levels of culture, problems of which Great Britain has had a long experience but which are comparatively new to most of the younger dominions. And in this way it leads to a clearer understanding of many of the most difficult problems of the Empire.

## CHAPTER XV

### SOUTH AFRICA—INTERNAL

THE Union of South Africa occupies the southern peninsular extremity of Africa, for a thousand miles northward from its southernmost point at Cape Agulhas to the Limpopo River, between latitudes  $35^{\circ}$  and  $22^{\circ}$  south of the equator. Its maximum east-west width, near latitude  $29^{\circ}$  S., is also about a thousand miles, from near the mouth of the Orange River to the coast of Zululand. Within these limits the land area of the Union is somewhat less than half a million square miles; so that it is more than one-eighth as large as Canada, and about one-sixth the area of Australia, but four times as large as either the British Isles or New Zealand.

Most of the country is a high plateau, from three to six thousand feet above sea-level, with its highest parts near the southeastern edge barely a hundred miles from the sea, and with a general slope down towards the shallow basin areas of the Kalahari to the northwest. The plateau surface is generally monotonous; but in places it is diversified by some low scarped ridges, usually with an east-west trend and most numerous towards the northeast in the southern Transvaal; there are also numerous kopjes, or isolated remnant hills, also often occurring in broken ranges and both larger and more numerous on the eastern half of the plateau than to the west. The surface also includes many shallow depressions, or basins, more prominent in the drier regions where their bottoms are often occupied by salt pans. On the plateau the rivers, few of which are perennial, flow for the most part in wide shallow valleys; but those larger ones which reach the sea, the Orange and Limpopo, leave the edge of the plateau in deep and youthful gorges in which

their course is broken by many rapids. None of the navigable stretches of these rivers is of any considerable length.

On the northeast and west coasts the plateau is bordered by narrow strips of coastal plain, widest to the northeast in Zululand. On the southeast, in Natal and the Trans-Kei territories, it falls to the sea in a series of terraces cut by deep and narrow transverse valleys. Only to the south is there a different type of structure. Here most of the area south of latitude  $33^{\circ}$  S. forms the Cape Region. This extends along the south coast for five hundred miles, from near Grahamstown to the Cape, and thence northward along the west coast for nearly two hundred miles, with a width of less than a hundred miles inland from the south and west coasts. It is occupied by ranges of folded mountains parallel to the coasts and to the edge of the plateau, enclosing longitudinal valleys and basins, and broken here and there by transverse gorges through which their rivers escape to the sea. The coast of this "Cape Region," which differs in many respects from that of the rest of the country, is much less smooth than that characteristic of the African Tableland; and it is marked by a series of bays, from St. Helena Bay round to Algoa Bay. Most of these bays are wide and shallow with the openings facing to northwest, north of the Cape, or to southeast, east of the Cape. But they render this coast less inhospitable to shipping than the other coasts of the Union, along which there are few indentations of any kind and almost the only harbours are small estuarine inlets which tend to be silted up very rapidly by the torrential streams flowing into them during the rainy season.

The rocks of South Africa are almost wholly of archæan and paleozoic age. Only to the extreme east, in the coastal plain of northeastern Natal, and to the south, among the mountains of the Cape Region, are there important areas of younger rocks, apart from the recent deposits of wind-blown sands which cover extensive areas on the more arid parts

of the plateau and rare patches of recent alluvial deposits. In the Cape Region there are some important areas of cretaceous rocks, and near Algoa Bay a large patch of tertiary formations. But the total area occupied by these younger rocks is not more than two or three hundredths of the whole ; and their presence hardly modifies the statement that South Africa is essentially part of a very ancient land mass, the African Tableland, closely similar to the plateaus of the western half of Australia, the Dekkan of India, and Brazil, with which it has been grouped as part of "Gondwanaland."

Owing to its latitude the climates of South Africa range from tropical to warm temperate. On the plateau there is a wide diurnal range of temperature ; and even at Johannesburg, near latitude  $26^{\circ}$  S. but six thousand feet above sea-level, frost is common in winter nights. But, since there is no land area on the poleward side of the country, the winters are normally warm except on the highest areas (above six thousand feet) and snow is rare anywhere except on the mountains. The summers are generally hot except on the south coast and the highest parts of the highlands.

Like those parts of Australia which lie in the same latitudes the interior and west of South Africa is a thirsty land ; and the chief hindrances to agriculture and settled life over large areas are the insufficiency and unreliability of the rainfall. The Cape Region, like the southern projections of Australia, receives moderate winter rains and has a climate of Mediterranean type. Over the remaining nine-tenths of the Union the rainfall comes mainly in summer and is brought by the southeast trade winds from the Indian Ocean. It is usually abundant on the east coast and on the eastern scarps of the plateau ; but both the amount and the reliability of the rain diminish rapidly westward on the plateau surface ; so that the western half of the country is semi-desert, merging into the Kalahari Desert which lies

immediately to the northwest of the territory of the Union.

The distribution of the rain and the variations in altitude together determine the main regional divisions of South Africa in relation to settlement. On the accompanying map only five such regions are indicated ; though all of these could be subdivided.

The Cape Region is suitable for agriculture of the




FIG. 35.—SOUTH AFRICA: NATURAL REGIONS

Mediterranean type ; and where water can be obtained for irrigation its valley bottoms are very productive. Much of it is mountainous, and its northwestern end is arid ; but elsewhere its fertile lands are under cultivation. It is occupied by White farmers, and nearly half its population is White, the rest being mainly the Cape Coloured people. This region contains a higher proportion of Whites than any other in South Africa.

The East Coast Lowland in Natal is lowlying, hot, and generally well-watered. It is the principal area of plantation

crops, the chief of which is cane-sugar. The northern part is in the native reserves of Zululand and has practically no White population. The southern has only a few Whites as owners and managers, except in the city of Durban, where Whites form almost a third of the population. Durban, besides being an important seaport, is one of the chief seaside resorts for the White population of the Transvaal mining areas ; the city and its suburbs contain half the Whites of Natal.

The Eastern Highland consists of a series of east-facing terraces between the Drakensberg, which forms the high edge of the plateau, and the Indian Ocean, among which there are many small fertile areas. Its high temperatures and rainfall give it a denser vegetation than is found elsewhere, except on the coastal plain below it, and at the same time render it less healthy than the higher inland regions. It is the most populous of all the regions ; and, together with the narrow lowland at its foot, contains more than half the non-White population of the Union on barely a fourth of the total area. It contains the chief native reserves within the Union.

The fourth region, which includes most of the veldt, is that part of the plateau land which has normally a moderate rainfall of from fifteen to thirty inches per year ; though in the extreme southwest, on the borders of the Karroo, in the lee of the Cape Mountains, the rainfall falls below ten inches. This region is on the whole high, dry, and healthy. In its wetter eastern margins it contains some good agricultural land, on which the chief cereal of South Africa, maize, is largely grown. Towards the west it is a poor pastoral region which merges into the poorer scrubland of the Kalahari Desert and the Karroo. It includes the gold mining districts of the Witwatersrand and the diamond mining district of Kimberley ; and with these it probably includes more than half of the total White population of the Union ; although Whites are here out-

numbered by the non-Whites in the proportion of about two to one. Nearly all the land is in the possession of the Whites.

The last region, the Dry Veldt and Karroo, occupies more than a third of the total area of the Union and all its mandate territory of Southwest Africa, so that it includes more than half of the land under the control of the Union Government. It is nearly all either desert or very poor scrubland, though there are some pastoral districts on the higher areas of the territory. The total population numbers less than half a million, less than one person per square mile, nine-tenths of whom are natives. The only perennial rivers are the Orange, and the Kunene on its northern border, both of which derive their water from wetter regions.

The climates of most of South Africa are fairly healthy for White men. There are two distinctly unhealthy areas, respectively on the northeastern coastal plain and on the lower northeastern end of the veldt, the "Low Veldt" or "Bush Veldt," in the valleys of the Limpopo and its tributaries in the north and northeast of the Transvaal. It is only in these two areas that malaria is endemic, though it may occur sporadically in the moister parts of other regions. But, with the exception of the Cape Region, the wetter and more fertile areas are the ones least suitable for Whites. Only in the higher, drier, and therefore less fertile, regions is the White population fully acclimatized.

In the most important group of natural resources South Africa is a poor country. Over at least half of the area of the Union and all its mandate territory the inadequacy and uncertainty of the rainfall prohibit any important development of agriculture, except on the few small and scattered patches where irrigation is possible. The wetter southeastern half, which has an adequate rainfall in normal years, includes most of the high and rugged mountain land. The soils are generally poor. There is no large extent of fertile alluvial soils, though there are many small patches of good soils in the valley bottoms of the more rugged

regions. The archæan and paleozoic rocks which form most of the country give rise to poor soils, which have been leached to lateritic types where there is moderate rainfall ; while the areas of recent and tertiary deposits are mainly taken up by sand wastes and porous sandy or gravelly soils which give rise to scrublands. The most important areas of good soils are on the secondary (cretaceous) rocks, which occur in some basins in the Cape Region and in the northeastern coastal plain, and on the dolomite areas in the Cape Region and in the central Transvaal. The latter are normally dry soils on which agricultural crops suffer badly if the rainfall is lower than usual. Probably the total extent of the areas in South Africa which are favourable to agricultural development in respect to both soils and climate, is not more than a tenth of that of the whole country, and is less than that of the corresponding areas of the British Isles or of New Zealand.

The area capable of pastoral development is very extensive, covering at least half the territory of the Union ; but most of it suffers from a very long dry season and a liability to prolonged droughts ; and it is generally only a poor grassland or bush country, easily damaged by overgrazing.

The mineral wealth of the country is both abundant and varied. Coal of good quality is mined in northern Natal and eastern Transvaal in sufficient quantity to supply local needs and a small export trade on the Indian Ocean. Iron ore is probably abundant ; but it is not yet very extensively worked. Copper and tin and some of the rarer metals are also found and worked. But the distinguishing features of the mineral wealth are gold and diamonds, of both of which South Africa is the principal source in the world. In recent years gold has formed about two-thirds and diamonds a sixth of the annual value of the mineral production ; and the extraction of these minerals employs similar proportions of the mining population. The total value of the gold produced in South Africa down to the present time is over

a thousand million pounds, and that of the diamonds rather more than a quarter of this sum.

The gold mining has caused the concentration of a population of over half a million in the chief gold-producing area, on the Witwatersrand in the southern half of the Transvaal, along the divide between the tributaries of the rivers Vaal and Limpopo. Three hundred thousand of these are in Johannesburg, the "Gold Reef City," now the largest town in all South Africa. As a result of this concentration, Johannesburg has become the chief railway centre and industrial town of South Africa. But it is essentially a mining camp ; and no one can foretell what will become of it when the gold mines are exhausted, fifty to a hundred years hence, or even earlier when their output begins to diminish seriously.

Kimberley, the city of the diamond mines, differs from Johannesburg in that it is nothing but a mining camp. It is on the edge of the desert and lives on and by a purely luxury industry ; and it will drop into ruins when the local diamond mines are worked out and abandoned, or superseded by discoveries elsewhere.

Yet these mining towns have played, and still play, a great part in the life of South Africa. It was the diamond and gold mines which made it economically profitable to build long railways up the scarped edge of the tableland and far into the thinly-peopled veldt ; and their location largely determined the layout of the railway system. It was these mines that attracted the immigrants in the "rushes" of the later decades of the nineteenth century, and so brought in at least a third of the White population. The mines and the wealth obtained from them have to a very large extent dominated the economic and political development of South Africa for the past half century, drawing together its chief masses of labour, both White and Coloured, and developing its larger towns, both mining towns and seaports, and local markets for agriculture and other industries. For years the

mines have produced at least half the exports (by value) and have been responsible directly and indirectly for more than half of the external trade. A very large part of the present economic life of South Africa is built on the gold and diamond mines, which as an economic foundation is less secure than iron and coal. The discovery of many other valuable and useful minerals has so far done little to lessen the relative importance of the luxury mines; though it may in time give a sounder and wider base to the mining industry. The temporary prosperity brought by mining may and should be used for the better development of agriculture and manufacturing industry.

The population of the Union of South Africa at the last full census (1921) was just under seven millions, of whom less than a fourth were Whites. During the intercensal period 1911-21 the rate of increase of the Whites was nineteen per cent. and that of the other races fifteen per cent.; and from 1921 to the 1931 census of Whites only, this section showed an increase of twenty per cent. Hence it appears that the Whites, aided by some immigration, are increasing more rapidly than the non-White sections of the population.

The racial composition of the South African peoples is very mixed. The two main sections are the Whites and the non-Whites: but each of these is divided, though in very differing degrees.<sup>1</sup> The mixture of peoples of widely

<sup>1</sup> THE PEOPLES OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1921

Chief divisions:

- A. WHITES (*i.e.* persons of British and European origin)—about 1½ millions (1,827,166 in 1931).
  - 1. "British," *i.e.* English-speaking.
  - 2. "Dutch," *i.e.* Afrikaans-speaking.
- B. NON-WHITES—about 5½ millions.
  - 1. Cape Coloured (perhaps 1 million):
    - (a) Christians. (b) Muhammadans or "Malays."
  - 2. Bantu (Natives) (more than 4 millions):
    - (a) Tribal—mainly pagans. (b) Detribalized—largely Christians.
  - 3. Indians (150,000):
    - (a) Hindus. (b) Muhammadans. (c) Buddhists.

differing races and types of culture and traditions is the outstanding fact in the life of South Africa. This is one of the countries where the "Colour Question," *i.e.* the complex of the many and varied problems which arise where peoples of different races and cultures live in the same areas, is most prominent. It pervades the whole of the social, economic, and political life of the country; it affects, and in many cases determines, the attitude of every section of the peoples to almost every question which arises in any department of their public and social life. No important aspect of the life and development of South Africa is independent of the Colour Question.

The general attitude of the Whites may be summed up by saying that they are the ruling race, and that they intend to keep that position. Among them there are many differences of opinion on various problems and policies arising out of the Colour Question; but no serious divergence from that primary policy. So far as they can ensure it South Africa will remain a land of Western Civilization ruled by its White citizens. The majority in each of the two chief sections of the Whites are members of the same race; and nearly all of them are Protestant Christians. They differ from one another in language and, to a slight extent, in cultural affiliations; but these differences are quite insignificant in comparison with those between the Whites and the non-White peoples.

The non-White population is divided into three chief racial groups, each of which is further broken up into other important divisions by cultural or religious or linguistic differences.

The Cape Coloured, who are sometimes spoken of merely as the "Coloured" people, are of very mixed racial origins. Their ancestors included the Hottentots, who were in occupation of the Cape Region and a wide area to the north of it at the time of the discovery, but have since ceased to exist in those areas as a distinct people. With

them were mingled the slaves imported by the Dutch in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from the East Indies and from East and West Africa. There is also a strong infusion of European blood from some intermarriage in the early colonial period and from the descendants of slave women and White masters ; and for some generations many of the Coloured people were known as the "Bastaards." It is probable also that another racial ingredient was supplied by the Bushmen, some of whom existed in the south-west corner of South Africa until the early years of the nineteenth century, but who are now, like the Hottentots, extinct as a separate race in this area. With such an origin at so recent a period the Cape Coloured are not a definite people, but merely an accidental group of individuals without real internal cohesion. They have no language of their own, but use either Afrikaans or English, often in very debased forms. Nearly all their religions, their standards of life, and their culture, like their languages, are copied from those of the Whites. And they are far more widely divided from the Bantus than from the Whites in all respects except those of social and economic status. They are descendants of slaves emancipated a bare hundred years ago; and hence in their cultural relations they find their nearest analogue in the Coloured population of the southern United States of America.

The great majority of the Cape Coloured live in the Cape Region, where they form nearly half of the total population. In and near Capetown a small number of them have maintained the religion brought by some of their ancestors from the East Indies, and are Muhammadans. These Muhammadans are locally known as Malays, though the essential bond of their group is not racial or linguistic, but religious. There is no marked racial difference between Muhammadan and Christian among the Cape Coloured. The Muhammadans number not more than a fiftieth of the whole Coloured population ; but their concentration in and near

Capetown, and their greater solidarity, give them a much greater importance than their numbers alone would justify.

Without any effective unity of language, or culture, or religion, or race, without any separate tribal or social or political organization, this medley of mixed peoples grouped together as the Cape Coloured is by far the weakest of the principal racial groups of South Africa. It is dependent on the Whites for all that goes to make a nation; and the Whites, whose ancestors brought this medley into existence here, have a heavy moral responsibility for them and their future. In the clash of races which some expect to see in South Africa in the future the Cape Coloured would more naturally be allied with the Whites than with the Bantu Negroes, unless the policy of the Whites drives them into the opposite camp. From the Bantu, at his present status, they could expect little but massacre; from the White they may hope for toleration and should receive also education and justice.

The smallest of the racial groups is that of the Indians, numbering little more than one hundred and sixty thousand, of whom nineteen-twentieths live in Natal, mainly in the coastal areas and the immediate hinterland of Durban. They are descended from ancestors brought to Natal in the second half of the nineteenth century as indentured labourers for work on the plantations in the coastal zone. No importation or immigration of Indians has been allowed for the past generation; and all but the very aged among the present Indians of Natal were born in South Africa and have known no other home. Neither in language nor in religion are they a homogeneous people. Two-thirds of them are Hindus, one-fifth are Muhammadans, and the remainder Buddhists; all holding to the religions of their ancestors and reproducing in miniature, in an alien land, the divisions which break up the Indians of India itself. Their chief political importance is due to the fact that some of the nationalists in India have concerned themselves about the

political fate of these fragments of the Indian peoples ; and that they have thus been brought into the limelight of imperial politics and endowed with a political importance out of proportion to their numbers. Unlike the native Bantus they have a distinct civilization of their own ; and they do not readily accept that of the ruling people.

In the province of Natal the Indians slightly outnumber the Whites. They are mainly small farmers and retail tradesmen, who hold a large share in the trade of the province and form a large proportion of its middle classes. Their migration to, and settlement in, any other province is hindered by severe restrictions. And the few of them who are outside Natal are in the Transvaal, mainly near the Witwatersrand.

The Negro, or negroid, Bantu peoples form by far the largest racial group in South Africa and outnumber all the other races combined. They are usually referred to simply as the " Natives." This is a somewhat misleading term in most of the Union ; for it suggests that they represent the peoples who were in occupation of the land at the time of its discovery by Europeans. In fact their ancestors appear to have entered it from the north, along the habitable regions east of the desert, at about the same period as that of the discovery and colonization by the Whites at the opposite end of the land. In the early decades of the nineteenth century the Whites and Bantus, both urged to expansion by land-hunger, met in the areas which now form the eastern districts of the Cape of Good Hope province. The meeting led to the Kaffir Wars and stopped the advance of the Bantus, who are very few in the population west of that area (in regions 1 and 5) ; but form the great majority in the regions to the northeast of it (2 and 3 on map, p. 191).

The Bantus are no more homogeneous than the other groups. Several different languages are spoken among them, of which those of the Basutos and the Zulus are probably the most widely used. A large number are

still organized in tribes under their own chiefs on native reserves, though the tribal system is breaking down as a result of contact with Western Civilization. The rest are detribalized and for the most part live among the Whites as labourers on the farms and in the towns. These detribalized Bantus form most of the unskilled labouring class of the South African population outside the western three-fourths of the Cape of Good Hope province, except in so far as workers for the mines are also obtained by temporary recruitment from the tribal reserves. The relative numbers of tribal and detribalized Bantus are constantly changing and cannot be precisely known ; but it seems that those who are still organized in tribes are little, if at all, more than half of the total within the Union. They are, however, strongly reinforced by the fact that Basutoland—a protected native state—is the reserve of the largest Bantu people in South Africa. Some of the strongest of the tribes which fought the Kaffir Wars, such as the AmaKosa, have practically vanished ; but the Zulus on the northern end of the coastal plain are still a numerous people, with vivid traditions of the time when their kings ruled a wide empire of which Zululand is only the remnant.

None of the peoples found in South Africa by the Whites had reached a level of culture or of social organization above the higher stages of barbarism ; and they had no writing or literature. Hence the conquest by the superior culture and weapons of the Whites was complete. But, while the Hottentots made no serious organized resistance, the Bantu peoples were only conquered after very severe fighting, extending over nearly two generations. In all sections the conquest was complete and the defeated peoples have lost all that it was possible for them to lose. Except in the reserves their descendants are now the landless and unorganized labourers who form the lowest social classes. The rise of any individuals among them to any higher social levels is hindered by the racial differences and a strong

colour prejudice based on the most obvious, though not the most important, racial character. But the Bantus are still the most numerous section of the population, and in the eastern regions form more than three-fourths of the total. They are slowly acquiring some knowledge of the culture of their conquerors, from contact, and from some small attempts at formal education, the latter mainly by missionaries. Their future, and their share in the country and its future, is the greatest of all the problems which loom ahead in South Africa.

The chief guide to the relative numbers of the several sections of the peoples of South Africa is given by the results of the religious census.<sup>1</sup> If the division between Britons and Boers (Dutch) coincided exactly with that between White members of different Protestant denominations it would seem that the latter were slightly the more numerous. But there has been a great deal of intermixture and intermarriage between these two main sections of the Whites ; and the denominational figures can be only a very rough approximation.

The relative membership of the chief political parties is also a clue. But here again, fortunately, the lines of cleavage are not determined by, and do not coincide with, linguistic

<sup>1</sup> Results of Religious Census, 1921 (round numbers):

A. WHITES :

1. " Dutch " Churches . . . . .	839,000
2. " British " Churches (Protestant) . . . . .	540,000
3. Others (Roman Catholics, Jews, and Lutherans) . . . . .	142,000

B. NON-WHITES :

1. " Dutch " Churches . . . . .	276,000	nearly all Cape Coloured.
2. " British " Churches . . . . .	1,471,000	Cape Coloured and Bantu.
3. Other Christians . . . . .	324,000	Cape Coloured and Bantu.
4. Hindus . . . . .	109,000	Indians.
5. Buddhists . . . . .	14,000	Indians.
6. Muhammadans . . . . .	50,000	Indian (30,000) and Cape Coloured (20,000).
7. Pagans and Unspecified . . . . .	3,164,000	nearly all Bantu.

divisions or national origins. The Nationalist Party is said to draw its chief support from the Dutch population ; but it includes some men of British origin among its leaders and has been in alliance with the White Labour Party, which is composed mainly of the skilled artisans of British origin. The chief leaders of the South African Party have been statesmen of Dutch origin, though it has been regarded as being mainly the British party. The results of elections indicate, as is also indicated by language distribution and the history of settlement, that the British are the majority in Natal, in the "Eastern Province" of the old Cape Colony, and in the large towns ; while the Dutch are similarly the majority in the Orange Free State, the "Western Province" of the Cape, and the rural areas of the Transvaal. All the native-born Whites of South Africa may equally claim to be Afrikaners.

The Dutch are descended almost wholly from the colonists settled there by the Dutch East India Company in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Among these were some Huguenots and a few Germans as well as the natives of Holland who formed the majority ; but the assimilation of the foreigners was vigorous and complete. By the end of the eighteenth century they were a homogeneous White population. Since then they have been reinforced by only a small trickle of immigration from Holland during the nineteenth century ; and there has been a considerable intermixture with the British.

The Cape became a British possession during the Napoleonic Wars. After the close of those wars in 1815 the threat of Kaffir wars on the then eastern frontier of Cape Colony combined with conditions in the United Kingdom to lead to the settlement of some thousands of discharged soldiers and their families on that threatened frontier. These settlers and their descendants made and kept the "Eastern Province" British, and the active organization of their descendants, "The 1820 Settlers Association," is an im-

portant factor in the country today. The coast of Natal was also first settled from Great Britain between 1820-40.

Meanwhile the Dutch had spread inland from their original settlements near the Cape, in a succession of treks, to form a thin sprinkling of pastoralists over the Veldt. Not until the discovery of diamonds and gold was there any large movement of population towards the interior. The "rushes" caused by these discoveries led to the growth of the interior towns and the establishment of an urban White population which is more British than Dutch, but is also to a considerable degree a mingling of immigrants from many European nations. This town population found the previous Dutch Boer settlers in effective control of the Transvaal, which was then the South African Republic, and the Orange Free State; and the clash between the pastoral Boers and the urban mining population determined South African history for half a century.

The most significant facts of the numerical distribution of the non-White peoples brought out by the religious census (see footnote, p. 202) is the high proportion of those in the so-called "British" churches. This is the result of the earlier and greater missionary zeal of these churches. Not until recent decades did the Dutch South Africans make serious attempts to proselytize any Coloured people other than their own slaves (before 1833). The result is that among those non-White peoples who have accepted the Christian faith, and usually with it something of the culture brought by its missionaries, more than two-thirds are associated with the English-speaking churches and less than a fifth with the Dutch. Since the British took possession of the Cape, the missionaries, almost wholly of British origin, have been the most active agents in a large proportion of the deliberate attempts to improve the conditions and raise the status of the Coloured and Bantu peoples; and their schools and institutes have been the chief educational services among these peoples.

The first clash between Whites and Bantus in South Africa arose out of conflicting claims to the land. Both peoples were mainly cattle herders, though on different cultural levels. Both desired large open spaces of grazing land, and spread farther and farther afield in search of such lands. In this expansion they met along a wide zone about the eastern edge of the Veldt (see map, p. 191)—and wars resulted. The Whites conquered and took most of the land. But the Blacks remain ; they are still by far the more numerous section and the division of the land is still a difficult problem. The Bantu tribes live on reserves left to them ; their numbers have increased considerably since peace was imposed on them ; and their modes of life and methods of cultivation do not now enable them to live comfortably on those areas. Even in Basutoland, which is not in the Union, there are now nearly half a million people on a little more than eleven thousand square miles of the most mountainous land in South Africa. The people are mainly pastoral, with some agriculture, and with this density of about forty per square mile, more than twice the mean density of the Union, Basutoland is overpeopled. Many of its younger men go to work in the mines of the Rand or of Kimberley for some months in the year, and their wages help to supplement the resources of their homeland. To a greater or less degree this is true of most of the native reserves. The absence of so many of their younger men (often a third or more of them) for so long a period tends to weaken the tribal authority of the elders, and with it the coherence of the tribe. And the removal of customary tribal restrictions on conduct is not usually balanced by any other moral training, so that the mine work may be accompanied by moral and social deterioration.

At the mines the Coloured workers are housed in " compounds," many of which are very like prison-camps. They are not allowed to go out of the compounds except by permission, which is not always freely given even outside work-

ing hours. And the Coloured people and Natives, other than mine workers, in many of the towns of the interior, are usually compelled to dwell in special "locations" set apart for them, which are generally akin to the compounds.

The "compound" and "location" systems are associated with the Pass System which is in force in large parts of the Union. Under this system a native (Bantu or Coloured) may not be outside his reserve, or location, or compound, or off the farm on which he is employed—either at any time, in some areas, or at certain hours, in others—without a pass supplied by his employer or by a magistrate. The regulations are enforced by police inspection, and violation is severely punished. This system is not used in most of the Cape Region, and only in a few areas of the Cape of Good Hope province, such as the Kimberley district; but it is general over a large part of the Union, with many local variations in its detailed application. It is a severe restriction on the personal liberty of all those to whom it is applied; and it can be made very oppressive in individual cases.

Throughout most of the Union the franchise is restricted to Whites; and only Whites may be members of the Union parliament, even including the four senators nominated to represent the interests of the non-Whites. But the constitution provides that, in the province of the Cape of Good Hope, the old franchise laws of the Cape Colony shall not be narrowed. Here the vote is granted to men on the "Cape Franchise," for which the conditions required include residence, a property qualification, and the ability to read and write either English or Afrikaans, but are independent of race or colour. Under this franchise practically all the adult male Whites and a small proportion (less than one-tenth) of the adult males of the Coloured population hold the franchise. The recent extension of the franchise to women throughout the Union applies to Whites only, and this is an adult female vote; so that all White women, and no other women, may vote. Yet in

some few constituencies the Coloured vote may turn the balance between the chief political parties. Many of the Whites dislike the existence of any non-White voters; and a vigorous colour prejudice, combined with this fact and the absence of Coloured voters in the other three provinces, has led to a widespread demand for the abolition of the Cape Franchise and the application to all the Union of a uniform franchise which would exclude all the non-Whites from voting.

On the economic plane the restriction of Coloured persons, other than the Cape Coloured, to unskilled labour has been proposed in the Colour Bar Bill and is strongly urged by the Labour Party. Outside the Cape Region this restriction is widely, but by no means completely, enforced. Against it is its obvious injustice; and the fact that the standard rates of pay for Whites are very much higher than those for Coloured workers, and therefore that it pays the employer to use Coloured labour wherever he can do so without a more than proportionate loss of efficiency.

One of the many difficult social problems arising out of the Colour question is that of the so-called "Poor Whites." Among the Whites of South Africa, as among every other population on the earth, there are some who are so markedly inferior in capacity to the general average of their own people that they cannot efficiently fill useful positions in the community. Where, as in South Africa, class distinctions are largely based on the accident of skin colour, and all the lower grades of labour are regarded as "niggers' work" beneath the dignity of a White man, it follows that there is no place for the Poor White who has not sufficient ability to enable him to do skilled or responsible work of any kind. If he is to live on the standards becoming to a member of the ruling race he must have a much larger income than the local rate of wages for unskilled labour. But he is less efficient than at least the abler members of the lower racial classes, and the latter will work for much less pay. Therefore

he remains unemployed and in poverty, and tends to drag down the prestige of the race to which he too obviously belongs.

Every country has this social problem of the inefficients. The increasing demands made on the intelligence of all workers by the increasingly complex conditions of modern civilized life, and the mechanization of so many forms of unskilled labour, tend to reduce the economic and social value of the man who is not capable of more than irresponsible unskilled work. This section of the populace supplies the permanent nucleus of the "submerged tenth" and the "unemployables" of modern civilized society. It is a burden to be borne by the capable members. But in South Africa the resulting social problem is enormously complicated by the Colour Question ; and the existence of the Poor Whites constitutes a very direct menace to the stability of the social stratification which regards a White man or woman as being, in virtue solely of colour, superior to a non-White person ; since the obvious inferiority of the Poor White demonstrates the falsity of the general assumption. For the state to attempt to carry the Poor Whites on the "White standards of living" is to assume a heavy, probably an increasingly heavy, burden ; to allow them to fall to the ordinary standards of living of unskilled labour, *i.e.* to the "Kaffir standard of living," is to abandon the effort to preserve a rigid Colour Line and so to facilitate the intermixture of races which is already taking place in some of the slums of the cities and countryside.

Such a brief consideration of the Colour Question inevitably raises the inquiry as to whether South Africa is a White man's country, and whether it will remain a White man's country. The phrase is usually taken to mean a country in which Whites are completely acclimatized and form the majority of the population ; more rarely it means a country in which Whites are completely dominant, even though they may be a minority.

Over two of the important natural regions of South Africa, the Cape Region and the High and Middle Veldt, the climatic conditions have allowed a White population to live for several generations without any apparent racial deterioration. There it seems that the Whites are fully acclimatized ; though it must be remembered that they have had an inferior class of slaves or serfs—now the landless Coloured labourers—to do the unskilled manual labour for them. It has not yet been proved that the Whites themselves can do all the necessary labour in these regions without detriment to their health and racial vigour ; though there is reason to think that they can. But even here the Whites are less than half of the total population ; hence it will be in fact a White man's land only so long as they remain the completely dominant minority, or when they succeed in becoming a decisive majority.

In the two eastern regions of South Africa, the East Coast Lowland and the Eastern Highlands, the Whites form only a small minority of the population, probably not more than a tenth, among the strongest and most virile of the other races. Here the Whites are not acclimatized ; the combination of high temperatures and humidity for a large part of each year makes the climate unsuitable to them ; and they are present only as the ruling class, maintained from one generation to another by sending their children to healthier regions for several years of their upbringing, and by newcomers from those regions. This is a Black man's land ; and there is no prospect of the Whites ever holding it more firmly than they do now. But it may be held indefinitely by such a White " garrison " recruited and maintained from those regions of South Africa which are, or can be made, a White man's land ; so long as the strength of the Whites there is sufficient for the task.

## CHAPTER XVI

### SOUTH AFRICA—EXTERNAL

THE external relations of South Africa are, and have been, dominated by two principal geographical facts of its position. The first is its position as the peninsular end of Africa, fully open to the rest of that continent ; for no physical barriers of desert or mountain define it on its landward frontiers. Before the Age of Discovery it was one of the "ends of the earth," occupied by refugee peoples at the lower levels of human culture. The other is its position on the seaways as the turning-point on the open-sea route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean, the route from the North Atlantic lands of Europe and eastern North America to "The Indies," from the "West" to the "East," a position which became a fact of importance with the discovery of the sea route to India in 1497 A.D.

The discovery of South Africa was a by-product of the search for a way to the Indies. The first colonization of the Cape (in 1652 A.D.) was for the purpose of establishing there a port-of-call and a provisioning station for ships sailing between Europe and the East Indies. For more than a century after the first settlement this purpose determined the policies of its government. The same fact of position determined the British conquest of the Cape in the Napoleonic Wars ; although by that date the local settlement had grown to a colony which already had a life and importance of its own. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 diverted much of the shipping which had formerly used the Cape Route and so lessened, but did not destroy, its importance. But with the general increase in the amount of seaborne




FIG. 36.—WORLD MAP CENTRED ON SOUTH AFRICA  
(Actual centre 30° S. and 30° E.)

trade during the past century Capetown has maintained its position as one of the principal ports-of-call on the ocean ways, and it is still one of the great seaports of the world. On the airways it can be only a terminus ; and hence the coming transfer of some traffic to the air will cause a real reduction in its relative value.

The strategic value of the Cape, as a turning-point on the seaways, is greatly enhanced by the length of all the distances which separate it from possible rival bases. It is not at a physical defile of routes ; but any ship using the open-sea route between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans can only avoid calling at some port of South Africa by making a very long passage between stations. For twelve hundred miles on each side of the Cape there is no foreign port ; and the only foreign ports within two thousand miles are in the possession of Portugal.

This turning-point between the Atlantic and Indian oceans is one of the most important strategic positions on the ocean routes of the British Empire. A glance at a world map in which South Africa is centrally placed (fig. 36) shows that the route past it is nearly the shortest route between the North Atlantic and Australia and New Zealand, only a little longer than that via Suez in the proportions of twelve to eleven, and free from many of the dangers of the inland-sea route. Also by this route South Africa is approximately half way between the other two groups of British States.<sup>1</sup> It is this midway position which gives to South Africa its strategic importance among the States of the Commonwealth.

The South African Customs Union includes all British South Africa, as far north as the River Zambesi, *i.e.* it

<sup>1</sup> Distances (in round numbers) :

Southampton—Capetown	.	.	.	.	6,000 sea miles
Halifax, N.S.—Capetown	.	.	.	.	6,800 „ „
Capetown—Melbourne	.	.	.	.	5,800 „ „
Capetown—Wellington, N.Z.	.	.	.	.	6,800 „ „

includes Southern Rhodesia and the protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland as well as the Union of South Africa and its mandate territory of South-west Africa (see fig. 37, p. 215). Thus it has more than double the area of the Union, and about a fifth more population. All references to external trade here are for the whole of the Customs Union, which contains a population of about nine millions, of whom a little less than a fourth are Whites.

The *per capita* value of the external trade is nearly a third as high as that of New Zealand (see App. IV, p. 393), and barely half of that of the United Kingdom. But in South Africa it is not so clear an index of economic development, because of the widely different standards of living of the different sections of the population. In fact White South Africa is at a stage of development similar in many respects to that of Australia; and, though some of her "backveldt" farmers live on lower standards than those of Australia, and are more nearly self-sufficing, her great mining industries are as completely dependent on external markets as are the pastoral industries of Australia and New Zealand, or the wheat-growing of Canada.

The mines supply more than half of the exports (by value). The pastoral occupations supply another quarter, chiefly in the form of wool. And it is interesting to note that the value of the agricultural products exported is less than half of that of the foods and drink imported. At the present time South Africa is hardly self-supporting in food production; and it has only a beginning, though a substantial beginning, of manufacturing industries, aided by government organization for the basic industry of iron and steel production and by a system of high protective tariffs. More than half of the imports are manufactured goods; and the Afrikaners are as completely dependent on this external trade for the maintenance of their present standards of civilization as are the peoples of any of the other States of the British Commonwealth.

Also the external trade is practically all overseas trade. Some part of it passes through the Portuguese East African ports of *Lorenço Marques* and *Beira*, which are economically dependent on their hinterlands in British South Africa. The total volume of the trade carried on by land with the neighbouring countries is almost insignificant, except for the transit trade between Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo (*Katanga* district) on the one hand and South African ports, particularly *Beira*, on the other. This trade is likely to be diminished considerably by the development of the *Benguela* railway, which was opened in March 1931. There is also some export of foodstuffs, and of coal, to the *Katanga* district.

One special feature of the overseas trade arises from the fact that the principal exports are of very small bulk in proportion to their value. All the gold and diamonds of a year's export would not fill one liner. And almost the only bulky export goods are maize, coal, and wool. Hence the bulk of the goods imported is normally greater than the bulk of the exports, especially in the trade with the United Kingdom, Europe, and the United States, which are the chief buyers of South African exports. This lack of full return cargoes handicaps shipping and is a direct cause of the relatively high freight charges and the high costs of maintaining frequent services, which in turn handicap the development of South Africa's external trade. The attempts made in recent years to increase the production and export of wool and maize are, at least in part, influenced by these peculiar conditions of the export trade ; for, unlike most lands of primary production, South Africa has not yet developed any really large export of bulky foods or raw materials.

The colony of Southern Rhodesia occupies the eastern well-watered section of the high plateau which forms the northward extension of the *Veldt* natural region of the Union (cf. maps, pp. 191 and 215). It is limited to the north by the middle part of the *River Zambesi*, whose deep and

narrow valley forms a distinct economic, as well as a climatic and a physiographic, frontier ; since the low moist valley-land is infested by the tsetse fly and so puts a limit to the extension of cattle and horses. Similar limits occur to east and southeast where the plateau falls to the lowlands of Portuguese East Africa and to the Limpopo Valley. But to




FIG. 37.—SOUTH AFRICA: POLITICAL DIVISIONS

the southwest Southern Rhodesia is a direct continuation of the dry Veldt ; and its altitude of more than five thousand feet so far compensates for its lower latitude ( $16^{\circ}$  to  $22^{\circ}$  S.) as to make it practically a part of the Veldt.

Since Southern Rhodesia is thus geographically, and in some degree economically, an extension of one of the most important natural regions of the Union, proposals for its incorporation as a fifth province have been discussed frequently ; but up to the present these have been rejected

by the parliament of Southern Rhodesia. A chief difficulty is the language position in the Union, where English and Afrikaans are on an equal footing as official languages ; for the White population of Rhodesia is English-speaking and does not wish to be compelled to learn a second language.<sup>1</sup> The same fact makes some of the advocates of Afrikaans in the Union reluctant to welcome a fifth province which would add to the numbers and weight of the English-speaking population within the Union. The population of Southern Rhodesia is just over a million, of whom only fifty thousand are Whites ; and the non-White population is practically all Bantu. Hence the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia in the Union would alter the racial proportions there to a considerable extent, and reduce the White population from twenty-two per cent. to eighteen per cent. of the total while increasing the Bantus from sixty-four per cent. to sixty-nine per cent.<sup>2</sup>

An important part of the external relations of the Union arises from the demand of its mining industries for large masses of cheap labour. The skilled labour and supervision is almost wholly done by Whites ; but the unskilled work is done by Coloured labourers. These labourers are mainly recruited from the Bantu population within the Union, within and without the Native Reserves. But this supply is insufficient ; and it is therefore supplemented by recruitment in the neighbouring protectorates, especially in Basutoland, and from Portuguese East Africa. And there have been efforts to obtain labourers from farther afield in central and East Africa. This recruitment from outside adds to the complications of the racial complex and the Colour Question ; it also brings the Union government into close relations with those of British and Portuguese East Africa. In all these areas the local population is too scanty

<sup>1</sup> An interesting parallel to the position of Northern Ireland ("Ulster"), in respect to the Irish Free State.

<sup>2</sup> Percentages calculated from figures of the 1921 censuses.

to supply sufficient labour for a rapid development of the natural resources ; and this relative scarcity of labour on the one hand tends to raise its price, and on the other produces a widespread tendency to apply pressure to aid the recruiters in obtaining labourers.

The three South African protectorates of Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland are in direct relation to the government of the United Kingdom, which is represented in these relations by a High Commissioner. Before 1931 the Governor-General of the Union was also High Commissioner for South Africa. Since that year the Governor-General is no longer nominated by the government of the United Kingdom, whereas the High Commissioner is the representative in South Africa of that government ; and so the two offices are held by different persons. The Governor-General (or Viceroy) represents the King, whereas the High Commissioner represents the government of the United Kingdom ; and since that government was a party to the treaties which established the protectorates its representative is responsible for the carrying out of those treaties.

The strongest and most populous of the protectorates, Basutoland, is entirely surrounded by the territory of the Union ; and both of the others have the greater part of their boundaries co-terminous with those of the Union. This position (see map, p. 215) has naturally led to suggestions for the transfer of the control of these protectorates from the United Kingdom to the Union of South Africa. The obstacle to such a transfer is that the treaties with the native chiefs which guarantee the protectorates were made by and with the government of the United Kingdom on behalf of the King ; and it would be a breach of faith to transfer any of these protectorates to another government except with their own consent. If any one of them wished for such a transfer it is probable that both of the British governments concerned would welcome it. But until the

native policies of the Union win the confidence of the chiefs and elders in the protectorates they are likely to prefer the present state of affairs, in which the High Commissioner is a buffer between them and the Union.

Southwest Africa includes the mandate area which was formerly German territory, together with the Walfish Bay District which was previously British territory. Under the terms of the mandate Southwest Africa may be administered as part of the Union ; and, except that it is not a province, its administration is being so assimilated. The territory is mostly desert or semi-desert land except on the highest parts of the interior. It has some mineral wealth, though little in comparison with the rest of South Africa. The total population is about a quarter of a million, of whom barely a tenth are Whites, and the mean density of population is less than one person per square mile. The non-White population includes Hottentots and Bushmen, some mixed peoples akin to the Cape Coloured, and tribes of mixed Hottentot and Bantu descent. The White population is mainly of German and South African Dutch origin. Under the German Empire, before 1915, the territory was of strategic importance as a base for a possible attack on the Union, and for that reason the Union government and people will naturally wish to retain control of it. The large area, desert conditions, scanty population, and lack of attractions for settlers make it a poor country in which administration is necessarily costly in proportion to the resources. Its importance to the Union is almost wholly in its relation to defence.

The geographical position of South Africa, and the dominant importance of the Colour Question in that country, give its citizens a special interest in the whole of the British territories in East Africa, at least as far to the north as Kenya. These territories form a continuous series from the Union northward to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan ; and the East African Tablelands offer in many areas, northward

from the Transvaal to Kenya, possibilities of development like that of parts of South Africa, by similar settlements of White farmers or planters using Coloured labour. All these scattered settlers tend to develop similar views on the Colour Question, and to support each other in regard to it. The Tanganyika territory was, during the Great War, conquered for the Empire by a force consisting partly of South Africans, and commanded during part of the War by a South African. The White South Africans tend to give what support they can to the smaller colonies of Whites settled in Rhodesia and British East Africa in their efforts to introduce native policies akin to that of South Africa. The fact that these smaller colonies are predominantly English-speaking is of only minor importance in their present relations with the Afrikanders ; since there is no prospect of their inclusion in the Union. It does not affect the spread of a common sympathy among all the Whites of South and East Africa.

The Union has also been brought into political relations with India by the presence of Indians in Natal, and the attempts of Indian nationalists to use the Natal Indians in political agitations. Here also a similar position in Kenya forms a link between the Whites in the two regions.

## CHAPTER XVII

### INDIA—INTERNAL

FROM the vast and compact land mass which forms the centre of the Old World—the “Heartland” of the “World Island,” to use Mackinder’s vivid terms<sup>1</sup>—two peninsulas of sub-continental magnitude project to the west and to the south respectively. These peninsulas are Europe, west of Russia, and India, south of the Himalayas. They are approximately equal to one another in area and in population. Both are lands of age-long civilization and of dense population. Both are regions where the political geography is marked by a very complicated series of states. The politico-geographical pattern of Europe is still kaleidoscopic, as it has been since the breakdown of the Roman Empire. That of India has been crystallized for the past century, during which internal changes of state boundaries have been checked by the imposition of an alien rule. This came in with the battle of Plassey (1757 A.D.) and spread over practically the whole of India during the next hundred years, down to the establishment of the British Government of India in 1858 and the proclamation of the present Empire of India in 1876.

But while western Europe and India are fairly comparable in extent and in population, and in some other respects, there are very wide differences between them. The chief of these result from their positions in different latitudes. Europe is wholly in temperate latitudes, ranging from 35° N. to the Arctic Ocean. India, with the exception of Kashmir, is wholly subtropical and intertropical, extending

<sup>1</sup> Sir Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, London, 1919.

from 8° N. to 35° N. Thus Europe has cool or cold winters; and only in the warmer parts of its Mediterranean lands are the winter temperatures as high as those of the northern parts of the Indian lowlands. India is a hot land; and owing to the mountains which shelter it on the north the winters of its northern plains are much warmer than those of places in the same latitudes in North America. On the plains of India frost is rare, and snow is almost unknown. Indian civilization has not been influenced by either the difficulties or the stimulus of a cold or cool winter.

Europe is a peninsula of peninsulas, in close touch with the seas which penetrate far into it and have led many of its peoples out on to the seaways. India is a very compact sub-continental land mass, with few gulfs or islands or minor peninsulas to bring it into intimate contact with the ocean to which it has given its name. The few inlets which are prominent on the map, such as the Gulf of Cambay and the Rann of Cutch, are generally shallow, and the latter is hardly more than a salt marsh: while India's greater rivers are all shut off from the sea by deltaic marshlands whose winding silted channels are inhospitable to shipping. Throughout the greater part of India's long history the sea has counted for little in the life of its peoples. Since the end of the period of expansion of Hinduism to some of the East India Islands in the fifth century of the Christian era the sea has been to the Hindu a barrier rather than a way; and it remained a barrier until the period of modern trans-oceanic navigation. And for the caste Hindu its barrier character has been, and is, reinforced by caste restrictions.

Under such different geographical conditions India and Europe have evolved very different types of civilization. The restless and materialistic modern civilization of the West has few points of sympathy with the contemplative and more essentially religious civilization of India. The English are the most "western" of the White peoples; and the social philosophies of the Hindus and of the English

differ as widely as any two which are prominent in the civilized world of to-day. The Hinduism which binds the social and religious life of the majority of the peoples of India is as far removed from the Protestant Christianity and rationalist science which dominate those of the English as its caste system is from the democratic theory, and aristocratic or plutocratic practice, of their social relations. The resulting mental atmospheres of England and India are perhaps as widely different as any two which can be found in the world of today ; and few peoples seem less likely to be able to appreciate each other's view-point than the ordinary matter-of-fact Briton and the Hindu mystic.

India is the third largest of the great population masses of the world. It contains more than three hundred and fifty million inhabitants, that is about a sixth of the world's population, approximately two-thirds as many people as either Europe (including Russia) or the Far East, and twice as many as the whole of North America. And it is by far the greatest dependency which has ever been held by a completely external Power. There is no close historical precedent for such an Empire as that which has been established by the British in India, at a distance of six thousand miles from their homeland. All the many previous conquerors of India settled down in the land, and became absorbed in its peoples. The small governing class sent out from Britain has never settled in India ; its numbers are maintained entirely by recruitment from the distant homelands, and its members expect to retire to those lands when their term of service is ended. Also this governing class is small, almost unbelievably small in numbers, in relation to the population of India. In 1921 the total population of "European" (mainly British) descent in British India was 156,637. This represents a proportion of less than three in five thousand of the population of British India, and one in two thousand for all India. But this 156,637 included 45,000 women, and 21,780 adult males who were not in

the government services but were otherwise occupied—as missionaries, traders, planters, experts in industry, etc. So that the total number of the men of British origin directly engaged by the government was less than ninety thousand, or about one to every four thousand of India's population. The sixty thousand British soldiers formed two-thirds of these. One-third of the remainder were technical experts in subordinate positions on government railways, irrigation works, and similar undertakings. Less than a twentieth of them, not quite four thousand in all, supplied the British members of the higher grades of the Civil and Political Services. The rest were mainly occupied in the Educational, Medical, Police, and Forestry Services. There can be few, if any, cases in history where so small a body of men has exercised so great an influence on a vast population, by which they are so greatly outnumbered. The very smallness of the British population is evidence that it does not rule, and cannot rule, by force without the consent of the great mass of the Indian peoples. It holds, and has held, its position because the great majority of those peoples have in fact acquiesced in British rule : though this has probably been in most cases a passive acquiescence rather than an active support.

The Indian Empire, without Burma, has an area of about one and a half million square miles of land, and contains more than three hundred and fifty million inhabitants. Thus it has two and a half times the population of the continental United States on half the area of that country, with a mean density of population of more than two hundred persons per square mile, which is five times the mean of the inhabited lands of the world and about half of that of the United Kingdom.

The shape is that of an irregular quadrilateral with its diagonals from north to south, from latitudes  $8^{\circ}$  N. to  $37^{\circ}$  N., a direct distance of about two thousand miles, and east to west between longitudes  $61^{\circ}$  E. and  $98^{\circ}$  E. for about two thousand two hundred miles. The southwestern and southeastern sides of the quadrilateral rest on the ocean in

long smooth coastlines, with few large inlets or good harbours. The northwestern and northeastern sides are the land frontiers along the southern mountainous edge of "High Asia," the highest and most extensive of the elevated regions on the earth. And where the mountains decrease in elevation as they approach the sea they stretch into a desert barrier on the northwest, and become clad with dense




FIG. 38.—INDIA : PHYSIOGRAPHIC REGIONS

jungle on the northeast. Thus India is marked off on the landward sides by definite and strong barrier frontiers which have contributed greatly to the establishment of her very strongly marked geographical individuality.

Within these limits the major geographical features are comparatively simple. The greater part of the peninsula is occupied by the Dekkan, a plateau area of ancient rock similar to the corresponding plateaus of the western half of Australia and of Africa. The Dekkan repeats the quadri-lateral shape of the whole of India ; its high southwestern

edge forms the scarp of the Western Ghats, close to the west coast as far as latitude  $22^{\circ}$  N.; its southeastern and lower edge in the Eastern Ghats lies parallel to the east coast from the Ganges delta southwards ; its northwestern edge overlooks the plains of Rajputana from Gujarat to near Delhi and is roughly parallel to the North West Frontier, which lies four hundred miles away beyond the Indus lowlands ; while the more broken northeastern edge forms the southern limit of the Ganges Lowland and is nearly parallel to the Himalayan foothills which form the opposite border of that lowland, between two and three hundreds of miles away. The northernmost point of the Dekkan links on to the Delhi Ridge.

The region here called the Dekkan falls into three main natural divisions. The first and largest of these, to which the name Dekkan is often restricted, is that which slopes eastward from the Western Ghats and is bounded on the north by the Vindhya ranges. The second lies to the northwest and slopes northward to the Ganges Valley ; it is known as the Malwa plateau. The third is the area of tangled hills and valleys which forms the northeastern corner of the Dekkan, and extends almost to the bend of the Ganges above Murshedabad. It is the least accessible and least populous of the divisions, and the home of the most backward of the peoples. But it also includes the chief coalfield of India and the modern industrial centre of Jamshedpur, and lies nearest to the populous lowlands of the Ganges Valley and Delta.

Outside the Dekkan the great northern lowlands which occupy the depression between it and the mountain frontiers of India are divided by position and climate into two very different regions, that of the Ganges Valley to the northeast and that of the Indus Valley and Thar Desert to the northwest. The former normally receives an adequate rainfall from the summer monsoon, and it is the most fertile and populous region of India ; while the latter has over nearly

all its extent an insufficient rainfall, and its agriculture is dependent on irrigation. These two sections of the lowland are approximately equal in area ; but the eastern contains at least five times as numerous a population as the western. The lowland is narrowest where the two sections come together ; and here in the gateway, which separates the northernmost end of the Dekkan and the Thar from the foothills of the Himalaya and connects the Ganges and Indus valleys, is the city of Delhi. This is the meeting-point of the populous lowlands and the chief junction of their communication ways, and so occupies one of the most important strategic sites in India.

The eastern coast plains, which extend all the way from the Ganges delta to Cape Comorin, are generally less than fifty miles wide, but in places broaden out to twice that width. They resemble the Ganges Lowland in climate, in facilities for irrigation, and in density of population, and form the second most populous region of India. Physically, but not politically, this division includes most of the island of Ceylon, which is not part of the Indian Empire.

Besides the great regions of the Dekkan and the Plains the Indian Empire includes most of the inward slopes of the bordering mountains, which form a narrow edging along its land frontiers and include its most difficult areas. These mountain borders are held primarily for the defence of the plains country. In resources and population they are the least of the regions of India.

This comparative simplicity of the major physiographic divisions of India is paralleled in its climates. India is a hot land ; and no part of its lowlands has a cool season. Nowhere on the lowland does the mean temperature of the coolest month fall below  $50^{\circ}$  F. Over the northern half the short winters are warm, and the rest of the year is hot. Elsewhere every season is hot.

The rainfall is almost wholly dependent on the monsoons. It ranges from the greatest fall recorded in the world, over

six hundred inches per year, in the northeast to less than five inches in the extreme west near the lower Indus. In four areas, viz. (1) the eastern half of the Ganges Valley and the areas to north and east of it, (2) the west coast south of latitude  $21^{\circ}$  N., (3) the far south and the southeast coast, and (4) the Himalayas and their foothills, the rainfall is abundant. Over a wide central area stretching from north to south, from the Himalayan foothills to include the upper half of the Ganges Valley, part of the Panjab, nearly all central India, and the Dekkan, the rainfall is between twenty and forty inches in normal years. This great area of moderate rainfall is also an area of unreliable rainfall ; and in the years of a weak monsoon it includes the famine areas. To the west and northwest of this in the Indus Valley and the areas east and west of the lower Indus, is the region of low rainfall, from twenty to less than five inches per year. In this "dry India" all cultivation is dependent on irrigation. The Indus is to lower Panjab and to Sind what the Nile is to Egypt.

It should be noted that the northern high mountains rise far above the snowline ; hence their rivers are sustained by the melting of the snow and glaciers in the summer months, and are therefore of far more value for irrigation than those of the Dekkan, which are dependent wholly on the monsoon rains and diminish greatly in the dry season.

The natural resources of India are extensive, though not great in proportion to the numbers of the population. Perhaps half the area of all India (and two-thirds of British India) is cultivable, and much of it in the alluvial lowlands is good cultivable land. On these lowlands lives the great majority of the people, four-fifths of whom are village-dwellers dependent on the cultivation of the soil. Agriculture is overwhelmingly the principal occupation. India is self-supporting in agricultural products, and her agriculture also provides four-fifths of her exports.

Except for her fertile soils India is a poor country. In proportion to the area the mineral wealth is very small. In

coal and iron her production is a tenth of that of Great Britain and is not sufficient to supply local needs ; there are large reserves of iron ore, but no great deposits of coal are known. The supplies of precious stones and of gold and silver, which contributed to the medieval legends of the "wealth of the Indies," are for the most part exhausted ; though a very wide range of metals is obtained in small quantities. In the wetter mountainous areas there are great reserves of potential water-power, some of which are now being brought into use for hydro-electric developments. These water-power resources offer a principal basis for modern industrial development. Many of them are within practicable reach of the great cities, and of the great areas of production of vegetable raw materials.

It has already been noted that the mean density of population over India is about two hundred persons per square mile. But here, as everywhere else, the population is very unevenly distributed over the land. There are rural districts in the well-watered areas of the Ganges Lowland where the density is more than a thousand per square mile, and others in the desert and in some jungle areas which are almost uninhabited. British India occupies a little more than half the total area, but contains little less than three-fourths of the total population, more than half of whom dwell in the Ganges Valley. The populous northern lowland extends for about fifteen hundred miles along the foot of the mountains from Assam to the Indus, with a width varying from three hundred to one hundred miles. It occupies less than a fifth of the total area of India, but contains more than half of the total population. The next populous area is the much smaller east coast lowland, which contains more than a tenth of the population on perhaps a twentieth of the total area of India. And there is a similar, though smaller, area of dense population on the west coast south of the tropic. The rest of the sub-continent is in general very thinly peopled, in spite of the occurrence of small areas of dense

population in irrigated lands, near Bombay and some other cities, and in some fertile districts in the west and north-west of the Dekkan.

The spread of population over India in the past has been that of slowly expanding agricultural settlement. In the east and northeast this population was dependent on rice as its principal food crop. But rice cultivation is in practice




FIG. 39.—INDIA: DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION

limited to level areas of good soils where the conditions are suitable for irrigation, and where water is plentiful for the greater part of the year. It cannot be carried on on any considerable slopes. Hence the culture, and the population, dependent on rice was limited to the alluvial lowlands and valley bottoms in areas of abundant rainfall; it could not spread on to higher slopes or into the hill districts or the drier regions; and the hilly areas within the great bend of the lower Ganges are still among the most backward parts of India, though they are close to the most ancient

centres and most densely peopled areas of Hinduism (see fig. 42, p. 243). The wetter areas of highland and their steep slopes are still covered by dense jungle.

Farther to the northwest, in the upper Ganges Valley, the cultivator depends more on "dry land" crops, of which millet is perhaps the most important. But here the rainfall is less and the dry season longer; and permanent cultivation is, therefore, generally restricted to the areas where regular irrigation is possible, a restriction which becomes closer as cultivation extends towards the drier areas of the Indus Lowland.

In parts of south India, and to some extent also in the west, cultivation has been carried up the slopes by means of terracing, which allows of irrigation on the hill sides; but in general Indian cultivation is almost limited to the gentler slopes of the well-watered plains and plateaus and of the valley floors. This limitation partly accounts for the survival in a land of long civilization of such large areas of "backward," often almost primitive, peoples in difficult hill country, quite near to the centres of civilization on the plains. The same limitation is one of the chief causes of the relative stagnation of the great mass of the population. Until the present generation few Indians seem to have moved far from the place of their birth; the great majority, probably more than nine-tenths of the whole, were born, lived, and died within the area of one village or town. This stagnation was reinforced by social customs and traditions, and particularly by caste restrictions; it was but slightly modified by the practice of religious pilgrimage to sacred places; and it maintained the village as the vital unit of India's economic and political organization.

Perhaps the most important fact in the recent impact of Western Civilization on India is its attack on this stagnation of the population. The security provided by a strong and stable government, together with the introduction of roads and railways and freedom of internal trade throughout

most of India, has made it possible for larger numbers of the people to move about freely than at any previous period in India's long history. The great trunk road from Calcutta to Peshawar, completed just before the railway came to India, was the first great artery of what is now an extensive modern road system. Formerly pilgrims and merchants, armies and the government emissaries, travelled; now anyone may travel. The automobile and the motor bus have invaded India, and led to a great extension of the road system and a jostling together of the common people of different districts and towns and villages and castes. The vernacular press is reaching every village; it is a press of recent growth, and its standards of responsibility have not yet reached a high level; but it carries the ferment of new knowledge and new ideas into every corner of the land. The greatest obstacles to the unification of the peoples of India which remain are the divisions due to religions and castes, and the diversity of their languages.

The linguistic complexity of India is even greater than that of Europe<sup>1</sup>; and one of the greatest needs is a common

#### <sup>1</sup> CHIEF LANGUAGES OF INDIA

Hindustani :	<i>No. of Speakers in Millions, 1931.</i>	<i>Chief Areas.</i>
(a) Hindi (Sanskrit Script)	} 121·3	(a) Bihar and middle Ganges plain and Central India
(b) Urdu (Persian Script)		(b) Upper Ganges plain (United Provinces) and eastern Panjab
Bengali	53·5	Bengal
Telugu	26·4	Central parts of Madras Presidency
Panjabi and Lahnda	24·6	Indus Lowland and Kashmir
Marathi	21·4	Northwest Dekkan
Tamil	20·4	Southern Madras and Mysore (and north of Ceylon)
Kanarese	11·2	Mysore and western Madras
Oriya	11·2	Orissa and east of Central Provinces, <i>i.e.</i> in northeast Dekkan
Burmese	9·9	Burma, central and south
Malayalam	9·1	Travancore, and extreme southwest
and nine other languages each spoken by more than a million people, with more than a hundred of less importance.		

means of intercourse, a well-established *lingua franca*, for All-India. The nearest approach to this at the present time is the English language, which is used by some two and a half millions of the educated population, and is the only language used equally in all parts of India. Every other Indian language has only a regional distribution ; though this distribution is very far from being coincident with the limits of the provinces, except possibly in Bengal. It is also noteworthy that the distribution of languages has no close or regular relation to that of religions ; though the division of written Hindustani by the use of two distinct scripts is associated with the division between Hindu and Muhammadan speakers of that language. Persian and Arabic were introduced by the Muhammadans, and the former was the classical language of the Mughal courts. But only its script was imposed on the vernaculars of the provinces which contained their several capitals ; and though Persian is still a culture language in northwest India it is not widely spoken there.

In two of the three suggestions for the establishment of new provinces which have been made recently, the language distribution is a main factor. These are for a province of " Andhra " for the Telugu-speaking peoples of Madras Presidency, and a province of Orissa for those speaking the Oriya language in what is now the southern part of Bihar and Orissa Province and the extreme north of Madras Presidency. In the third case, that of Sind, the case for a new province rests on grounds of geographical position, administrative convenience, religious distributions, and communal politics.

The religious divisions of the peoples of India are at present much more important and, at least from a distance, far more prominent than their linguistic divisions. Of the three hundred and forty million people of India proper nearly two hundred and forty millions are counted as Hindus, and seventy-five millions are Muhammadans.




FIG. 40.—INDIA: DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHIEF COMMUNITIES, BY PROVINCES, LARGE STATES, AND AGENCY AREAS

(From the Report on the Census of 1931, Cmd. 4194; by permission of H.M. Stationery Office.)

The size of the rectangles also indicates the total population in each area.

The remaining twenty-five millions are divided among several religious groups, of which the Christians are the most numerous with more than six million members mainly in south India. Others are the Sikhs, Jains, and Parsis. And there are nearly nine million people, classed as adherents of "tribal religions" or as "animists," who do not belong to any one of the greater organized religions ; though in many cases there is very little distinction between them and some of the lower castes of Hinduism.

Between the adherents of these several religions there is almost no social intercourse and no intermarriage ; so that they are in fact separate peoples. They are usually spoken of as the "Communities," and an Indian community is thus a section of the population separated from the rest by very definite and strong social and religious barriers, across which there is very little intercourse.

Hinduism is the faith of a large majority, approximately two-thirds, of the peoples of India proper, and it is practically confined to India. It has nothing of the apparent simplicity of Muhammadanism, with its rigid monotheism, or of Protestant Christianity. These can be defined, in theory if not in practice, by their sacred books ; but Hinduism admits of no such clear definition or summary. It is a polytheistic religion, which at one end includes peoples who are hardly more than pagan nature worshippers. At the other extreme it is led by Brahman philosophers, whose lofty mysticism makes a strong appeal to many western students, and who are probably as far from sharing the beliefs of the common people in India as they are from any western religion.

An outstanding feature of Hinduism is its belief in the unity and sacredness of all animal life, and the resulting refusal of the orthodox Hindu to kill any animal or to eat any flesh. It also regards the cow as specially sacred. This may frequently lead to disagreement and even conflict with Muhammadan and Christian, who are eaters of

meat ; and the former of whom, in India, makes a ceremonial sacrifice of the cow at some festivals.

But Hinduism is as much a social philosophy as it is a religion, and one which directs and influences a large part of the everyday life of its adherents. Here it requires the complete subordination of the individual to the larger unit of the family ; and in many ways it approaches, or includes, ancestor-worship. In this way it has been the strong cement of the Hindu civilization for many generations. This side of Hinduism has very strongly influenced the non-Hindu peoples of India. However much the Indian Muhammadan or Christian may condemn the Hindu as an idolater it remains true that his own social ideals and customs are very largely based on those of Hinduism. The need for a son, to perform the funeral rites and to carry on the family, is urgent for every Hindu. And this need is a potent factor in the system of early marriage and in producing the high birth-rate, and so indirectly the high death-rate, characteristic of India. So long as this particular religious and social need is dominant there can be no relief from the pressure of population on India's soil which keeps her people in poverty.

The most outstanding feature of the social system of Hinduism is its caste divisions. More or less rigid division into social classes, based mainly on the accident of birth, has been a characteristic feature of many cultures and civilizations—as the people of ancient Rome were either patricians or plebeians, and those of medieval feudal Europe were “gentle” or “simple.” But nowhere else have these distinctions become so rigid and so numerous as in India, where they are interwoven with the religious system and form an integral part, and the most prominent part, of the Hindu social structure.

More than two thousand castes are listed by the Census of India. The process of subdivision is still going on, especially among the lower castes ; and there are grada-

tions of caste even among the "untouchables." But the most important divisions are (1) between the Brahmans and the rest, and (2) between the low castes, or "depressed classes" or "untouchables," and all the castes above them, who are the "twice-born." Every Hindu is born into the caste of his parents. No attainments, of honour, of learning, or of wealth, no piety or sacrifice can alter his caste status or raise him one step in its rigid social scale. If he violates its rules and restrictions he may become an outcast, with the forfeiture of all his family ties and social rights. But only if he entirely abandons Hinduism, and becomes a member of some other community, can he escape from the dominance of caste.

The Brahman males number only some seven or eight millions among the two hundred and forty millions of Hindus. But they monopolize the priesthood; and they long claimed, and exercised, a practical monopoly of literary education and of all the power which belonged to the only literate caste. Their monopoly of such education was broken when the British Government, and Christian missions, established schools and universities in India open to all Indians irrespective of caste. But in practice the Brahmans are still the most highly educated class in India, and the only Hindu caste with a social heritage which includes a strong tradition of learning and scholarship; hence they form a very large proportion of the educated and professional classes. Their influence, as priests and as the educated class, is so great that in the "reforms" introduced in 1919 it was deemed necessary to introduce into the constitutions of some provinces a proviso to ensure that Brahmans should not hold all the seats allotted to Hindus in the Legislative Assemblies. Subsequent experience suggests that this proviso was not needed against the Brahmans; though it may be necessary to secure any direct representation of the depressed classes.

At the other end of the Hindu social scale are the "un-

touchables " or the " depressed classes," so low that their touch on his person, his food, his seat, or his clothing is defilement to any member of the " twice-born " castes. The precise definition or classification of " untouchability " varies somewhat in different parts of India, as also does the extent of the disabilities which it involves. In general it seems that the disabilities are greatest where Hindus form nearly the whole population, as in parts of the Madras Presidency, and least where Hindus are a minority of the whole population, as in eastern Bengal and the Panjab, where the higher castes have greater need of their low caste co-religionists. In the extreme case " untouchability " becomes " unapproachability "; and the " unapproachable " may not come within a defined distance of a high caste Hindu or of a temple without causing ceremonial defilement.

It is, of course, self-evident that the maintenance of any such rigid caste distinctions is entirely inconsistent with democratic theories of social organization and government, and with the whole spirit of modern Western Civilization. Hence the impact of Western Civilization on Hinduism inevitably leads to a weakening of the rigidity of the caste system. Probably the system is already changing ; and the introduction of modern industrial works and factories and modern means of transport are likely to weaken it much farther. But in the vital matters of general social intercourse, the possibilities of eating together and of inter-marriage, the caste Hindu is as rigidly separated from his co-religionists of other castes as he is from the Christian or the Muhammadan. And the fact that a member of the depressed classes may escape from many of his social disabilities by conversion to Christianity or to Islam is likely to become steadily more important as the amount of internal movement in the population increases and the level of education rises. In this connection it is interesting to note that in the last intercensal period (1921-31) the number of

Hindus increased by only 10·4 per cent., in almost the same proportion as the total population. There was a large decrease among those counted as adherents of "tribal religions," which was probably caused by counting many of them as low caste Hindus. In the same period the Christians increased by 32·5 per cent., largely by gaining converts from the depressed classes in south India.

Muhammadanism is, in theory and largely also in practice, a completely democratic system in which all believers are brethren and in which no hereditary castes are recognized. It is also, in its active forms, an aggressive missionary faith, fundamentally antagonistic to Hinduism, which the "true believer" regards as a vile idolatry. And the rivalry between Hindus and Muhammadans is at present more prominent, and perhaps more important, in India than the efforts of the depressed classes to improve their status. The Muhammadans of India number more than seventy millions.<sup>1</sup> They are less than a third as numerous as all the Hindus, and only slightly more numerous than the depressed classes, but nearly half as numerous as the caste Hindus.

Nearly half the Muhammadans live in northwestern "dry" India, mainly in the Panjab and in Sind, where they are a majority of the whole population. Most of the rest live in eastern Bengal, where they number more than twenty millions. Elsewhere, in the middle Ganges Valley and in all south and central India, they are a minority, and often a very small minority, of the total population (see table, p. 240, and fig. 41).

Before the British Conquest India had undergone a series of Muhammadan invasions, entering from the northwest, which had extended through seven hundred years, from the ninth to the sixteenth centuries of the Christian era, and had culminated in the establishment by Muhammadan conquerors of successive empires over the larger part of India. The

<sup>1</sup> Nearly a third of the total number of Muhammadans in the world.

last of the Muhammadan Empires, that of the Mughals, was crumbling down into anarchy during the eighteenth century; and the British raj was established on its ruins. In many of the native states Muhammadan Rajahs still reign over Hindu populations, though there are also some in which




FIG. 41.—INDIA: DISTRIBUTION OF THE TWO CHIEF RELIGIONS

(Compiled from Table XI in Census Report 1931. Cmd. 4194.)

In the areas left white there are large proportions of Buddhists (in Burma and Ceylon) or Christians (in Travancore and Cochin).

Hindu princes reign over populations which are largely Muhammadan.

From the time of the British Conquest to the early years of the twentieth century the antagonism between Hindu and Muhammadan was seldom active on any large scale, though it never completely disappeared. But the introduction of the first stages of democratic selfgovernment led to the recrudescence of religious hostility. Under the influence

of theories of democratic government the Hindu tends to believe, or assume, that his majority gives him a right to rule. But the Muhammadan remembers that his ancestors, at no remote period, were conquerors and rulers in India ; and he has no intention of submitting to the rule of a conquered people whose pacific habits and character often lead the more martial Muhammadans to despise and underrate them. Since the reforms of 1909 and 1919, the antagonism has been revived and stimulated by the manœuvring for position of the political leaders on both sides. In spite of many efforts at agreement between the leaders the number and magnitude of communal (*i.e.* religious) riots has increased greatly ; and probably at no period within the last hundred and fifty years has the hostility between Hindu and Muhammadan been so strong and acute and widespread as it is today.

In six of the nine " Governor's Provinces " of India proper the Muhammadans are a minority, often a small minority.<sup>1</sup> In two they have a small majority ; and in the North West Frontier Province almost the whole population is Muhammadan. But under an electoral

<sup>1</sup> CHIEF RELIGIONS IN THE GOVERNOR'S PROVINCES OF INDIA PROPER  
*Census of 1931*

Province.	Total Population in millions.	Muhammadans		Hindus	
		in millions	% of total.	in millions	% of total.
Assam . . . .	9.25	2.75	30	4.9	<b>53</b>
Bengal . . . .	51.1	27.5	<b>54</b>	21.6	<b>42</b>
Bihar and Orissa . . . .	42.3	4.25	10	31	<b>73</b>
Bombay . . . .	26.4	4.5	19	16.6	<b>63</b>
Central Provinces and Berar . . . .	18	0.7	4	13.3	<b>73</b>
Madras . . . .	47.2	3.3	7	41.3	<b>87.5</b>
Panjab . . . .	24	13.3	<b>56</b>	6.3	<b>26</b>
United Provinces (Agra and Oudh) . . . .	50	7.2	14	41	<b>82</b>

system the only security for the fair representation of the minority communities lies in the adoption of either communal constituencies or an appropriate form of proportional representation. The former method was adopted in 1909. It is naturally disliked by the Hindu majority because it guarantees the minority electorates their own choice of members far more definitely than could be done by any system of common constituencies with proportional representation, in which the election of a Muhammadan would be, or might be, influenced by Hindu votes, and vice versa. The difference is that between a Muhammadan representative chosen by Muhammadans only and one chosen by a mixed constituency in which his co-religionists would usually be a minority and where he would (or might) owe his election in part to non-Muhammadan voters, and therefore must pay regard to non-Muhammadan opinion. The same problem arises with other minority communities such as the Sikhs in the Panjab ; and it is inevitably a cause of keen dispute among the various communities.

The Native States of the Indian Empire number more than six hundred and include more than a third of its area and nearly a quarter of the total population. The largest and most populous state is Hyderabad, which is nearly as large as Great Britain and contains thirteen million inhabitants. Kashmir is almost as extensive in area but only a fourth as populous. From this magnitude the states range downwards, until the least are hardly more than large estates whose lords retain some feudal powers of jurisdiction over their tenant-subjects.

The Native States are not part of British India. All of them are subject to the paramount power of their suzerain, the King-Emperor, exercised through his Viceroy the Governor-General of India. The extent of this paramountcy is influenced or determined by treaty engagements, by imperial sanads (decrees), and by precedent and policy. It is incapable of any precise definition applicable to all

circumstances, and in detail there are many variations in the relations of those states to the suzerain power.

The origins of the Native States are as varied as their extent and population. In some cases the state and its ruling dynasty have a long and continuous history over centuries preceding the British raj ; in others the British Conquest found a local leader, who was perhaps hardly more than a successful leader of bandits or a rebel against a previous ruler, in control of a district, and recognized him as ruler of the district, which thereby became a state. These are extreme cases ; and the great majority are intermediate in origin.

In several of the larger states the ruling dynasty differs in religion from the majority of its subjects. Hyderabad is peopled mainly by Hindus under a Muhammadan Nizam. Kashmir is ruled by a Hindu Maharajah, though its people are mostly Muhammadans. Some states are made up of several detached areas; and in general the boundaries of the states are purely arbitrary and often very irregular, and have no direct relation to physical features or to the complicated distribution of religious and linguistic groups. In few cases does any state include even a majority of the members of any one linguistic or religious group, though Mysore may include a majority of the Kanarese-speaking people. Among the smaller states there are, of course, many which are wholly within the area of one language and in which the great majority of the people are of one religion ; but the larger Native States share fully in the complexity of the provinces of British India in these respects.

The geographical distribution of the Native States, in relation to each other and to the provinces of British India, is as complex as their boundaries. But some important facts stand out. In only three considerable stretches do Native States occupy the coast. These are (1) the coasts of Travancore and Cochin in the extreme southwest, which

stretch for two hundred miles northward from Cape Comorin, (2) the peninsula of Kathiawar and the island of Cutch, just south of the northern tropic on the west coast, and (3) the coast of Baluchistan, west of Sind. With few and small exceptions, the chief of which are the Portuguese and French territories, the rest of the coasts of India are




FIG. 42.—INDIA: POLITICAL DIVISIONS

(Based on a map in the Report of the "Simon" Commission, Cmd. 3568, by permission of H.M. Stationery Office.)

parts of British India, which includes all the important seaports.

Besides the coastal areas British India includes most of the great lowland along the foot of the Himalayas, from Assam and the head of the Bay of Bengal to the foothills of the North West Frontier. This large continuous area is extended down the Indus Valley to include Sind; and it reaches the shore of the Arabian Sea in the Indus delta. Most of

the large central regions included within the frame formed by these continuous sections of British India are occupied by Native States. But in the middle is the irregular area of the Central Provinces ; this has projecting districts which make direct contact with the provinces of Bombay to the west, Madras to the south, Bihar and Orissa to the east, and the United Provinces to the north ; so that it effectively interrupts the continuity of the great central area from the Sutlej to the Kistna which is otherwise occupied almost wholly by Native States. Except for the Central Provinces, the provinces of British India are mainly on, and occupy most of, the coastal areas and the fertile lowlands drained by the Ganges and Indus rivers ; while the Native States are largely on the Dekkan plateaus and in the semi-desert and mountainous regions. British India is, or rather was, the India of the waterways ; and it left to the Native States most of the areas away from the coasts and the navigable rivers.

In their political grouping the states fall into two chief series. The rulers of a few of the larger and more important states are in direct relations, as individuals, with the Governor-General (Viceroy). Another and very numerous group is dealt with through the Political Agents, appointed by and directly responsible to the Governor-General, in the " Agency " areas of Central India, Western India, Rajputana, the North West Frontier, Baluchistan, the Panjab, and Madras. The remaining small states are scattered among the provinces of British India singly or in small groups. These were formerly related to the government of the province in which they are situated ; but nearly all have been transferred to the Central Government, which now deals directly with all the major states and groups of states.

Still another grouping, not necessarily coincident with those just mentioned, is that into (1) states whose rulers are members of the Chamber of Princes, (2) states

whose rulers are represented in that Chamber, and (3) other states.<sup>1</sup>

Such a complex inevitably reminds a student of the condition of central Europe in the later centuries of the Holy Roman Empire, before Napoleon swept away many of its statelets. In India the last conquest, that of the British, did little to lessen this complexity of the political geography, but rather fixed it in a more stable form. This extreme complexity of politico-geographical units, Governor's provinces with "administered" and "unadministered" areas, Commissioner's provinces, Agencies, and States of many degrees, is a direct result of the historical development and of the complexity of the racial, linguistic, religious, and social divisions of the sub-continent. But it is in innumerable ways a hindrance to the development of a united India. For instance the right of many of the princes to impose customs duties must be merged in a customs union before India can have complete internal free trade. India is a region of great complexity in nearly all its human aspects, and its political organization must inevitably reflect

#### <sup>1</sup> INDIAN NATIVE STATES

*(Protected States of the Indian Empire)*

Class.	Number	Total Area (square miles).	Total Population 1921.
I. States whose rulers are members of the Chamber of Princes	108	514,886	59,847,186
II. States whose rulers are represented in the Chamber of Princes by twelve members of their order elected by themselves . . . .	127	76,846	8,004,114
III. Minor States and Jaghirs .	327	6,406	801,674

From the *Report of the Indian States Committee*, Cmd. 3302 of 1929.  
Not including states in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan.

that complexity ; but the fixation of so complex, and often irrational, a system of divisions is an evil chargeable to the British raj. A selfgoverning India must necessarily endeavour to bring its political subdivisions more nearly into accord with its social and administrative needs, and to attain greater unity in its systems of local government, land tenure, and law.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### INDIA—EXTERNAL

INDIA's external relations have long been of great importance to the world because of the magnitude of the land and its peoples and the high development of its civilization. Before, and during, the Age of Discovery the imagined and legendary wealth of the Indies was a lodestone to all the adventurous minds of Europe. "The Indies" was a vague term; it seems at one time to have denoted all the populous and civilized lands which lay eastward and southeastward from Europe, beyond the zone of the Mid-World Deserts which bounded the world of Western Civilization. The Indies of the medieval world thus included China and Japan, as well as the lands which we now know as India, Indo-China, and the East India Islands, all of which may be grouped together as the Monsoon Lands of Asia (cf. fig. 5, p. 19).

For many centuries the peoples and states of this vast region seem to have been almost passive in their external relations. Other peoples, mainly from central and western Asia, from the oasis- and steppe-lands in and bordering on the zone of deserts, pushed into the Monsoon Lands as immigrants, traders, missionaries, invaders, conquerors; and the native peoples accepted them, submitted to them, and absorbed them. Then, as now, the peoples of the Monsoon Lands of Asia formed half, or more than half, of the total population of the world and enormously outnumbered all invaders. But from India itself there was little or no return movement or pressure towards central Asia or the West. And though the Indian-born religion and social philosophy of Buddhism spread over the Far East, it

did not produce a permanent contact with that region because it was stamped out by persecution in the land of its origin.

Before the Age of Discovery India's contact with the external world was practically limited to two streams. Across the River Indus there came and went through the passes of the northwestern mountain borders a thin stream of caravans, and an occasional army of invaders. Even the Buddhist pilgrims from China reached India by way of central Asia and the North West Frontier. Along the coasts there lapped a thin trickle of small coastwise trading vessels, largely Arabian, on the trade routes between the lands of southwestern Asia and the East Indies. And some venturesome navigators from eastern Asia reached as far to the west as Ceylon. But not until late in the sixteenth century, nearly a hundred years after Europeans had passed the Cape of Good Hope, and so opened the seaway round the western end of the zone of the Mid-World deserts, did India's sea frontier become comparable in importance to the North West Frontier. In the long series of the conquests of India that by the British is the only one in which the invaders entered from the sea. Their first important bases were the coastal stations which have grown into the great seaport cities of Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay. The influence of the sea entry is clearly marked in the location of eight of the ten Governor's Provinces of the Indian Empire by the coasts and along the great rivers. British India was the India of the waterways; and its capital remained at the seaward end of the populous Ganges Valley until 1912.

The land boundaries of India, without Burma, have a total length of more than four thousand miles. Of this some fifteen hundred miles is the length of the northwestern boundary, from the sea to the western end of the Karakoram range. A little less than half lies along the great mountain ranges of the Karakoram and the Himalaya,




FIG. 43.—WORLD MAP WITH INDIA NEAR CENTRE

north of India, between longitudes  $75^{\circ}$  E. and  $95^{\circ}$  E. These are the highest mountain ranges in the world ; and this part of the boundary is almost wholly in regions far above the levels of any permanent human habitations. Little of it has been precisely demarkated, except in the chief passes ; and much of it is not closely delimited. It is essentially a frontier of separation in one of the most effective barrier areas on the land surface. This northern land frontier of India has hitherto been of very little importance in its foreign relations. The Indian Empire does not formally include all that lies on the Indian slopes of the Himalaya ; but in many respects Nepal and Bhutan may be regarded as Indian states. Tibet is, or was, the " Hermit Land," protected by its mountain walls and the desert conditions of its high plateaus ; and it can hardly be a source of any danger to India.

The northeastern frontier separates India from Burma for some seven hundred miles inland from the Bay of Bengal. It is for the most part on mountains which lie in the heart of the area of maximum monsoon rainfall, in one of the wettest regions on the globe. These mountains are, therefore, clad with dense forest and jungle. And as a barrier this is only a little less effective than the northern frontier ; so that practically all intercourse between India and Burma is carried on by sea. Beyond the tangled, and as yet almost unsurveyed, ranges of northern Burma and eastern Assam lies China, with its nearer populous valleys separated from those of Assam and Burma by some six hundred miles of mountainous country. With the peaceful development of China this frontier may, in the future, be pierced by routes between that country and India. But down to the present time it has, in practice, been almost a closed frontier to any large-scale movements.

The active land frontier is that to the northwest. Here the great mountain ranges of " High Asia " sink to the lower ranges, which border the plateau of Iran on the east and

north at altitudes which allow of the development of fairly easy passes. Here also the mountain system narrows to a width of little more than three hundred miles between the plains of India and those of Turkistan. A little to the west of the narrowest part it is possible to pass round the western end of the Hindu Kush Mountains without climbing to more than five thousand feet above the level of the sea. And many practicable, if not easy, passes lead from the plateau of Iran through the ranges which form its eastern edge down to the valley of the Indus. At its southern end this frontier is in deserts, at the northern in high mountains; and it is significant that the important routes are nearer to the mountains than to the desert which is, or was in the recent past, a more difficult barrier than mountains of moderate elevation.

No great invasion has penetrated far into India from this direction since the British raj was established; though the possibility of an attack from Russia (Tsarist or Soviet) has influenced Indian frontier policy, and there have been attempted invasions from Afghanistan. But the nearer dangers to the peace of India's frontier provinces, caused by the restless and warlike tribes of the mountain borderland, have kept the frontier astir during all the century of British guardianship. Two rival frontier policies have been advocated in India and in Britain. One, "the forward policy," is that of pushing the conquest, and subsequent rule and pacification, of the turbulent border tribes as far into the mountains as is necessary to reach a stable boundary; which would, of course, have meant right up to the Russian boundary. The other policy, which has generally been adopted, is that of maintaining a well-organized defence at the Indian edge of the mountains, combined with a keen watch and if necessary, but only as a last resort, armed intervention to prevent invasions or the development of combinations hostile to India. Permanent peace on this border is not likely to be attained in our generation; and

the guardians of India cannot afford to relax their watch along this frontier. That defence of its own peoples from external raids or invasions which is the first duty of every government, success in which is also the first condition of its own stability, offers a more continuously difficult problem here than anywhere else along the far-flung frontiers of the British Empire. The maintenance of this frontier will be not the least difficult of the duties of a selfgoverning India.

The Indian peninsula projects as a blunt wedge of land for more than a thousand miles southward into the Indian Ocean. It is separated by greater distances than that from the other large peninsulas to the east and west of it ; and, except opposite the island of Ceylon, its coasts face wide expanses of open ocean. These coasts are generally smooth and include few good harbours ; while the only large inlets, the Gulfs of Cambay and Cutch, are shallow and inhospitable to shipping. Thus the peoples of the coastlands have not been tempted out to sea, and India has produced few seafarers. But the seas of India are part of the waters used by the coasting route of the Old World, a maritime route which has been in use from the dawn of history and which has steadily increased in importance with advancing civilization and the general increase of intercourse among the peoples of the world.

Across these frontiers India's chief intercourse with the outer world has been westward. The coasting routes from western India to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea made contact with the West comparatively easy ; and these were supplemented by landways over the plateau of Iran. The barriers to the north and east were much more formidable ; and it is probable that India has, throughout the ages, had less effective contact with the Far East than with the West.

Almost the whole of the present-day external trade of India is seaborne. The land boundary is nowhere crossed by a railway, mainly because of the physical difficulties ;

though where railways do reach into the frontier in the northwest they stop short at the boundary of Afghanistan for political reasons. Less than one-hundredth of the total external trade of India passes across the land boundaries. There is also a very marked concentration of the seaborne trade on a small number of ports. Nearly two-thirds of it (64 per cent.) passes through the two chief ports of Calcutta and Bombay ; and these two, with Madras and Karachi, and the Burman port of Rangoon, deal with no less than nineteen-twentieths of the total. More than three-quarters of the trade is westward, with Britain, Europe, and Africa, and less than a fourth is eastward, with Japan, China, and Australia. A considerable part of the trade, especially with the Persian Gulf and East Africa, is in the hands of Indian merchants. But in general the external trade and connections of India are carried on by other peoples, among whom the British are the most prominent.

Emigration from India has also, within the last hundred years, brought Indians into some contact with other lands and peoples ; though the total numbers involved in this emigration are very small in proportion to the population of India. A part of it was from the districts of Gujarat, north of Bombay ; but the chief emigration has been from south India, especially the Madras Presidency, across the bay to Lower Burma, which is a foreign land to the peoples of India ; though it is within the Indian Empire. But the politically more important migrations have been to South and East Africa, where Indians now form an appreciable proportion of the populations of both Natal and Kenya and add to the racial complexity of those colonies. Other bodies of Indian emigrants are settled in Mauritius, in the Fiji Islands, and in the West Indian islands of Trinidad and Jamaica and the coastlands of British Guiana. Many of these are descendants of indentured labourers imported to these lands in the latter half of the nineteenth century for plantation work ; and the most important recent migration

outside the Empire of India is that to East Africa. None of these Indian colonies are numerous; though they form an important proportion of the total population in some of the lands in which they are settled. The groups in Mauritius, and in the British West Indies, with British Guiana, each number more than a quarter of a million; but the total number of Indians in the British Empire outside Asia is not more than one million.

The most important political fact in the external relations of India is its position in the British Empire. Down to 1919 it was clearly a dependency ruled autocratically by officials appointed by the government of the United Kingdom, and responsible only to that government. In that year a large measure of responsible autonomous government was introduced by the establishment of legislative assemblies, for British India, and for each of the Governor's Provinces, and by the transfer to these bodies of the control of several departments of government. Other departments were reserved to the Governors; and the system of "transferred" and "reserved" subjects is that known as Dyarchy. It had only a partial success in the ten years from 1919 for which it was to be tried. It was conceived as a transitional stage, for a limited period, leading to a larger measure of selfgovernment. In practice it helped to stimulate political agitation quite as much as it formed a school for the practice of responsible government; since the political parties were more interested in preparing for its end than in working it.

There are two outstanding questions in respect to the future government of India :

(1) Can the peoples of India work a democratic and autonomous Indian Government? Or will the divisions and antagonisms between the various sections of Indians break up all attempts at responsible representative government, and lead through anarchy back to autocracy? No one can give a certain answer to these questions now. But it is clear

that the attempt to establish responsible Indian government in India must be made, if only because the citizen peoples of the British Commonwealth are not prepared to maintain an autocracy in India against the opposition of any really considerable body of Indian opinion. In a land of such magnitude and internal complexity only a federal system offers any hope of success. But whether any form of the democratic representative methods of government, which have been slowly developed in Britain during several centuries of experiment, can be adapted to the peoples and conditions of India is yet to be seen. It may be necessary for India to work out, by slow and probably painful experiments, different methods and forms of government more suitable to Indian circumstances.

(2) Will India remain within the British Empire ?

India has been a part of the British Empire for the past hundred and fifty years by virtue of the acquiescence, on the whole a passive acquiescence, of the great majority of the Indian peoples in that position. There has never been in India at any one time a sufficiently large British force to hold the land against a widespread popular resistance.<sup>1</sup> And, in view of the relative populations and geographical positions of Britain and India it is safe to say that there never will be such a force in India ; even if the British were willing to undertake a great war for the holding or the reconquest of the sub-continent, which is very unlikely. If a self-governing India wishes to leave the British Empire it will be able to do so.

But if such an independent India should desire to remain within the Empire as a State of the Commonwealth, with the same status as the present member-states of that Commonwealth, the proposal would at once open up a long series of new and difficult problems. Would the present members

<sup>1</sup> The great Indian Mutiny of 1857 was localized in the central parts of the northern lowland ; and it was a military mutiny of a large part of the army of the Bengal Presidency, not a popular rebellion.

be willing to admit another "Dominion" which differs so completely from all of them in its civilization and social heritage, and which is far more populous than all of them taken together? If the constitution of the British Commonwealth is sufficiently flexible to hold together in the same political group such widely different states as Canada and a selfgoverning India then it will indeed prove itself an effective working model for a world organization. But it is not to be expected that the British States will be willing to sacrifice any part of their own freedom or their own social inheritance for the sake of bringing, or of keeping, India within their group. And it is easily conceivable that the initiative in separation should come from the British.

The responsibilities entailed on the Commonwealth by the inclusion of India as a member-state would certainly be very great; since it is unlikely that India can, for a long time to come, maintain its own frontiers against external raids and invasions; and it is probable that the transfer of the guard on the North West Frontier from British to Indian hands would be a signal for an outbreak of frontier wars. It is also doubtful whether an Indian Government could maintain order within its own frontiers in face of the violent religious antagonisms, and the wide social and traditional differences, among the many peoples of India. In this connection it should be remembered that many of the "minority peoples" are also the "martial races" (see note on fig. 41, p. 239); and that these differences would probably be much more acutely realized in the political agitations incidental to any parliamentary form of selfgovernment than they were in the past century under an entirely neutral autocracy.

Within the British Empire India might attempt to find solutions to its internal problems while free from the distractions and difficulties of its external affairs, and from foreign interference. But the protection of the Empire would necessarily imply some degree of control. No

British government could place British forces at the unfettered disposal of an Indian government. If such forces are to be used for the defence of the frontiers, and the suppression of incipient communal or religious civil war in India, they must be so used at the sole discretion of a British government. Otherwise they would be merely foreign mercenaries, fighting in quarrels with which they had no concern ; and they would have only the prestige and morale of such mercenaries. For the British peoples responsibility without control in India would very soon lead to an intolerable position.

No selfgoverning state which is unable to ensure the rule of law and order within its boundaries can hope to maintain itself. In respect to this task India will offer to a native government perhaps the most difficult problem in the world. The present anarchy of China is an indication of some possibilities. But though China is similar to India in extent and populousness its people are far less heterogeneous, and they have very little of the religious and caste differences which hinder unity among the many peoples of the Indian sub-continent. And China has no equivalent to the Native States, which include several well-organized Powers, whose rulers may be either supporters or destroyers of an All-India government.

## CHAPTER XIX

# THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN SOUTHEASTERN ASIA

THE British Empire includes five colonies or groups of territories in, and off the shores of, southeastern Asia beyond India ; viz. Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, north Borneo, and Hongkong.

Of these Burma is much larger than, and as populous as, all the others taken together. It is at present part of the Empire of India, and consists of the Governor's Province of Burma and the native states and backward territories associated with it. Its territory extends along the eastern shore of the Bay of Bengal for more than a thousand miles between  $10^{\circ}$  and  $21^{\circ}$  north latitude, and inland north-eastward from the coast for more than four hundred miles. The length from north to south is about twelve hundred miles, and the total area nearly a quarter of a million square miles, twice that of the British Isles ; so that Burma is the largest province in the Indian Empire. But of this area a little more than two-fifths is occupied by the " backward " tracts, including the Shan States and the unadministered areas, which were excluded from the 1919 reforms (see map, p. 243). These tracts occupy the hill districts of the north and east. They are inhabited by a small and scattered population of hill tribes, at much lower levels of culture than the other Burmans, whose numbers are estimated at only two millions, or less than a sixth of the total population of the province. The real Burma is the remaining three-fifths of the province in the coastal districts and the valleys of the Irrawadi and Sittang rivers up to

about 24° N. This contains a population of some twelve million people, nine-tenths of whom are Burmese. The Burmese, who thus form about five-sixths of the total population of the province, are a homogeneous people in language and culture and are mainly Buddhists in religion. The populous areas of Burma form a compact region, completely severed from India by the tract of almost impassable jungle-clad mountains, some two hundred miles in width, which lies between it and eastern Bengal and Assam ; and its effective communications with the rest of the Empire are by sea. Its chief port is Rangoon, a thousand miles from Madras and three-fourths of that distance from Calcutta.

The political and administrative association of Burma with India is hardly more than an accident. "The Burmese are as distinct from the Indians in race and language as they are from the British."<sup>1</sup> The association with British India dates only from the middle of the nineteenth century ; and it has been almost limited to governmental organization. There is an immigrant Indian population, mainly from the Madras Presidency, in Rangoon and the districts about that city. These immigrants number nearly a million and form a large proportion of the labourers in the port and in the rice fields of the Irrawadi delta. But they form less than a twelfth of the population of Burma ; they are mostly males ; and a large proportion of them return to India as soon as their savings justify that course ; while of the rest those who marry Burmese women are usually absorbed into the Burman population. Excluding its wide mountain borderland of "backward tracts," Burma is more nearly homogeneous in culture and language than any other Governor's Province of the Indian Empire ; and both its language (Burmese) and its religion (Buddhism) are distinct from any of those of India, while it has no caste system comparable to that of Hinduism ; though it does contain

<sup>1</sup> From the *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, 1930 (Cmd. 3568), Vol. I, p. 77.

some small "minority" peoples. In linguistic, religious, and racial affinities the Burmese are an Indo-Chinese people ; and they are more akin to the peoples of the Far East than to those of India. The geographical and cultural separateness of the country from India goes far to justify the popular demand for separation from India in matters of government, and makes it probable that in the coming establishment of selfgovernment in the Indian Empire Burma will become a separate unit outside the Indian federation. The chief difficulties in the separation will arise from the discussion of the necessary financial arrangements, and from possible attempts by politicians in India and in Burma to gain party advantages in the discussions.

The military problems of Burma are at present limited to those of maintaining order in a province which includes large areas of difficult mountain and jungle country, some of whose inhabitants are among the most backward peoples of Asia. The northeastern frontier marches with China, and may in the future become a frontier of contact with a Great Power. But for an indefinite time to come the wide expanse of mountains between the populous valleys of Burma and those of China will maintain this as a frontier of separation.

Burma lies towards the head of the Bay of Bengal ; and its coast is off the main seaways for any ships which are not voyaging to or from Burma. In this respect it is in a very different position from the other British territories in south-eastern Asia, all of which are of the characteristically British geographical type in that they are insular or peninsular in location and are near important positions on the seaways. Ceylon and Malaya are situated at the southern extremities of the Indian and Indo-Chinese peninsulas respectively, and so occupy turning-points on the great seaway along the coasts of Eurasia. The British portions of the large island of Borneo flank that route in the South China Sea. And Hongkong, on a small island near the mouth of the



FIG. 44.—SOUTHEASTERN ASIA: RELIEF AND POLITICAL DIVISIONS

Canton River, in South China, is one of the most important depots along that route. All four of these territories are comparatively small in area, population, and local resources, in comparison with the countries on the mainland of Asia ; and in a study of their political geography all four are of importance primarily in relation to the seaway along which they are strung.

The island of Ceylon extends north and south for some three hundred miles, between latitudes  $6^{\circ}$  and  $10^{\circ}$  N., just to the east of Cape Comorin, and so lies at the southwest corner of the Bay of Bengal. It is separated from India by the shallow Palk Strait. At its southern end this strait is marked off from the Gulf of Manaar by the islands and reef which almost link Ceylon to the mainland and block the sea passage for any large ships. The reef is known as Adam's (or Siva's) Bridge. Many gaps in it, and between the islands, allow the passage of small vessels. On the Indian side the first gap has been bridged by a railway which serves the pilgrim traffic to the Hindu shrines at Rameswaram. But there is no prospect of carrying the line from there along the twenty odd miles of reef to the Ceylonese island of Manaar. The reef is not a bridge, except in legend. And, though there is a ferry service here, the chief routes between south India and Ceylon use the longer sea passages either from Tuticorin to Colombo or from Negapatam to Jaffna. It is important to note that the existence and position of the reef ensures that for large ocean-going vessels Ceylon is practically an extension of the Indian peninsula; and such vessels must go round the south of the island to enter or leave the Bay of Bengal on the west. At its capital, Colombo, and more so at Trincomali, Ceylon possesses harbours better than most of those of south India ; hence the chief ports-of-call are in the island and not on the mainland. Colombo is the port whence vessels using the Suez route to the East diverge to pass northward into the Bay of Bengal, or eastward through the Strait of Malacca

to the Far East, or southeastward across the Indian Ocean to Australia. It is thus one of the chief ports-of-call in the Indian Ocean, and is of considerable strategic value.

Ceylon is a Crown Colony with a large measure of responsible representative government, politically quite separate from the Indian Empire. It has an area of some twenty-five thousand square miles and a population numbering more than five millions. This population is very heterogeneous in origins, race, language, and religions. Nearly half are Sinhalese, who occupy most of the southern parts of the island. They speak a distinct language and are mainly Buddhists in religion ; though their Buddhism, unlike that of Burma, has a large admixture of Hindu beliefs and practices. The next largest group is formed by the Tamil-speaking population of the northern parts of Ceylon, together with the recent immigrants from the " Tamil-land " of south India who work on many of the modern plantations in Ceylon. These number nearly a million and are mainly Hindus, though they include a considerable minority of Christians. They are an offshoot of the main mass of the Tamils, who inhabit the lowlands of south India from the neighbourhood of Madras to near Cape Comorin. The Tamil population of Ceylon is partly derived from the long period of the extension of the medieval Tamil kingdoms of south India across the narrow seas between the island and the mainland. These kingdoms had been broken up before the period of the first European voyages to the Indies. And for at least four centuries Ceylon has been politically separate from the mainland ; while at no time did the Tamil states include the whole of the island. The rest of the population includes Moors and Malays, who are mostly Muhammadans, a number of Eurasians, including some descendants of the Portuguese and Dutch colonists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and less than ten thousand " Europeans " (mainly British). In religion there are nearly three million Buddhists, a million

Hindus, and half as many Christians, and a little less than half a million Muhammadans, with a considerable number of animists. Thus in origin, language, and religion the peoples of Ceylon reproduce the divisions and complications characteristic of India ; though their largest community, the Sinhalese Buddhists, has no direct counterpart in India.

The peninsular territory of Malaya, at the southeastern entrance to the Bay of Bengal, has a far more independent location than Ceylon ; since that island is closer to, and is largely overshadowed by, India, in spite of its physical insularity. Malaya is connected with the mainland by the long and narrow isthmus of Kra, which is about five hundred miles long but less than twenty-five miles wide at its narrowest point, near latitude  $10^{\circ}$  N. Until recently this isthmus was almost wholly covered by dense forest. This is now interrupted by many plantations, of rubber and some other " export " crops, and the extension of railways into it from south and north may make it a practicable through route to Siam and Burma. The peninsula stretches southward to within a hundred miles of the equator and is the most southerly part of the mainland of Asia.

In its political geography the Malay Peninsula falls into four main sections. There are (1) the Straits Settlements, a British Crown Colony, which consists of several detached fragments of territory including Singapore with Labuan Island, Christmas Island, and the Cocos Islands, Penang with Province Wellesley and the Dindings, and Malacca ; (2) the Federated Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang, which form a British Protectorate ; (3) five other Malay States under British suzerainty, namely Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Trengganu. Each of the Malay States, whether federated or not, is ruled by its own chief (Sultan) with the aid of a State Council ; and the Governor of the Straits Settlements is their High Commissioner. These three sections form British Malaya,

which, with a common system of weights and measures and a common currency, is a single economic area for most purposes. The fourth section consists of the northernmost parts of the peninsula, and the isthmus, which are




FIG. 45.—MALAYA: POLITICAL DIVISIONS

subject to the Kingdom of Siam, either by direct rule or through native Sultans. This section has been described as a British "sphere of influence." British interest in it follows from the facts that it includes the narrowest and lowest parts of the isthmus of Kra and therefore the possible trans-isthmian routes, that it is the land connection between British Malaya and lower Burma, and that its western

shore is part of the coasts of the Bay of Bengal. Hence it is a British interest that Siamese Malaya should not fall under the control of any rival or unfriendly Power.

The population of British Malaya is almost as heterogeneous as that of Ceylon. The economic developments of the past two generations have been very rapid, as a result of the growth of Singapore as a port-of-call, the expansion of the long-standing industry of tin-mining, and the introduction and extraordinarily rapid extension of rubber plantations. Malaya is now a principal source of both tin and rubber for the world. This expansion has drawn in immigrants from several surrounding countries. In 1931 the population of British Malaya numbered nearly four-and-a-half millions, an increase of almost a third over that of 1921. Of the total little more than half were born in the country, and less than half are Malays ; more than a third are Chinese, and nearly a sixth are from south India. The White population, of British, European, and North American origin, is less than twenty thousand. Most of the Chinese and Indians are, like the Whites, temporary immigrants who hope to acquire sufficient wealth to enable them to retire to their homelands. Singapore is by far the most important place in Malaya so far as external relations are concerned. The harbour and city of Singapore are on the south side of a small island of the same name, some twenty-seven miles long by fourteen miles wide, which has an area nearly equal to that of the Isle of Man. This is off the southern extremity of the peninsula, from which it is separated by a very narrow strait. Its position off the southernmost point of Asia makes Singapore the chief turning-point between the Indian and China seas, between the Middle East and the Far East, and so one of the most important ports-of-call on the great coasting route of Eurasia. Most of the seaborne traffic between the Far East and all the lands round the Indian and the Atlantic

Oceans passes by Singapore ; and a very large proportion of the ships which carry it make use of that port.

Beyond the narrow channel of Malacca Strait, the thousand-mile-long island of Sumatra lies to the southwest of and nearly parallel to Malaya, between that peninsula and the Indian Ocean. Hence all ships coming from, or going to, the West must either go round the northern end of Sumatra, seven hundred miles northwest of Singapore, or pass through the Sunda Straits, which lie five hundred miles south of that port. Most of the steamship, and motor ship, traffic passes through the Malacca Strait and so by Singapore; since this is the shorter and more direct way for vessels using the Suez route. But for ships which use the route via the Cape of Good Hope the Sunda Strait offers the more direct access to, or from, the China Seas; and this is the route preferred for practically all sailing ships. The relation of the two straits to the Cape and Suez routes respectively was a main factor in determining the relative development of the port of Singapore and Batavia, the chief port of the Dutch East Indies. When the island of Singapore was ceded to the British by the ruler of Johore in 1819 it was almost uninhabited. It had had an early period of importance in the fourteenth century ; but its modern importance dates only from the middle of the last century, and most of the growth of the port and city has taken place since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. It is now the chief port and city, and the effective commercial metropolis, of a region much wider than British Malaya. This region includes some of the most developed areas of the equatorial zone ; it has a wide range of products, but is as yet best known for its rubber and tin. In recent years it has produced nearly half of the tin and more than half of the rubber entering the world markets ; and the rubber " boom " from 1910-20 led to an excessive concentration on rubber plantations. The city of Singapore contains a population of more than half a million, which is mainly made up of recent immi-

grants, most of them from southern Asia ; the largest groups are the Chinese, the Indians, and the Malays. The equatorial climate prohibits White settlement, and the transitory population of British, European, and North American origin numbers barely ten thousand.

The great commercial and military strategic importance of Singapore is thus a growth of the last generation, since the Malacca Strait became the chief way to and from the Far East. This importance has developed from the use of steamships and the opening of the Suez Canal ; and it seems likely to be further increased by the development of airways, since Singapore is a most convenient jumping-off ground for aircraft travelling to and from the Dutch East Indies and Australia.

Singapore lies near the equator in longitude  $104^{\circ}$  east of Greenwich, the antimeridian of Ottawa, in the strait which is now the chief opening in the western side of the Pacific Ocean. For the purposes of the Washington Conference of 1922 the western limit of the Pacific was placed at longitude  $110^{\circ}$  E. in order to exclude Singapore, which is therefore not directly affected by the limitations on fortification and naval equipment laid down in the treaties drawn up at that Conference. The great increase in the size of naval "capital" ships during the present century has made it impossible for these enormous vessels to be docked and refitted in any but a few specially well-equipped ports. There are no ports with such equipment in the Indian Ocean, where the depth of docks and harbours has been largely determined by that of the Suez Canal, and no British ports of the type between Malta and Sydney. This last, and the chief naval harbours of Japan and those of the United States of America in the Pacific, are the only Pacific Ocean ports which are capable of serving as bases for a fleet of modern capital ships of war. Under these circumstances the vast interests of the British Empire in the lands round the Indian Ocean and between it and the Pacific Ocean

make it desirable that the British Navy should possess an adequate base in those waters. For such a naval base Singapore is the most suitable site in every respect except that of climate. The hot wet equatorial climate is a handicap in the maintenance of the efficiency of both the human and material equipment of such a base. But in spite of this its position on the seaways makes Singapore the obvious site.<sup>1</sup> The concentration of British naval strength into the Home Waters in the first decades of this century prevented the development of such a distant base at that time. And since the close of the Great War it has been delayed by various circumstances, among which may be reckoned doubts as to the real value of the huge battleships for which alone the very large dock accommodation is required.

The British territories in Borneo are of minor political importance. They occupy the whole northern slopes of the island towards the South China Sea for some seven hundred miles, and have a total area almost equal to that of Great Britain, with a population of less than a million. The very low density of this population, hardly more than ten persons per square mile, links these territories with "New World" areas rather than with the densely peopled Monsoon Lands of Asia near which they lie. Of the lands which have just

<sup>1</sup> In any discussion on the importance of Singapore the distances from it to some other ports are of importance. Some of these are given here: distances in nautical miles by usual routes.

Batavia . . . 530	Aden . . . 3,700	Derby, W.A. . . 1,700
Sarawak . . . 420	Port Said . . . 5,100	Darwin, N.A. . . 1,900
Bangkok . . . 850	Malta . . . 6,000	Thursday Island. 2,500
Saigon . . . 630	Southampton . 8,000	Fremantle, W.A. 2,300
	(via Suez)	Sydney, N.S.W.. 3,300
Rangoon. . . 1,100	Halifax, N.S. . 10,000	Auckland, N.Z. . 3,800
Calcutta . . . 1,700		
Madras . . . 1,600	Manila . . . 1,350	Mauritius . . . 3,000
Colombo. . . 1,600	Hongkong . . . 1,450	Durban . . . 4,500
Bombay . . . 2,500	Shanghai . . . 2,200	Capetown . . . 5,000
	Yokohama . . . 2,900	Southampton . 11,000
	Vancouver . . . 7,000	(via Cape)

been discussed, Ceylon has a population density of two hundred and forty, Burma has for the whole province sixty and without the "backward tracts" eighty, and British Malaya has sixty. Borneo was for the most part untouched by the developed agricultural civilization of the Monsoon Lowlands ; and the present stage of cultural development of its peoples is more nearly like that of the inhabitants of intertropical Africa than like that of most of the Asiatic peoples. Here British intervention began with attempts to suppress the piracy which formerly flourished along these coasts and threatened shipping on the great route to and from the Far East. The area now includes four political units : (1) the small island of Labuan, which is governed from Singapore as a part of the Straits Settlements ; (2) the territory of British North Borneo, administered by a chartered company ; and (3) and (4) the protected states of Brunei and Sarawak, the former under a native Sultan, the latter under Rajah Brooke, the descendant of an Englishman who acquired part of the territory in 1842.

The last, in several senses, of these British territories is Hongkong, which is the extreme outpost of the British Empire in the East, more than nine thousand miles from England by the coasting route. The territory includes the island of Hongkong, with some minor islets, and the peninsula of Kowloon, which form the Crown Colony, and a neighbouring area leased from China which is administered as part of the colony. This leased area includes Mirs Bay and some small islets, and is of value mainly as giving control of inlets which were formerly used as shelters by the pirates who are still a danger to small vessels along this coast. The total area is less than four hundred square miles ; and the total population is more than a million, nearly all of them Chinese, half of whom live in the city of Victoria and another quarter on the opposite shore of the harbour in Kowloon.

Hongkong lies between 22° and 23° north latitude, at

the eastern side of the entrance to the Canton River, the principal estuary of south China. During a large part of the nineteenth century it was of primary importance as a safe shelter for British, and all other, ships and trade in the Far Eastern seas. It was the base of a light naval force whose chief duty was, and still is, to protect that trade from piratical interruptions. Such a force is still necessary; and it seems likely to remain so until China achieves political stability and the power to maintain order within its borders and territorial waters. For nearly a century Hongkong has been a free port under a stable government. These advantages over the ports of China have helped to make it one of the greatest entrepôt ports of the Far East. The tonnage of shipping entered and cleared in 1929 was forty millions, a total which ranks Hongkong among the greater seaports of the world. The rise of Shanghai at the entrance to the Yangtse Valley has somewhat lessened its relative importance; and when a stable government can give to all the ports of China a political and economic security comparable to that which Hongkong enjoys under the British Flag the preëminent importance of the British port will disappear, and with it the real justification for the British possession of a port in Chinese waters. It has acquired a commercial momentum which will maintain it as a great port for many years to come; but it has no decisive geographical advantages over several possible rival ports in its neighbourhood, and a less favourable position for the entrepôt trade than that of Shanghai. Its importance has been built up mainly on its relative political advantages; and these in turn have been largely a result of the relative weakness and anarchy of China. Hence the commercial greatness of Hongkong is possibly only a temporary condition.

## CHAPTER XX

### THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE NEAR EAST

THE Near East is an important, but vaguely defined, region lying between Europe and India. It includes at least the areas of Persia, Turkey, and Arabia in the widest sense; and it is often used so as to include Egypt also. The first three of these together form the "Lands of the Five Seas," which border on the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, the Mediterranean and Black seas, and the Caspian Lake. Of these five seas the first two are linked, independently of each other, with the Indian Ocean, and the next two with one another and then with the Atlantic; while the last is the centre of a very large and important area of inland drainage which has no natural waterway connection with the ocean.

The Near East includes in Mesopotamia and Egypt the cradlelands of Western Civilization, and in Palestine and Arabia the lands in which the principal religions of the Western World were founded. The names of its ancient cities are redolent of a long and romantic history. Thebes and Babylon, Jerusalem and Mekka, Damascus, Alexandria, Bagdad; these are household words throughout all the West, where they shine with the glamour of the romances and legends of the youth of the world and the beginnings of civilization; so that this region is one in which all the peoples of the West have some interest. It has influenced all Christendom and all the world of Islam.

Through the Near East stretch the direct ways between the two most populous regions of the world, Europe and the Monsoon Lands of Asia, the northwestern and the southeastern coastal regions of the Continent, which

together contain more than two-thirds of mankind. Hence this region includes some of the world's most important routes and nodes of routes ; it is therefore of very great strategic importance in world relations. And since those great populous regions include the two most populous lands




FIG. 46.—THE NEAR EAST: RELIEF REGIONS

of the British Empire, Great Britain and India, the Near East is of similar importance to the Empire.

Structurally the Near East includes parts of three major world regions. Its northern areas, in Turkey and Persia, are part of the Mid-World Mountain Belt ; this is a region of folded mountains, of geologically recent elevation, whose ranges here trend east and west in long arcs which spread

out widely to enclose the plateaus of Iran and Anatolia but come together in the central areas about Mount Ararat in Armenia. North and south of the mountain belt are the associated basin-depressions of the Black and Caspian seas, the eastern (Levantine) basin of the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf. The last-named sea occupies only the lower part of its depression, the rest of which has been filled up to a little above sea-level by the alluvial deposits which form Mesopotamia. South of the Levantine and Mesopotamian basins, and the Syrian Gate which links the Euphrates Valley to the lowland round the Gulf of Iskanderun, lie the tablelands of Arabia and Africa, separated from each other only by the Great Rift Valley. The track of the Great Rift in the northwest of Arabia is marked by the valley of Cœle-Syria, between the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, and the Jordan Valley, between the highlands of Judea and Moab, and then by the Dead Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. South of Aqaba the rift separates Arabia from Africa ; here it is flooded by the ocean waters and holds the Red Sea. At both sides of the rift the plateau edges have been very steeply upthrust ; and from these higher areas the land surface slopes downward away from the rift valley, in Arabia towards the Mesopotamian-Persian Gulf depression and in north Africa towards the Nile ; so that no rivers enter the Red Sea.

The Near East extends through thirty degrees of latitude, some two thousand miles, from north to south, from  $12^{\circ}$  N. in the south of Arabia to  $42^{\circ}$  N. in the Black and Caspian seas. Thus it stretches right across the northern zone of tropical deserts. The coast of Palestine and Syria is two thousand miles east of Gibraltar ; so that the region lies far to the east of the open ocean. And it forms the central part of the zone of the Mid-World deserts, which extends across the Continent from the Atlantic to north China. Hence it is a dry region. Most of its lowlands are deserts, except where irrigation is possible, and even on the higher

plateaus the precipitation is small and uncertain. On some of the windward slopes of its higher mountains there is an abundant rainfall ; but these well-watered areas are few and small, and by far the greater part of the Near East is a thirsty land. The northern plateaus, near latitude  $40^{\circ}$  N., are high enough to have cold, though short, winters. The southern limit of these areas of cold winters lies near the southern mountain edge of these plateaus ; and it is curiously close to the northern limit of the Arab Lands, which usually have warm winters. The whole region has hot summers, except on the highest parts of its mountains ; but there is normally a high diurnal range of temperature, and the nights are frequently cool. The climates are generally dry and bracing, except in such hollows as the Jordan Valley and on some of the southern plains, which suffer from excessive heat in summer.

Except in well-developed oases, such as that of the lower Nile Valley, which is Egypt, the region is thinly peopled. It is probable that in the past Mesopotamia had a population density similar to that of Egypt ; but since its irrigation system fell into decay it is hardly more densely peopled than the other semi-arid areas near it. Its present population is only a fifth as numerous as that of Egypt, though its irrigable area is much greater. The Asiatic portions of the Near East have a total area of a little over two million square miles, and a population which may be estimated at from thirty-five to forty millions. Of these twenty-five millions are in the northern zone occupied by Turkey and Persia, and only some ten to fifteen millions in the Arab Lands, which occupy more than a million square miles. This small population may increase considerably in the future with the development of irrigation, and settlements based on irrigation agriculture, in the northern "Fertile Crescent" of these lands, and particularly in Mesopotamia. But the greater part of the Arab Lands are, and seem destined to remain, very thinly peopled.

In the past the chief routes through the Near East were the land caravan ways, along the northern plateaus from Constantinople and Smyrna to Persia and Turkistan or to Mesopotamia, through the Syrian Gate or across Lebanon from the ports of the Levant to the Euphrates Valley and thence eastward or southeastward towards India. And during two or three centuries before the Age of Discovery the short landway across Egypt, from the Nile to the Red Sea, was much used in connection with the seaways of Arab and Venetian traders. At the present day the chief routes, and the ones of special importance to the British Empire, are those from the eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, the waterway through the Suez Canal, which is the central defile of the inland-sea route through the Old World and of the coasting route of Eurasia, and the airway from Egypt across Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq to the Persian Gulf and India. The importance of the Near East and its routes to the British Empire lies primarily in their relation to India ; and in a survey of its naval and military geography they are part of the Indian Ocean division of the Empire.

British interest in the Near East, since the Crusades, dates only from Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 A.D. His aim was an attack on the British in India. But when his fleet and army had been defeated and driven from the eastern Mediterranean the British appear to have forgotten that the Suez Isthmus has any relation to India. Their way to India was round the Cape ; and an overland way had little interest to a people whose ways to, and thoughts of, distant lands were all across the seas. Not until two generations later, when another Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps, began the construction of the Suez Canal, which was opened in 1869, did Britain wake up to a renewed interest in the isthmus and the lands which border it. At first this interest was shown by active opposition to the canal scheme. Later, when the Canal had become a fact, it led to the pur-

chase by the British government of the Khedive of Egypt's shares in the Suez Canal Company. The same interest led to intervention in Egypt's civil war in order to keep the Canal open, and so to the subsequent occupation of Egypt and, in consequence, also of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and still later during the last great war to the occupation of Palestine.

A second factor leading to the development of British interests in the Near East was the crusade against piracy and the slave trade, which was a principal activity of the British Navy for several decades in the middle of the nineteenth century. When this was extended to East Africa it was found that the principal markets for slaves shipped from East Africa were in the lands of the Near East, in Arabia and round the Persian Gulf. This crusade, and trade relations, led to connections with the Arab dynasty which ruled the widespread Empire of Oman, and later with the two branches of that House which divided the Empire into the Sultanates of Maskat, or Oman, in eastern Arabia, and of Zanzibar in East Africa. These connections developed into a direct protectorate over Zanzibar and its mainland territories, and an alliance with Maskat. Similarly there grew up the alliances with the "Trucial Chiefs" of the islands and the south coast of the Persian Gulf; these closed their harbours to the slave trade and gave some security for trade in that sea; but they also laid on the Empire many responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order in that region. India has long had close trade and cultural relations with the coastlands of the Persian Gulf; and these lands now form an eighth Agency area of the Indian Empire.

The relations between the British Empire and Persia in this area are close and complex. The British Political Agent is Resident at Bushire, whence he controls the policing of the Gulf and watches the interests of the Empire and its subjects and allies. A large proportion of the former are from western India, particularly Bombay. There are also conflicting claims to some of the islands, held by

local chiefs, under British protection, since the middle of the nineteenth century, which were under Persian suzerainty during part of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But in Persia, as in Arabia, British interests lie in the maintenance of open routes along and off the coasts, and in the observance of treaty engagements. Persia is also, geographically, a buffer state between the Indian Ocean lands of the Empire and the territories of the Soviet Union. In both respects it is in the interests of the British Empire that Persia should be a strong and independent friendly state. It may be expected that the independence of Iraq will aid development in that direction.

On the other side of Arabia the small peninsula and harbour of Aden was occupied in 1839, and developed into a naval base, for the use of vessels engaged in the crusade against the slave trade. It became an important port-of-call only after the opening of the Suez Canal thirty years later. The Protectorate of Aden behind the town is the result of attempts to maintain peace in the immediate hinterland of the harbour, and that of British Somaliland on the opposite shore of the Gulf of Aden is partly a result of efforts to find a nearby source of fresh food for the garrison of this desert station and for the ships which called there. Outlying islands such as Perim in the Straits of Bab-el-Mandab, and Sokotra off the Eastern Horn of Africa, were preëempted to forestall rival or hostile occupation. And the result has been to gather into British hands the bases necessary to a naval control of the exit from the Suez route to the Indian Ocean ; and so to establish a second base for defence against any European attack on India, for use if an enemy gained control of the Canal. Aden was long administered as a part of the Presidency of Bombay ; but since April 1932 the town and protectorate are ruled by a Chief Commissioner who is appointed by, and is directly responsible to, the Governor-General (Viceroy) of India.

The other important areas of the Near East in the present political geography of the British Empire are :

- (1) Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
- (2) Arabia and its marginal territories, with
- (3) The mandate territory of Palestine and Transjordan, and the Kingdom of Iraq.




FIG. 47.—THE NEAR EAST: POLITICAL DIVISIONS

EGYPT owes its importance in the world of today primarily to the fact that it includes the Isthmus and Canal of Suez, and so controls the shortest waterway between European and Indian seas.

During most of the millennia that have elapsed since civilization began in Egypt the most characteristic

geographical feature of that country has been its relative isolation. It consists essentially of the long and narrow oasis of the lower Nile Valley, which stretches for seven hundred miles from the lower cataracts to the marshes at the seaward edge of the delta, with an average width, above the delta, which is probably not more than ten miles. This is closely hemmed in on both sides by deserts ; and it has no other populous lands near to it. The first, and probably the longer, part of Egypt's history is one of isolation. With the Persian conquest in the sixth century B.C. it was brought into a wider political association. Since then it has been a dependency of external empires, among which have been the Greek (Alexandrine and Ptolemaic), Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Turkish, and British. The Arab conquest was the most complete. It made the great majority of the Egyptians an Arab-speaking Muhammadan people ; and Egypt became a central land of the Muhammadan world. During the later Middle Ages its caravan routes between the Nile Valley and the Red Sea ports formed one of the ways by which the merchants of the Mediterranean trading republics obtained from the Arab traders of the Indian Ocean some of the wares of the eastern trade ; but the total traffic was small in volume, and it does not appear to have affected the life of the country to any great extent. This medieval through traffic ceased on the opening of the sea route to India ; and Egypt remained isolated, away from the main routes of world movements, until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. This turned a main stream of traffic through Egypt ; and, because of the greater volume of traffic in the modern world, this is a far vaster stream than Egypt has ever previously known.

The Suez Canal, through which the route passes, lies well to the east of the inhabited land of Egypt, and normally very few Egyptians even see the ships which carry this traffic through their country. So that its direct effects on Egypt might have been almost as small as its effects on the

coastlands of the Red Sea, but for the facts that the Canal lies in an area of utter desert and that the only available source of fresh water for its workers is the Nile. The " Sweet-water " Canal, which is drawn from the Nile and carries fresh water to the towns of the Canal Zone, links that area inseparably to Egypt. No control of the Suez Canal is worth anything unless it includes control of this freshwater supply, on which the life of the Canal workers depends.<sup>1</sup>

The opening of this new waterway shifted Egypt from its ancient isolation to a vital place on a defile in one of the world's chief highways. The change was made by external powers, with the permission and coöperation of the rulers of Egypt, as a result of great economic and political developments in which Egypt had had no share. It established on Egyptian territory a link in world communications which Egypt herself, at that time, could neither maintain, nor control, nor defend. Hence it completely altered the politico-geographical situation of Egypt, and led directly to foreign intervention in the country. The opening of the Suez Canal was for Egypt a geographical revolution which led inevitably to political and economic revolutions.

The direct British connection with Egypt began in 1882 as a result of the rebellions in Egypt which threatened the Canal, and actually produced a collapse of government authority. The intervention was solely British only because the other Powers concerned in the guarantee of the Canal, particularly France, refused to coöperate with the government of the United Kingdom. It led to a British occupation of Egypt, and the reorganization of the Egyptian government by British officers, whose proportionate numbers in the country were similar to those of the British in India. The outstanding results of the occupation are three, namely :

(1) The renewal and great extension of the irrigation

<sup>1</sup> The distillation of sea water forms only an emergency reserve means of obtaining drinkable water.

system, which has more than doubled the productivity of Egypt and allowed a doubling of the population—from 6,800,000 at the census of 1882 to 14,200,000 at that of 1927.

(2) The reconquest of the eastern Sudan, and the suppression of the slave trade in that country.

(3) The development of a national consciousness among the Egyptians.

The political status of Egypt in relation to the British Empire is, and has been since the occupation, indefinite and unsatisfactory. Until the great war of 1914-18, Egypt was a tributary state of the Turkish Empire, though occupied by a small British army. During that war the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey was formally repudiated, and Egypt became a "Protectorate" of the British Empire. Since then it has become a formally independent kingdom, whose independence is very considerably qualified by the recognition of the special interests of the British Empire and by the presence of a British military force.

The development of air-navigation and airways during and since the war has further modified the politico-geographical position of Egypt. The present main route of airways between western Europe and the lands round the Indian Ocean keeps to the south of the Mid-World Mountains because of both physical conditions, which are permanent, and political conditions, which may be temporary. The close approach of the mountains to the north coasts of the Mediterranean Sea makes it desirable to place the main junction of airways, from Europe to the southeast, near the southeastern corner of that sea. And the geographical factors of location, and local conditions of water supply, relief, and landmarks, combine to fix the best sites for the great junction airport in lower Egypt. Once again, and again as a result of entirely external developments, Egypt is placed at a great junction of world highways. One of the most important junctions of the airways of the Old World is

in lower Egypt. So the ancient isolation of Egypt is gone ; and her people are faced with the difficult task of adjusting their concepts of life, and all their aspirations, to this fact. The airports of Egypt will be needed by the air vessels of all the peoples of the Eastern Hemisphere. At present they are controlled by Great Britain, the Power most immediately interested ; but if Britain withdrew she would soon be succeeded by one of the European Great Powers. The chief airport is at Helwan, near Cairo ; and from there routes radiate westward and southward, northward and eastward. And it is probable that in the near future there will also be regular routes following the Red Sea coasts southeastward towards central and East Africa and regions beyond. The physical conditions of air-navigation are such that no single junction of airways can ever have a strategic importance, in commerce or in war, comparable to that of a defile in the seaways such as the Suez Canal for maritime movements. But the great junction port of airways in this region is likely to remain close to the lower Nile. The dry atmosphere of the desert normally gives good visibility ; but no site actually in the desert can afford sufficient local resources of water and food ; and no site in the fairly well watered portions of Palestine has nearly as favourable conditions of relief and accessibility.

The eastern, or Anglo-Egyptian, Sudan derives much of its present political importance from the fact that it includes most of the upper basin of the Nile. Egypt's interest in it arises from Egypt's complete dependence on the Nile waters. But before the early years of the nineteenth century Egypt had no knowledge and no control of the upper portions of the Nile, or of any of its important tributaries. The rulers of Egypt have become conscious of their relation to this eastern part of the Sudan only since the early years of last century, when exploration in the upper Nile basin was followed by an Egyptian conquest of a large part of the eastern Sudan. And the relation has become important only

since the greater development of irrigation in Egypt, under British control, has led to a fuller utilization of the Nile flood water and so to an interest in schemes for increasing the supply by control of the run-off and of the local use of the water before it enters Egypt.

The territory of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan extends from the southern boundary of Egypt, about latitude  $22^{\circ}$  N., to the northern boundary of Uganda, in latitude  $4^{\circ}$  N., a distance of nearly fourteen hundred miles, with a width of more than half that distance westward from the Red Sea and the borders of Eritrea and Ethiopia (Abyssinia). The total area is a little more than a million square miles ; but of this great extent more than half is desert or poor scrubland and much of the rest is poor savana or swamp. The desert areas are in the northern two-thirds ; and the comparatively well-watered and possibly fertile lands are in the south, as far away from Egypt as possible. The direct connection between the two countries depends on the slender thread of the Nile across the Great Desert ; and it has never been sufficient to make possible any close or frequent intercourse between the peoples. The two capitals at Khartum and Cairo are a thousand miles apart, and neither finds its most important external relations focussed on the other. The easiest way out for the external trade of the eastern Sudan is by the short railway to Port Sudan and Suakin on the Red Sea, rather than by the long route down the Nile. And its southern provinces may in the near future find their most convenient port at Mombasa in British East Africa.

The relations to the Nile which give Egypt an interest in the eastern Sudan give it similar interests in Ethiopia, from which most of the Nile flood comes via the Blue Nile and the Atbara and Sobat rivers, and minor interests in Uganda, at the head-waters of the White Nile. In both of these lands it is possible to construct storage reservoirs for Nile waters, and thereby to increase the amount of water in the river at low Nile. The eastern Sudan differs from

Ethiopia and Uganda in that it is nearer to Egypt, and that it is governed as a "condominium" of the United Kingdom and Egypt ; so that Egypt has some political claims on it. The claims arising from the conquest of a large part of the Sudan by the armies of the Khedives of Egypt in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century ceased to have any value when the successful revolt of the Mahdists expelled all traces of their authority. The later conquest was made, from Egypt as a base, by British and Egyptian forces under British commanders; and it was dictated by British policy. Had it not been made effective the eastern Sudan would probably have become part of the African territories of one of the European colonizing Powers ; and it is extremely unlikely that Egypt could have regained any part of it or any influence in it. In fact Great Britain is directly responsible for the last conquest of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and for the rule and good government of that territory. And the nominal authority held by Egypt under the condominium is hardly more than a useless and irritating complication of the political status.

The population of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan has increased rapidly, from less than three millions to more than five and a half millions, in the thirty years since the conquest. This growth has made possible a rapid development of the country in many directions. Much of this development depends on the irrigation schemes. It is clear that in the northern part of the eastern Sudan the dependence on the Nile waters for the cultivation of its lands is as complete as it is in Egypt ; and also that large extensions of irrigation in the Sudan may lessen the amount of water passing down the river. Such a conflict of interests between peoples who are dependent on the same river for their water supplies is in some sense inevitable. Along the Nile it has become apparent only within the last few decades, as a result of the great extension of the irrigation system in Egypt and the growth of national consciousness in that country. The

great increase in the population of Egypt (see p. 282) has almost counterbalanced the increase in its resources produced by the substitution of perennial irrigation for the former basin irrigation, and the resulting extension of the area and season of cultivation ; so that there is still widespread poverty, resulting from the pressure of population against limited resources, in that country. Egyptians in control of the upper Nile basin would be tempted to sacrifice the interests of the Sudanese cultivators to the demands for more water in Egypt, and so to provoke revolt in the Sudan, whose people are also increasing and becoming more conscious of their dependence on the Nile. The Sudanese are not Egyptians ; and they have no tradition of respect for, or fear of, the Egyptians—rather the reverse. The British control of the eastern Sudan, combined with their special interests in Egypt, is probably under present conditions the best available guarantee that the difficult problems of the control and allocation of the Nile waters will be dealt with fairly. These problems also involve Ethiopia. The scheme for making Lake Tana a greater storage reservoir for the waters of the Blue Nile, which is so obviously desirable for the lands which need the Nile waters, will bring about closer economic and political relations between Egypt and that country and with them greater possibilities of mutual friction.

In all directions the political problems of Egypt are many. And the changes from its age-long isolation to its present position at a world cross-roads, and from self-sufficiency to dependence, have coincided with the growth of a local nationalism which plans for Egypt alone. Yet no country in the modern world is less capable of living to itself, or is less likely to be allowed to do so, than Egypt.

THE ARAB LANDS of the Near East include the great peninsula to which the name Arabia is usually limited together with the areas to the north of it, as far as the foot of the mountains which form the southern rim of the plateaus

of Anatolia, Armenia, and Iran, and also Egypt. For all these lands are inhabited by Arabic-speaking Muhammadan peoples with a common tradition ; though they contain important minorities of other peoples, particularly in the northwest coastlands near the Mediterranean Sea.

The central area is mainly desert or poor steppe-land ; and the areas of importance are the marginal zones along which pass the great routes. The seaways off the west and south coasts are part of a great world route, and are independent of any calling stations in Arabia, other than Aden. The maritime routes of the Persian Gulf are more local ; while the overland routes across the north are necessarily dependent on land stations and depots. The use of these routes round Arabia has not led to any desire to penetrate the central areas, except for pure exploration, so that the interests of their users are limited to the need for preventing local interference with the free use of the ways. Thus British interests in the coastlands of Arabia began as a result of attempts to suppress piracy in the marginal seas, and were linked up and extended in the crusade against the slave trade. The British Empire has many, and somewhat complex, treaty relations with a large number of Arab rulers in these coastlands, and with the Wahabi King of Nejd in the interior. But down to the close of the nineteenth century her interests in the peninsula were confined to that of the maintenance of peace along its shores and among these chiefs or, when that proved impossible, to localizing their warfare as narrowly as possible, along with the prevention of any interference with shipping. Recent developments have added to these the need of equal security for the airways, and the provision of suitable refuelling stations and airports.

The ferment of Arabia in the great war of 1914-18 was associated in some areas with aspirations for the political union of all Arabia. These were most prominent in the northern and western regions, whose inhabitants had had

much more contact with Turks and other Europeans, and so had been more exposed to the influence of European ideas and Turkish oppression, than had the Arabs of the east and centre. These aspirations were focussed round the Sharifian dynasty, whose head was the Emir Hussain, ruler of the Hejaz as a vassal of the Sultan of Turkey. In the war the Emir Hussain became an ally of the victors ; and at its close he found himself recognized as King of an independent Hejaz ; while two of his sons became Kings of the mandate states of Transjordan and Iraq. King Faisal of Iraq had previously been hailed as King in Damascus, and had ruled there for some time before the settlement of the mandate areas placed the Damascus region in Syria under the control of France. Thus the Sharifian royal family was in possession of three of the thrones of Arabia, in the west and the north. But the interior, and the south and east coastlands, were little affected by these changes.

In the interior the chief power was, and is, that of the King of Nejd, Ibn Sa'ud, the ruler of the Wahabi peoples. They are the Puritans of the Muhammadan world, and have often been moved by a fanatical hatred for the less rigidly, or differently, orthodox Muhammadans who surround them. Their present ruler has shown great ability in controlling and directing their fanaticism ; and the chief recent (post-War) changes in the political geography of Arabia are due to his success. His kingdom of Nejd has been expanded to the northward by the conquest of the Shammar and other tribal districts ; and it is now coterminous with Iraq and Transjordan. To the west religious differences and rival ambitions led to war with the Hejaz. That land has been conquered ; and Ibn Sa'ud is now King of both Nejd and Hejaz, though the two are still organized as distinct states. Thus the Wahabi dominions now extend across central Arabia from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf, and over more than half of the peninsula. But it may be doubted whether the strength and cohesion of the Wahabis

is sufficient to enable them to hold the territories they have won. The population of Nejd is probably not more than two, or two and a half, millions ; and that of the Hejaz is perhaps half as numerous. The inhabited oases are all small, and are widely scattered ; there are deep and long-standing feuds among the many tribes, as well as religious differences ; and only an unusually able ruler is likely to succeed in holding them together. It may be that Ibn Sa'ud's Empire will not long outlast his own life. It is only in Iraq that any Arab state possesses natural resources sufficient to enable it to develop a population and power adequate to the task of unifying all the Arab Lands. But Iraq is on the northeastern fringe of Arabia; and for the present generation at least it is very far from possessing any such power.

In the south of Arabia the state of Yemen, or Sana'a, remains independent of Nejd. And the whole of the habitable oases of the south and east coasts are cut off from the interior by the great southern desert, of which the eastern two-thirds, the Rub'al Khali, is almost impassable and forms a complete defence for the coastal state of Maskat, or Oman, against serious attack from the interior. All this coast is mainly under British influence exerted through arrangements with the native chiefs, with most of whom Britain has made treaties. But, outside Aden, no part of it is directly governed by the British.

The present airway to India and beyond passes over northern Arabia and along the Persian Gulf. Its chief stations in Arabia are near Amman, in Transjordan, and near Bagdad and Basra, in Iraq. Thence there are alternative ways by the north or the south shores of the Gulf to Gwadar and Karachi. Along the north shore the chief airport is at Jask, and there are intermediate landing grounds and refuelling stations at Bushire and Linga, all in Persia. Along the southern route the chief airport is on Bahrain Island ; and there are landing grounds on other

small islands and a second airport at Shajah. This southern route has the disadvantage of being somewhat longer than the northern route, and the advantages of being farther away from the mountains and the more variable weather conditions associated with them, and of having its chief depots on small islands which are readily accessible to shipping and more easily defensible by a naval power. But where it crosses the northward peninsula of Oman a short stretch of this route lies over an area in which it is difficult to maintain a station. This stretch may be avoided by a detour round the end of the peninsula, where there is a station on the Persian island of Henjam. Before 1932 the northern route was the only one in use. In that year the southern route was opened to regular traffic. And it may be noted that the probable development of airways along the Red Sea in the near future may provide a third route to India, by way of the south coast of Arabia. On this last route the service could be maintained by seaplanes, since it would nowhere involve the crossing of any extensive area of land.

In the north of Arabia the British Empire has been much more deeply involved as a result of the great war, in which the defence of the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf routes led to the invasions of Palestine and Iraq and the conquest of those lands from the Turks. The disappearance of the Turkish power from the Arab Lands resulted in an increase in the number of independent Arab states in the peninsula ; though some of these have since been incorporated by conquest into the Wahabi Empire. But the northern section was divided into the mandate territories of Syria, Palestine and Transjordan, and Iraq ; and the mandates for the last two territories<sup>1</sup> were allotted to the British Empire. These three lands occupy a continuous territory, with an area of a quarter of a million square miles, which extends right across

<sup>1</sup> Palestine and Transjordan are distinct countries ; but they are administered under one mandate.

northern Arabia from Egypt to Persia and from the Mediterranean and Red seas to the Persian Gulf.

Iraq is now an Arab kingdom. Its central area is the territory of the ancient Mesopotamia in the lowland of the




FIG. 48.—THE NEAR EAST: SEAWAYS AND AIRWAYS

Euphrates and Tigris rivers ; and it also includes a wide fringe of the foothill country to the east and north and of the semi-desert to the southwest. The kingdom was administered under the mandate for thirteen years from 1919 ; and at the end of this period it became fully independent. In October of 1932 Iraq was admitted as a member of the League of Nations ; and the special responsibility of the

British Empire in respect to it came to an end. The kingdom extends inland for about four hundred miles from a very small foothold on the seaboard at the head of the Persian Gulf, which includes the great port of Basra. Iraq has no strong natural frontiers ; and it is exposed on all parts of its long land boundaries. The ancient wealth and populousness of Mesopotamia disappeared when the Turkish conquest led to the ruin and neglect of its irrigation works ; and today Iraq has only three million inhabitants on an area double that of Great Britain, or less than twenty persons per square mile of its territory. It may become prosperous and populous once more if its lands are again systematically irrigated ; but such a development requires peaceful progress for many years to come. The great majority of the people are Arabs ; but there is an important minority of Kurds in the far north, as well as some other smaller minority peoples. The unity of the kingdom is very recent and is hardly yet consolidated ; and the population and developed resources are small in proportion to the area and to the length of the vulnerable frontiers. It is possible that the withdrawal of the British may tempt invaders, and expose the country to attack from Arabia, and doubtful whether the kingdom could successfully repulse such attacks. The British interests in Iraq are limited to the maintenance of the airway across it, which is part of the present route from Great Britain to India and farther east, to the prevention of interference with her seaways and trade in and around the Persian Gulf, and the observance of treaty engagements.

The lands to the north of the Persian Gulf along the foothills of the Zagros Mountains include some important oil-fields, in Persia and in Iraq. Those in Persia lie in the extreme southwest of that country, in the valley of the Karun River, and are connected by pipeline to the port of Muhammarah, east of Basra. The area is worked by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company ; and it has for some years

been an important source of supply of mineral oil. The chief oilfields of Iraq are in the northern part of that country, in an area centring on Kirkuk, a hundred and fifty miles north of Bagdad, and so much farther inland than those of Persia. The exploitation of the field is hardly yet begun on any considerable scale. And the distribution of its outlets is complicated by both the geographical situation and the political relations of Iraq. There is railway and, for most of the way, river connection to Basra, and no serious physical obstacles to hinder the laying of a pipeline to that port. But the direct distance to the Levant coast is very little more than that to Basra ; while the westward route avoids the long voyage round Arabia and the heavy dues of the Suez Canal. Hence the pipeline is to be laid westward from Kirkuk ; and, for political reasons, it is to fork within Iraq, so that one branch will pass through Syria to Tripoli and the other through Transjordan and Palestine to Haifa. The development of the oilfields may bring some wealth to Iraq and an easy revenue to its government, as it has done to Persia. But it also brings into the country important economic and financial interests from other lands which will influence its political relations and subsequent development.

TRANSJORDAN is an almost landlocked state enclosed between Iraq and Palestine to east and west, and between the territories of Nejd on the south and Syria, under mandate to France, on the north. It includes the small port of Aqaba on the Red Sea, which is connected to the capital by motor road ; but its maritime interests are almost negligible. Transjordan covers a large area, most of which is almost desert, and the small population of little more than a quarter of a million is mainly in the north-western part of the country near the Jordan Valley. The state is politically similar to Iraq, and British interests in it are of the same character. But it is much more closely linked to the lands of inner Arabia, which it resembles in

many respects ; and the withdrawal of British support would almost certainly make way, under present conditions, for its incorporation in the larger Arab Empire. There is no obvious reason why the British Empire should oppose the union of the several Arab states by any peaceful means. But her treaty obligations to some of them, and her position as a mandatory Power of the League of Nations, forbid acquiescence in a union by conquest. Also such an extension of the Arab Empire would bring its borders up to those of Palestine and Syria and of Turkey and Persia, and would therefore be a matter of direct concern to the rulers of those countries as well as to the British Empire.

PALESTINE, the third of these mandate lands, differs in many respects from the other two. It is a narrow strip of land, nowhere more than sixty miles wide from east to west, which stretches for about a hundred and thirty miles along the southern part of the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. At its southern end it approaches the Suez Isthmus ; but the fact that it has no good natural harbour greatly lessens its value in relation to the seaways. It is marked off from the purely Arab lands to the east of it by the Great Rift Valley, here occupied by the River Jordan and the Dead Sea. The surface of this lake is thirteen hundred feet below sea-level, while the highlands of Judea and Moab rise to twice that distance above sea-level ; hence the steep-sided rift forms a very serious obstacle to direct east-west movement on the land along most of the eastern border. Palestine is a small country, hardly double the area of Yorkshire, very definitely marked off by physical limits to east and west and merging into desert to the south. Only at the narrow northern end are its limits partly artificial. It is also marked out by the relatively high density of its population ; it is at least twenty times as densely peopled as the lands to east and south of it, and very few of its inhabitants are nomads.

There is probably no other area of similar extent in the

whole world which has claims on the special interest and regard of so large a proportion of mankind. For both Jews and Christians it is the "Holy Land" of the origins of their faith. To the Muhammadans it is only less sacred than the Hejaz itself. And Christian and Muhammadan fought in and for it some of the bitterest of their wars in the long series of the Crusades. Hence for all three of the great Western religions Palestine is a sacred land ; and its political and economic status and development are inevitably affected, and partly dominated, by this special character. To the Jews Palestine is not only the Holy Land ; it is also their ancient homeland ; and a large and important section of the Jews throughout the West looks forward to making it once more a national homeland, and a focus for all Jews. This aspiration has been encouraged by British policy, as expressed in the "Balfour Declaration" ; and it is recognized in the terms of the mandate under which Great Britain holds and administers the land. It is limited by the condition that its fulfilment must not be so attained as to cause injustice to the other inhabitants. For Palestine, as a natural consequence of its location and its past history, is an area of very mixed population.<sup>1</sup>

Since the close of the great war there has been a very considerable addition to the number of the Jews in the country, as the result of immigration promoted by the Zionist organizations. Further, the Jewish colonists have been backed by the wealth of those organizations ; and they are also aided by a considerable, though undefined, moral and diplomatic support from many influential Jews in other

<sup>1</sup> Population of Palestine :

Census of	1922	1927	1931
Muhammadans . . . .	590,890	648,556	759,952
Jews . . . . .	83,794	147,687	175,006
Christians . . . . .	73,024	76,839	90,607
Others . . . . .	9,474	8,928	9,589
Totals . . . . .	757,182	882,010	1,035,154

lands. Between 1922 and 1931 the Jews increased by more than a hundred per cent., from less than one-ninth to more than one-sixth of the population ; while in the same period the Muhammadans increased by less than thirty per cent. And the Jews are still increasing more rapidly than the other sections of the peoples of Palestine.

The worldwide Zionist organizations have been able to expend in Palestine comparatively large sums of money, in the purchase of lands for Jewish colonies, in the equipment and development of those colonies, and in other schemes for the development of the country under Jewish control. Enthusiastic Zionists have been able and willing to supply capital for such objects on terms which offered less prospect of profits, and often also less security, than could be obtained elsewhere. Hence this Jewish capital has had a practical monopoly in Palestine ; and the Jewish population is collectively, and often individually, far more wealthy than the Arabs and seems likely to acquire a practical monopoly of some of the resources of the country. The Jews have been, for many centuries, a people without a land. If a successful Zionism attaches them once more to a " homeland " of their own the reactions of such a fact on the whole worldwide Jewry must be great and, as yet, incalculable.

The Zionists are strong in many of the countries in which there is a large population of Jews ; but their chief strength is found in the United States of America, Great Britain, and western Europe, although the majority of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine come from eastern and central Europe. The range and character of the movement, and the influence of many of its supporters, make them a powerful international body, and give international aspects to some matters in Palestine which in any other country would be purely internal. Under the stimulus of the Zionist movement, the Palestine Muslims also appeal for support to their co-religionists in other lands. Their appeal has aroused a widespread response ; and the struggle in

Palestine thus affects, and is affected by, conditions in many other lands from India to North America.

The great progress of Jewish settlement, and the still greater increase of Jewish influence, in Palestine has inevitably aroused feelings of hostility and resentment among the Muhammadan Arabs who are still the majority of the population, and who could recently, *i.e.* before 1918, regard Palestine as their own country. Many of them sold their lands to Jews, often for a price above its value at the time. But among an illiterate and backward peasantry the loss of the land leaves a much stronger impression than the gain of money, which few of them knew how to use profitably, and which many of them have since lost. Such feelings have given rise to friction and agitation, and in some cases to rioting, in recent years. They greatly increase the difficulties of administration.

While the two chief sections of the population are at such different levels of culture, and are so distrustful of each other, as the Palestinian Arabs and the Jews, it will be very difficult for the country to make any substantial advance towards selfgovernment. But if the increase in the Jewish population continues so far as to make Palestine in effect a Jewish land with a preponderantly Hebrew population, it would naturally, under the terms of the mandate, and in sympathy with British policy elsewhere, become a selfgoverning country. A similar stage might be reached much earlier as a result of a practical settlement between Jew and Arab in the land. The relations of a selfgoverning Palestine to the British Empire, to the League of Nations, to a worldwide Jewry, and to an independent Arabia would present many complex problems. And its development may be influenced considerably by the aims set before themselves now by the states and peoples concerned. It has been suggested that the country could develop into a "dominion," *i.e.* a State of the British Commonwealth. In that relation Palestine may present a simpler case than India ; but the Indian case may

well be decided first and its settlement may influence others. It is more probable that the direction of development will be towards independence outside the British Empire, following the precedent of Iraq. These are, of course, speculations ; and the present antagonism of the chief sections of Palestine's population towards one another seems likely to delay the establishment of selfgovernment for many years.

## CHAPTER XXI

### THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN EAST AFRICA

THE term "East Africa" is here used to denote all that part of Africa which lies east of the Belgian Congo,<sup>1</sup> between the River Zambesi on the south and the southern borders of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Ethiopia (Abyssinia) on the north. This area extends from five hundred to seven hundred miles inland from the western shores of the Indian Ocean, and stretches for more than fifteen hundred miles from north to south between the parallels of latitude  $5^{\circ}$  N. and  $18^{\circ}$  S. ; so that it is wholly intertropical, and its climates are everywhere hot all the year round except in so far as the mean temperature on the highlands is reduced by the elevation.

Most of the land is occupied by the eastern and highest sections of the great tableland of Africa. Except for a narrow coastal lowland, which is rarely as much as a hundred miles wide, all the land is more than a thousand feet above the sea-level ; and nearly half of it is above three thousand feet ; while there are important areas at more than twice that altitude. The generally smooth surface of the plateaus is interrupted by three other types of relief. The most important of these are the two great rift valleys, with their many smaller branches. The eastern rift extends through East Africa from north to south, roughly parallel to the coast and from three hundred to four hundred miles inland. Its course is marked by the Lakes Rudolf and Nyasa, in its

<sup>1</sup> Northwestern Rhodesia is not, in most respects, part of East Africa. It is more closely linked with South Africa. But northeastern Rhodesia is clearly part of East Africa.

northern and southern portions, and several smaller lakes between them. Its maximum depth to the lake floors is perhaps ten thousand feet, and elsewhere half that distance.




FIG. 49.—EAST AFRICA: RELIEF REGIONS

The western rift forms a crescentic loop from the eastern one, from north of Lake Rudolf towards the north end of Lake Nyasa. Its lower levels are occupied by the waters of a series of lakes, from Tanganyika to Albert, and its depths

are similar to those of the eastern rift. Both of these great rifts, and the other smaller ones, are very irregular in width and depth ; and in places they are partly or wholly filled by masses of eruptive material or other recent deposits. But they form very serious obstacles to east-west movement over the land ; for the steep fault-scarps which border them are as difficult to climb as mountains of similar altitude.

The eruptions which have filled some parts of the rift valleys have also produced the second series of features, the volcanic mountains, which rise high above the general level of the plateau surface in groups of varying size or as isolated peaks. The chief group is round about the eastern rift near the equator within the triangle marked by Mounts Kenya, Kilimanjaro, and Elgon, all of which rise well above the snowline. The central area within this group is usually termed the Kenya Highlands. In the same latitudes about the western rift are the Mfumbiro and Ruwenzori Mountains, which reach similar altitudes. Other important groups are the Usambara Highlands near the coast, about 5° south, and the Rungwe and Iringa Highlands to the north and northeast of Lake Nyasa.

Between the Kenya and Mfumbiro (or Ruanda) Highlands the plateau surface is depressed a little to form the wide shallow basin whose lowest parts are occupied by the waters of Lake Victoria, the largest of the African lakes and one of the largest freshwater lakes of the world,<sup>1</sup> at an altitude of more than three thousand feet above sea-level. A similar depression to the north is marked by the swamps of Lake Kiogo ; and two hundred miles south of Lake Tanganyika the swamps round Lake Bangweolo occupy another similar basin area at a similar altitude. These basin lakes are usually surrounded by low swampy shores and are generally wide and shallow. They are in strong contrast to the long, narrow, and deep lakes in the rift valleys. The latter are

<sup>1</sup> Area about twenty-eight thousand square miles, midway between that of Lakes Superior and Huron.

bordered in many places by high and steep escarpments which render their shores difficult of access.

The whole of East Africa lies between the tropics. Hence it is a hot region ; and it is in the zones of latitude normally occupied by the trade winds which blow from northeast and southeast. The northeastern part of the region is within the area where the normal flow of these winds is seasonally deflected by the Indian Monsoons ; but over most of East Africa the prevalent winds are the trades coming over the ocean. The rainfall is generally sufficient to maintain at least a rich grassland vegetation ; but towards the northeast the amount of the rain is much less, and half of Kenya Colony approaches the semi-arid conditions of Somaliland. Elsewhere there are great local variations in rainfall due to the abrupt changes in the relief. The mountain slopes and the sea-facing scarps usually receive heavy rains, and are in many places densely forested. Most of the open plateaus receive moderate rains, and a large part of their surface is a savana grassland. But the valley bottoms in the lee of the great scarps are in many cases arid areas of poor scrubland or desert. The eastern rift valley is mainly a semi-arid area of inland drainage whose lakes have no outlet ; so that many of them are saline. The same is true of the Rukwa basin in southwestern Tanganyika. And at least three of the greater lakes, Tanganyika, Nyasa, and Victoria, are so placed that the water which flows into them from their relatively small catchment areas is not always sufficient to exceed the loss by evaporation from their surfaces ; so that their out-flowing rivers are very variable, and in dry periods may even cease to flow. In spite of the prominence and importance of its great lakes East Africa has no permanently navigable rivers connected with them ; so that each lake forms an isolated area of navigable water. A few of the larger rivers of the coastal plain are navigable for relatively short distances inland ; but none of them affords any important waterway to the interior.

It follows from these features of the relief and hydrography that the natural features of East Africa are not favourable to easy communications. Movement over the open plateau surfaces is easy ; but this surface is broken up by valleys bordered by steep scarps which are either forested, and in some cases infested by the tsetse fly, or arid. Some of the hollows are swampy and fertile, but unhealthy and fly-infested ; while others are almost desert. And most of the favourable areas of good conditions on the plateaus are sharply limited by abrupt changes of relief. East Africa contains many fertile and desirable areas, some of which are difficult of access, in a region which as a whole is marked by great variety in its surface conditions.

The chief transport ways of East Africa are the lake steamers and the railways. The three northern territories contain twenty-five hundred miles of railway, which form at present two separate systems. The northern system consists of the main line of the Uganda railway, from the sea at Mombasa inland to Lake Victoria, with several branches on the highlands, and a secondary line inland from Tanga to the Usambara and Moshi highlands. The southern system consists of a main line from Dar-es-Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika with few branches, the most important of which reaches Lake Victoria. All these railways are built to the gauge of one metre ; and the two systems will probably soon be connected and extended southwestward towards Lake Nyasa, and to join the Rhodesian lines. In the far south of British East Africa there are two entirely separate railways in the line southward from Blantyre on the southern highlands of Nyasaland, and the section of the Rhodesian railways which passes through northwestern Rhodesia from the Zambesi Bridge at Livingstone to the Belgian Congo. Both of these lines are on the South African gauge of 3 feet 6 inches and are connected with the South African system. Their connection with the sea is by the Portuguese ports of Beira on the east coast and Lobito Bay on the west coast, or

by South African ports ; and thus they lead the traffic away from the ports of British East Africa.

Most of the more important centres in East Africa are now served by a network of motor roads. And though many of these are passable only in the dry season they serve as effective ways of communication within the region, and act as feeders to the railways and to the smaller lake and sea ports.

In its political geography by far the greater part of East Africa is under British control, subordinate to the government of the United Kingdom. British East Africa includes five continuous territories on the mainland. These are Uganda, Kenya Colony and Protectorate, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia.<sup>1</sup> Outside this area to the northeast stretches the Eastern Horn of Africa, which is divided between Ethiopian, Italian, and British territories. Of these British Somaliland is more closely associated with Aden than with British East Africa. Off the coast the inshore islands of Zanzibar and Pemba form the territory of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, a British protectorate, which is for some purposes part of British East Africa. The southeastern corner of East Africa, between Lake Nyasa and the Indian Ocean, is Portuguese territory.

British East Africa, within these limits, has a total area of nearly a million square miles and a population estimated at more than fourteen million people.<sup>2</sup> Except for the

<sup>1</sup> The name British East Africa is sometimes used in a narrower sense to indicate only the first three of these territories.

<sup>2</sup> British Territories in East Africa :

		<i>Land Area (sq. miles).</i>	<i>Population.</i>	<i>Density per sq. mile.</i>
Uganda	Protectorate . . .	80,000	3,514,000	44
Kenya	Colony and Protectorate	225,000	3,050,000	14
Zanzibar	Protectorate . . .	1,020	235,000	230
Tanganyika	Mandate Territory . .	354,000	4,860,000	14
Nyasaland	Protectorate . . .	37,600	1,395,000	37
Northern Rhodesia	Colony . . . . .	288,000	1,340,000	5
Totals . . . . .		985,620	14,104,000	

If Northwestern Rhodesia be omitted these totals become approximately 900,000 sq. miles and 13,500,000 people.

western section of Northern Rhodesia, formerly known as Northwestern Rhodesia, which is more closely associated with British South Africa, it is a compact area occupying




FIG. 50.—EAST AFRICA: POLITICAL DIVISIONS, AND RAILWAYS

most of the East African tableland between the Indian Ocean and the parallel line of the western great lakes which marks it off from the Belgian Congo. Of its five mainland territories three are wholly inland. The two which border

on the ocean share a coastline of about eight hundred miles in length between latitudes  $1^{\circ}$  and  $10\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  south of the equator. The total length of the land boundaries with foreign territories is more than five thousand miles,<sup>1</sup> bordering on Italian, Ethiopian, Belgian, and Portuguese lands.

To the south and north British East Africa is bordered by British South Africa and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan respectively. Thus it is the central part of that large section of the British Empire which extends from the Cape of Good Hope to the borders of Egypt, along the whole length of Africa. And the middle sections of the Cape-to-Cairo route lie in, or over, these territories.

Of the five territories the central one is Tanganyika, which is held under a mandate from the League of Nations. Tanganyika is not only central in British East Africa, it is also the only one of these territories which extends across the whole breadth of East Africa from the coast to the western border. Hence it is geographically the keystone territory in all the communications of both East Africa and of the Cape-to-Cairo route ; since landways or airways which do not pass through or over it must make a detour and pass through or over foreign territory. The only alternative landway is through the Belgian Congo, a route which could connect South Africa with the Nile Valley without touching East Africa, except in Northwestern Rhodesia.

The native population of British East Africa is of mixed racial types. Probably the majority are Bantu Negroes; but there has been extensive immigration of Hamitic peoples from the north, and many tribes are of mingled Bantu and Hamitic stock. In comparatively modern times there has been some immigration of Arabs along the coast ; and many of the coastal peoples show traces of this intermixture. The spoken languages are more varied than the racial types. Among the advanced agricultural peoples

<sup>1</sup> About four thousand miles if Northwestern Rhodesia is excluded.

north and west of Lake Victoria, in Uganda and Ruanda, the languages have in some cases been reduced to writing, and so have acquired the stability associated with that fixation of form. The same is true of the Swaheli language of the coast, which has been very largely influenced by Arabic, and of the Chinyanga language of south Nyasaland, which owes its written form to British missionaries. But elsewhere the native languages are hardly more than dialects liable to many and frequent variations in vocabulary and in form. There is a strong tendency on the part of some of the Whites, particularly among missionaries engaged in educational work, to attempt to give these dialects a fixed form and a literature, which usually begins with translations of some parts of the Bible. Such fixation of slight linguistic differences seems to be both unnecessary and undesirable. It tends to perpetuate the divisions and the obstacles to intercourse characteristic of the barbaric stages of social evolution. The Swaheli language of the Arabized coastal peoples is widespread along the coast ; and it has spread inland along some trade routes. But there is no *lingua franca* for the whole area as yet. Any higher education of the natives must obviously be in English ; and since that is also the language of the government, and of external relations and of commerce, it should be made the general second language supplementary to the vernacular throughout East Africa.

To the fourteen millions of the native inhabitants there have been added, in the last two or three generations, small immigrant populations which now number more than a hundred thousand and form nearly one per cent. of the total. About half of these recent immigrants are Indians settled in Kenya, Zanzibar, and Tanganyika to a total number of nearly sixty thousand. Many of these were brought in as workers on the construction of the railways ; and they form a considerable proportion of the artisan and clerical workers of the territories. The Indians maintain their distinctive

customs and faiths, and have not mingled with the other peoples of the country to any large extent.

A second group of peoples is formed by the Arabs, with those of the natives who have come under their influence. The Arabs are mainly descended from nineteenth-century immigrants from eastern Arabia ; though there has been some intercourse between East Africa and Arabia for many centuries. They number perhaps twenty thousand all told, mainly on the coast and in Uganda ; and they are the ruling people in Zanzibar. But the Arabs, unlike the other immigrant peoples, have freely intermarried with the native peoples ; and many of them are now not easily distinguishable from the natives. Nearly all of them are Muhammadans.

The third group of recent immigrants is that of the Whites. The majority of these are from Great Britain ; and others are from Germany and from South Africa. They include some five thousand officials and missionaries, who are spread widely over all the territories, and nearly twenty thousand settlers, nearly all of whom are clustered on the highlands in a few comparatively small areas. Half of these settlers are on the highlands of Kenya, and a tenth in the northeastern highlands of Tanganyika near the Kenya border, with a smaller group in south Nyasaland. The only other considerable group is in Northwestern Rhodesia ; and this is mainly associated with the mines of the Congo-Zambesi water-parting rather than with the plantation agriculture of the East African highlands. Thus the effective White population actually settled in British East Africa numbers less than twenty thousand ; and probably five-sixths of these are in the comparatively small area of the highlands served by the railways in Kenya and the bordering districts of Tanganyika.

These White colonists are trying out one of the most important experiments in the attempts of the White peoples to become acclimatized in an equatorial region.

Their numbers are few, and fewer still have yet spent a large proportion of their lives wholly in East Africa, so that the experiment is still in a very early stage. And so far it seems that, while the temperatures and humidity are not directly injurious, the combined effects of high altitudes and equatorial light, with the absence of marked seasonal changes of temperature, impose severe strains on the nervous system.

The great majority of the Negroes are still pagans. But both Arabs and Whites have carried on an active missionary propaganda since the latter decades of the nineteenth century ; and there are now considerable numbers of Muhammadans and Christians. Missionary work has been most successful in Uganda, whose population is now almost equally divided among Pagans, Muhammadans, and Christians, and where in the last decade of the nineteenth century the last two fought a religious war which led to British intervention and the establishment of the protectorate. Where Arab influence was strongest, along the coast, a large proportion of the people are Muhammadans. The Indian settlers generally hold to the faiths which they brought with them ; but they have made no serious attempts to proselytize their neighbours.

The influence of these immigrant peoples is much greater than their small numbers would suggest ; since they are at higher levels of culture than the natives, and they include the ruling peoples. But one of the first results of their coming appears to be an intensification of racial, linguistic, religious, and cultural confusion among the peoples. In this respect East Africa resembles many other lands in which Western Civilization is impinging on other forms of culture ; and it is now an area in which inter-racial problems are very prominent.

With a population of only fourteen millions on an area of a million square miles British East Africa is a thinly peopled land. The small island territory of Zanzibar is densely peopled, with more than two hundred inhabitants per

square mile ; but the mean density of population on the mainland is little more than a third of the average world density. There are two areas of relatively dense population. The larger and more populous of these is on the fertile lands in the Victoria basin, west and north of the lake, in Uganda and the northwest corner of Tanganyika, where nearly a third of the total population is concentrated on about a twentieth of the total area ; the second is in the south of Nyasaland and contains about a million inhabitants. There is a third area of moderate density of population on the Kenya highlands.

Thus the chief complications and difficulties of organization and government in British East Africa arise from the mixture of peoples and cultures, and the scantiness of the total population. The White settlers have come in mainly as owners or managers of large estates, on which they attempt to develop a plantation-cultivation of exportable crops. This involves a demand for a large labour-supply. The natives are normally able to supply their needs, on their own standards of living, adequately from their own lands, and are often unwilling to leave those lands to undertake wage-labour for the immigrant settler. The large labour force required for the building of the railway through Kenya was obtained in part by the importation of coolies from India ; and it led to the establishment of an Indian population in that colony. But the Indians are now mainly engaged in the railway service, and in retail trade and skilled labour, and so do not affect the plantation labour-supply very directly. The prosperity and development of the plantations is directly dependent on the maintenance and increase of the supply of labour from the native population ; and the White settlers tend to use their influence in favour of policies which urge the natives to accept work on their plantations. In Kenya Colony the Whites elect some representatives to the Legislative Council ; and there their tendency to attempt to use government influence to maintain their labour-supply has been a cause of consider-

able friction both with the local government and with the home government, which is the trustee for the interests of the whole population.

These internal difficulties are probably most acute in Kenya Colony ; since that is the territory in which White settlers are most numerous, and the only one in which these settlers have a direct share in the government. In that territory there is also some development of political consciousness among the Indian settlers. And under the stimulus applied to them by the other two peoples some of the natives show signs of a similar development.

The greater part of the native African population is still tribal in its social organization. The suppression of tribal warfare, which was one of the first effects of British rule, has deprived large numbers of the men of their traditional occupation, especially among the more warlike peoples such as the Masai ; and the contact with modern civilization in its other aspects inevitably causes change and disturbance of the traditional modes of life. The pressure of Western Civilization on a barbaric people must inevitably produce great economic and social changes, including the destruction of the tribal system and the disappearance of its sanctions for, and control of, individual and social conduct.

The suppression of tribal warfare and slave raiding also removed the pressure which had formerly kept nearly every individual within a small tribal district for most or all of his life ; and large numbers began to move about the country wherever they could safely do so. The recruitment of labour for plantations, and for the construction of roads and railways and other purposes, usually on engagements for periods of from three months to a year, aided this movement. Complete freedom of movement has been restricted in some districts by the introduction of a "pass" system under which the movements of individuals are limited and controlled. Such a system may easily become an oppressive restriction on individual liberty ; but there are also dangers inherent

in unlimited freedom among peoples just emerging from barbarism. One such danger is indicated by the rapid spread in central Africa of some infectious or contagious diseases, such as sleeping sickness, within the present century ; and another by the demoralization which has frequently accompanied a rapid detribalization when no alternative moral sanctions replace the tribal control and the influence of the older men. Such full personal liberty and freedom of movement as is now general among the Englishry is associated with a high level of civilization. It has never existed among uncivilized peoples, and not always in civilized lands. Some restrictions seem to be necessary to the maintenance of order among a partly civilized people and a very mixed population.

In their external relations the British East African territories fall into two groups. The three northern territories of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika form one customs union, with internal free trade and a common tariff ; and they also share a common currency whose unit is a shilling of the same value as the British shilling. The other territories form distinct customs areas ; and both are associated rather with South Africa than with their northern neighbours, because their railway connections lead their trade southward or westward rather than northward or eastward ; and, before the Great War, their only direct contact with other British territories was with South Africa.

Three groups of facts are of primary importance in the external relations of British East Africa. First the area is one capable of producing great quantities of equatorial and tropical vegetation, and so of many vegetable raw materials and foodstuffs which are of rapidly increasing importance to the industrial peoples of the temperate lands. This fact is common to a large proportion of the lands of the Hot Belt, and need not be elaborated.

Secondly East Africa includes several small areas of highland at elevations of more than six thousand feet above

sea-level, and a very large part of the territories is above the level of three thousand feet. Because of their elevation these highlands have much lower mean temperatures than the equatorial lowlands, and have attracted some White settlers. Thus the problems of the acclimatization of Whites near the equator, and of the relations of two races at widely different levels of culture, have been added to those of the native peoples and of the economic development of the country. Of these races the more advanced is a very small minority of the total population here. But these highlands are part of a series which stretches, with few very wide breaks, from temperate South Africa to Ethiopia, through a distance of nearly four thousand miles, between latitudes  $35^{\circ}$  S. and  $15^{\circ}$  N. The plateaus from which the highlands rise guided the migrations of the Bantu Negroes who have peopled much of southern Africa, and have long been the homes of some of the most vigorous of the African peoples. In the last two hundred years White peoples have settled on many parts of them, beginning in the southern extremity near the Cape at sea-level and choosing higher altitudes as the latitudes decrease till the Kenya colonists are for the most part settled on the highlands at more than six thousand feet above sea-level. There are now colonies of Whites, mainly from Great Britain and South Africa, in Southern and Northern Rhodesia, in southern Nyasaland, on the highlands north of Lake Nyasa in southeastern Tanganyika, in northeastern Tanganyika, and in Kenya. All of them are living under similar conditions, both climatic and economic, many of which recall those of the planters of the eighteenth century in the West Indies and the southeastern colonies in North America (the "Old South" of the United States). And, though the main transport routes of all these highland colonies lead down to the sea, they are directly linked together by telegraph and motor road and airway, and in the near future probably by railway and lake steamers also, as well as indirectly by the coastal seaway; and they are

conscious of their common problems and interests. Some of the political and social problems of Rhodesia and Kenya are akin to many of those of the Union of South Africa. The racial problems have very similar factors. Differences in local conditions, and grouping in separate administrative areas, do little to mask the essential unity of all East Africa.

Thirdly East Africa is part of the coastlands of the Indian Ocean and shares the problems of those coasts. From other shores of that sea it received its Asiatic immigrants; and, like Natal, it finds its racial problems complicated thereby. India is also a part of the British Empire, and is thus doubly interested in East Africa.

But the principal state concerned in British East Africa is the United Kingdom, which is responsible for the government of all its territories. For the central territory of Tanganyika that responsibility is defined in the terms of the mandate from the League of Nations. But, since those terms are hardly more than a formulation of the principles which had been developed in Great Britain for the guidance of British policy towards the less advanced peoples, the mandate does not impose any substantial differences to distinguish the internal government of Tanganyika from that of the other territories.

Any view of the possible future developments in British East Africa must be dominated by the fact that the African peoples form the overwhelming majority, about ninety-nine per cent. of the whole, and that nearly all of them are not more than a generation away from barbarism. There is no tradition of civilization or social organization comparable to those of India or of Europe, and the development of civilization in the country must be the work of many years. Talk of an East African "dominion" is absurd, whether it means selfgovernment by the natives or the handing over of the territories to the small minority of colonists, White or Indian or both. But the grouping of all, or several, of them as units of an East African Viceroyalty might

lead to improved coördination of public services and of communications, and pave the way for the advance towards the status of a civilized selfgoverning country, an advance which depends on the maintenance of a government which can and will enforce order and do justice among all the varied peoples of this great dependency.

## CHAPTER XXII

### THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN WEST AFRICA

"WEST AFRICA" projects westward for some two thousand miles from the main mass of Africa, between the Sahara Desert to the north and the Gulf of Guinea to the south, with a width from north to south of from seven hundred to a thousand miles. In it British West Africa consists of the four separate dependencies of Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria, which are scattered along the two thousand miles of coast between Cape Verd and the head of the Gulf of Guinea. West Africa is a sub-continental "peninsula," between the desert and the ocean, which is quite comparable in extent to India and to peninsular Europe; though it is hardly one-sixth as populous as either of those regions. It is wholly intertropical, all its lands lying between  $4^{\circ}$  and  $18^{\circ}$  north of the equator. The coastal margin is everywhere wet; and in the three largest and most southerly of the British territories its climate approaches the equatorial regime of no dry season, with constantly high temperatures and high humidity. Inland, and north of about latitude  $8^{\circ}$  N., the year-long wet season of the Guinea coastlands gives place to the alternation of wet and dry seasons, and the dry seasons increase in length and aridity northward; though the desert is not reached till the latitudes of  $16^{\circ}$  to  $18^{\circ}$  N., beyond the northern boundaries of the British territories.

The two smaller dependencies of Gambia and Sierra Leone are limited to the coastal slopes; while both the larger ones, Gold Coast and Nigeria, extend far on to the plateau. But, except in two places, one where the scarped edge of the plateau forms part of the border of Sierra Leone,




Fig. 51.—WEST AFRICA: RELIEF AND POLITICAL DIVISIONS

and one where the British mandate territory of Cameroons is bounded to the southeast by the Cameroon Mountains, all the land boundaries are entirely arbitrary and artificial. No one of these territories is a well-defined region, or is marked off from the neighbouring lands by natural frontiers. And all four may be regarded as coastal enclaves in the French African Empire, whose continuous land area extends from the Congo River to Cape Verd and to the Mediterranean Sea, through forty degrees of latitude, and wraps round all the British West African dependencies. Sierra Leone marches with the Negro republic of Liberia for a hundred and fifty miles along its southeastern boundary ; but all the rest of the four thousand miles of the land boundaries of British West Africa march with those of the French Empire. The four dependencies are geographically quite separate from each other ; and their ordinary communications with one another and with the rest of the British Empire are wholly by sea.

British West Africa forms, in many respects, a striking contrast to British East Africa. The most obvious, and not the least important, contrast is that of the complete discontinuity of the West African dependencies with the territorial continuity of British East Africa. Also British West Africa has little more than half the area, but nearly double the population, of British East Africa<sup>1</sup>;

<sup>1</sup> Area, population, etc. of British West Africa : (M) denotes mandate territories.

Dependency.	Land Area in square miles.	Population.	Persons per sq. mile.	Distance of chief port from England (miles).	Railways open (miles).
Gambia . . .	4,000	200,000	50	2,500	—
Sierra Leone . .	31,000	1,500,000	50	3,000	340
Gold Coast . . .	80,000	3,100,000	39	3,800	480
Togoland (M) . .	13,000	300,000			
Nigeria . . .	373,000	21,000,000	56	4,100	1,580
Cameroons (M) . .	34,000	700,000			
Totals . . .	535,000	26,800,000			2,400
Compare British East Africa	986,000	14,000,000	15	6,200	2,500

hence it is, on the average, more than three times as densely peopled. In fact British West Africa contains a very large proportion of the best lands and the most densely peopled areas of West Africa ; and its population is more numerous than that of French West Africa, which has three times its area. The White population numbers less than ten thousand all told ; it is composed almost exclusively of government servants, missionaries, and traders, none of whom look forward to making a permanent home in the country. There are no colonies of European or Asiatic peoples comparable to those which complicate the social, economic, and political problems of East Africa. This last contrast is partly due to the fact that West Africa contains no highlands like those of the East. Here the general level of the plateau is much lower, less than fifteen hundred feet above sea-level, and the areas which rise to more than three thousand feet are few and small, while only a few peaks exceed six thousand feet. Thus there are no considerable areas where the altitude is sufficient to cause such a reduction of the temperatures as to make them attractive to White settlers. And the evil reputation gained for the coastal lowlands in past generations has tended to obscure the fact that West Africa is no more unhealthy than other regions of similar climate. The denser population of West Africa has also been adequate to prevent the importation of foreign labour supplies, such as that which formed a nucleus for the Indian populations of Kenya and Natal.

The coast of West Africa is nearer to Great Britain and western Europe than is any other well-watered intertropical region, and hence the West African dependencies are the nearest sources of " tropical " produce. The ports of Gambia and Sierra Leone are nearer to England than are any of the West India islands ; while the port of Lagos in Nigeria is almost equidistant from England with Kingston in Jamaica.

Owing to their comparative nearness, and their accessi-

bility by a coasting voyage, the coastlands of West Africa were the first parts of the " New World " to be discovered by Europeans in the early years of the Age of Discovery, when the Portuguese prince Henry the Navigator sent his explorers southward past the shore of the Great Desert in the middle of the fifteenth century, a generation before Columbus crossed the North Atlantic Ocean. Thus Europeans have been in continuous contact with this coast for more than four hundred years ; though it is hardly more than a century since they were successful in penetrating the interior. Coastal settlements, in fortified trading stations or " castles," were established along the Guinea coast during the sixteenth century by almost all the nations of the Atlantic seaboard of Europe, including Prussia and Sweden. Here White men first came into contact with the diseases of the equatorial climatic zone ; and parts of the coast became known as " The White Man's Grave." Many of the " factories " or " stations " became bases for the slave trade ; and the later cessation of that trade, together with the unhealthiness of the climate, led to their abandonment. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries West Africa offered no attractions to Whites sufficient to counter-balance the evils of the climate of its coast and the difficulty of access to the interior ; and the exploring and colonizing activities of those centuries passed it by. In the early decades of the nineteenth century only the British, the French, and the Portuguese remained in possession of small footholds on the coast.

British explorers, missionaries, and traders were active in West Africa during the nineteenth century ; and their discoveries and acquisitions made possible the expansion from the earlier bases to the present colonies and protectorates. Serious development here dates back only to the later decades of last century ; and, like the contemporaneous exploitation of other intertropical lands, it was due to the economic and political developments in Britain and

Europe which made it desirable, in their own interests, for the industrial states to control areas of production of raw materials and some possible future markets. Britain was first in the field, followed by France and later by Germany ; but the French were the most active in the exploration of the interior of West Africa. And in the " Partition of Africa " among the Western Powers in the last three decades of the nineteenth century Britain retained several of her older coastal stations and some part of the hinterland of each group, least behind the estuary of the Gambia and most behind Lagos and the " Oil Rivers " of the Niger delta ; while France obtained most of the interior together with several strips of the coast. Germany acquired two territories, in Togoland and Kamerun, which were transferred after the war of 1914-18 to the French and British Empires as " mandate " territories. Outside the French and British dependencies there are small areas of Portuguese and Spanish territories, and the Negro state of Liberia. This last was founded by philanthropic citizens of the United States of America as a colony for liberated Negro slaves. It has had an independent existence, under the ægis of the United States, for nearly a century ; but that Power has undertaken no active responsibility for its development, and it is a civilized state in name only.

A slight recent subsidence of the coast of West Africa, between about latitudes  $6^{\circ}$  and  $15^{\circ}$  N., has produced there a series of drowned valleys and small coastal islands which form numerous sheltered inlets and harbours, and so make this stretch much more accessible from the sea than are most parts of the coasts of Africa. This is the only part of the African coast where a Negro people, the Krumen, have shown much aptitude for seafaring. Unfortunately it is an isolated stretch of favourable coast. Before the Age of Discovery its people were hindered from any wide development of their seafaring by the great extent of the harbourless desert coast to the north and the equally harbourless, though

not desert, coast to the east, and the impassable width of the ocean in front of them. For primitive navigators it was an isolated area and not part of any far-reaching seaway; though today it flanks one of the chief seaways of the world.

The estuary of the River Gambia, near the northern end of this sunken coast, is one of its best inlets and is well placed for the establishment of the principal port of West Africa. But the British territory here includes only the shores of the estuary and of that part of the river which is readily navigable. It is some two hundred miles long and has an average width of about twenty miles. The area is inadequate to form the hinderland of a great port; but it suffices to shut off the estuary from its natural hinderland in the extensive territory of Senegambia and to compel the French to concentrate their port development on the promontory port of Dakar. Both Gambia and the hinderland are badly handicapped by the political and economic boundary which separates them.

Sierra Leone is near the southern extremity of the same stretch of indented coast and contains many sheltered inlets and estuaries. But here the scarped edge of the plateau is nearer to the sea, within a hundred and fifty miles, and higher than in most of West Africa; and so this coastland is comparatively isolated from the interior. The colony of Sierra Leone originated with the purchase, in 1788, by British philanthropists from a native chief, of the peninsula on which the capital, Freetown, is situated as a home for freed Negro slaves. It was used in the nineteenth century as a settlement for many of the Negroes liberated by the British Navy in its endeavours to suppress the slave trade off the Guinea coasts. Its present population, in the colony proper, is very largely composed of the descendants of these freed slaves and is an amalgam of nearly all the tribes and peoples of West Africa. Their language is English, among the uneducated sections "pidgin" English, and the colony has a Legislative Council which includes some elected

members. Freetown was long the centre of British authority for all the West African dependencies, and it is still the chief naval and military station ; though the civil governments of the other territories became separate as they increased in importance. The area inland from the colony became the Protectorate of Sierra Leone in the last decade of last century, in order to prevent the immediate hinterland from falling into the possession of a foreign Power.

During the Great War of 1914-18 Freetown again became prominent as a naval station, and as a port-of-call on the seaway to India and Australia. Modern sanitation and public health have advanced so far that the danger to the health of White people is very small for short stays even in the wet season ; while it is seriously suggested that its climate and position may make Freetown a suitable winter resort for Whites during its dry season in December, January, and February. It has a good natural harbour ; and its position on the flank of the route from Great Britain to the Cape, almost half way between Southampton and Capetown, makes it capable of serving as a useful way-station on the open-sea route between the North Atlantic and the Indian Oceans.

The Gold Coast dependency includes the four divisions of the Gold Coast Colony, the protectorates of Ashanti and the northern territory, and the mandate territory of Togoland. The total area is a little more than that of Great Britain, and it extends northward for four hundred miles from the unindented shore of the Gulf of Guinea, with a mean width of little more than half that distance. Within recent years this area has undergone a very rapid economic development, and in 1930 the gross value of its overseas trade was twenty million sterling. This development has been very largely based on the successful cultivation of cocoa for export. In 1930 this one crop formed more than half of the total exports, by value. Half the remaining exports are of minerals, gold, manganese, and diamonds, and no

other vegetable product is of outstanding importance. Such a concentration on one money crop has its dangers, as well as the advantage of allowing of a large-scale organization. The cultivation is almost wholly in the hands of the natives, guided to some extent by government experimental stations and advisers. There are no large plantation areas owned by Whites ; but none the less the development of a system of growing crops for sale rather than for local use, *i.e.* the transition from a subsistence farming to commercial agriculture, is leading to a breakdown of the former system of land tenure, in which the land was owned by the tribe and distributed among its members for cultivation for short periods of one or two years only. Such a system of frequent periodical redistribution of cultivated land is incompatible with a systematic cultivation of perennial plants or rotation of crops. Hence tribal ownership is giving way to individual ownership of land. And with the loss of their control of the land the tribal chiefs lose authority in other directions also. Here, as elsewhere, the contact of different cultures is causing the breakdown of the weaker ; and the tribal system of economic and social organization is rapidly disintegrating.

Nigeria is by far the largest and most populous of the British West African dependencies. It includes the whole region of the Niger delta, and the lower valleys of the River Niger and its chief tributary, the Benue, as far as those rivers are navigable from the sea. North of this it includes the whole of the plateau area, the Bauchi Plateau, between the lower lands of the Niger and Benue valleys, on the west, south and southeast, the Chad Basin on the northeast, and the lower plateau on the north, which is drained west and east to the middle Niger and Lake Chad. Politically the dependency consists of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria and that part of Cameroons territory which was transferred to the British Empire as a mandate territory. Southern Nigeria occupies the coastal lowland and the delta ; while Northern Nigeria consists of the plateau




FIG. 52.—WEST AFRICA: VEGETATION ZONES

country and its bordering valleys. The mandate territory is a strip along the southeastern border, formed of those parts of the former German territory of Kamerun which are in the drainage-area of the River Benue. There is a partly-elected Legislative Council for the Colony. But for the greater part of the dependency the government is carried on through the native chiefs and headmen, with the aid and supervision of a very small number of British officers.<sup>1</sup>

The most distinctive geographical feature of West Africa is the division of the whole sub-continent into a series of climatic and vegetation zones nearly parallel to the south coast. These are primarily determined, and distinguished from each other, by the differences in the amount and seasonal distribution of the rain. Along the south coast is a zone which receives heavy and almost constant rain, and is therefore naturally covered for the most part with a dense equatorial forest and jungle. This occupies all the Niger delta, and most of Liberia and Sierra Leone, in both of which it extends inland for at least a hundred miles. Between these areas, and northwest of Sierra Leone, it is much narrower and less continuous ; and it ends in the neighbourhood of the Gambia. Immediately inland from the coastal forests the climates differ by the appearance of considerable dry seasons. These interrupt the continuity of plant growth ; and the dense forest gives way to a more open vegetation of seasonal character, gradually changing from the forest, through a parkland of rich grasses interspersed with woodlands, to a poor grassland, and thence (north of British territory) to scrubland and desert. The coastal forest zone is what was formerly known as Guinea ; while the inner zones form the western parts of the Sudan, between Guinea and the Sahara desert.

These zones may also be distinguished by their characteristic crops and vegetable products. The coastal zone is

<sup>1</sup> For an account of this "indirect" system see Lord Lugard's *The Dual Mandate*.

that of forest products such as the oil palm and mahogany, cocoa and rubber. It has been called the banana zone, from one of its chief food plants. The climatic conditions are unfavourable to domestic animals ; so that work-animals are comparatively few, and milch cows even fewer. Farther inland the alternation of wet and dry seasons favours the growth of grasses and the use of animal labour, except in some areas infested by the tsetse fly ; and here cereals become important. The zone next to the forest belt is the millet zone. It includes many of the most populous areas of West Africa, from the Benue Valley to Ashanti, and is the chief area of production of cotton and ground-nuts, while a large part of it is suited to maize cultivation and its valley bottoms are adaptable to rice culture. Still farther inland, in Northern Nigeria and the northern territories of the Gold Coast, the rainfall becomes less and the wet seasons shorter ; so that the density of the vegetation is less, and pastoral occupations become relatively more important. Here the millet zone merges gradually into the cattle zone, and pastoral peoples dominate or replace the agriculturists.

These three zones are distinguished by differences in the social development of their inhabitants, as well as by climatic and economic features. The forest zone is inhabited by a comparatively dense<sup>1</sup> population of Negroes living mainly by the cultivation of forest plants, among which the banana, manioc, and some palms are prominent. They dwell for the most part in villages in clearings ; and until recently most of these villages were isolated in the dense forests and travel was unsafe. Local dialects differed from one village to the next, and native union was usually limited at its widest to a group of neighbouring villages. The region was one of the principal sources of the slaves who were carried to the Americas from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries ;

<sup>1</sup> From fifty to one hundred per square mile in many areas. This is a high density of population for Africa, but less than a fourth of that on many areas of similar natural conditions in southern Asia.

and the name " Slave Coast " was long attached to the coast between the deltas of the Niger and Volta rivers. Slave-raiding, with the warfare and social disorganization caused by it, was stopped only when the whole region was brought under civilized government by the British, French, and Germans late in the nineteenth century.<sup>1</sup> Since then the suppression of local war and the opening of roads have allowed the development of a very active commerce, and the beginnings of a widespread movement and mingling of the peoples.

The inner edge of the forest zone was the area of development of a series of Negro kingdoms, of which perhaps the best known were Ashanti, Dahomey, and Benin. By the nineteenth century, when Whites came to know them, these kingdoms had been completely demoralized by the slave trade, which had given an easy revenue to their rulers, and were hardly more than barbarous tyrannies. But their existence is evidence of some capacity for organization among the Negro peoples.

Farther inland, where the more open country and the use of beasts of burden increased human mobility, there seems to have been a varying number of kingdoms or empires, some of which attained stability for a few generations. Much of their culture was derived from the north and east ; and their ruling peoples were Muhammadan descendants of invaders from the border zones of the Sahara. Here the native peoples are no longer pure Negroes, but show evidence of much intermixture ; and they have reached higher levels of culture than those of the forest zone. Before the beginning of the twentieth century the peoples of the Sudan were still connected to the north by a diminishing trans-Saharan caravan traffic, and their contact with a higher culture was with the Muhammadan world. The Age of Discovery had brought White peoples into contact with the western end of the Sudan, where it reaches the sea between

<sup>1</sup> Except in Liberia, where it is hardly yet extinct.

latitudes  $12^{\circ}$  and  $18^{\circ}$  N. ; and their first effective penetration into the region was from that direction, when the French advanced to the middle Niger in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The later building of railways inland from the coast has revolutionized the external relations of the Sudan, and almost destroyed the trans-Saharan traffic, by providing a much more efficient and cheaper transport to the outer world. There is still a pilgrim traffic which maintains some cultural contact with the centres of Islam by land routes. And in recent years the Sahara has been crossed on many occasions by motor cars. But the outlook of the western Sudan has been reversed. For its commercial and political contacts it now looks southward and westward, through the forest zone, towards and across the ocean. So in their relations to the peoples of the Sudan the desert and the forest have exchanged rôles. The desert is now the background and the forest the zone of transit. The volume of the intercourse between the Sudan and Guinea is increasing rapidly ; and the peoples of grassland and forest are being brought into ever closer and more intimate contact.

In their external relations the British West African dependencies have two, and only two, dominant outlooks. Most of their present trade and other intercourse with the outside world is overseas ; and this is chiefly with Great Britain, along with their political relationship.

But they are not insular or peninsular lands. They are parts of the one region of West Africa, and are marked off from the rest of that sub-continent only by arbitrary and artificial boundaries. Their peoples are of the same races and cultures as those of the rest of West Africa ; and the geographical and social conditions are similar. They differ only in that the two groups have been arbitrarily allotted, by wholly external powers, to the British and French Empires respectively, and are therefore being introduced to Western Civilization under somewhat different auspices. Evidently

such a division ignores the essential unity of West Africa as one geographical region. And therefore the peaceful and harmonious development of its peoples depends on the agreement and mutual sympathy of the British and French colonial policies in regard to them. The actions of each Power in its dependencies here must affect the peoples of both sets of "colonies." Even if they wished to do so the governments could not check the constant passage of ideas and persons to and fro across the four thousand miles of boundary lines, mostly unwatched, which separate their West African dependencies ; and which really demarkate administrative divisions of one country. Of the four British dependencies Nigeria is the most important ; and its size and resources mark it out as capable of becoming a definite political entity in spite of the entirely arbitrary nature of nine-tenths of its land boundary. Its central and focal position in relation to the great rivers and its large population, more numerous than that of the whole of French West Africa, make it by far the principal political division of all West Africa ; and to the north it approaches so near to the natural limits formed by the desert that it is more likely to attract the peoples of the fringe of inhabited land between it and the desert than to be attracted by them. Sierra Leone is partly shut off from the interior. But neither the Gold Coast Dependency nor Gambia is in any way a geographically distinct or independent region ; and the boundaries which separate them from the interior are wholly arbitrary and tentative.

## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE SMALLER SCATTERED DEPENDENCIES

THE many small portions of the Empire which are not included in the groups of territories so far dealt with are scattered very widely over the seas. Most of them are small islands ; though one of the largest, British Guiana, is a part of the continent of South America and is nearly as large as Great Britain. These scattered dependencies may conveniently be described in five groups determined by their geographical positions ; though nearly all of them are distinct units for most purposes. These groups are :

- A. In the Mediterranean Sea.  
Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus.
- B. In, and on the shores of, the western Atlantic Ocean.  
The British West Indies, Bermuda, British Honduras, and British Guiana.
- C. In the South Atlantic Ocean.  
St. Helena and Ascension islands, Tristan da Cunha, the Falkland Islands and their dependencies.
- D. In the Indian Ocean.  
Mauritius, and many groups of smaller islands.
- E. In the South Pacific Ocean.  
The Fiji Islands with many groups of small islands.  
The eastern half of New Guinea, and the neighbouring islands.

The first three of these groups are parts of the British lands round the Atlantic Ocean ; and the disposition of these lands is of some interest. We may regard the Atlantic as a vast channel extending from the edge of the North

Polar Ice to the edge of the South Polar regions, with a length of ten thousand miles and a width varying from two to four thousand miles. This vast sheet of water occupies less than a quarter of the water surface of the earth, and it merges into the rest of the water surface, which is the "Outer" or "World" Ocean, at its southern end. There are also great inland seas extending from it east and west in the northern hemisphere in the Mediterranean and Caribbean regions ; and these have now been extended by the artificial waterways of the Suez and Panama canals to give direct connections from the North Atlantic to the outer seas. Thus there are four routes for ships between the North Atlantic Ocean, which with the Arctic forms the "Midland" Ocean, and the rest of the water surface, which forms the "World" Ocean and surrounds the chief land masses, except that Australia and Antarctica lie apart as islands in the "World" Ocean.

The Atlantic lands of the British Empire lie at all the ways into and out from the Atlantic Ocean. In the northeast corner are the British Isles, between the open ocean and the marginal lands of northwest Europe. The northwest corner is fully occupied by Canada and Newfoundland, and all the shores of the opposite southeast corner are similarly controlled by the Union of South Africa ; while in the far southwest corner of the ocean, three hundred miles east of the entrances by Magellan Strait and round Cape Horn, is the small colony of the Falkland Isles. The route out from the Atlantic eastward lies along the Mediterranean Sea past Gibraltar and Malta ; and those westward to the Panama Canal pass through the West Indies by several channels.

These positions are illustrated in the diagram-map (fig. 53) which also marks some ports, such as Bermuda and Freetown, which can serve as intermediate stations between these groups. It may be noted that the intervals between British ports on the east and west sides of the




FIG. 53.—THE BRITISH LANDS ROUND THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

North Atlantic are nowhere more than about twelve hundred miles ; but that in the southwest the Falkland Islands are separated by nearly four times that distance from the nearest important British stations in South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Barbados.

Thus these British lands are so placed as to give access to all the ways between the " Midland " and the " Outer " oceans. On the eastern side they are so placed as to facilitate control of those ways ; and on the west they can hold a watching brief.

#### A. THE MEDITERRANEAN TERRITORIES

The three British territories in the Mediterranean differ widely from each other in extent and population. Gibraltar and Malta derive most of their importance from their value as waystations on the inland-sea route which connects the North Atlantic and Indian oceans. But Cyprus is a little aside from this route and contains no good harbour to serve an important port.

GIBRALTAR is a small peninsula at the northern side of the strait which links the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. The main part is " the Rock," which extends some two-and-a-half miles from north to south with an average width of nearly half a mile, and a summit altitude of 1,396 feet above the sea. At its northern end this is joined to the mainland by a low sandy isthmus ; and along the northern part of its western shore the area is extended by a strip of land reclaimed from the bay. It lies about sixteen miles to the northeast of the narrowest part of the strait, which is not quite ten miles wide, and fifteen miles due north of Ceuta, the similar rock on the African shore, which with Gibraltar marks the eastern, or Mediterranean, end of the strait. These two rocky promontories, the Pillars of Hercules of the classical geographers, rise more than a thousand feet above the waters and form a well-marked portal at the western outlet of the great inland sea.

Gibraltar is probably the smallest territory in the Empire with a distinct administration. It is a Crown Colony under a governor who is the Officer-in-Command of the garrison. He is assisted, as Governor, by a small nominated Council. The area is less than two square miles, and the civilian population numbers only sixteen thousand. Even this population is too large for the small area at the northwestern foot




FIG. 54.—THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR

of the Rock which is all that is available for houses ; so immigration is forbidden and emigration is encouraged. A large number of the workers of the port live just across the border in La Linea, a Spanish town of more than sixty thousand people which is economically a suburb of Gibraltar.

The commercial harbour of Gibraltar is a free port and an important coaling station for ships, with an active trade in ships' stores and a ship-repairing industry. Since the Rock is barren and unproductive, all the supplies needed by the

garrison and the civilian population are necessarily imported. The port is also becoming a tourist centre.

The part of the isthmus nearest to the Rock is the only flat ground in Gibraltar, and part of it is used as an exercise and recreation ground. The central part is a "Neutral Ground" between British and Spanish territory which is kept open and unoccupied. This is an interesting survival of the ancient and medieval type of "no-man's-land" frontier. It is crossed daily by those of the port workers who dwell in La Linea.

To the east, and all round its southern extremity, the Rock falls precipitously to the sea ; and from this side it is not easily accessible. The western side slopes steeply to the Bay of Algeciras, and on the northern half of this coast the water is more sheltered and is comparatively shallow for half a mile out. Hence the town and port cling to the foot of this part of the Rock and the harbour has been constructed here. The port has a water area of only four hundred and forty acres within the moles ; but there is an extensive anchorage ground within the bay.

Gibraltar is a strong fortress, and a naval station of great importance. It successfully withstood many attacks in the first hundred years after its capture by the British, including those of the great three-and-a-half-years siege of 1779-83. But the Bay of Algeciras is only some six miles wide ; and within a radius of fifteen miles from Gibraltar there is a considerable area of ground west of the bay which rises to altitudes well above the summit of the Rock. It is doubtful whether Gibraltar could be held against an enemy who controlled the nearby mainland and was equipped with modern artillery ; for in that case it would offer a compact target to guns which could themselves be spread out along a wide front. The strength of the fortress has not been tested under modern conditions.

The peninsula of Gibraltar is physically a part of Spain ; and its possession by a foreign Power is a perpetual challenge

and affront to the pride and patriotism of Spain. On the opposite shore of the strait the corresponding rock of Ceuta and the territory round it form part of the overseas dependencies of Spain. Suggestions for the exchange of Gibraltar for an area on the opposite shore, which would give scope for the development there of an adequate base for British shipping in the strait, have occasionally been made by private persons. And, though such an exchange would involve the abandonment of most of the results of the great expenditure on the development of Gibraltar, it may be suggested that recent changes in conditions have made it worth while to examine the possibilities with great care. In particular it should be noted that Gibraltar is quite inadequate, in extent and relief, for an airport ; while an airport near the strait would be of very great value in the airway communications of the Empire. (Cf. p. 63.)

THE MALTESE ISLANDS lie in the wide channel between Sicily and north Africa which links the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean Sea ; and they are almost midway between Gibraltar and Port Said, a thousand sea miles from each. The Grand Harbour of Valetta in the chief island of Malta is one of the best natural harbours in the Mediterranean ; and the addition of this advantage to those of its position and its political status as part of a leading maritime empire has made Malta one of the most important ports-of-call in the world.

The islands are fifty miles from the nearest point of Sicily, and more than three times as far from the coast of Africa. The total area of the three inhabited islands is only a hundred and twenty-two square miles, of which Malta includes three-fourths. They are a fragmentary plateau of tertiary limestones which is part of the structural belt of the mountain zone of the Atlas and Apennines ; but the highest point is little more than seven hundred feet above sea-level. The coast is somewhat dissected and

there are several natural harbours. The soils are usually thin and dry ; and the climate is typically Mediterranean, with a dry hot summer, a moist warm winter, and a total rainfall of about twenty inches a year.

Malta is very densely peopled. At the census of 1931 the population numbered 241,621, *i.e.* nearly two thousand persons per square mile, a figure which marks the islands as one of the most densely crowded areas of the world. There are forty-three thousand acres of land under cultivation in more than ten thousand separate holdings ; and there is an export of vegetables for the early spring market in London ; but Malta imports a large part of the food needed by its people. There is no important manufacturing industry ; and, next to a varied and intensive agriculture, the chief occupation is the maintenance of the services of the naval base and of the port-of-call. But the islands are overpeopled and have, for some generations, been an area of emigration. Most of the emigrants have gone to other parts of the Mediterranean Lands, especially to Tunis ; but a considerable number went to the United States before 1914 ; and, in recent years, many have gone to Australia.

Malta has been held in turn by nearly all the great naval Powers of the Mediterranean, from the Phœnicians to the British. The native language is mainly Semitic, though it contains many words borrowed from various other peoples. This language, Maltese, is the ordinary speech of the islanders and is used exclusively in the lower grades of the primary schools. The long-drawn-out dispute over the second language concerns the respective positions of English and Italian ; both of which are equally foreign to the Maltese. There has long been a close intercourse with Italy, aided by the fact that practically all the Maltese are Roman Catholics ; and an important section, perhaps a sixth of the whole, speak Italian in addition to their native tongue. This section includes a majority of the professional classes and of the clergy. Italian was formerly the language of the

law courts, since Latin fell into disuse, even for those Maltese who did not know that language; and it is still the "language of record" in the courts. English is the language of administration and the principal language of commerce; and it is now taught as the first foreign language in the schools.

In government the status of Malta is that of a Crown Colony with local selfgovernment. The elected parliament controls all government functions except those of defence, coinage, and external relations; these are reserved to the Governor and a nominated Council. In emergency it is within the powers of the Governor, who is responsible to the government of the United Kingdom, to suspend the constitution and rule autocratically. This was done from 1930 to 1932 as a result of clerical interference with the elections of members of the parliament.

The essential importance of Malta lies in its possession of a good harbour in a position which makes it of great value to a Mediterranean Power in commerce and in war. None of the other islands in this part of the Mediterranean Sea, between Sicily and Africa, has any first-class harbour, nor have the neighbouring coasts of Sicily and north Africa. During a large part of the Middle Ages it was an outpost of Christendom against the Muhammadans. And when, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Knights of St. John ceased to be a strong power, Malta decayed until Napoleon, with a keen eye for strategic values, seized it in 1798. But then, as always, it was impossible to hold Malta without adequate naval power; and the French garrison fell in 1799 before the combination of a Maltese rising and a British fleet. The leaders of the rising appealed for British protection; and since then Malta has been the chief base of the British Navy in the Mediterranean. Its importance was greatly increased by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. And in recent years it has also been made a station on the airways of the Empire.

CYPRUS is an island in the northeast corner of the eastern Mediterranean. Its north coast is only forty miles from the coast of Asia Minor, and its easternmost point is sixty miles from that of Syria ; while the southwest corner is about two hundred and forty miles north of Port Said at the northern end of the Suez Canal. The greater part of the island is mountainous ; but there is a wide central plain, the Mesaoria, and patches of coastal lowland. It is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea, with an area of nearly three thousand six hundred square miles, a little less than that of Devon and Cornwall. Nearly half of its surface is under cultivation, producing the cereals and fruits typical of Mediterranean lands ; and, since the population is under three hundred and fifty thousand, the principal exports are of agricultural produce.

The population contains small numbers of many of the peoples of the Levant ; but the great majority, more than three-fourths, belong to the Orthodox Church and speak a dialect of modern Greek. Nearly a sixth are Muhammadans, most of whom speak Turkish. Among the Greeks there has been some agitation for annexation to Greece. English is the language of the government and is spoken by most of the educated classes ; it has long been taught in missionary schools, British at Nicosia and American at Larnaca, and in recent years also in the government secondary schools.

The island had been part of the Turkish Empire for more than three centuries before its administration was transferred to the British in 1878. It was annexed to the British Empire in 1914 ; and after the war it was given the status of a colony. A majority, fifteen out of twenty-four, of the members of the Legislative Council are elected, three by Muhammadan voters and twelve by the rest of the electors.

The island has no good harbour ; and its ports were all on open roadsteads, usable only in fair weather, until the

recent construction of harbour works at Famagusta on the east coast. This lack of any good accommodation for shipping has prevented Cyprus from having more than a local importance in the Mediterranean, in spite of its size and fertility, and has thereby reduced its political and strategic value.

The remaining dependencies dealt with in this chapter are nearly all small islands scattered widely over the oceans, though most of them are between or near to the tropics. It will save time and space if a brief account of the chief types of island is given here before considering the several groups. In all these islands the structure is closely related to the physical features and the natural resources, and so to the uses that man can make of the land. Hence we may well base this account on the chief types of structure. These are only three in number, viz. continental, volcanic, and coral.

The islands of continental structure include most of the West Indies, the Falklands and their dependencies, Mahé in the Seychelles group in the western Indian Ocean, and the larger islands in the southwest of the Pacific Ocean from New Guinea through the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides to New Zealand. All these are generally mountainous in character, with a rugged relief, and a great variety of rocks which in some cases include considerable wealth in minerals. They are also in general much larger than the other islands.

The second type is that of the volcanic islands. These are found chiefly in the Pacific Ocean, where they include the main islands of the Fiji and Samoa archipelagoes. Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, as well as St. Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha in the South Atlantic are also of this type. And several of the West India islands contain volcanic rocks. Such volcanic islands are also usually mountainous; though they are generally much

smaller than the "continental" islands. They vary greatly in relief. Where the volcanic rocks have not been exposed to denudation for a sufficiently long period they form smooth slopes and plateaus, which may be completely barren. Where denudation has made substantial progress the higher parts are carved into ragged ridges by many deep gullies and the lower areas and gentler slopes have a cover of fertile soils. But the purely volcanic islands have a very small variety of rocks, limited almost entirely to the lavas, volcanic ashes and pumice, and the alluvium which may be deposited in hollows and at the shores. They have no important mineral resources.

The third type is the coral island. This is confined entirely to warm seas and is not found far outside the tropics. The most characteristic form of the coral island is an atoll such as Funafuti in the central Pacific and Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean, or a reef such as that of Bermuda. These are usually low, rarely rising to as much as a hundred feet above the sea ; though in a few cases recent elevation has carried them to greater altitudes. Nearly all the coral islands are very small ; many of them are mere points of rock ; and their total area is inconsiderable. The pure coral island has even less variety of surface and rock than the volcanic island. It is made of coralline limestones and sands and has no mineral wealth and little or no fertile soil. Almost the largest islands of this type are the Bahamas, where considerable accumulations of æolian deposits have formed hills which rise to from one to four hundred feet above sea-level. It is possible that the large (for coral islands) area of some of the Bahamas is due to infilling of lagoons by these deposits. The Bermudas, where the twenty inhabited islands have a total area of twenty square miles, are more typical of coral islands in this respect.

Within the tropics coral reefs are found on many shores ; and a large proportion of the islands of the first two types




FIG. 55.—(a) BERMUDA: A CORAL REEF  
(b) DIEGO GARCIA: A CORAL ATOLL

are fringed along part of their coast by such reefs or, where part of the reef is above the level of the high tide, by lines of coral islets. The Great Barrier Reef, off the northeast coast of Australia, is the greatest of such fringing reefs.

The "continental" islands are frequently much dissected; and many of them have undergone recent subsidence (or the sea-level has risen). In such cases they frequently contain sheltered inlets which may form good harbours. Examples are the Falkland Islands, Mahé, and some of the West Indies. Where such a harbour is in a favourable position it may develop an important port; but in most of these islands the hinderland is too small to allow the growth of a large seaport, and they are too near to a continent to have a principal port-of-call.

Some, perhaps most, of the volcanic islands are cones which rise abruptly from considerable depths. In these there is usually no good harbour. In other cases, either because dissection is farther advanced or because subsidence or fracture has admitted the sea to the crater of an extinct volcano, these islands may provide very good harbours. Examples of the former type of inlet are found in Mauritius and in Fiji; while one of the best examples of the latter is the harbour of Pago Pago in American Samoa.

The partly enclosed lagoon of the coral atoll is usually an area of more or less sheltered water. But only if it is deep enough for large ships, accessible by an equally deep channel, and enclosed by a reef which is sufficiently high and continuous to shelter it from storm winds, can such a lagoon be a really good harbour. Such a combination of features must be extremely rare; and there is no really important port on a coral island.

#### B. THE WESTERN ATLANTIC TERRITORIES

THE WEST INDIA islands are the exposed parts of the partially submerged mountain system which separates the Caribbean Basin from the North Atlantic Ocean. The

main range extends between latitudes  $17^{\circ}$  and  $23^{\circ}$  N., east and west for more than twelve hundred miles, from the west end of Cuba to about  $64^{\circ}$  W. long. in the wide channel east of the Virgin Islands. From here a minor range stretches southward for a further five hundred miles till it almost touches the coast of South America. Between these ridges and the mainland coast of South and Central America is the Caribbean Sea. The greater part of the east-west range is formed by three islands of the Greater Antilles ; and there are only three entrances to the Caribbean Sea through the western three-fourths of its northern rim. In this respect the eastern rim offers a striking contrast ; for east of Puerto Rico the islands are all small and there are very many ways through between them.

Except for the northern portion of the Bahama group all the islands lie within the tropics and, again with the exception of the Bahamas, all are mountainous. They are within the zone of the northeast trade wind ; and for the most part there is abundant rainfall on the mountain slopes ; but some of the valleys and small lowlands in the rainshadow areas on the lee side of the mountains are arid and can be cultivated only where irrigation is possible.

These islands were the first lands of the New World to be reached by Europeans in the early years of the Age of Discovery. And, except for the semi-arid islands off the northwest coast of Africa, they are the nearest to Europe of all tropical islands. In the first hundred years after their discovery, *i.e.* during the sixteenth century, the West Indies were left to the Spaniards. But Spain was then concerned mainly with the search for the precious metals ; and the main stream of Spanish conquest and colonization passed by the islands to the mainland, leaving small settlements only in the larger islands. Hence when other nations entered the region most of the smaller islands were still unoccupied, except by the aborigines. In the seventeenth century several of the nations of western Europe, among whom the

English and the French were the most prominent, planted colonies in these smaller islands. The first English settlement was made in 1625 on St. Kitts (now St. Christopher) Island; and within the next few years Barbados and some other small islands were also colonized. In 1655 Jamaica




FIG. 56.—THE WESTERN ATLANTIC: BRITISH LANDS  
(All islands named are British.)

was wrested from the Spaniards. And by 1713 most of the islands which now form the British West Indies were already recognized as British. The chief later addition is Trinidad, taken in 1797 during the Napoleonic Wars. Some of the present White inhabitants are direct descendants of those early colonists.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these

small islands were among the most highly valued oversea possessions of the expanding Atlantic states of Europe. Under the economic conditions of that age, in the absence of any large and regular bulk transport of goods, every country was necessarily self-supporting in respect to its essential (perishable) food products, and distant trade was mainly limited to articles of luxury. Among these the spices, which could only be grown in the Hot Belt, ranked very high at first ; though by the eighteenth century they were exceeded in bulk and value by two other commodities new to Europe—cane sugar and tobacco. For the production of these commodities small and hilly islands were preferred, partly as being easily accessible and less unhealthy for Whites than most other intertropical lands, but particularly because such islands and their labourers, chiefly negro slaves after the seventeenth century, could be far more easily controlled and exploited than mainland territories ; while they were large enough to produce as much of these goods as could be absorbed. The difficulties of land transport limited the plantations to a narrow strip of coast ; and any unoccupied areas behind this increased the difficulties of control. Under such conditions the most favourable areas for the production of these articles were the smaller islands of the West Indies. Until the developments of medical science and mechanical transport in the later decades of the nineteenth century made the larger fertile regions within the tropics accessible and comparatively safe, such small islands were almost the only intertropical lands which were intensively exploited. It is difficult for us today to realize the high value set on these islands during those centuries ; but we may recall that, in 1763, the island of Guadeloupe was offered as a fair equivalent for Canada.

Of these islands the English secured in the seventeenth century most of those which now form the British West Indies. These have a total area of about twelve thousand square miles, and a population in 1931 of just over two

millions. They consist of several separate colonies, now organized in six groups. There have been many suggestions for federation among some or all of these colonies. It is possible that these suggestions may lead to some further measure of administrative union among some of those in the Lesser Antilles, where all the British islands are within a range whose extreme length is just over six hundred miles. But the Lesser Antilles are separated by a direct distance of more than a thousand miles from Jamaica and the Bahamas ; while the chief town of the Bahamas, Nassau, is more than six hundred miles from Jamaica. These gaps make a federation of all the British West Indies improbable.

JAMAICA is much the largest of the British West India islands, with rather more than a third of the area and half the population of the whole. It is the one important island which is within the Caribbean Sea ; it is off the southern end of the Windward Passage, through which pass the shortest routes from eastern North America to the Panama Canal, five hundred miles to the south of Jamaica. The great majority of the million inhabitants are Negroes ; but about fifteen thousand are classed as Whites, with ten times as many Coloured, and there are small numbers of Indians and Chinese. Jamaican Negroes have migrated in considerable numbers, as temporary labourers, to other lands in the Caribbean region ; they supplied a large part of the labour force for the construction of the Panama Canal, and they work on many plantations and in sugar factories in Central America. Jamaica, with some islets, forms a Crown Colony with a partly-elected Legislative Assembly. The capital and chief town is Kingston, on a good harbour on the southeast coast.

The BAHAMA ISLANDS have a total area a little greater than that of Jamaica, but a population only one-fifteenth as numerous. In many other respects these islands offer a

strong contrast to the rest of the West Indies. They are lowlying lands formed almost wholly of coral rocks and windblown coralline sands. They rise from the extensive submarine plateau of the Bahama Bank. This appears to be of similar structure to the Florida peninsula, from which it is separated by a channel only sixty miles wide at its narrowest point. It lies off the eastern entrance to the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf Stream flows northwards along the Florida channel between the Bahamas and that peninsula ; and its concentration and direction are partly due to the position of the Bank.

The Bahamas were originally colonized by Englishmen , and although Negroes now form a majority of the small population of about sixty thousand, there is still a large proportion of Whites. In recent decades these islands have become prominent as a winter resort for North Americans ; and during the attempt to enforce Prohibition in the United States, they became a centre of an extensive contraband traffic in alcoholic liquors. This traffic was very much facilitated by the great extent and scanty population of the group and the enormous number of small islets and sheltered channels which it contains, all of which make smuggling comparatively easy ; while conditions in the United States made it highly profitable.

The WINDWARD ISLANDS, with Barbados and Trinidad, form the southern section of the Lesser Antilles between latitudes  $10^{\circ}$  and  $14^{\circ}$  N. All these are British ; but they are organized into five colonies based on the principal islands, namely Trinidad with Tobago, Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, and St. Lucia. The last three of these are united for some purposes as the Windward Islands, but have separate local administrations. More than half the population of this group is in the largest island, TRINIDAD. This is structurally a part of the northern mountains of South America ; and it is in some respects the most varied of the islands.

It contains the well-known pitch lake, and a number of oil wells, and is now the second producer of mineral oils in the Empire. The volume produced in 1930 was three hundred and thirty million gallons, to the value of nearly three million pounds. Trinidad had been occupied by French and Spanish colonists before it was taken by the British in 1797, and dialects of both those languages are still spoken in some of its rural districts ; though English is the language in general use. The Whites of the island are descended from colonists of all three nations. The majority of the population is Negro or Coloured. But in the latter part of the nineteenth century labourers were imported from India in such numbers that their descendants now form more than a third of the inhabitants of the island.

BARBADOS is the most easterly of all the West India islands, and is near west longitude  $60^{\circ}$ , which is that of the easternmost edge of the Dominion of Canada. It is a small island, of about the same area as the Isle of Wight, which supports a dense population of nearly a thousand persons per square mile. It contains no high land, and it is the only one of these islands which was wholly occupied at the time of the abolition of slavery in 1833. Here there was no unused land on which the freed slaves could "squat"; hence they continued to work as wage-earners and Barbados escaped the labour shortage which affected the other colonies.

The rest of the Lesser Antilles, north of latitude  $15^{\circ}$  N., form the Leeward and the Virgin Islands. Politically these are divided among four Powers, Britain, France, the United States, and Holland. The British islands are scattered among the rest. All of them are small, the largest, Dominica, having an area of only three hundred square miles with less than fifty thousand inhabitants. Only a third of its area is under cultivation, and much of this is devoted to the production of limes, which provide the chief export.

The **BERMUDA ISLANDS** lie out in the North Atlantic Ocean in latitude  $32\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$  N., seven hundred and fifty sea miles almost due south from Halifax in Nova Scotia, seven hundred southeast from New York, about eight hundred north of the nearer islands of the West Indies, and three thousand from England. There are more than two hundred islets, of which only twenty are inhabited. They are part of a coral reef which lies right in the track of the Gulf Stream and enjoys an unusually warm and equable climate for the latitude. It is the most northerly coral reef in the world. The total area of the inhabited islands is only some twenty square miles ; but the population numbers nearly thirty thousand. Bermuda has been an English colony since it was first settled in 1612 ; and its Assembly is the oldest parliament in the overseas lands of the Empire. Its dense population is largely engaged in intensive agriculture, and the chief export is early vegetables to the markets of eastern North America. The islands also form a winter health resort, for which they have the advantage of being nearer to New York and eastern Canada than the resorts of Florida and the West Indies. Bermuda possesses a fairly good harbour and has long been a minor naval station. It is now a port-of-call on the route of the regular shipping services between Canada and the West Indies. (See fig. 55, p. 343.)

**BRITISH HONDURAS** is a small area on the east coast of Central America, bordering on the republics of Guatemala and Mexico. It began in the seventeenth century as a settlement of wood-cutters from Jamaica, which lies six hundred miles to the eastward ; and mahogany and logwood are still staple exports, though there is now an increasing production of bananas and other fruits. The population is just over fifty thousand on an area of nearly nine thousand square miles.

**BRITISH GUIANA**, with an area equal to that of Great Britain, is nearly four times as large as all the rest of

these Western Atlantic lands of the Empire taken together. In fact it is essentially a group of small coastal settlements of the same type as those on the West India islands ; and the extensive hinderland which makes it bulk so large on the map is as yet almost unsurveyed and unused. The total population is a little more than three hundred thousand, less than that of Trinidad ; and, as in that island, more than a third of these are Indians. The number of aborigines in the interior is unknown ; but it is estimated at not more than ten thousand. The principal product, and export, is sugar ; but the area under rice is now nearly equal to that of the sugar plantations. The territory contains very large, though only partly prospected, mineral and forest resources.

These Western Atlantic territories are scattered over a large area extending two thousand miles east and west from British Honduras to Barbados and a similar distance north and south from Bermuda to the southern border of British Guiana. All are in regions of tropical or subtropical climates and, except for Bermuda, depend on similar products. The majority are small and densely peopled islands ; while the two mainland territories are in fact small coastal settlements on the edge of almost empty lands. For more than a hundred years the principal product has been cane sugar ; and many of the colonies fell into the unsafe economic position of resting their prosperity on a single staple crop. The development and subsidization of the beet-sugar industry in Europe caused widespread distress in the islands and in British Guiana in the second half of the nineteenth century. It also led to a move towards a more diversified production, aided by the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture now established in Trinidad ; and the islands now produce and export a fairly wide range of tropical fruits and spices, though a high degree of specialization still obtains in some of the smallest of them. Their principal markets are in the British Isles and Canada, with

both of which the principal islands are connected by direct shipping lines with connecting services to all the colonies. The trade with these countries is also favoured by preferential tariffs. The United States is a nearer and larger market except in so far as its high tariffs exclude the products of the British colonies in favour of those of its own dependencies ; and the southward winter tourist traffic from North America brings to some of the islands the majority of their visitors and an important addition to their income. Yet nearly two-thirds of the "visible" trade of these colonies is with other lands of the Empire. The links between the British West Indies and the United States were first established when the latter were also British colonies. They are strengthened by the community of language, and of many institutions, as well as by the comparative nearness and the great interests of the United States in this Caribbean region. American money circulates by the side of the British in many of the islands ; and American books and magazines are in general circulation.

### C. SOUTHERN ATLANTIC TERRITORIES

All the small and widely separated islands which constitute the British territories in the South Atlantic Ocean were uninhabited at the time of their discovery, a fact which reflects their outstanding characteristic of extreme isolation. The best known of these islands is St. Helena, which is in latitude  $16^{\circ}$  S., eleven hundred miles from Africa, eighteen hundred from Cape Town and from South America, seven hundred from Ascension Island, and forty-five hundred from Southampton ; distances which indicate the isolation of a remote oceanic islet. Yet the isolation of St. Helena is considerably lessened by the fact that it is close to the most direct route of shipping from the North Atlantic to the Cape.

St. Helena was formerly an important calling station on the Cape route to India ; and it was a possession of the

English East India Company from 1651. But since the introduction of steamships and the opening of the Suez Canal it has ceased to be important as a port-of-call. The area is forty-seven square miles ; and the population, of very mixed origins, European, Asiatic, and African, numbers nearly four thousand. Ascension Island is still smaller (34 square miles) and has only a hundred and fifty inhabitants. Both islands are of volcanic origin and their summits rise nearly three thousand feet above the sea. There is good anchorage ground in St. James Bay off the northwest (lee) coast of St. Helena ; but neither island has any inlet to form a sheltered harbour. They are in the trade wind belt, and St. Helena in particular has a climate which is unusually cool and healthy for the latitude.

Fifteen hundred miles south of St. Helena and seventeen hundred west of Capetown are the still more isolated islands of Tristan da Cunha, far from any important route of regular shipping. Tristan is a volcanic cone rising to 7,640 feet above the sea. There is no good landing-place ; and the only inhabited area is a plateau on the northwest of the island, where there is a population of about a hundred and thirty. The other islands of the group are uninhabited.

The FALKLAND ISLANDS are in south latitude  $51^{\circ}$  to  $53^{\circ}$ , which corresponds to that of the English Midlands in the northern hemisphere ; but their climate rather resembles that of the Shetlands. The area of the two main islands is a little less than that of Yorkshire ; and the population at the census of 1931 was 2,392, practically all of British origin. The chief occupation of the islanders is sheep-rearing, and the islands contain nearly three hundred times as many sheep as human beings. The Falkland Islands are a partly submerged outlier of the Andean mountain system ; and their coasts are deeply indented, with many inlets providing safe harbours. The capital, and only town, is Port Stanley

[illegible]

The Falkland Islands dependencies are scattered over a very large area of ocean south of latitude 50° S. (see map, above). They include all the land within this area ; but there is only one permanent settlement, on South Georgia.

The lands are in a region of harsh climate and are unproductive. The only present value of the area lies in its whaling and sealing, for which the islands are the bases. So long as a land base remains necessary the control of the islands enables the government to exercise some control over the "fisheries"; but the development of "factory ships" may remove the need for a land base and, in the absence of sufficient international agreement, hasten the extermination of the animals which are hunted in these seas.

The boundary lines on the maps are usually continued along the meridians southward to the Pole and so mark out a Falkland Islands "Sector" of the South Polar Regions. A similar area, south of the parallel of  $60^{\circ}$  S. lat., between the meridians of  $160^{\circ}$  E. and  $150^{\circ}$  W. of Greenwich, was proclaimed a British Settlement in 1923, under the name of the Ross Dependency, and placed under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of New Zealand. The corresponding sector between longitudes  $45^{\circ}$  and  $160^{\circ}$  E. was proclaimed British territory in 1933, and placed under the control of the Commonwealth of Australia. Similar sectors have been indicated on maps of the North Polar Regions, north of Canada and of Alaska.

These polar sectors are of very little direct value to the countries which have asserted their claims to them. And the chief purpose of these claims is to enable the state concerned to exercise jurisdiction over the fisheries of the coasts within the sector.

#### D. ISLANDS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Most of the small islands in the Indian Ocean are parts of the British Empire. Those near the coasts are in general under the government of the larger dependencies which border that ocean; and, of those which are not closely coastal, the Andaman and Nicobar islands and the Laccadives are parts of the Indian Empire, the Maldivé Islands

are dependencies of Ceylon, the Cocos and Christmas islands in the east are included with Singapore in the Straits Settlements, and the Sokotra group in the northwest is part of the protectorate of Aden. The remaining small islands are grouped into the two colonies of Mauritius and the Seychelles, which include most of the small islands between




FIG. 58.—THE INDIAN OCEAN: POLITICAL DIVISIONS

the equator and the southern tropic in the western half of the Indian Ocean.

The islands which make up these two colonies (see map, above) were uninhabited when first discovered by Europeans in the early years of the Age of Discovery. And, with the substitution of Portuguese for Spaniards, their history down to the nineteenth century is very closely similar to that of the smaller islands of the West Indies. Here the Dutch, French, and English were the nations most concerned; and all three still hold islands in and round the Indian Ocean; while the Portuguese territories consist of a large

area on the mainland of East Africa, parts of the island of Timor, and three stations on the west coast of India.

MAURITIUS is by far the largest and most populous of these islands ; though its area is only seven hundred and twenty square miles, about equal to that of the English county of Berkshire. It is in latitude  $20^{\circ}$  S., five hundred miles east of the coast of Madagascar and fifteen hundred from Natal ; while it is nearly equidistant, about twenty-four hundred miles, from Capetown, Bombay, and Aden, and near the best route from the Cape to India. Hence it was an important port-of-call on the chief route to India before the opening of the Suez Canal, a fact to which it owed much of its early importance. The island is of volcanic origin and rises to a maximum altitude of two thousand seven hundred feet above the sea. Its coast is partly surrounded by coral reefs, but includes several inlets. One of these, on the northwest of the island, the lee side, forms a very good harbour, on which is the capital, Port Louis. Before 1789 this was the capital of the French East Indies, and Mauritius was one of the chief of the French colonies. It was taken by the British during the Napoleonic Wars. The French language still has an equal status with English in the island ; and a majority of the native White (Creole) population still speak it. The early colonists imported slaves, from Asia and Africa, to cultivate their plantations ; and in the nineteenth century, after the abolition of slavery, there was a considerable import of indentured labourers from India. The population is now made up of Whites, Negroes, Indians, and Chinese, with a considerable number of mixed descent. The Indians are a majority of the total. In 1931 the population numbered 393,418 ; so that the island is very densely peopled, with a mean density of nearly five hundred and fifty persons per square mile.

The cultivation of the sugar cane was introduced into

Mauritius in the eighteenth century ; and sugar has long been the staple product, accounting in recent years for more than nine-tenths of the value of the total exports. Four-fifths of the cultivated land is under sugar and more than an eighth under fibre crops, principally aloes. Hence nearly all the food supply of the dense population is imported, most of it from India and Australia. Thus the external trade is large. Its average annual value in the years 1926-30 was about six million five hundred thousand pounds, or more than sixteen pounds per head. The import of food and manufactured goods is slightly greater in value than the export of sugar and fibres ; and the small balance is chiefly accounted for by the services of the port-of-call. The dangers of such an unbalanced economy, with its dependence on a single crop, have often been pointed out in the history of the island. About three-fourths of the trade is with other parts of the Empire, chiefly India and the United Kingdom.

The other islands in the colony are from two hundred to twelve hundred miles distant from Mauritius. They are all small, with a total population of less than ten thousand. Except for Rodriguez they are small coral islets. Diego Garcia in the Chagos group is an atoll almost enclosing a lagoon which is accessible to large ships. It is the most central harbour in the Indian Ocean and, as such, has some importance, though it is not much used. (See fig. 55, p. 343.)

In the Seychelles colony, as in Mauritius, there is one principal island ; though Mahé includes only a third of the total area of 156 square miles and two-thirds of the total population of less than thirty thousand. The island is situated about a thousand miles nearly due east of Mombasa and has a good harbour. It was first colonized from Mauritius ; and it has a similar mixture of peoples, with a smaller proportion of Indians. The chief crop of the islands is the coco-nut ; but there is a fairly wide range of products.

## E. ISLANDS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN

The great majority of the islands of the Pacific, excepting those in the coastal waters of the Americas and Asia, are in the southwestern quarter of that ocean. And this area includes all the British islands, except Hongkong and the coastal islands of British Columbia. Within that part of the ocean which extends from the meridian of  $141^{\circ}$  E. eastward to that of  $155^{\circ}$  W., a distance of more than four thousand miles, and a similar distance from the parallel of  $4^{\circ}$  N. latitude southward to Antarctica, with an extension to the northeast, nearly all the land is within the British Empire ; though the exceptions include two islands of considerable importance (see map, p. 361). Within this vast area of about sixteen million square miles there are three groups of islands belonging to foreign Powers, the New Caledonia and Loyalty Isles and the Wallis archipelago to the French Empire, and the eastern Samoa Islands to that of the United States of America. There is also the New Hebrides group under a British and French condominium. And three other areas include lands held by the British under mandates from the League of Nations. Outside this British area of the South Pacific the islands to the east are held by France and those to the north by the United States and Japan ; while to the northwest of Australia are the Dutch East Indies.

Three of the States of the British Commonwealth share the control of the dependencies in this region (see map, opposite). The lands to the north of Australia, including the eastern half of the large island of New Guinea, are controlled by the Federal Government of Australia, and a large number of small islands scattered over the eastern area are subject to New Zealand ; while the rest, mainly in the centre and north, are under the control of the government of the United Kingdom. The one exception to these distributions is that the island of Nauru, near the equator,

is held by the three British states under a joint mandate. Its importance, like that of its neighbour Ocean Island, is due to its phosphate deposits.

It is of interest to note that the chief islands in this part of the Pacific Ocean diminish very rapidly in size from south-




FIG. 59.—THE SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN: POLITICAL DIVISIONS

west to northeast, from Australia to Fanning Island. In a broad zone curving round the east and northeast of Australia are the continental islands from New Zealand to New Guinea, including the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides. Beyond this zone the islands are either volcanic or coral. The larger ones are volcanic cones or groups of cones; and these include the main islands of the Fiji and Samoa groups. The great majority of the rest are minute

coral rocks, often in clusters on an atoll or reef, few of which have areas of more than one or two square miles. The numbers of the populations vary as much as the size of the islands, but by no means in proportion to the area. Generally the large islands are thinly peopled ; some of the smaller ones are densely peopled, as in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands with a mean density of two hundred per square mile for the group and far higher densities in some of the separate islands; while many of the minor islets have no permanent inhabitants.

The islands controlled by the governments of Australia and New Zealand have already been referred to in Chapters XIII and XIV respectively. Those which are under the supervision of the United Kingdom are in two parts, the Fijis and the rest ; but the same officer is Governor of the Fijis and High Commissioner of the Western Pacific. In the latter capacity he is responsible for supervising the administration of a very large number of small islands scattered about an area of some six million square miles of ocean. The total area of the lands under his supervision is about twenty-three thousand square miles, of which three-fifths is in the Solomon Islands and a third in the Fiji archipelago, leaving less than a thousand square miles for all the rest. Similarly of the total population of nearly three hundred and fifty thousand more than half is in the Fiji Islands, more than a fourth in the Solomons, and a tenth on the Gilbert and Ellice atolls, leaving less than fifty thousand among all the other islands. Most of the islands are governed by their native chiefs and councils, assisted by a resident British Commissioner who interferes as little as possible. But the Fiji group has a regular colonial government with a partly-elected Legislative Assembly ; though much of the local government of its districts is carried on through the native chiefs and their councils.

The FIJI ISLANDS are much the most important group in this area ; and their capital, Suva, is the principal port-of-

call in the South Pacific. It is near  $18^{\circ}$  S. lat. and  $178\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  E. long., fifteen hundred miles from the nearest Australian port, Brisbane, and eleven hundred from Auckland in New Zealand. It is on the diagonal route across the Pacific from Canada to Australia at distances of seventeen hundred and fifty miles from Sydney, twenty-seven hundred from Honolulu, and fifty-two hundred from Vancouver. And it is one of the two ocean stations on the British trans-Pacific cable, the other being on Fanning Island.

The main islands of the Fijis are of volcanic origin, and their summits rise to altitudes of more than three thousand feet above the sea. There are considerable areas of fertile soils, and the rainfall is heavy on the windward, south-eastern, side of the high ground. The total area of the group is a little less than that of Wales.

Owing to its great distance from Europe, and the concentration of the seventeenth-century exploration and exploitation of tropical islands on the more accessible regions of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the island-world of the South Pacific was not fully explored until late in the eighteenth century, and the islands were not brought into close or effective contact with White peoples till the middle of the nineteenth century. Hence their exploitation came after the abolition of slavery in the British Empire, and after the introduction of steamships. The natives in nearly all the islands proved unwilling or unable to undertake the regular labour demanded by the systematic cultivation of the plantations ; and there has been a considerable importation of other labourers, mainly from Asia. Those brought to the Fiji Islands were mostly from India ; and Indians now number two-fifths of the population and seem likely to be the majority in the next generation. Native Fijians still form about half of the total ; and the remainder is made up of Whites, Chinese, and persons of mixed descent. Similar mixtures of peoples have been established in other important island groups ; though Indians are less prominent in the

non-British islands. In many of the islands the native population is diminishing in numbers.

In most of the islands the chief plantation crop is the coconut ; but the introduced banana is now a staple food crop and many other introduced plants are of primary economic value. In the Fijis sugar cane and rice rank after bananas in the amount of land under cultivation ; and in recent years sugar has been the principal export, accounting for two-fifths of the total value of the exports. More than three-fourths of the trade is with other parts of the Empire, chiefly Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and India.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### SOME WORLD RELATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

THE British Empire is a World State in close relations with most of the other states of the world ; and the relations between the quarter of the world which is included within the Empire and the fifty or sixty independent sovereign states which occupy the other three-quarters are very complex. The geographical factors in these relations depend mainly on the relative positions of their lands and peoples, and the extent to which the manifold interests of different states and peoples are intermingled in various areas. The relations of the Empire, and of its several states, to other states are extremely varied. With some inland states, such as Switzerland, Hungary, and Bolivia, there are relations of social, commercial, and political intercourse, but no direct geographical contact. With every other maritime state Britain has some direct intercourse by sea. And the long land boundaries of the Empire, which have a total length of more than twenty thousand miles, give it direct contact with many other states ; though it is important to note that more than half of these boundaries mark off the British dependencies from dependencies of other empires. The most important external relations of the British Empire are with the other Great Powers and with the most populous regions. And we should first note the distribution of the chief of these regions.

More than two-thirds of the two thousand millions of human inhabitants of the earth dwell in four populous regions, which together have a total area of less than eight

million square miles, barely a seventh part of the land surface. This distribution is a result of the fact that the natural resources on which Man depends are very unevenly distributed over the earth. And it is, in itself, one of the most important of geographical facts. The four regions, with their approximate areas and populations, are<sup>1</sup>:

	Approx. area in millions of sq. miles.	Approx. population in millions.
EUROPE . . . . .	2·8	500
EASTERN NORTH AMERICA . . . . .	1·9	100
THE FAR EAST . . . . .	1·9	500
INDIA . . . . .	1·0	300

Of these regions the first three are not only the largest but they are wholly within the North Temperate Zone. There are no comparably extensive areas of continuously habitable land in the South Temperate Zone. Indeed the total area of the cultivable land of that zone, in its three sub-continental areas, is less than half of that of Europe. Hence the three regions first named in the above table are the principal centres of the development, actual and possible, of the dominant forms of human culture on the earth ; for the lessening of human energy in the lands of the Hot Belt seems to preclude the possibility of any comparable development in equatorial or tropical regions. Hence these three regions of "Europe," the "Far East," and "Eastern North America" are the three most important of the major human regions, the "Centres of World Power." The fourth great populous region, in India, is mainly tropical and is wholly within the British Empire. (Cf. figs. 60 and 61, pp. 368 and 369.)

We may briefly note the geographical relations of the Empire to each of the three primary regions. Of the three Europe and the Far East are the areas of development of the two major human races and cultures ; while the third

<sup>1</sup> For some discussion of these regions see articles by the author on "Centres of World Power," in the *Sociological Review*, April 1926, and "The Extent of the Cultivable Land," in the *Geographical Journal*, December 1930.

in North America is a recent colony of Britain and Europe, and is still very closely akin to its mother-countries. This kinship is strengthened and maintained by the comparative nearness to each other of Europe and North America, whose most populous areas lie on the opposite shores of the North Atlantic and are separated only by less than four thousand miles of open ocean across which there are frequent services maintained by the largest and fastest ships of the world. But each of these areas is severed from the correspondingly populous lands of the Far East, round the China Seas, by a direct distance of more than five thousand miles, and a voyage by way of either Suez or Panama which is much more than twice as long as the North Atlantic crossing.

What are the geographical relations of the British Empire to these three great regions? By far the greater part of its area lies entirely outside all three of them. In the Far East it has only the small outlying territory of Hong-kong. But within the great human region of Europe lie the homelands of the Empire, though they are physically detached from its main mass, as well as the small Mediterranean dependencies. The British Isles include barely one-hundredth part of the area of the Empire and a sixtieth of that of the Commonwealth; but they contain two-thirds of its White population. Here is the "Heart of the Empire," in the most populous and wealthy of its states. The geographical position of Great Britain is the principal fact in the relations of the Empire to Europe. The third of the regions which we have termed Centres of World Power is Eastern North America; here the inhabited areas of Canada occupy the northern part of the region, and include perhaps a fifth of its area of cultivable land and a tenth of its population. Thus the North Atlantic States of the British Commonwealth are parts of the great human regions of Europe and Eastern North America respectively. These states between them contain six-sevenths of the White population of the Empire, and a corresponding proportion





FIG. 60.—WORLD POPULATION MAP



Chief fertile lands in Temperate Zones are shaded.  
Isotherms show surface temperature for months named.

FIG. 61.—CENTRES OF WORLD POWER

of its effective man-power ; so that their external relations are of primary importance to the Empire.

For the few years from the cession of Canada in 1763 to the independence of the United States in 1781 the "First British Empire" included almost the whole of Eastern North America, which then included all the British colonies in the temperate zones (see fig. 1, p. 3). By the secession of the thirteen colonies which soon after formed themselves into the United States of America the English-speaking peoples were divided between the British and the American Commonwealths. At that time their combined populations numbered somewhat less than twenty millions, of whom about four-fifths were British and one-fifth American. Both sections have increased very greatly in the subsequent hundred and fifty years ; and now the Englishry number nearly two hundred millions, of whom some two-fifths are British and three-fifths American. This tenfold increase in the numbers of the peoples has been accompanied by an even greater increase in their territories. Today the Englishry, in the British Empire and the United States, control about a third of the land of the world, nearly a third of its population, and considerably more than a third of its wealth. In total population and area the British Empire is approximately three times as large as that of the United States. But every such comparison must take full account of the fact that the lands and peoples of the British Commonwealth are widely separated while those of the American Commonwealth, like the homelands of every other great Power, are in one continuous area.

Eastern North America is a much smaller region than Europe in the extent of its cultivable land. But it is of interest to note that in this respect the British and American Commonwealths are approximately equal to each other, and together equal to Europe ; though their joint population is less than half as numerous as that of continental Europe.

The Englishry form by far the largest linguistic group

among the White peoples ; though as political groups the Americans and the British are respectively second and third in numbers among the White states. These facts alone would make the relations between them of special importance ; but it happens that in geographical position also the British Empire is by far the chief neighbour of the United States.

Including all its dependencies the United States ranks fourth in population and fifth in area among the independent states of the world. Yet it has direct contact along land frontiers with only two others, Canada and Mexico, and is separated from the rest by wide stretches of ocean.<sup>1</sup> Canada is a more important country than Mexico ; and its people are nearer to those of the United States in actual location, in language, and in type of culture, than are the Mexicans. Hence of these two sections of the land frontiers that with Canada is by far the more important. It is also the longer. It is mainly artificial ; but where it is marked by natural features these are for the most part navigable waterways, and so means of communication rather than barriers. And the more important sections of this frontier lie near to the most populous areas in the two countries. Hence it is preëminently a frontier of contact and intercourse.

Away from the land frontiers of the United States some of the smaller insular territories of the British are among their nearest neighbours. To the east are the Bermuda Islands, which were colonized at the same time as Virginia ; these are half way between Nova Scotia and the West Indies and only seven hundred miles from New York. To the southeast are the Bahamas, the most westerly of which is barely sixty miles from the east coast of Florida. And in

<sup>1</sup> Unless Liberia is to be counted a part of the Empire of the United States of America, which it is in some respects. It adds a land frontier with the French Empire and another contact with the British. There is also similarly indirect contact with some Latin-American republics south of Mexico.

the Caribbean region, which is of prime importance to the United States, British territories and interests are in extent and importance second only to those of that empire. Other waystations and coasts of the British Empire are close to several of the principal routes of shipping to and from the United States and its dependencies. The great circle route between all their eastern ports and those of northwestern Europe lies, at its western end, close to the coasts of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland ; and its eastern end is even closer to the shores of Great Britain. Similarly the southward routes to the West Indies and beyond pass close to British harbours. And in the northwest the routes to and from Alaska are coasting routes of British Columbia ; while all the shipping into and out from the great ports on Puget Sound passes within sight of Vancouver Island. Only from the ports on the open Pacific coast do her ships depart on long voyages which do not take them near British lands. Hence for a very large proportion of the ships which leave United States ports the first foreign territory sighted is some part of the British Empire. No other overseas Power is so near to either the home territory or the detached dependencies of the American Commonwealth. It is mainly because of the closeness and extent of these geographical contacts that the American jingo must needs direct his diatribes against the British Empire. He sees no other target. The jingoes of Great Britain find their chief objects of vituperation in Europe ; and hence they are less directly inimical to the maintenance of good relations between these two sections of the Englishry than their counterparts in the United States.

The relations between the British Empire and the United States of America would be of primary importance to both if they were only those which result from the geographical position of their lands. But this importance is enormously increased by the community of language and literature, of a large body of customs and common law, and so of traditions

and ideals, shared by their peoples. Only in the political and legal senses are their citizen peoples foreigners to each other : in all the essentials of their civilization and culture they are merely sections of the Englishry. And among the several nations of the Englishry the extreme types are to be found within the British Commonwealth. Those of the United States are intermediate in many respects : less crowded together and urbanized than those of Great Britain, but more so than those of Canada or New Zealand : younger than those of the British Homelands, but older than those of most of the other British Dominions. If Old England bears the impress of a thousand years of accumulated traditions and historic memories while New Zealand counts less than a hundred years, yet Virginia and New England have now lived through three centuries of continuous growth and development. And while some of the western sections of the United States are of very recent settlement and development none is so young as the Prairie Provinces of Canada, which have not yet outlived the first generation of their settlers.

The American Commonwealth has grown from some of the oldest of the English colonies ; and its oldest states were English colonies for a longer period than that during which they have been members of the Union. Both before and after the separation the immigrants from the British Isles have been the most numerous group among the settlers in the continental United States. For the first two hundred and fifty years of its three centuries of history they were overwhelmingly the largest group. They and their descendants were the decisive majority in the country and have built up its life and institutions on the foundation of the social heritage which they brought from their homelands. The contacts thus established have never been broken ; but they have been enormously increased in range and intensity by the improvements in means of communication which have distinguished the last hundred years from all

the previous centuries of human history. The British and American peoples took the leading part in the development of these improved communications, and in profiting by them ; and by them they have been brought into closer contact today than at any previous period of their history, not excluding the colonial beginnings.

Every contact includes the possibility of friction. And the numbers and character of the contacts between the British and the Americans offer innumerable chances of developing friction between them. For the last two centuries these two sections of the Englishry have been among the most rapidly growing, and therefore the most aggressive, peoples of our aggressive modern Western Civilization. But since 1812 their differences, which have been neither few nor unimportant, have all been settled peacefully by negotiation or by arbitration ; and it is sometimes assumed that similarly peaceful methods will inevitably be employed to settle all future disagreements between them. Peace, however, is not automatic or inevitable ; it requires preparation, and the education and organization of public opinion is the chief part of that preparation.

Except for their common land frontier across the whole width of North America, both Commonwealths are mainly insular Powers in that their chief contacts with other states are overseas. Hence for both of them the most important part of their armed forces is the Navy.<sup>1</sup> This relative importance of sea-power was first realized by the older state. During the whole of the nineteenth century the navy of the United Kingdom (then the whole, and even now almost the whole, of the British Navy) was supreme. The great war of 1914-18 gave further evidence of the vital necessity of sea-power for the life of Great Britain and the continued existence of the British Empire. The same war roused the

<sup>1</sup> This has been true down to the present day ; and it is still regarded as true by the majority of their citizens. But it is uncertain how soon, and how far, air forces may supplement or in part supersede navies.

United States to some realization of the importance of sea-power, and, in view of the wealth and population of the country, led at once to the adoption of a policy of vigorous naval expansion. The dangers of a competition between the two Commonwealths in the building of warships have been avoided by the acceptance of a standard of parity of naval forces. And this has been accompanied by a formal, though necessarily temporary, recognition and admission by the other important naval Powers of the claim to superior strength at sea made by the British and American Commonwealths. Naval parity is of course an abstraction ; and it is as difficult to translate it into fact as for any other abstraction. It is complicated by the position of the United Kingdom close to Europe ; so that her naval policy is primarily related to those of the European Continental Naval Powers and only secondarily to those of the other Oceanic Naval Powers (United States and Japan). In practice it seems likely to mean that each of the greater naval Powers will have effective naval superiority in its home waters.

For Great Britain the power to secure the safe passage of supplies to and from her ports is vital ; and the surrender of naval superiority in her home waters would be equivalent to a surrender of her political and economic independence. And the same is true of the other insular States of the British Commonwealth. For the British Empire the freedom to use the seaways which link together its scattered lands is essential to its continued existence. But a powerful navy is not essential to the independence or the existence of the American Commonwealth, which is far more nearly self-contained, is potentially the greatest military Power in the world, and is practically secure from danger of invasion ; though such a navy may be needed for the maintenance of communications with the outlying dependencies, as well as for reasons of policy and prestige.

Away from home waters the possession of a number of well-distributed naval bases gives the British Navy a local

advantage in many seas over any navy which has fewer bases. And in the same way the compactness of the home areas of all the other Great Powers gives them a great military advantage in comparison with the States of the British Commonwealth. Such geographical differences completely prohibit the attainment of any absolute and worldwide parity.

The development of Western Civilization in the last two centuries has been characterized by the great growth of its manufacturing industries. In many countries some of these have now reached a stage in which the quantity of their products exceeds that which can be absorbed by the home market. As soon as this stage is reached it is necessary to make a choice between a restriction of industrial expansion and a sale of its products in external markets ; and in practice there is a search for markets. This development is now worldwide. Every considerable state endeavours to develop manufacturing industries under its own control for the supply of its own markets as essential to its economic independence. And these developments have naturally given birth to the policies of economic nationalism which are now a chief hindrance to international coöperation.

Great Britain is distinguished from other industrial states mainly by two facts. This country was the first in the field of large-scale manufacturing industry, and made such use of an early start, and of great local advantages, that in the first half of the modern industrial period she built up a vast manufacturing industry and external trade. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Great Britain's manufacturing industries and external trade were far larger than those of any other country, both absolutely and in proportion to the extent and resources of the country. And at the period when her relative industrial advantages were near their maximum she adopted the economic policy of free trade. Under these conditions Great Britain has built up an economic system, and a

dense population, for the maintenance of which a large external trade is necessary. That external trade is changing in character and in volume owing to conditions entirely outside the control of any one country. And perhaps the greatest problem facing Great Britain at the present day is that of the adjustment of her economic life to the conditions of a world in which a great majority of the states have decisively preferred the policy of economic nationalism to that of free trade, and are erecting ever higher and stronger tariff barriers around their home markets. Some first steps in this adjustment have been taken by the abandonment of the system of free imports, and by the trade agreements made with other British states at the Ottawa Conference in 1932, and with some other countries since. This readjustment of economic conditions in the country which is still the second state of the world in wealth and economic power, and one of its principal markets, will inevitably produce far-reaching repercussions throughout the Empire and in many foreign countries.

These necessary adjustments of the economic life of Great Britain to the changed conditions of the twentieth century cannot possibly be helped by aggressive imperialistic policies, and would probably be seriously handicapped by the friction which any such policies would produce. The post-war relative positions of Great Britain and Germany in world trade give evidence that a military victory does not ensure any clear economic advantage in competition for external trade. And with little or nothing to gain from any conceivable war Great Britain has very much to lose. Few other countries are today more in need of peace for at least a generation to come. Hence for practical as well as for idealistic reasons, British policy will aim at the maintenance of peace.

The present tendency towards the adoption of a pacific policy in international affairs is supported in many lands by some results of the check to the rapid growth of their popu-

lations which is occurring in this generation. This check is directly due to the widespread decline of the birth-rate in most of the countries of Western Civilization. It is accompanied by a smaller decline in the death-rate ; and therefore by a rise in the mean age of their populations. And a population which is increasing only slowly, or not at all, and in which elderly persons form a much larger proportion of the whole than is the case in rapidly growing populations, is not likely to be very aggressive.

The American Commonwealth is also faced with the prospect of considerable economic and social changes in the coming decades. The check to immigration, and the decline of the birth-rate to a figure which hardly gives a replacement rate, have put an end to that rapid increase in numbers which has been a dominant fact in the social and economic development of the country throughout its brief history. The social and psychological life of a country with a stationary, or a declining, population differs in innumerable and incalculable ways from that of one in a state of rapid growth. And the change from a growing to a nearly stationary population is apparently coming to the United States within a generation. An industrial system which has been built up during a period of rapid growth, and organized for continual expansion, must either be adjusted to comparatively stationary conditions or attempt to capture external markets on a very large scale. What will be the effects of these changes on the mass-emotions of an excitable people ? and on their relations to other peoples ? Will it accentuate the belief in their own self-sufficiency and strengthen the policies of aloofness ? Or will it produce what popularizing psychologists call an "inferiority complex" and thus lead to attempts at needless self-assertion ? The one certain fact is that these changes in the growth and composition of the populations of many countries introduce new factors into international relations.

For the present generation the United States is, economi-

cally and militarily, so much the most powerful individual state in the world that all the rest must be strongly influenced by its acts. And this is particularly and more immediately true of its closest neighbours, the leading States of the British Commonwealth. Because of the magnitude of their natural resources and the high development of their industrial organization, the British Empire and the United States are the two principal Powers of the world of today. Because of the geographical position of their lands and the character and extent of the intercourse between their peoples, they are in more intimate contact with each other than almost any other two Great Powers. Under such circumstances they must either move towards coöperation in support of their common ideals, with all other peoples who accept those ideals, or drift into an antagonism leading towards direct hostility. A mutual indifference is impossible. The British peoples are sufficiently conscious of world tendencies to have made their position clear. They will welcome free and friendly coöperation for such ends. On the other hand it seems that a very large proportion of the citizens of the United States have not yet realized that isolation is no longer possible ; and hence their country has no clear policy.

The States of the British Commonwealth are placed in a dilemma by the uncertain policy of the United States. As a group it may be assumed that they would willingly coöperate with the United States. But the British Empire is a " World " Power ; and, even less than any other state can it afford to stand aside from the rest of the world or refuse to take part in that coöperation among states and peoples which is the only practicable means of advance towards a safe and well-ordered world society. Great Britain in particular is too near to the most inflammable regions to stand aloof from such a body as the League of Nations and its efforts to aid effective international coöperation and to prevent war. The world is one ; mankind is one ; and

those who are not for a worldwide order are against it. An aloof neutrality, or a "splendid isolation," has ceased to be a possibility for any considerable state. Hermit countries are no longer possible in any accessible regions. Tibet may stand aside from world affairs ; but not the British Empire.

The peoples of the United Kingdom are now rapidly becoming an ever smaller and smaller fraction of the whole population of the British Empire, and of the world. But the maintenance of the essential principles of representative government and association which they have developed must depend for a long while to come on the power of those citizens who can understand, respect, and enforce those principles. The peoples of the other States of the British Commonwealth can do this. Will they come in and take their share of the responsibility of maintaining these principles throughout the Empire ? Few of the peoples of the dependencies are yet sufficiently imbued with their ideals and principles to maintain it under selfgovernment. Until they can do this selfgovernment for them would probably mean anarchy, as it did throughout a large part of Latin America in the nineteenth century.

Outside the British Empire the one great people who share the ideals and principles of the British Commonwealth is the other branch of the Englishry in the American Commonwealth. In dealing with their Negro and Coloured subjects in their own land, and the peoples of their dependencies in the Philippines, Hawaii, and the Caribbean lands they are face to face with the same problems and difficulties as the British in India and Africa ; though on a far smaller scale and with greater numbers and resources at home. Few other great Powers in the world stand so completely and definitely for this principle, which is essential to the maintenance of any real personal freedom, that the rule of law must be supreme. And the greatest need of the world of today, in the face of the worldwide unrest due to the

clash of civilizations, the widespread breakdown of older social systems, and the general challenge to representative government, is that the nations whose peoples believe in personal liberty as the foundation of their political systems should coöperate for the defence of that principle. They have worked and fought "that government of the people by the people for the people shall not perish from the earth." Will they use their joint influence to ensure that that same form of government shall still be maintained—remembering that the world of tomorrow may not be large enough to have room for incompatible political systems?

But while its relations to the United States are perhaps the most important and urgent of the external relations of the British Empire at the present day, there is another and distinct series of relations which tend to increase in importance. We have referred briefly to the position of the lands of the Empire in respect to the great land mass of the Old World, the Continent (see Chapter II, p. 20 *et seq.*). In this relation it is largely a marginal empire. The Continent, of Europe-Asia-Africa, without its bordering island groups, contains two-thirds of the accessible land and nearly three-fourths of the population of the earth. It is four times as large and more than ten times as populous as the largest of the outlying land masses, North America. Hence the Continent is overwhelmingly the principal land area of the world. Its very magnitude has hitherto prevented any union of its major regions and peoples; and the semi-arid and desert character of its central regions has made them obstacles to human intercourse, and so allowed the development of distinct civilizations in its fertile marginal regions.

During the three centuries from the Age of Discovery to the full establishment of mechanical transport on land, sea transport was markedly safer and cheaper, and for a time also speedier, than land transport or travel. This fact gave a very great, though temporary, advantage to the seafaring

peoples over those of interior lands. With this advantage Great Britain, and the Atlantic coast states of western Europe, have gained a long lead over those of the interior. They have even reached through the Continent by the inland-sea route, and dominated nearly the whole of its intertropical lands in southern Asia and in Africa. But with the linking together of the several regions of the great land area of the Old World by railways and telegraphs, airways and motor roads, the advantage of superior communications is ceasing to lie with the states of the seaways. It is now possible for a large continental state to consolidate and organize its lands and peoples as effectively as those of a small maritime country, and thus to make full use of the great area and the continuity, and resulting compactness, of its territory. Mere distance has ceased to be a fatal obstacle to the effective union of the Continent ; and the Power which occupies its central regions has the more permanent advantages of the central location and of interior lines of communication, now made into speedways by the use of aircraft.

The British Empire lies in part close to the western and southern margins of the Continent, and includes two of its great southward peninsular sub-continents in India and South Africa. But only in the North West Frontier of India does the Empire reach in towards the heartland of the Continent.

The greater part of this heartland is now the territory of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, which also includes a large part of eastern Europe, its most populous area, and part of the Far East. This territory covers nearly a third of the area of Eurasia in one continuous land empire, which has an area equal to two-thirds of that of the British Empire and a population equal to that of the British Empire without India. Its resources are as yet less well organized and developed than those of the Western Powers. The Soviet Union is fully committed to the economic and political doctrines of Bolshevik Communism.




FIG. 62.—THE MARGINAL EMPIRE: SHOWING THE BRITISH LANDS RANGED ROUND THE OLD WORLD

And the more firmly those doctrines are held the more surely must their holders endeavour to extend them over the rest of the world ; for that form of Communism is, at present, a militant missionary faith. If the Soviet Union can show that its social and economic policy does in fact give its people a better life than that of the peoples of other lands, then its methods will be adopted, and adapted, by other peoples and states. But if such a process of conversion is too slow, or if it fails, Communism must either fail to spread or be spread by force.

In any case the existence in the heart of the Continent of so great a state is a fact of primary importance to all other states, and not least to the marginal empire. Nowhere do the territories of the British Empire and the Soviet Union come into actual contact. And the lands of the Soviet nowhere reach the open ocean. They reach the shores of the icebound North Polar Sea and of five inland seas, in the Baltic and Black seas of Europe, and Bering Sea, Okhotsk Sea and the Sea of Japan in the Far East ; but almost all their ports are partly or wholly closed by ice in the winter months. The urge towards free access to the open sea, and so to the outer world, has for centuries pressed the rulers of the Russian lands towards the goal of an ice-free port on " warm " water. That urge largely determined the expansionist policies of Tsarist Russia during the last three centuries ; and Soviet Russia inherits the same position and policy. The threat of Bolshevik Communism to the social and economic systems of all non-Soviet states, and the imperialist expansion policies of the Soviet Union, are obvious threats to the peace and security of the bordering states and, beyond them, the rest of the world. It is clear that the first brunt of propaganda or attack from Soviet Russia is not likely to fall on the British Empire. But it is also true that the British Commonwealth is, in both politics and economics, the chief representative of a system of social organization which is entirely incompatible with Communism. Such a loose

grouping of free states, ruled by governments which are responsible to popularly elected parliaments, and arranging their common affairs by conference and negotiation, is as different from the rigid system now dominant in the Soviet lands as it is from any autocratic imperialism. The development of the Soviet Union in the Russian lands which occupy almost the whole of the heartland of the Old World must be a matter of supreme interest to all the world. And it is possible that its policies may at any time make it also of most urgent importance.

Continental Europe west of Russia is in its political geography the most fragmented area of the earth. On little more than a fiftieth of the land surface it contains some twenty-five "independent sovereign states," out of the sixty odd states in the world which claim that status. These are held apart by differences of political organization, of language, and of tradition, by minor differences of culture within the general framework of European culture, by many longstanding feuds and grievances, and by similar grievances of recent origin arising from the treaties which concluded the war of 1914-18. These differences, and the friction to which they give rise, make Europe the chief "danger-zone" of world politics. Among them perhaps the most important are the centuries-old antagonisms between the French and the Germans, and between the Germans and the Slavs. But Europe as a whole is the most important of the major human regions; and therefore any considerable disturbance in Europe must affect the rest of the world. Any European war is likely to expand into a world war. The unrest of Europe, and the instability of its present political divisions, is a constant threat to the peace of the world. The nearness of Great Britain to this "danger-zone" is a principal fact influencing the external relations of the British Empire.

No one of the European states approaches in mere area or population the magnitude of the three giant Powers to

which we have referred previously, the British Empire, the United States of America, and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. But taken together, with their extra-European dependencies, the European states include a seventh of the land surface and a population which is twice as numerous as that of the Soviet Union or of the American Commonwealth and four times that of the British Commonwealth. Three of these European states are of the same order of magnitude as the United Kingdom and, like it, derive from their compactness, the high cultural level of their peoples, and their position in the chief human region, a world importance much greater than their small extent would alone justify. A United States of Europe, even without the British Isles and Russia, would be the greatest of the World Powers.

The League of Nations is another important factor in world relations. This is not a state, and it has no territory. It includes among its members a large majority of the independent states of the world ; but two<sup>1</sup> of the most important, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, are non-members ; and without them it necessarily falls far short of being a World League. In spite of its name the League is an association of governments or states, rather than of nations or peoples. Its headquarters are in Geneva, and half its members are European states ; these also include a majority of its more active members ; so that the League is in some danger of becoming primarily a European organization. The British Empire and six of its states are also members. The League has fulfilled many valuable functions and is a focus for a very large number of international contacts and organizations. But it has, inevitably, failed to satisfy the hopes of its most ardent advocates. It can act only by securing agreement. And the only force behind any of its decisions or recommendations is that of so much of public opinion as can be rallied

<sup>1</sup> Three, as soon as the withdrawal of Japan takes effect.

in its support, and that of any of its member-states which are willing to give support in any particular case. The primary function of the League so far has been that of focussing and expressing a world public opinion.

The British Commonwealth has often been likened to a league of nations. It is in fact a league of nations and states supplemented and cemented by the formal allegiance of all its peoples to one sovereign. The King is at once the Sovereign of all his peoples and states and the connecting link between them ; and the Crown is the symbol of union throughout the Empire. The States of the Commonwealth, and most of the dependencies, have developed a system of conferences on common affairs which has already done much to coördinate their policies and acts and to strengthen the many informal links which bind them. The system is extremely elastic ; and it may be regarded as feeling the way towards some form of organization which can serve the peoples and policies of the Empire without imposing on them any restrictions which they are unwilling to accept. In these matters the Empire is in a stage of transition. Before the establishment of the Dominion of Canada in 1867 the government of the United Kingdom was in many respects the autocratic government of the rest of the Empire, and so in fact also the Imperial Government. Since then the other States of the Commonwealth have gradually acquired equal status with the United Kingdom ; and the policies of the Empire as a whole now require the assent, and in many cases the coöperation, of several governments. There is now no Imperial Government.

The greatest drawback of such a system, dependent on the agreement of separate governments in widely separated lands, each of which is responsible to its own electors, is the length of time required to reach decisions. This essential quality of slowness is inherent in democratic institutions ; here it is accentuated by the wide geographical dispersion of the British lands. But if, in spite of the handicaps of

distance and the wide differences, in resources, in magnitude, in stage of development, and in local interests, among its states, the British Commonwealth can succeed in organizing effective union among its members it may well form a model and a nucleus for a far more effective league of nations than that now in existence. It is probably the most hopeful effort towards a world union which is now being made.

Such a union as that of the British States, with its members and dependencies spread so widely over the world, is inevitably in intimate contact with many other states and peoples. And no state, or group of states, is less capable of isolating itself from the rest of the world. Its future depends in the first place on the success of its statesmen and peoples in the solution of the many and intricate problems of the organization of an effective unity. The problem, and the conditions for its solution, are new to the world. If it is successfully solved the result will not be any type of Empire known to history, but some new form of political organization.

APPENDIX I  
LANDS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE  
I. LANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

	Area (square miles) (round nos.)	Population (round nos)	Density per square mile
A. North Atlantic States :			
Great Britain . . . .	90,000	47,000,000	} 47 <sup>o</sup>
Northern Ireland . . . .	5,000	1,000,000	
Irish Free State . . . .	27,000	3,000,000	110
Canada (provinces only) . .	2,189,000	10,000,000	5
Newfoundland . . . .	43,000	250,000	6
Totals . . . .	2,354,000	61,250,000	
B. In Southern Hemisphere :			
Australia (south of the south- ern tropic) . . . .	1,825,000	6,500,000	4
New Zealand . . . .	105,000	1,500,000	15
Union of South Africa . .	473,000	2,000,000 (Whites)	5 <sup>1</sup>
Totals . . . .	2,403,000	10,000,000	
Totals A and B	4,757,000	71,250,000	

<sup>1</sup> 17 if non-Whites included.

II. LANDS OF THE DEPENDENCIES

*C. denotes colony ; and P. protectorate*

	Status	Square miles (round nos.)	Population (round nos.)
A. In Southern Asia :			
Indian Empire . . . .		1,800,000	350,000,000
Ceylon . . . .	C.	25,000	6,000,000
Malaya . . . .	C. and P.	53,000	4,000,000
Borneo . . . .	P.	77,000	1,000,000
Hongkong . . . .	C.	400	1,000,000
Aden . . . .	Part of Indian Empire	10	55,000
Arab Coast . . . .	Protectorates	?	?
Totals . . . .		1,955,410	362,055,000

II. LANDS OF THE DEPENDENCIES—*continued**C. denotes colony ; and P. protectorate*

	Status	Square miles (round nos.)	Population (round nos.)
<b>B. In South and East Africa :</b>			
Southwest Africa . . . . .	(Mandate to U. of S. Africa)	330,000	250,000
Basutoland . . . . .	P.	11,000	500,000
Bechuanaland . . . . .	P.	275,000	150,000
Swaziland . . . . .	P.	6,700	100,000
Southern Rhodesia . . . . .	C.	149,000	1,000,000
Northern Rhodesia . . . . .	C.	288,000	1,250,000
Nyasaland . . . . .	C. and P.	38,000	1,250,000
Tanganyika . . . . .	(Mandate to U.K.)	365,000	4,000,000
Zanzibar . . . . .	P.	1,000	200,000
Kenya . . . . .	C. and P.	212,000	3,800,000
Uganda . . . . .	P.	110,000	3,000,000
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan . . . . .	Condominium	1,000,000	6,500,000
Somaliland . . . . .	P.	68,000	300,000
Totals . . . . .	. . . . .	2,853,700	22,300,000
<b>C. In West Africa :</b>			
Nigeria . . . . .	C. and P.	335,000	21,000,000
Cameroons . . . . .	(Mandate to U.K.)	31,000	1,000,000
Gold Coast . . . . .	C. and P.	80,000	3,000,000
Togoland . . . . .	(Mandate to U.K.)	12,000	200,000
Sierra Leone . . . . .	C. and P.	31,000	1,500,000
Gambia . . . . .	C.	4,000	200,000
Totals . . . . .	. . . . .	493,000	26,900,000
<b>D. In Mediterranean :</b>			
Gibraltar . . . . .	(Military Station)	2	20,000
Malta . . . . .	C.	120	250,000
Cyprus . . . . .	C.	3,500	350,000
<b>E. In Central America and West Indies :</b>			
Bermuda . . . . .	C.	19	20,000
British Guiana . . . . .	C.	90,000	300,000
British Honduras . . . . .	C.	8,600	50,000
British West Indies . . . . .	Cs.	7,806	2,000,000
<b>F. In South Atlantic Ocean :</b>			
Falkland Islands . . . . .	C.	5,600	2,000
St. Helena and Ascension . . . . .	C.	81	4,000

II. LANDS OF THE DEPENDENCIES—*continued**C. denotes colony ; and P. protectorate*

	Status	Square miles (round nos.)	Population (round nos.)
<b>G. In Indian Ocean :</b>			
Mauritius . . .	C.	800	450,000
Other Islets . . .	P.	200	30,000
<b>H. In Pacific Ocean :</b>			
New Guinea . . .	(Mandate to Australia)	90,000	} 750,000
Papua . . . . .	(Australian C.)	90,000	
Fiji and Small Islands.	C. and P.	20,000	
Cook Islands . . .	New Zealand C.	280	14,000
Western Samoa . .	(Mandate to N.Z.)	1,200	40,000
Nauru . . . . .	(Joint Mandate, U.K., Australia, N.Z.)	10	2,000
New Hebrides . . .	Condominium		

## APPENDIX II

## INTERGENSAL INCREASE OF POPULATION PER CENT. IN DECENNIAL PERIODS

(From *New Zealand Year Book*, 1929 and 1933)

Country	1860-70	1870-80	1880-90	1890-1900	1900-10	1910-20	1920-30
New Zealand .	158·93	91·09	25·87	23·31	30·51	20·87	19·84
Great Britain .	12·73	13·95	11·17	12·03	10·36	4·76	4·70
Australia . .	45·61	32·30	41·07	18·88	18·08	22·04	19·68
Canada . . .	19·37	17·23	11·76	11·13	34·17	21·95	18·04
South Africa <sup>1</sup> .	45·25	111·82 <sup>2</sup>		57·79	6·44	8·49	12·68
United States of America .	22·63	30·08	25·50	20·73	21·02	14·96	16·14

<sup>1</sup> Before 1910 Cape Colony. After 1910 Union of South Africa.<sup>2</sup> Period of twenty years.

## APPENDIX III

## ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES OF INCREASE OF POPULATION DURING THE PERIOD

(From *Australian Year Book*, 1929, p. 903)

	1891 to 1896	1896 to 1901	1901 to 1906	1906 to 1911	1911 to 1916	1916 to 1921	1921 to 1926	Mean 1891 to 1926
New Zealand . . . . .	2.41	1.98	2.86	2.56	1.61	2.32	1.95	2.26
Canada . . . . .	0.97	1.19	2.99	2.99	2.20	1.81	1.33	1.93
Australia . . . . .	1.86	1.49	1.38	2.03	1.95	1.99	2.09	1.83
United States of America . . . . .	1.93	2.02	2.00	1.82	1.67	1.21	1.67	1.76
England and Wales . . . . .	1.15	1.15	1.04	1.04	0.95	1.89	0.62	0.85
Scotland . . . . .	1.06	1.06	0.55	0.56	0.31	0.24	0.09	0.55
Ireland . . . . .	— 0.60	— 0.43	— 0.22	— 0.06	— 0.21	0.58	— 0.60	— 0.22

For the period 1901-11 the mean percentage rate of annual increase for all countries in which censuses were taken was 1.159.

## APPENDIX IV

VALUE OF EXTERNAL TRADE PER HEAD OF POPULATION—  
IN POUNDS STERLING

(From *New Zealand Year Book*, 1929, p. 289)

Country	Year	Imports	Exports	Total
New Zealand . . . . .	1927	30·5	33·05	63·55
Australia . . . . .	1926	24·8	24·3	49·1
Canada . . . . .	1926	21·95	26·75	48·7
Denmark . . . . .	1923	23·85	19·25	43·1
Switzerland . . . . .	1926	24·45	18·6	43·05
Belgium . . . . .	1926	23·85	18·65	42·55
Holland . . . . .	1923	24·0	15·6	39·6
United Kingdom . . . . .	1926	24·7	14·4	39·1
Argentina . . . . .	1925	17·45	17·8	34·75
Norway . . . . .	1925	18·5	10·9	29·4
Sweden . . . . .	1924	14·55	12·85	27·4
France . . . . .	1926	10·85	10·85	21·7
South Africa <sup>1</sup> (Customs Union) . . . . .	1925	8·9	11·2	20·1
Germany . . . . .	1925	9·8	6·9	16·7
United States of America . . . . .	1926	8·0	8·35	16·35
Italy . . . . .	1925	5·05	3·5	8·55
Japan . . . . .	1924	4·05	3·0	7·05
Spain . . . . .	1923	4·45	2·3	6·75

<sup>1</sup> South African Customs Union in 1927 for total population 22, for White population 80.

## APPENDIX V

NOTE on the modifications of the Mollweide (Homolographic or Elliptic Equal Area) map net used in this book.

The normal Mollweide net for a world map, which is used for figs. 1, 2, 3, 4, and some others, is by now quite familiar to readers of works on geography as one of the most useful of the many nets used in atlases to show the whole surface of the earth on one map. It is an equal-area net, *i.e.* the proportion of the area of any part of the map to that of the part of the earth it represents is the same all over the map. But the representation of distance varies very greatly in different parts of the map; and only along the axes of the ellipse can it be said to have a linear scale; though distances can be calculated elsewhere from the lines of latitude and longitude. Within a central area, extending to some  $40^\circ$  from the mid-point of the ellipse, and also near the axes, the shapes of land and sea areas are shown with little distortion. Farther from the centre the distortion of shapes increases rapidly; and it becomes very great towards the edges of the map, as may be seen by comparing the shapes by which any given land area is represented when it comes (*a*) near the centre, and (*b*) near the edge, *e.g.* on fig. 4.

This net is used for the Antipodal map, fig. 4: This consists of two direct normal Mollweide maps, (*a*) one whose major axis is the equator and minor axis the meridian of Greenwich, and (*b*) one whose major axis is the equator and minor axis the antimeridian of Greenwich ( $180^\circ$ ). The second is so placed that its S. and N. poles come on the N. and S. poles of the first. On this map every considerable land area is shown twice, in antipodal positions.

A first modification of the direct, or normal, Mollweide is the "interrupted Mollweide," one form of which is used for figs. 60 and 61. Here the equator is still the major axis; but different meridians are used as minor axes for the several sectors on which the separate continents are drawn. The idea was first used, so far as I know, by the late Dr. Paul Goode of Chicago. The advantage of this map net is that it minimizes distortion of the shapes of the continents, because no part of the land area is very far from the axis in reference to which it is drawn. The maximum distortion is thrown into the seas.

A second modification is that used for fig. 53. This was devised

by Sir Charles Close, and described by him in an Ordnance Survey Professional Paper (No. 11, New Series, 1927). It uses a meridian great circle as the major axis; so that half of the equator forms the minor axis, and the other half of the equator is the circumference of the ellipse.

This transverse Mollweide net is a particular case of the transformation whereby any great circle may be made the major axis of the ellipse, and any point on that circle may be taken as the centre. Then the great circle perpendicular to the major axis at its centre becomes the minor axis and circumference. Such a "skew Mollweide" was described by Mr. J. Fairgrieve in *Geography*, Autumn 1928, with a graphical construction; it was further discussed, with a calculation of a formula for a mathematical construction, by Sir Charles Close in the *Geographical Journal*, March 1929.

The several skew Mollweide nets used here (see figs. 5, 21, 36, etc.) have been constructed by the graphic method. They have been planned to place selected areas in the centre of the map, and so to show how other land and water areas are grouped round those central areas. They will probably give many readers new views of the relative positions of some lands. On each of these maps the central hemisphere is marked out by a circle which occupies the central half of the ellipse. The distortion near the edge of a skew map is, of course, quite similar to that in corresponding positions on a normal map; but, because it happens to occur on parts of the earth which are not often seen so distorted, it is in some cases very striking.

#### METHOD OF CONSTRUCTION

The materials used were (a) a blackboard surface globe, marked with parallels and meridians at  $15^\circ$  intervals, (b) a normal Mollweide net with similarly spaced lines.

On the globe was marked (1) the great circle which was to be the "equator" of the "skew" net, (2) the perpendicular great circle which was to be the minor axis and circumference. (3) The points on No. 2 distant  $90^\circ$  from its intersections with No. 1 were marked as the "poles" of the "skew" net. Through these "poles" were drawn "meridians," at any required angular intervals: the closer the better for subsequent plotting. Each of these cut line 1, which is the "equator" of the "skew" net, perpendicularly. (4) "Parallels"

of the "skew" net were similarly drawn as circles parallel to its "equator" and concentric round its "poles."

Thus we got on the globe two sets of lines of latitude and longitude, (*a*) the normal set, which had reference to the true poles and equator, and (*b*) a "skew" set, which had reference to the "poles" and "equator" of the "skew" net. These two sets were precisely similar to one another. They differed only in being differently placed on the globe. If we had had a transparent movable spherical case fitting on to the globe, and marked with a network of parallels and meridians, we could have obtained a "skew" net by merely moving the case to the required position.

Then, on the outline "normal" Mollweide net we assumed that the normal lines represented the parallels and meridians of the "skew" net on the globe, and, with reference to them, plotted in the "normal" parallels and meridians of the globe. These then formed the network for the "skew" map; and on to it, we plotted the outlines of the lands and any other lines which were required.

The degree of accuracy, and the speed, of the work increased considerably with practice; but the construction of one such map in outline required many hours of careful work. It is possible that a higher standard of accuracy could have been obtained by calculation, and plotting, from the formula obtained by Sir Charles Close. But on the small diagrams used here the difference would probably be inappreciable.

The method is obviously applicable to many other map nets as readily as to the Mollweide.

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